Abstract

This document extends PASSporT, which conveys cryptographically-signed information about the people involved in personal communications, to include an indication that a call has been diverted from its originally destination to a new one. This information can greatly improve the decisions made by verification services in call forwarding scenarios.

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PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] is a token format based on JWT [RFC7519] for conveying cryptographically-signed information about the people involved in personal communications; it is used with STIR [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] to convey a signed assertion of the identity of the participants in real-time communications established via a protocol like SIP. This specification extends PASSporT to include an indication that a call has been diverted from its originally destination to a new one.

Although the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] is focused on preventing the impersonation of the caller’s identity, which is a common enabler for threats such as robocalling and voicemail hacking on the telephone network today, it also provides a signature over the called number as the authentication service sees it. As [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 12.1 describes, this protection over the contents of the To header field is intended to prevent a class of cut-and-paste attacks. If Alice calls Bob, for example, Bob might attempt to cut-and-paste the Identity header in Alice’s INVITE into a new INVITE that Bob sends to Carol, and thus be able to fool Carol into thinking the call came from Alice and not Bob. With the signature over the To header, the INVITE Carol sees will clearly have been destined originally for Bob, and thus Carol can view the INVITE as suspect.

However, as [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 12.1.1 points out, it is difficult for Carol to confirm or reject these suspicions based on the information she receives from the baseline PASSporT object. The common "call forwarding" service serves as a good example of the fact...
that the original called party number is not always the number to which a call is delivered. The address in the To header field value of SIP requests is not supposed to change, accordingly to baseline [RFC3261], as it is the Request-URI that is supposed to be updated when a call is retargeted, but practically speaking some operational environments do alter the To header field. There are a number of potential ways for intermediaries to indicate that such a forwarding operating has taken place. The History-Info header field [RFC7044] was created to store the Request-URIs that are discarded by a call in transit. The SIP Diversion header field [RFC5806], though historic, is still used for this purpose by some operators today. Neither of these header fields provide any cryptographic assurance of secure redirection, and they can both capture minor syntactical changes in URIs that do not reflect a change to the actual target of a call.

This specification therefore extends PASSporT with an explicit indication that original called number in PASSporT no longer reflects the destination to which a call is likely to be delivered. Verification services and the relying parties who make authorization decisions about communications may use this indication to confirm that a legitimate retargeting of the call has taken place, rather than a cut-and-paste attack.

2. Terminology

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. PASSporT 'div' Claim

This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "div" which indicates a previous destination for a call during its routing process. When a retargeting entity receives a call signed with a PASSporT, it may act as an authentication service and create a new PASSporT containing the "div" claim to attach to the call (without removing the original PASSporT). Note that a new PASSporT is only necessary when the canonical form of the "dest" identifier (per the canonicalization procedures in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8) changes due to this retargeting. "div" is typically populated with a destination address found in the "dest" field of PASSporT received by the retargeting entity. These new PASSporT generated by retargeting entities MUST include the "div" PASSporT type, and an "x5u" field pointing to a credential that the retargeting entity controls. The new PASSporT will look as follows:
A PASSporT claims object containing "div" is populated with a modification of the original token before the call was retargeted: at a high level, the original identifier for the called party in the "dest" array will become the "div" claim in the new PASSporT. If the "dest" array of the original PASSporT contains multiple identifiers, the retargeting entity MUST select only one them to occupy the "div" field in the new PASSporT. and in particular, it MUST select an identifier that is within the scope of the credential that the retargeting entity will specify in the "x5u" of the header (as described below).

The new target for the call selected by the retargeting entity becomes the value of the "dest" array of the new PASSporT. The "orig" value MUST be copied into the new PASSporT from the original PASSporT received by the retargeting entity; the regargeting entity SHOULD retain the "iat" value from the original PASSporT, though if in the underlying signaling protocol (e.g. SIP) the retargeting entity changes the date and time information in the retargeted request, the new PASSporT should reflect that. No other extension claims should be copied from the original PASSporT to the "div" PASSporT.

So, for an original PASSporT of the form:

```
{ "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
 "dest":{"tn":"12155551213"},
 "iat":1443208345 }
```

If the retargeting entity is changing the target from 12155551213 to 12155551214, the new PASSporT with "div" would look as follows:

```
{ "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
 "dest":{"tn":"12155551214"},
 "iat":1443208345,
 "div":{"tn":"121555551213"} }
```

After the PASSporT header and claims have been constructed, their signature is generated per the guidance in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] - except for the credential required to sign it. While in the ordinary construction of a PASSporT, the credential used to sign will have authority over the identity in the "orig" claim (for example, a certificate with authority over the telephone number in "orig" per [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates]), for all PASSporTs using the "div" type
the signature MUST be created with a credential with authority over the identity present in the "div" claim. So for the example above, where the original "dest" is "1215551213", the signer of the new AccessT object MUST have authority over that telephone number, and need not have any authority over the telephone number present in the "orig" claim.

4. Using 'div' in SIP

This section specifies SIP-specific usage for the "div" AccessT type and its handling in the SIP Identity header field "ppt" parameter value. Other using protocols of AccessT may define behavior specific to their use of the "div" claim.

4.1. Authentication Service Behavior

An authentication service only adds an Identity header field containing the "div" AccessT type to an SIP request that already contains at least one Identity header field; it MUST NOT add a "div" request to an INVITE that contains no other Identity headers fields. When adding an Identity header with an AccessT object containing a "div" claim, SIP authentication services MUST also add a "ppt" parameter to that Identity header with a value of "div". The resulting compact form Identity header might look as follows:

```
Identity: ..sv5CTo05KqpSmtHt3dcEiO/1CWT52tnG3iV+1nmurLXV/HmtyNS7ltrg9d1xkWzo eU7d7OV8WeITDo83itTmgPwCJaEmMyEI3d7SyN21yNDo2ER/0vgtw0Lu5csIp pPqOgluxndzHbG7mR6R19BnUhHuFRb51Mn3w0gfUs=; \n info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cer>;alg=ES256;ppt="div"
```

A SIP authentication service typically will derive the new value of "dest" from a new Request-URI that is set for the SIP request before it is forwarded. Older values of the Request-URI may appear in headers like Diversion or History-Info; this document specifies no specific interaction between the "div" mechanism and those SIP headers. Note as well that because AccessT operates on canonicalized telephone numbers and normalized URIs, many smaller changes to the syntax of identifiers that might be captured by other mechanisms (like History-Info) that record regargeting will likely not require a "div" AccessT.

4.2. Verification Service Behavior

[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that specifications defining "ppt" values describe any additional verifier behavior. The behavior specified for the "div" value of "ppt" is as follows.
In order to use the "div" extension, a verification service needs to inspect all of the valid Identity headers associated with a request, as an Identity header containing "div" necessary refers to an earlier PASSporT associated with the request. In particular, the verification service must find an earlier PASSporT associated with the call that contains a "dest" claim with a value equivalent to the "div" claim in the current PASSporT. It is possible that this earlier PASSporT will also contain a "div", and that it will in turn chain to a still earlier PASSporT stored in a different Identity header. Ultimately, by looking at this chain of transformations and validating the associated signatures, the verification service will be able to ascertain that the appropriate parties were responsible for the retargeting of the call to its ultimate destination; this can help the verification service to determine that original PASSporT in the call was not simply used in a cut-and-paste attack. This will help relying parties to make any associated authorization decisions in terms of how the call will be treated - though those policies are outside the scope of this document.

5. Extending ‘div’

Past experience has shown that there may be additional information about the motivation for retargeting that relying parties might consider when making authorization decisions about a call, see for example the "reason" associated with the SIP Diversion header field [RFC5806]. Future extensions to this specification might incorporate reasons into "div".

6. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank YOU for contributions to this problem statement and framework.

7. IANA Considerations

This specification requests that the IANA add a new claim to the JSON Web Token Claims registry as defined in [RFC7519].

Claim Name: "div"

Claim Description: New Target of a Call

Change Controller: IESG

Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
8. Security Considerations

This specification describes a security feature, and is primarily concerned with increasing security when calls are forwarded. Including information about how calls were retargeted during the routing process can reveal to downstream entities particulars of the policies used to route calls through the network. But including this information about forwarding is at the discretion of the retargeting entity, so if there is a requirement to keep the original called number confidential, no PASSporT should be created for that retargeting – the only consequence will be that downstream entities will have less confidence that the PASSporT was meant to be associated with this call.

9. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates]

[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]

[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]


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