Identifying origin server of HTTP Cookies

draft-pettersen-cookie-origin-01

Abstract

HTTP Cookies, as originally defined by Netscape in [NETSC] and as later updated by [RFC2109] and [RFC2965] did not address the issue of how to restrict which domains a server is allowed to set a cookie for: This is particularly a problem for servers hosted in top level domains having subdomains that are controlled by registries and not by domain owners, e.g. co.uk and city.state.us domains. In such situations, unless the client uses some kind of domain black-list, it is possible for a malicious server to set cookies so they are sent to all servers in a domain the attacker does not control. These cookies may adversely affect the function of servers receiving them. The primary reason this is a problem is that the server receiving the cookie has no way of telling which server originally set it, and is therefore not able to reliably distinguish an invalid cookie from a valid cookie.

This document proposes a new attribute, "$Origin", that is associated with each cookie and sent in all client cookie headers in the requests sent to the server. Servers recognizing the attribute may then check to see if the cookie was set by a server which is allowed to set cookies for the server, and if necessary ignore the cookie.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................ 4
2. The $Origin attribute .................................... 4
   2.1. General syntax ...................................... 4
   2.2. Updated client processing of received cookies ...... 4
   2.3. Updated Cookie header syntax ....................... 5
3. Examples .................................................... 6
4. IANA Considerations ....................................... 6
5. Security Considerations ................................... 6
6. Acknowledgements ......................................... 7
7. Normative References ...................................... 7
Author’s Address .............................................. 7
1. Introduction

When originally defined, Netscape’s HTTP Cookie specification [NETSC] did not extensively specify how clients should check the domain of cookies. Although [RFC2109] and [RFC2965] did put restrictions on the domains that a server setting cookies could set, these policies have not been widely implemented, and are also not able to protect against all possible abuses.

Clients have attempted to limit this problem by using heuristics and domain blacklists to determine to which domains they can set cookies for. However, these workarounds have limits both in terms of correctness, amount of data needed to implement them, and in the timeliness of updates to the list.

Alternatively, servers have no way to determine whether or not a cookie it receives from a client is one of the cookies it sent to the client, or if it came from another server, which server originally set it. The server may include information in the cookie’s value to determine correctness. However, this does not guard against a malicious server using a correctly generated cookie that was originally sent to a different client.

A way to allow servers to learn if received cookies are valid and not set by an unauthorized server, is to include the name of the server setting the cookie in an attribute, "$Origin", associated with each cookie value in the Cookie header sent to the server. This attribute would either identify the name of the server that set the cookie, or if the name of this server is not known, the domain for which the cookie has been set. This allows the receiving server to remove or ignore cookies set by servers not allowed to set cookies for its domain, and also to log the information about the incorrectly set cookies.

2. The $Origin attribute

2.1. General syntax

This specification uses the same syntax as is used by [RFC2109], [RFC2965], and [RFC2616]

attr        =     token
value       =     token | quoted-string

2.2. Updated client processing of received cookies

When a client receives a Set-Cookie or Set-Cookie header, it will process the header as specified by the appropriate specification,
which can be either [NETSC], [RFC2109], or [RFC2965]. When storing the cookie it MUST also register information about the host setting the cookie. This information MUST include the hostname and MAY include parts of, or the entire URI that set the cookie.

2.3. Updated Cookie header syntax

This specification updates the Cookie header as sent by the client by associating each cookie value with a $Origin attribute that specifies where the the cookie came from.

This specification does not change the way cookies are selected for inclusion in the Cookie header.

The syntax for the header field is:

```
cookie          =  "Cookie:" cookie-value 0*(";" cookie-value)
cookie-value    =  NAME "=" VALUE ";" cookie-origin
NAME            =  attr
VALUE           =  value
cookie-origin   =  "$Origin" "=" <"http_URL" >
```

NAME and VALUE have the same meaning as in [RFC2109] and [RFC2965].

The http_URL value of the $Origin attribute MUST be the URI of the resource setting the cookie, which SHOULD be restricted to the default path (remove the query part and the last path segment). If the client does not know the URI that originally set the cookie, such as when the cookie was received by a version of the client that does not support $Origin, it MUST instead send a generated default URL "http://" +domainname"/" where domainname is the name of the domain the cookie is set for. This domain name MUST be preceded by a single period (".") to differentiate the domain name from a hostname.

The http_URL value MUST be encoded as described in [RFC3986].

When receiving a cookie header containing $Origin, servers recognizing it SHOULD check if the identified host or domain from the URI in the argument is acceptable to the server. If the cookie is not from an acceptable host or domain, the cookie can be ignored and optionally reported to the server administrator. The server SHOULD also ignore all cookies that are not followed by a $Origin attribute, if one cookie in the header has a $Origin attribute.

[[Open issue: An option for cases with unknown origin is to send an empty $Origin attribute or no $Origin attribute for that cookie. An
argument against having a special dot prefix, is that these cookies will only exist for a limited time after a client has been updated to set and send $Origin. The author thinks it is better to provide some information to the server about the domain of the cookie, rather than provide no information. Either case would require special handling in the server.]

[[Open issue: An alternative requirement for the URI is to include all of the original URI, except the query portion.]]

3. Examples

http://www.example.com/path1/resource?query sets the cookie:

    Set-Cookie: foo=value1; domain=.example.com; path=/

http://www2.example.com/path2/resource2?query1 sets the cookie:

    Set-Cookie: bar=value2; domain=.example.com; path=/

An unknown server set the cookie:

    Set-Cookie: xyz=value3; domain=.example.com; path=/

The resulting Cookie header is:

    Cookie: foo=value1; $Origin="http://www.example.com/path1/";
    bar=value2; $Origin="http://www2.example.com/path2/";
    xyz=value3; $Origin="http://.example.com/"

4. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to the RFC Editor: this section may be removed upon publication as a RFC.

5. Security Considerations

This specification is intended to make the sharing of cookies across domains detectable, whether the sharing is intentional, unintentional, or with malicious intent. It can therefore also be used to limit the potential for cookie spoofing, as discussed in the security considerations of [RFC2109] and [RFC2965]. It is, however,
still possible for servers within a permitted group of servers to set incorrect or malicious cookies, which might adversely affect other servers in the domain.

6. Acknowledgements

7. Normative References


Author’s Address

Yngve N. Pettersen
Opera Software ASA
Waldemar Thranes gate 98
N-0175 OSLO,
Norway

Email: yngve@opera.com