Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) based Robot Challenges for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

draft-tschofenig-sipping-captcha-00.txt

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Abstract

Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) is one of the foreseen future forms of spamming that SIP networks may have to handle. SPIT also has more impact on users than email spam since it is more intrusive. Email as a store-and-forward communication mechanism allows for several filtering mechanisms to be applied to the full content before being presented to the user. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
interaction is, in contrast, real-time communication and therefore
does not provide much information prior to the transmission of the
content, making it both harder to filter and more annoying to users. The
responsibility for filtering, blocking calls, or taking any other
preventive action can belong to different elements in the call flow
and may depend on various factors.

This document concentrates on "Completely Automated Public Turing
Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart" (CAPTCHA) tests, which
require human interaction. The document proposes an approach how to
apply those challenges to SIP communication for handling the SPIT
problem.

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1. Introduction

The problem of Spam for Internet Telephony (SPIT) is an imminent challenge and only the combination of several techniques can provide a framework for dealing with unwanted communication attempts.  

[I-D.ietf-sipping-spam] provides four core recommendations that need to be considered for a SPIT solution, namely,

- Strong Identity
- White Lists
- Solve the Introduction Problem
- Don't Wait Until it's Too Late.

The human interaction required challenges are mainly used for solving the introduction problem targeting to handle requests from user agents with whom the recipient do not have former relations. E.g., the challenge is initiated towards user agents that are not yet white or black-listed, or based on some other criteria.

The [I-D.tschofenig-sipping-framework-spit-reduction] provides a framework for defining SPIT prevention policy. The policy contains rules which are applied to requests if the conditions of a given rule matches. The actions of the matching rules are executed. One of the actions could be to provide a challenge which must be solved by a human before the request is forwarded to the destination.

There are different techniques already developed for challenging user agents. "Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart" (CAPTCHA) [captcha] typically provides a human a task either to recognize something or a question to be answered using different media types. [Inaccessibility-of-CAPTCHA] provides alternatives to visual test for allowing systems to test for human users while preserving access by users with disabilities. Hashcash challenge [hashcash] requires user agents to perform CPU-intensive computational puzzles making it difficult to send large amounts of requests. The hashcash concept has been proposed for usage with SIP in [I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash]. XMPP has already adopted some of the techniques as extensions, see [XEP-0158].

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] provides the ability for the users to initiate, manage and terminate communication sessions. The scope of this document is to provide a mechanism for SIP based communication to apply SPIT reduction related challenges requiring human interaction.

2. Terminology

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are used in their IETF sense. The terms "protocol", "mechanism", and "service" are also used in their IETF sense.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, Definitions of Terms for the Internet Community [RFC2119].
3.  Overview

This section describes the technical requirements, available solutions and gives an overview of the proposed solution. The section is informational in nature. It does not contain any normative statements.

3.1.  Technical requirements and available solutions

Adopting CAPTCHA or Hashcash type of techniques for SIP communication requires a mechanism for enabling user interaction type of function to be associated with SIP requests. When a proxy or user agent server (UAS) server receives a SIP request which needs to be challenged, the proxy or UAS sends a challenge to the originator of the SIP request before continue handling of the request. After getting the answer to the challenge from the user, the user agent client (UAC) needs to provide the answer to the proxy or UAS in order to get the request passed to the recipient.

The challenge should offer multiple choices for the UACs to select depending on the capabilities of the device where the UAC is running. Also, the UAC should be able to authenticate and authorize the source of challenge. The UAC may receive the challenge via a URL or as direct media component(s).

The main target is to support SIP dialog creating request such as SIP INVITE, but ideally the solution should also cover non-dialog creating requests, e.g., SIP MESSAGE. It is also important that the mechanism functions with the existing UAC implementations.

There are existing mechanisms specified to be considered as a solution for the technical requirements discussed above.

[I-D.ietf-sipping-app-interaction-framework] defines a framework for interaction between users and SIP based applications. The framework covers both the "presentation capable" and "presentation free" user interfaces (UI) having different solutions to both. The user interaction with the presentation capable UI is handled by using SIP REFER and HTTP while the presentation free UI case utilize SIP events.
[RFC3265] (SIP SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY). Since there are different solutions for different cases, the UAC needs to indicate the supported application user interaction mechanisms when issuing a SIP request. This might be too a heavy requirement for solving the user interaction needs related to SPIT challenges. Also, the application interaction framework requires that a dialog exists before initiating or accepting any user interaction requests. In case of SPIT challenges the user interaction must happen during the dialog establishment so it seems that the application interaction framework cannot be directly used as a solution.

[XEP-0158] provides a XMPP based solution for SPIT challenges. The XML format defined for CAPTCHAs and Hashcash can be considered as basis also for the SIP based approach.

3.2. Overview of the Proposed Solution

The Figure 1 and Figure 2 present high level messages flows for conveying a challenge (e.g., CAPTCHA) to the SIP UAC which initiated a dialog forming SIP request. In Figure 1 the challenge is included in the body of the SIP 4xx response while in Figure 2 describes a case when the challenge is fetched via URL which was provided with the response. After the user has managed to solve the challenge the UAC re-issues the request with the solution. The SPIT proxy removes the solution before proxying the request to the SIP UAS.
Figure 1: A case where the SPIT Proxy returns the CAPTCHA directly with the response

Figure 2: A case where the SPIT Proxy returns a link to the CAPTCHA. The UAC fetches the CAPTCHA e.g. using HTTP.
4. Client and Proxy Operations

4.1. Operation of SPIT Proxy

When the SPIT Proxy receives a SIP request from a UAC, its authorization engine applies the authorization policy to the SIP request as defined in [I-D.tschofenig-sipping-framework-spit-reduction]. When the actions of the authorization policy results to request the proxy to generate a challenge to the UAC, the proxy sends a 4xx response with an XML document containing the challenge in the body. The Content-Type used for the XML document is ‘application/captcha-challenge+xml’.

OPEN ISSUE: define the value of the new response code.

When the SPIT Proxy receives a re-issued SIP request from the UAC, it validates the answer provided by the UAC in the Captcha header field. In case the answer and other possible policies allow the request to get proxied further to the UAS, the SPIT Proxy removes the Captcha header. Depending on the policies and functionality of the SPIT Proxy, the proxy may update the authorization policy according to the decision, e.g., insert the AoR of the user of the UAC to a white or block list. In case the answer was not satisfactory, the UAS acts according to a defined policy, e.g., rejects the request.

If the SPIT proxy does not get a re-issued SIP request and/or because of a timeout the SPIT proxy may consider the request ignored. The proxy might in some cases also consider adding the AoR of the user of the UAC to a block or observation list as a potential SPIT address.

4.2. Operation of UAC

When the UAC receives a 4xx response with a MIME type ‘application/captcha-challenge+xml’ in the body to be solved, the UAC first authenticates and authorizes the sender of the challenge.

TODO: describe the authentication and authorization more.

The UAC selects the challenges marked as mandatory and possibly some additional ones for UAC’s execution or to be rendered to the user based on e.g. the device capabilities. The UAC may also need to fetch the challenges from which URL links were provided. When the challenge gets solved, the UAC provides an answer in the Captcha header field by re-issuing the SIP request, e.g. by sending a SIP re-INVITE.
5. XML Structure

The XML Schema for the CAPTCHA challenge XML document is defined in Section 8.

5.1. Structure of XML-Encoded CAPTCHA challenge

A CAPTCHA challenge is an XML document that MUST be well-formed and MUST be valid according to schemas, including extension schemas available to the validator and applicable to the XML document. The XML documents MUST be based on XML 1.0 and MUST be encoded using UTF-8.

The namespace identifier for elements defined by this specification is a URN [RFC2141], using the namespace identifier 'ietf' defined by [RFC2648] and extended by [RFC3688]. This urn is: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns: captcha.

5.2. MIME Type for CAPTCHA Challenge Document

The MIME type for the XML document is 'application/captcha-challenge+xml'.

OPEN ISSUE: is there a need to indicate support for the MIME type in the initial request?

5.3. The <challenge> Root Element

The root element of the XML document is <challenge>.

The <challenge> element contains the namespace definition mentioned in Section 5.1. It also contains a mandatory 'id' attribute for correlating the challenge and the answer, and the 'min-tests' attribute which default value is 1. With the 'min-tests' attribute, it is possible to define the minimum amount of tests which needs to be solved.

The <challenge> element MUST have at least one child element. This document defines the <media> element as a child element. The <challenge> element may contain one or more <media> elements.

The <challenge> element may also be extended by XML elements or attributes defined with other namespaces.
5.4. The <media> element

The <media> element contains one child element. This document defines the <uri> and <data> elements as child elements for allowing the CAPTCHA challenge be provided directly as content or as a reference to an external content.

The <media> element contains a mandatory 'var' attribute indicating the type of the challenge (see values from the 'var' column of Figure 3). It may also contain optional 'width' and 'height' attributes for providing the size of the content. In addition, the element may contain an 'instr' attribute which purpose is to provide instructions related to the challenge (see the 'example generic instruction' column from Figure 3). The required tests can be indicated by setting the value of the 'required' attribute to 'true'.

The <media> element may also be extended by XML elements or attributes defined with other namespaces.

5.5. The <uri> element

The <uri> element contains a mandatory 'type' attribute indicating the MIME type of the challenge. See values from the 'MIME type' column of Figure 3. The value of the <uri> element is a URL where the challenge can be fetched.

The <uri> element may also be extended by XML attributes defined with other namespaces.

5.6. The <data> element

The <data> element contains a mandatory 'type' attribute indicating the MIME type of the challenge. See typical values from the 'MIME type' column of Figure 3.

The value of the <data> element is the content of the challenge.

The <data> element may also be extended by XML attributes defined with other namespaces.

5.7. Values

The following table copied from [XEP-0158] presents typical values for the CAPTCHA challenge. The 'var' column lists values for the 'var' attribute of the <media> element. The 'MIME type' column contains values of the corresponding 'type' attribute of the <uri> or <data> elements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'var'</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Media type</th>
<th>MIME type</th>
<th>Example generic instructions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ocr*</td>
<td>Optical Char</td>
<td>image</td>
<td>image/jpeg</td>
<td>Enter the code you see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>picture_recog</td>
<td>Picture Recognition</td>
<td>image</td>
<td>image/jpeg</td>
<td>Describe the picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video_recog</td>
<td>Video Recognition</td>
<td>video</td>
<td>video/mpeg</td>
<td>Describe the video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speech_recog</td>
<td>Speech Recognition</td>
<td>audio</td>
<td>audio/x-wav</td>
<td>Enter the words you hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audio_recog</td>
<td>Audio Recognition</td>
<td>audio</td>
<td>audio/x-wav</td>
<td>Describe the sound you hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>picture_q</td>
<td>Picture Question</td>
<td>image</td>
<td>image/jpeg</td>
<td>Answer the question you see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video_q</td>
<td>Video Question</td>
<td>video</td>
<td>video/mpeg</td>
<td>Answer the question in video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speech_q</td>
<td>Speech Question</td>
<td>audio</td>
<td>audio/x-wav</td>
<td>Answer the question you hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qa</td>
<td>Text Q &amp; A</td>
<td>text</td>
<td>text/plain</td>
<td>Answer the question</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The image portrays random characters that humans can read but OCR software cannot. To pass the challenge, the user must simply type the characters. The correct answer SHOULD NOT depend on the language specified by the ‘xml:lang’ attribute of the challenge.

Figure 3: Information of CAPTCHA challenges

6. Syntax

The Captcha header field carries the solution information. It has parameters called ‘id’ and ‘answer’. The ‘id’ parameter value is set to the same as the ‘id’ attribute of the CAPTCHA challenge sent to the UAC. The ‘answer’ parameter value is set to the answer of the CAPTCHA challenge.
OPEN ISSUE: the answer parameter to be thought more, e.g. whether there can be several answers? And if possible, then also ‘var’ information should be provided.

Example:

Captcha: id="rjffe32"; answer="2";

The ABNF for the header is:

Captcha = "Captcha" HCOLON captcha-param *(COMMA captcha-param)
captcha-param = captcha-id SEMI captcha-answer *(SEMI generic-param)
captcha-id = "id" EQUAL quoted-string
captcha-answer = "answer" EQUAL quoted-string

This document updates the Table 2 of [RFC3261] by adding the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header field</th>
<th>where</th>
<th>proxy</th>
<th>ACK</th>
<th>BYE</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>INV</th>
<th>OPT</th>
<th>REG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captcha</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>dr</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB</td>
<td>NOT</td>
<td>REF</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>UPD</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Example

The following XML document shows the content that is provided of a CAPTCHA the challenge message sent towards the sending party as shown in message (2) of Figure 2.
8. XML Schema

This document defines the XML Schema based on the schema defined in Section 12 of [XEP-0158].

OPEN ISSUE: should it be possible to define which tests are mandatory, and the minimum amount of tests to be executed?
<xs:attribute name="id" use="required" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="min_tests" type="xs:unsignedInt" default="1" use="optional" />
</xs:restriction>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
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</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
9. Internationalization Support

[Editor’s Note: A future version of this document will describe internationalization considerations.]

10. Security Considerations

[Editor’s Note: A future version of this document will describe security considerations.]

11. IANA Considerations

This specification registers a new header and a new response code. IANA is requested to make the following updates in the registry at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/sip-parameters. It also registers a new namespace and a content type.

OPEN ISSUE: A registry for the ‘var’ tokens is needed.

11.1. Captcha Header

Add the following entry to the header sub-registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Name</th>
<th>compact</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Tschofenig & Leppanen   Expires January 3, 2008   [Page 15]
11.2. 4xx Response

Add the following entry to the response code sub-registry under the "Request Failure 4xx" heading.

4xx CAPTCHA required [RFC-XXXX]

11.3. Namespace

This section registers a new XML namespace per the procedures in [RFC3688].

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha

Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
    (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type"
        content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
</head>
<title>Namespace for CAPTCHA Challenge</title>
</head>
<body>
    <h1>Namespace for providing CAPTCHA challenge</h1>
    <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha</h2>
    <p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX</a>
        [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
            Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.]</p>
</body>
</html>
END

11.4. Content-Type registration for 'application/captcha-challenge+xml'

This specification requests the registration of a new MIME type according to the procedures of RFC 2048 [RFC2048] and guidelines in RFC 3023 [RFC3023].
MIME media type name: application

MIME subtype name: captcha-challenge+xml
Mandatory parameters: none
Optional parameters: charset
   Indicates the character encoding of enclosed XML. Default is UTF-8.

Encoding considerations:

Uses XML, which can employ 8-bit characters, depending on the character encoding used. See RFC 3023, Section 3.2.

Security considerations:

This content type is designed to carry challenges for the user agent clients to solve in order to give a proof of being a human behind the generated request. This action is a part of a spam preventing mechanism. Appropriate precautions should be adopted to limit disclosure of this information. Please refer to RFCXXXX [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.] Security Considerations section for more information.

Interoperability considerations: none

Published specification: RFCXXXX [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.] this document

Applications which use this media type: SIP applications

Additional information:

Magic Number: None
File Extension: .xml
Macintosh file type code: 'TEXT'

Personal and email address for further information: Hannes Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com

Intended usage: LIMITED USE

Author/Change controller:

This specification is a work item of the IETF SIPPING working group, with mailing list address <xxxxx @ietf.org>.
11.5.  CAPTCHA Schema Registration


Registrant Contact:  IETF SIPPING Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig (Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com).

XML:  The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 8. Its first line is

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

and its last line is

</xs:schema>

12.  Acknowledgments

Years ago CAPTCHAs have been introduced for XMPP, see 'XEP-0158: Robot Challenges' [XEP-0158]. The authors of this document believe that there is value in re-using it for SIP for Spam prevention. Hence, the authors would like to thank the XMPP community for their work on this subject. In particular, all credits go to Ian Paterson (ian.paterson@clientside.co.uk), the author of [XEP-0158].

13.  References

13.1.  Normative references


13.2. Informative references

[I-D.ietf-sipping-app-interaction-framework]

[I-D.ietf-sipping-spam]

[I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash]

[I-D.tschofenig-sipping-framework-spit-reduction]

[Inaccessibility-of-CAPTCHA]

[RFC3265]

[XEP-0158]

[ captcha ]

[hashcash]

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