Two-way Authentication for IoT
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Abstract

In this draft a full two-way authentication security scheme for the Internet of Things (IoT) based on existing Internet standards and protocols is introduced. The solution is twofold providing a two-way authentication for resource-rich hardware (e.g., class 2 devices with ~50 KiB RAM and ~250 KiB ROM [RFC7228]) and for devices with less resources (e.g., class 1 devices with ~10 KiB RAM and ~100 KiB ROM [RFC7228]). By relying on an established standard, existing implementations, engineering techniques, and security infrastructure can be reused, which enables an easy security uptake. The proposed security scheme for resource-rich devices is, therefore, based on RSA, the most widely used public key cryptography algorithm. It is designed to work over standard communication stacks that offer UDP/IPv6 networking for Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs). RSA is a bulky solution at the moment but shows that it is possible using it on constraint devices for security purposes. An optimization is the usage of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) as assumed for devices with less resources.

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1. Introduction

Today, there is a multitude of envisioned and implemented use cases for the Internet of Things (IoT) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In many of these scenarios it is intended to make the collected data globally accessible to authorized users and data processing units through the Internet. Most of these data collected in such scenarios is of sensitive nature due to the relation to location and personal information or IDs. Even seemingly inconspicuous data, such as the energy consumption measured by a smart meter, can lead to potential infringements in the users’ privacy, e.g., by allowing an eavesdropper to conclude whether or not a user is currently at home. From an industry perspective, there is also a pressing need for security solutions based on standards as pointed out by the market research firm Gartner Inc. [1]. Regarding the infrastructure, security risks are aggravated by the trend toward a separation of sensor network infrastructure and applications. Therefore, a true end-to-end security solution is required to achieve an adequate level of security for IoT. Protecting the data once it leaves the scope of the local network is not sufficient.

A similar scenario in the traditional computing world would be a user browsing the Internet over an unsecured WLAN. Assuming attackers in physical proximity of the user it can happen that the attacker can capture the traffic between the user and a Web server. Countermeasures against such attacks include the establishment of a secured connection to the Web server via HTTPS, the use of a VPN tunnel to securely connect to a trusted VPN endpoint, and using wireless network security such as WPA.

These solutions are comparable to security approaches in the IoT area. Using WPA is similar to the traditional use of link layer encryption. The VPN solution is equivalent to creating a secure connection between a sensor node and a security end-point, which may or may not be the final destination of the sensor data. Establishing a HTTPS connection with the server is comparable to the approach described in this draft: The use of the DTLS protocol in an end-to-end security architecture for IoT is investigated, where a two-way authentication handshake is processed in order to establish a secured communication channel requiring authentication of both communication parties. Due to high resource requirements, especially memory and computational capacities, devices with additional hardware like TPM can perform this solution (e.g., class 2 devices with ~50 KiB RAM and ~250 KiB ROM [RFC7228]). More constraint devices (e.g., class 1 devices with ~10 KiB RAM and ~100 KiB ROM [RFC7228]) can perform two-way authentication using ECC [2] instead.
1.1. Document Structure

Section 2 mentions conventions used in this draft. Afterwards the assumed high level design requirements are briefly mentioned in Section 3. Section 4 describes a two-way authentication handshake for constraint devices in order to establish an end-to-end security in constraint networks (e.g., wireless sensor networks). This section consists of two parts specifying the solution for resource-rich devices (class 2 devices, for example, supporting Trusted Platform Module (TPM)) and for resource less devices (class 1). The parts include description of the handshake and message details. The assumed use-case with its requirements and architecture is described in Section 5. Section 6 defines the hardware requirements, followed by security considerations and IANA considerations.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

A publisher represents any kind of device that makes its data public available in a network using WLAN or LAN connection.

A subscriber represents any kind of device that wants to access data.

An Access Control server (AC) is an entity in the network that regulates the access of data and issues an access ticket for subscribers based on legal and regulative implications.

3. High Level Design Requirements

Due to the usage of DTLS for establishing an end-to-end security architecture for IoT three high-level design decisions have to be made.

3.1. Implementation of A Standards Based Design

Standardization has helped the widespread uptake of technologies. Radio chips can rely on IEEE 802.15.4 for the physical and the MAC layer. Routing functionality is provided by the so-called 'IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks' (RPL) [RFC6550] or 6LoWPAN [RFC4944]. COAP [RFC7252] defines the application layer. So far, no such efforts have addressed security in a wider context of IoT.
3.2. Focus on Application Layer and End-to-End Security

An end-to-end protocol provides security even if the underlying network infrastructure is only partially under the user’s control. As the infrastructure for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication is getting increasingly commoditized, this scenario becomes more likely: The European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) plans to standardize the transport of local device data to a remote data center. For stationary installations security functionality could be provided by the gateway to the higher-level network. However, such gateways may present a high-value target for an attacker. If the devices are mobile, as it is possible within a logistic application, there may be no gateway to a provider’s network that is under the user’s control, similar to how users of smart phones connect directly to their carrier’s network. Another example that favors end-to-end security is a multi-tenancy office building being equipped with a common infrastructure for metering and climate-control purposes. Tenants share the infrastructure but are still able to keep their devices’ data private from other members of the network.

DTLS is located between the transport and the application layer. Thus, it is not necessary that providers of the infrastructure support security mechanisms. It is purely in the hands of the two communicating applications to establish security. If the security is provided by a network layer protocol (e.g., IPsec) the same is true to a lower degree, because network stacks of both devices have to support the same security protocols.

3.3. Support for UDP

Reliable transport protocols like TCP incur an overhead over simpler protocols such as UDP. Especially for energy starved, battery powered devices this overhead is often too costly and TCP has been shown to perform poorly in low-bandwidth scenarios [3]. This is reflected in the design of the emerging standard COAP, which uses UDP transport and defines a binding to DTLS for security [RFC7252]. By using DTLS in conjunction with UDP this draft does not force the application developer to use reliable transport – as it would be the case if TLS would be used. It is still possible to use DTLS over transport protocols like TCP, since DTLS only assumes unreliable transport.

This is a weaker property than the reliability provided by TCP. However, adaptations of DTLS for unreliable transport introduce additional overhead when compared to TLS. There MAY be a benefit in using TCP during the handshake phase but the DTLS reliability mechanism SHOULD be adapted to the special requirements of constraint networks.
4. End-to-End Security Using Two-way authentication

End-to-end security using two-way authentication requires lots of resources depending on the selected solution. Here two solutions are presented using two device classes. The more resource consuming solution requires devices with ~50 KiB RAM and ~250 KiB RAM (e.g., class 2) as a minimum. Details are in Section 4.1. A two-way authentication solution using ECC gets along with smaller devices (e.g., class 1 devices with ~10 KiB RAM and ~100 KiB ROM) as describes in Section 4.2.

4.1. Class 2 Devices or Higher

The proposed system architecture in this draft is following the IoT model. It is assumed that IPv6 connects the Internet and parts of it run 6LoWPAN. The transport layer in 6LoWPAN is UDP, which can be considered unreliable; the routing layer is RPL or Hydro [3]. Both routing protocols are similar enough and, therefore, a change has negligible impact on the results. IEEE 802.15.4 is used for the physical and MAC layer. Based on this protocol stack DTLS was selected as the security protocol and placed in the application layer on top of the UDP transportation layer. Figure 1 shows the network stack used in this draft [6], while BLIP is a special 6LoWPAN implementation including several IP protocols [7].

```
+--------------------------------------+
| Application Layer: COAP, XML, .... |
| +----------------------------------|
| | Security Layer: DTLS             |
| +----------------------------------|
| +----------------------------------|
| +----------------------------------|
| | Transport Layer: UDP--           |
| | -->BLIP,RPL                      |
| +----------------------------------|
| | Network Layer: IPv6--            |
| +----------------------------------|
| | Medium Access Layer: IEEE 802.15.4 |
| +----------------------------------|
| | Physical Layer: IEEE 802.15.4    |
| +----------------------------------|
+--------------------------------------+
```

Figure 1: Assumed Network Stack

In order to support end-to-end communication security the need for proper authentication of data publishing devices and access control
throughout the network is required. Thus, an Access Control (AC) server is integrated in the assumed system architecture. The AC is a trusted entity and a resource-rich server, on which access rights for the publisher (= sensor nodes) of the secured network are stored. The identity of a default subscriber is usually preconfigured on a publisher before it is deployed.

If any additional subscribers want to initialize a connection with the publisher, they first have to obtain an access ticket from the AC. The AC verifies that the subscriber has the right to access the information available from the publisher. In the next step the publisher only has to evaluate the identity of the subscriber and has to verify the ticket it has received from the AC. This requires a unique identity for a publisher in the network.

In the Internet, identities are usually established via public key cryptography (PKC) and identifiers are provided through X.509 certificates. An X.509 certificate contains, among other information, the public key of an entity and its common name. A trusted third party, called the Certificate Authority (CA), signs the certificate.

The CA serves two purposes: Firstly, the signature allows the receiver to detect modifications to the certificate. Secondly, it also states that the CA has verified the identity of the entity that requested the certificate. In the following sections the proposed two-way authentication handshake is specified and message structure is presented in detail.

4.1.1. Handshake Description

Based on the hardware equipment (cf. Section 6) the proposed two-way authentication handshake has to support a solution for class 2 devices or higher.

Figure 2 summarizes the message flow during the two-way authentication handshake. Here client and server represent the two communication parties that want to exchange data. Client (Subscriber) is each entity that requests data from another entity and a server (Publisher) can be each entity that has the data.
4.1.2. Certificate Creation

When the network consists of class 2 devices or higher it is processed like shown in Figure 2. Before deploying the devices certificates and individual 2048 bit RSA keys should be created and stored. Therefore, it is recommended to use an OpenSSL implementation on the server site [13].

The certificate should include the following details:
1. Serial number
2. Validity:
   * Not Before: Date and time
   * Not After: Date and time
3. Subject
   * commonName = localhost
4. X509v3 extensions:
   * X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE
   * Netscape Comment: OpenSSL Generated Certificate
   * X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
   * X509v3 Authority Key Identifier

Depending on the implementation additional information should be requested that will be incorporated into the certificate request. This information may include the following:
4.2. Class 1 Devices

The proposed solution for class 1 devices requests the same network stack as for higher devices shown in Figure 2. Instead of working with X.509 certificates each device is deployed with an unique pre-shared key (PSK) of 16 Byte length [2]. This key is the initial key material that is used for resource saving ECC for performed PKC. ECC [RFC6090] itself offers efficient algorithms (ECDSA [RFC5280], ECIES [16], ECDH [RFC5280]) for key generation, key exchange, encryption, decryption, and signatures. For message encryption an integrated encryption scheme (IES) is recommended to harness the speed-advantage of symmetric encryption for large amount of data without drawback of a repeated key exchange for every transmission to avoid reusage of secrets.

4.2.1. Handshake

In order to achieve two-way authentication for class 1 devices the Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk (BCK) protocol [15] with pre-shared key is recommended [2]. Those pre-shared keys are master keys for initial authentication between two devices (e.g., client and server). Figure 3 shows the recommended handshake between two devices.

ECC is used for key generation, key exchange, encryption, decryption, and signatures during the data exchange. The public ECC keys are decomposed into x and y-coordinates for easy handling on the mote side. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures are integer keypairs, written as (r, s), and therefore difficult to include in a fixed-length packet, because the bit-length of the hexadecimal representation of large integers may vary. [2]
5. Architecture Description

As briefly mentioned in Section 1 data is connected to sensitive information and can lead to potential infringements in the users' privacy. This fact becomes a security risk if the data is transmitted over long distances, perhaps several hops, to a specified global sink [10]. Depending on the setting it might happen that the data is also transmitted via the Internet and might be cached in between. The latter case is inspired by the project FLAMINGO, which deals with access regulations based on legal and regulative implications in IP networks [9]. By definition of the Internet of Things it can be assumed that IP communication is supported by all devices in wireless sensor networks, which allows the adaptation of standards in IP networks to constraint networks.

5.1. Use-cases

The idea of the Internet of Thing includes any device connection that supports IPv6 communication. Thus, the diversity of use-cases is manifold and not limited to the following list of use-cases:

Home Automation

Different devices (e.g., temperature, light, movement sensors) are deployed in a house. Those devices transmit collected data to a central entity that is responsible for further processing including data publishing if other devices (e.g., HVAC unit,
mobile devices) subscribe to data in order to create an action (e.g., turn on heating or light).

Health Monitoring

Devices are carried by patients that monitor health status (e.g., heart beat, oxigen concentration). Data is transmitted to central unit that again publishes the data and makes it available to a doctor or health care center.

Emergency Alerts

Devices measure environment, transmit data to central unit to publish it. Authenticated entities subscribe to data for emergency warnings (e.g. earth quake warning system, fire department).

Logistics

Logistic devices are equipped with sensors (e.g., gravitation, humidity, GPS). Data is monitored and made available to owners to locate the equipment during transportation.

Several use-cases are specified in reference [12]. All use-cases have in common that data is collected to monitor something, is transmitted to central unit that published data. This data can than be accessed by authorized entities (e.g., device, persons). Usually, the data includes sensitive information and, therefore, secure transmission is required as proposed by the aforementioned sections. The projects FLAMINGO [9] and SmartenIT [8] deal with some of those use-cases and investigate the security issues with focus on two-way authentication issues for secure data transmission.

5.2. Requirements

In order to show the applicability of the proposed solution throughout the above sections a common network structure consisting of a global sink and several sensor nodes is assumed. Additionally, an Access Control Server (ACS) is integrated into the network. The ACS is a trusted entity and a more resource-rich server, on which the access rights for the publishers (= sensor nodes) of the secured network are stored. Therefore, every publisher in the network MUST have an unique identity. Figure 4 illustrates the assumed architecture, where it is assumed that also the subscriber, publisher, and sensors have individual certificates received from the Certificate Authority. Depending on individual architectural setups it can be possible to integrate the ACS functionality direct into the
As mentioned the concept of Internet of Things forms the basis for this draft, which include also the basic understanding of the Internet. Thus, it is assumed that identities are usually established via public key cryptography and the identifiers provided through X.509 certificates [RFC5280]. In general, X.509 certificate contains the public key of an entity and its common name. A trusted third party - Certificate Authority (CA) - signs that certificate. This signing allows the receiver to detect modifications to the certificate and that the identity of the entity, who requested the certificate, has been verified by the CA. The CA can be run by the administrator of the network or an established Internet certificate authority can be used.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the identity of a default subscriber is usually preconfigured on a publisher before it is deployed.

5.3. Data Access Procedure

Based on the FLAMINGO project the following use-case is assumed [9]: A sensor node has published its data, which is transmitted in direction to the global sink (cf. Figure 4 where global sink is located in the gateway component). Therefore, it is assumed that a two-way authentication handshake between those two communication
parties was successful performed before. In between the data can be cashed in order to make it accessible more quicker to subscribers. In this case the cached entity functions as a publisher.

Assuming the new subscriber wants to access the data, it must initialize a connection with the publisher. Therefore, the subscriber MUST obtain an access ticket from the ACS before. The functionality of the ACS is to verify that the subscriber has the right to access the data available from the publisher. Those rights are influenced by legal and regulative implications (e.g., rights connected to an ISP region, where the subscriber belongs to). If the subscriber received a valid access ticket, it is presented to the publisher. The publisher must evaluate the identity of the subscriber and verify the ticket it has received from the ACS.

If the validation was successful the subscriber can access the data. Before every kind of data exchange, where sensitive information is involved, takes place the proposed two-way authentication handshake is performed in order to establish a highly secured communication channel between the entities. Figure 5 summarizes the aforementioned work flow and will be defined in detail in the upcoming subsections assuming that the ACS functionality is included in the Gateway component.
6. Hardware Requirements

6.1. Class 2 Hardware Requirements

Hu et al. showed that RSA, the most commonly used public key algorithm in the Internet, can be used in sensor networks with the assistance of a class 2 devices that MAY include a TPM, which costs less than 5% of a common sensor node [4]. A TPM is an embedded chip that provides tamper proof generation and storage of RSA keys as well as hardware support for the RSA algorithm. The certificate of a TPM equipped publisher and the certificate of a trusted CA MUST be stored on the publisher prior to deployment.

For publishers that are not equipped with TPM chips the authentication can be proposed via the DTLS pre-shared key cipher-suite, which requires a small number of random bytes, from which the actual key is derived, to be preloaded to the publisher before

Figure 5: Flow Diagram for Data Access Procedure
deployment. This secret MUST also be made available to the ACS, which will disclose the key to devices with sufficient authorization.

6.2. Class 1 Hardware Requirements

No hardware requirements.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Class 2 Security Considerations

The following security goals are addressed by the key idea presented in this draft:

Authenticity

Recipients of a message can identify their communication partners and can detect if the sender information has been forged.

Integrity

Communication partners can detect changes to a message during transmission.

Confidentiality

Attackers cannot gain knowledge about the content of a secured message.

By choosing DTLS as the security protocol those goals can be achieved. DTLS is a modification of TLS for the unreliable UDP and inherits its security properties [5]. Furthermore, if hardware including TPM is available, it is recommended to use it especially on vulnerable points (e.g., cluster heads, aggregation points, publisher, subscriber) within the network.

7.2. Class 1 Security Considerations

t.b.a.

8. IANA Considerations

No considerations.
9. Acknowledgement

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10. Formal Syntax

6LoWPAN - IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network (RFC 4944)

ACS - Access Control Server

BLIP - Berkeley Low-power IP stack

CA - Certificate Authority

COAP - Constrained Application Protocol

DTLS - Datagram Transport Layer Security protocol (RFC 6347)

ECC - Elliptic Curve Cryptography

ECDH - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

ECIES - Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption System

ETSI - European Telecommunications Standard Institute

HVAC - Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IEC - Integrated Encryption Scheme

IoT - Internet of Things

KiB - Kibi-Byte (1 KiB = 1024 Bytes) [14]

PKC - Public Key Cryptography
PSK - Pre-shared Key

RPL - Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RFC 6550)

TCP - Transmission Control Protocol (RFC 793)


TPM - Trusted Platform Module

UDP - User Datagram Protocol (RFC 768)

WSN - Wireless Sensor Network

11. References

11.1. Normative References


[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)"


11.2. Informative References


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