GSS-API Key Exchange with SHA2
draft-ssorce-gss-keyex-sha2-00

Abstract

This document specifies additions and amendments to SSH GSS-API
Methods [RFC4462]. It defines a new key exchange method that uses
SHA-2 for integrity and deprecates weak DH groups. The purpose of
this specification is to modernize the cryptographic primitives used
by GSS Key Exchanges.

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1. Introduction

SSH GSS-API Methods [RFC4462] allows the use of GSSAPI for authentication and key exchange in SSH. It defines three exchange methods all based on DH groups and SHA-1. The new methods described in this document are intended to support environments that desired to use the SHA-2 cryptographic hash functions.

2. Rationale

Due to security concerns with SHA-1 [RFC6194] and with MODP groups with less than 2048 bits [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1] we propose the use of the SHA-2 based hashes with DH group14, group15, group16, group17 and group18 [RFC3526]. Additionally we add support for key exchange based on Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman with NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 as well as X25519 and X448 curves. Following the rationale of [I-Dietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2] only SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes are used.

3. Document Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
4. New Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange methods

This document adopts the same naming convention defined in [RFC4462] to define families of methods that cover any GSS-API mechanism used with a specific Diffie-Hellman group and SHA-2 Hash combination.

The following new key exchange algorithms are defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Implementation Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group15-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group16-sha512-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group17-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group18-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each key exchange method is implicitly registered by this document. The IESG is considered to be the owner of all these key exchange methods; this does NOT imply that the IESG is considered to be the owner of the underlying GSS-API mechanism.

4.1. gss-group14-sha256-*

Each of these methods specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] with SHA-256 as HASH, and the group defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC4253] The method name for each method is the concatenation of the string "gss-group14-sha256-" with the Base64 encoding of the MD5 hash [RFC1321] of the ASN.1 DER encoding [ISO-IEC-8825-1] of the underlying GSS-API mechanism’s OID. Base64 encoding is described in Section 6.8 of [RFC2045].

4.2. gss-group15-sha512-*

Each of these methods specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] with SHA-512 as HASH, and the group defined in Section 5 of [RFC3526] The method name for each method is the concatenation of the string "gss-group15-sha512-" with the Base64 encoding of the MD5 hash of the ASN.1 DER encoding of the underlying GSS-API mechanism’s OID.

4.3. gss-group16-sha512-*

Each of these methods specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] with SHA-512 as HASH, and the group defined in Section 5 of [RFC3526] The method name
for each method is the concatenation of the string "gss-group16-sha512-" with the Base64 encoding of the MD5 hash of the ASN.1 DER encoding of the underlying GSS-API mechanism's OID.

4.4.  gss-group17-sha512-*

Each of these methods specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] with SHA-512 as HASH, and the group defined in Section 5 of [RFC3526] The method name for each method is the concatenation of the string "gss-group17-sha512-" with the Base64 encoding of the MD5 hash of the ASN.1 DER encoding of the underlying GSS-API mechanism's OID.

4.5.  gss-group18-sha512-*

Each of these methods specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] with SHA-512 as HASH, and the group defined in Section 7 of [RFC3526] The method name for each method is the concatenation of the string "gss-group18-sha512-" with the Base64 encoding of the MD5 hash of the ASN.1 DER encoding of the underlying GSS-API mechanism's OID.

5.  New Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange methods

In [RFC5656] new SSH key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography are introduced. We reuse much of section 4 to implement GSS-API-authenticated ECDH Key Exchanges.

Additionally we utilize also the curves defined in [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] to complement the 3 classic NIST defined curves required by [RFC5656].

5.1.  Generic GSS-API Key Exchange with ECDH

This section reuses much of the scheme defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] and combines it with the scheme defined in Section 4 of [RFC5656]; in particular, all checks and verification steps prescribed in Section 4 of [RFC5656] apply here as well.

The symbols used in this description conform to the symbols used in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462]. Additionally, the following symbols are defined:

Q_C is the client ephemeral public key octet string
Q_S is the server ephemeral public key octet string

The Client:
1. C generates an ephemeral key pair with public key Q_C

2. C calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), using the most recent reply token received from S during this exchange, if any. For this call, the client MUST set mutual_req_flag to "true" to request that mutual authentication be performed. It also MUST set integ_req_flag to "true" to request that per-message integrity protection be supported for this context. In addition, deleg_req_flag MAY be set to "true" to request access delegation, if requested by the user. Since the key exchange process authenticates only the host, the setting of anon_req_flag is immaterial to this process. If the client does not support the "gssapi-keyex" user authentication method described in Section 4 of [RFC4462], or does not intend to use that method in conjunction with the GSS-API context established during key exchange, then anon_req_flag SHOULD be set to "true". Otherwise, this flag MAY be set to true if the client wishes to hide its identity. Since the key exchange process will involve the exchange of only a single token once the context has been established, it is not necessary that the GSS-API context support detection of replayed or out-of-sequence tokens. Thus, replay_det_req_flag and sequence_req_flag need not be set for this process. These flags SHOULD be set to "false".

If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and the mutual_state flag is not true, then mutual authentication has not been established, and the key exchange MUST fail.

If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and the integ_avail flag is not true, then per-message integrity protection is not available, and the key exchange MUST fail.

If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and both the mutual_state and integ_avail flags are true, the resulting output token is sent to S.

If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the output_token is sent to S, which will reply with a new token to be provided to GSS_Init_sec_context().

The client MUST also include Q_C with the first message it sends to the server during this process; if the server receives more than one Q_C or none at all, the key exchange MUST fail.

It is an error if the call does not produce a token of non-zero length to be sent to the server. In this case, the key exchange MUST fail.

3. When a Q_C key is received, S verifies that the key is valid. If the key is not valid the key exchange MUST fail.
4. S calls GSS_Accept_sec_context(), using the token received from C.

   If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and the mutual_state flag is not true, then mutual authentication has not been established, and the key exchange MUST fail.

   If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and the integ_avail flag is not true, then per-message integrity protection is not available, and the key exchange MUST fail.

   If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE and both the mutual_state and integ_avail flags are true, then the security context has been established, and processing continues with step 5.

   If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the output token is sent to C, and processing continues with step 2.

   If the resulting major_status code is GSS_S_COMPLETE, but a non-zero-length reply token is returned, then that token is sent to the client.

5. S generates an ephemeral key pair with public key Q_S and performs the following computations:

   K a shared secret obtained using Q_C and Q_S.

   H = hash(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || Q_C || Q_S || K).

   MIC is the GSS-API message integrity code for H computed by calling GSS_GetMIC().

6. This step is performed only if the server’s final call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() produced a non-zero-length final reply token to be sent to the client and if no previous call by the client to GSS_Init_sec_context() has resulted in a major_status of GSS_S_COMPLETE. Under these conditions, the client makes an additional call to GSS_Init_sec_context() to process the final reply token. This call is made exactly as described above. However, if the resulting major_status is anything other than GSS_S_COMPLETE, or a non-zero-length token is returned, it is an error and the key exchange MUST fail.

7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid. If the key is not valid the key exchange MUST fail.
8. C computes the shared secret K and H the same way it is done in step 5. It then calls GSS_VerifyMIC() to check that the MIC sent by S verifies H’s integrity. If the MIC is not successfully verified, the key exchange MUST fail.

If any GSS_Init_sec_context() or GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns a major_status other than GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, or any other GSS-API call returns a major_status other than GSS_S_COMPLETE, the key exchange MUST fail. The same recommendations expressed in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] are followed with regards to error reporting.

This exchange is implemented with the following messages:

The client sends:

```plaintext
byte     SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT
string   output_token (from GSS_Init_sec_context())
string   Q_C, client’s ephemeral public key octet string
```

The server may responds with:

```plaintext
byte     SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY
string   server public host key and certificates (K_S)
```

Since this key exchange method does not require the host key to be used for any encryption operations, this message is OPTIONAL. If the "null" host key algorithm described in Section 5 of [RFC4462] is used, this message MUST NOT be sent.

Each time the server’s call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns a major_status code of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED

The server replies:

```plaintext
byte     SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE
string   output_token (from GSS_Accept_sec_context())
```

If the client receives this message after a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() has returned a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE, a protocol error has occurred and the key exchange MUST fail.

Each time the client receives the message described above, it makes another call to GSS_Init_sec_context().
The client sends:

```plaintext
byte      SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE
string    output_token (from GSS_Init_sec_context())
```

The server and client continue to trade these two messages as long as the server’s calls to GSS_Accept_sec_context() result in major_status codes of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. When a call results in a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE, it sends one of two final messages.

If the server’s final call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() (resulting in a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE) returns a non-zero-length token to be sent to the client, it sends the following:

```plaintext
byte      SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE
string    Q_S, server’s ephemeral public key octet string
string    mic_token (MIC of H)
boolean   TRUE
string    output_token (from GSS_Accept_sec_context())
```

If the client receives this message after a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() has returned a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE, a protocol error has occurred and the key exchange MUST fail.

If the server’s final call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() (resulting in a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE) returns a zero-length token or no token at all, it sends the following:

```plaintext
byte      SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE
string    Q_S, server’s ephemeral public key octet string
string    mic_token (MIC of H)
boolean   FALSE
```

If the client receives this message when no call to GSS_Init_sec_context() has yet resulted in a major_status code of GSS_S_COMPLETE, a protocol error has occurred and the key exchange MUST fail.

In case of errors the messages described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] are used as well as the recommendation about the messages’ order.
The hash \( H \) is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the following:

- string \( V_C \), the client’s version string (CR, NL excluded)
- string \( V_S \), server’s identification string (CR and LF excluded)
- string \( I_C \), payload of the client’s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string \( I_S \), payload of the server’s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string \( K_S \), server’s public host key
- string \( Q_C \), client’s ephemeral public key octet string
- string \( Q_S \), server’s ephemeral public key octet string
- mpint \( K \), shared secret

This value is called the exchange hash, and it is used to authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash SHOULD be kept secret. If no SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message has been sent by the server or received by the client, then the empty string is used in place of \( K_S \) when computing the exchange hash.

The GSS_GetMIC call MUST be applied over \( H \), not the original data.

### 5.2. ECDH Key Exchange Methods

The following new key exchange methods are defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Implementation Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-secp256r1-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-secp384r1-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-secp521r1-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve25519-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve448-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### 6. IANA Considerations

This document augments the SSH Key Exchange Method Names in [RFC4462].
IANA is requested to update the SSH algorithm registry with the following entries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Implementation Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha256-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group15-sha512-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group16-sha512-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group17-sha512-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group18-sha512-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-secp256r1-sha256-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-secp384r1-sha512-*</td>
<td>This draft</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>This draft</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>This draft</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Security Considerations

7.1. New Finite Field DH mechanisms

Except for the use of a different secure hash function and larger DH groups, no significant changes has been made to the protocol described by [RFC4462]; therefore all the original Security Considerations apply.

7.2. New Elliptic Curve DH mechanisms

Although a new cryptographic primitive is used with these methods the actual key exchange closely follows the key exchange defined in [RFC5656]; therefore all the original Security Considerations as well as those expressed in [RFC5656] apply.

8. Normative References

[FIPS-180-4]

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[RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
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