Abstract

This document describes an experimental protocol and new DNS Resource Record that can be used to provide a message digest over DNS zone data. The ZONEMD Resource Record conveys the message digest data in the zone itself. When a zone publisher includes a ZONEMD record, recipients can verify the zone contents for accuracy and completeness. This provides assurance that received zone data matches published data, regardless of how the zone data has been transmitted and received.

ZONEMD is not designed to replace DNSSEC. Whereas DNSSEC protects individual RRs (DNS data with fine granularity), ZONEMD protects a zone’s data as a whole, whether consumed by authoritative name servers, recursive name servers, or any other applications.

As specified at this time, ZONEMD is not designed for use in large, dynamic zones due to the time and resources required for digest calculation. The ZONEMD record described in this document includes fields reserved for future work to support large, dynamic zones.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

In the DNS, a zone is the collection of authoritative resource records (RRs) sharing a common origin ([RFC7719]). Zones are often stored as files on disk in the so-called master file format [RFC1034]. Zones are generally distributed among name servers using the AXFR [RFC5936] and IXFR [RFC1995] protocols. Zone files can also be distributed outside of the DNS, with such protocols as FTP, HTTP, rsync, and even via email. Currently there is no standard way to verify the authenticity of a stand-alone zone.

This document introduces a new RR type that serves as a cryptographic message digest of the data in a zone. It allows a receiver of the zone to verify the zone’s authenticity, especially when used in combination with DNSSEC. This technique makes the message digest a part of the zone itself, allowing verification the zone as a whole, no matter how it is transmitted. Furthermore, the digest is based on the wire format of zone data. Thus, it is independent of presentation format, such as changes in whitespace, capitalization, and comments.

DNSSEC provides three strong security guarantees relevant to this protocol:
1. whether or not to expect DNSSEC records in the zone,

2. whether or not to expect a ZONEMD record in a signed zone, and

3. whether or not the ZONEMD record has been altered since it was signed.

This specification is OPTIONAL to implement by both publishers and consumers of zone data.

1.1. Motivation

The motivation for this protocol enhancement is the desire for the ability to verify the authenticity of a stand-alone zone, regardless of how it is transmitted. A consumer of zone data should be able to verify that the data is as-published by the zone operator.

One approach to preventing data tampering and corruption is to secure the distribution channel. The DNS has a number of features that can already be used for channel security. Perhaps the most widely used is DNS transaction signatures (TSIG [RFC2845]). TSIG uses shared secret keys and a message digest to protect individual query and response messages. It is generally used to authenticate and validate UPDATE [RFC2136], AXFR [RFC5936], and IXFR [RFC1995] messages.

DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0) [RFC2931]) is another protocol extension designed to authenticate individual DNS transactions. Whereas SIG records were originally designed to cover specific RR types, SIG(0) is used to sign an entire DNS message. Unlike TSIG, SIG(0) uses public key cryptography rather than shared secrets.

The Transport Layer Security protocol suite is also designed to provide channel security. One can easily imagine the distribution of zones over HTTPS-enabled web servers, as well as DNS-over-HTTPS [dns-over-https], and perhaps even a future version of DNS-over-TLS ([RFC7858]).

Unfortunately, the protections provided by these channel security techniques are (in practice) ephemeral and are not retained after the data transfer is complete. They can ensure that the client receives the data from the expected server, and that the data sent by the server is not modified during transmission. However, they do not guarantee that the server transmits the data as originally published, and do not provide any methods to verify data that is read after transmission is complete. For example, a name server loading saved zone data upon restart cannot guarantee that the on-disk data has not
been modified. For these reasons, it is preferable to secure the data itself.

Why not simply rely on DNSSEC, which provides certain data security guarantees? Certainly for zones that are signed, a recipient could validate all of the signed RRSets. Additionally, denial-of-existence records can prove that RRSets have not been added or removed. However, not all RRSets in a zone are signed. The design of DNSSEC stipulates that delegations (non-apex NS records) are not signed, and neither are any glue records. Thus, changes to delegation and glue records cannot be detected by DNSSEC alone. Furthermore, zones that employ NSEC3 with opt-out are susceptible to the removal or addition of names between the signed nodes. Whereas DNSSEC is primarily designed to protect consumers of DNS response messages, this protocol is designed to protect consumers of zones.

There are existing tools and protocols that provide data security, such as OpenPGP [RFC4880] and S/MIME [RFC3851]. In fact, the internic.net site publishes PGP signatures along side the root zone and other files available there. However, this is a detached signature with no strong association to the corresponding zone file other than its timestamp. Non-detached signatures are, of course, possible, but these necessarily change the format of the file being distributed. That is, a zone signed with OpenPGP or S/MIME no longer looks like a DNS zone and could not directly be loaded into a name server. Once loaded the signature data is lost, so it does not survive further propagation.

It seems the desire for data security in DNS zones was envisioned as far back as 1997. [RFC2065] is an obsoleted specification of the first generation DNSSEC Security Extensions. It describes a zone transfer signature, aka AXFR SIG, which is similar to the technique proposed by this document. That is, it proposes ordering all (signed) RRSets in a zone, hashing their contents, and then signing the zone hash. The AXFR SIG is described only for use during zone transfers. It did not postulate the need to validate zone data distributed outside of the DNS. Furthermore, its successor, [RFC2535], omits the AXFR SIG, while at the same time introducing an IXFR SIG.

1.2. Design Overview

This document introduces a new Resource Record type designed to convey a message digest of the content of a zone. The digest is calculated at the time of zone publication. Ideally the zone is signed with DNSSEC to guarantee that any modifications of the digest can be detected. The procedures for digest calculation and DNSSEC
signing are similar (i.e., both require the same ordering of RRs) and can be done in parallel.

The zone digest is designed to be used on zones that are relatively stable and have infrequent updates. As currently specified, the digest is re-calculated over the entire zone content each time. This specification does not provide an efficient mechanism for incremental updates of zone data. It does, however, reserve a field in the ZONEMD record for future work to support incremental zone digest algorithms (e.g. using Merkle trees).

It is expected that verification of a zone digest would be implemented in name server software. That is, a name server can verify the zone data it was given and refuse to serve a zone which fails verification. For signed zones, the name server needs a trust anchor to perform DNSSEC validation. For signed non-root zones, the name server may need to send queries to validate a chain-of-trust. Digest verification could also be performed externally.

1.3. Use Cases

1.3.1. Root Zone

The root zone [InterNIC] is one of the most widely distributed DNS zone on the Internet, served by 930 separate instances [RootServers] at the time of this writing. Additionally, many organizations configure their own name servers to serve the root zone locally. Reasons for doing so include privacy and reduced access time. [RFC7706] describes one, but not the only, way to do this. As the root zone spreads beyond its traditional deployment boundaries, the need for verification of the completeness of the zone contents becomes increasingly important.

1.3.2. Providers, Secondaries, and Anycast

Since its very early days, the developers of the DNS recognized the importance of secondary name servers and service diversity. However, they may not have anticipated the complexity of modern DNS service provisioning which can include multiple third-party providers and hundreds of anycast instances. Instead of a simple primary-to-secondary zone distribution system, today it is possible to have multiple levels, multiple parties, and multiple protocols involved in the distribution of zone data. This complexity introduces new places for problems to arise. The zone digest protects the integrity of data that flows through such systems.
1.3.3. Response Policy Zones

DNS Response Policy Zones is "a method of expressing DNS response policy information inside specially constructed DNS zones..." [RPZ]. A number of companies provide RPZ feeds, which can be consumed by name server and firewall products. Since these are zones, AXFR is often, but not necessarily used for transmission. While RPZ zones can certainly be signed with DNSSEC, the data is not queried directly, and would not be subject to DNSSEC validation.

1.3.4. Centralized Zone Data Service

ICANN operates the Centralized Zone Data Service [CZDS], which is a repository of top-level domain zone files. Users request access to the system, and to individual zones, and are then able to download zone data for certain uses. Adding a zone digest to these would provide CZDS users with assurances that the data has not been modified. Note that ZONEMD could be added to CZDS zone data independently of the zone served by production name servers.

1.3.5. General Purpose Comparison Check

Since the zone digest does not depend on presentation format, it could be used to compare multiple copies of a zone received from different sources, or copies generated by different processes.

1.4. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The ZONEMD Resource Record

This section describes the ZONEMD Resource Record, including its fields, wire format, and presentation format. The Type value for the ZONEMD RR is 63. The ZONEMD RR is class independent. The RDATA of the resource record consists of four fields: Serial, Digest Type, Reserved, and Digest.

FOR DISCUSSION: This document is currently written as though a zone MUST NOT contain more than one ZONEMD RR. Having exactly one ZONEMD record per zone simplifies this protocol and eliminates confusion around downgrade attacks, at the expense of algorithm agility.
2.1. ZONEMD RDATA Wire Format

The ZONEMD RDATA wire format is encoded as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                             Serial                            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Digest Type  |   Reserved    |                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
|                             Digest                            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/+-------------------------------------------------------------+
/                                                               /
/+-------------------------------------------------------------+
```

2.1.1. The Serial Field

The Serial field is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network order. It is equal to the serial number from the zone’s SOA record ([RFC1035] section 3.3.13) for which the message digest was generated.

The zone’s serial number is included here in order to make DNS response messages of type ZONEMD meaningful. Without the serial number, a stand-alone ZONEMD digest has no association to any particular instance of a zone.

2.1.2. The Digest Type Field

The Digest Type field is an 8-bit unsigned integer that identifies the algorithm used to construct the digest.

At the time of this writing, SHA384, with value 1, is the only Digest Type defined for ZONEMD records. The Digest Type registry is further described in Section 6.

2.1.3. The Reserved Field

The Reserved field is an 8-bit unsigned integer, which is always set to zero. This field is reserved for future work to support efficient incremental updates.

2.1.4. The Digest Field

The Digest field is a variable-length sequence of octets containing the message digest. Section 3 describes how to calculate the digest for a zone. Section 4 describes how to use the digest to verify the contents of a zone.
2.2. ZONEMD Presentation Format

The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows:

The Serial field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.

The Digest Type field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.

The Reserved field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer set to zero.

The Digest MUST be represented as a sequence of case-insensitive hexadecimal digits. Whitespace is allowed within the hexadecimal text.

2.3. ZONEMD Example

The following example shows a ZONEMD RR.

example.com. 86400 IN ZONEMD 2018031500 4 0 (FEBE3D4CE2EC2FFA4BA99D46CD69D6D29711E55217057BEE 7EB1A7B641A47BA7FED22D5B97AE499FAFA4F22C6BD647DE )

3. Calculating the Digest

3.1. Canonical Format and Ordering

Calculation of the zone digest REQUIRES the RRs in a zone to be processed in a consistent format and ordering. Correct ordering of the zone depends on (1) ordering of owner names in the zone, (2) ordering of RRs with the same owner name, and (3) ordering of RRs within an RRSet.

This specification adopts DNSSEC’s canonical ordering for names (Section 6.1 of [RFC4034]), and canonical ordering for RRs within an RRSet (Section 6.3 of [RFC4034]). It also adopts DNSSEC’s canonical RR form (Section 6.2 of [RFC4034]). However, since DNSSEC does not define a canonical ordering for RRSets having the same owner name, that ordering is defined here.

3.1.1. Order of RRSets Having the Same Owner Name

For the purposes of calculating the zone digest, RRSets having the same owner name MUST be numerically ordered, in ascending order, by their numeric RR TYPE.
3.1.2. Duplicate RRs

As stated in Section 5 of [RFC2181], it is meaningless for a zone to have multiple RRs with equal owner name, class, type, and RDATA. In the interest of consistency and interoperability, such duplicate RRs MUST NOT be included in the calculation of a zone digest.

3.2. Add ZONEMD Placeholder

In preparation for calculating the zone digest, any existing ZONEMD record at the zone apex MUST first be deleted.

FOR DISCUSSION: Should non-apex ZONEMD records be allowed in a zone? Or forbidden?

Prior to calculation of the digest, and prior to signing with DNSSEC, a placeholder ZONEMD record MUST be added to the zone apex. This serves two purposes: (1) it allows the digest to cover the Serial, Digest Type, and Reserved field values, and (2) ensures that appropriate denial-of-existence (NSEC, NSEC3) records are created if the zone is signed with DNSSEC.

It is RECOMMENDED that the TTL of the ZONEMD record match the TTL of the SOA.

In the placeholder record, the Serial field MUST be set to the current SOA Serial. The Digest Type field MUST be set to the value for the chosen digest algorithm. The Reserved field MUST be set to zero. The Digest field MUST be set to all zeroes and of length appropriate for the chosen digest algorithm.

3.3. Optionally Sign the Zone

Following addition of the placeholder record, the zone MAY be signed with DNSSEC. Note that when the digest calculation is complete, and the ZONEMD record is updated, the signature(s) for that record MUST be recalculated and updated as well. Therefore, the signer is not required to calculate a signature over the placeholder record at this step in the process, but it is harmless to do so.

3.4. Calculate the Digest

The zone digest is calculated by concatenating the canonical on-the-wire form (without name compression) of all RRs in the zone, in the order described above, subject to the inclusion/exclusion rules described below, and then applying the digest algorithm:
digest = digest_algorithm( RR(1) | RR(2) | RR(3) | ... )

where "|" denotes concatenation, and

RR(i) = owner | type | class | TTL | RDATA length | RDATA

3.4.1. Inclusion/Exclusion Rules

When calculating the digest, the following inclusion/exclusion rules apply:

- All records in the zone, including glue records, MUST be included.
- Occluded data ([RFC5936] Section 3.5) MUST be included.
- Duplicate RRs with equal owner, class, type, and RDATA MUST NOT be included.
- The placeholder ZONEMD RR MUST be included.
- If the zone is signed, DNSSEC RRs MUST be included, except:
  - The RRSIG covering ZONEMD MUST NOT be included.

3.5. Update ZONEMD RR

Once the zone digest has been calculated, its value is then copied to the Digest field of the ZONEMD record.

If the zone is signed with DNSSEC, the appropriate RRSIG records covering the ZONEMD record MUST then be added or updated. Because the ZONEMD placeholder was added prior to signing, the zone will already have the appropriate denial-of-existence (NSEC, NSEC3) records.

Some implementations of incremental DNSSEC signing might update the zone’s serial number for each resigning. However, to preserve the calculated digest, generation of the ZONEMD signature at this time MUST NOT also result in a change of the SOA serial number.

4. Verifying Zone Message Digest

The recipient of a zone that has a message digest record can verify the zone by calculating the digest as follows:

1. The verifier SHOULD first determine whether or not to expect DNSSEC records in the zone. This can be done by examining locally configured trust anchors, or querying for (and
validating) DS RRs in the parent zone. For zones that are provably unsigned, digest validation continues at step 4 below.

2. For zones that are provably signed, the existence of the apex ZONEMD record MUST be verified. If the ZONEMD record provably does not exist, digest verification cannot be done. If the ZONEMD record does provably exist, but is not found in the zone, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

3. For zones that are provably signed, the SOA RR and ZONEMD RR MUST have valid signatures, chaining up to a trust anchor. If DNSSEC validation of the SOA or ZONEMD records fails, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

4. If the zone contains more than one apex ZONEMD RR, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

5. The SOA Serial field MUST exactly match the ZONEMD Serial field. If the fields do not match, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

6. The ZONEMD Digest Type field MUST be checked. If the verifier does not support the given digest type, it SHOULD report that the zone digest could not be verified due to an unsupported algorithm.

7. The Reserved field MUST be checked. If the Reserved field value is not zero, verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

8. The received Digest Type and Digest values are copied to a temporary location.

9. The ZONEMD RR’s RDATA is reset to the placeholder values described in Section 3.2.

10. The zone digest is computed over the zone data as described in Section 3.4.

11. The calculated digest is compared to the received digest stored in the temporary location. If the two digest values match, verification is considered successful. Otherwise, verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

12. The ZONEMD RR’s RDATA is reset to the received Digest Type and Digest stored in the temporary location. Thus, any downstream clients can similarly verify the zone.
5. Scope of Experimentation

This memo is published as an Experimental RFC. The purpose of the experimental period is to provide the community time to analyze and evaluate the methods defined in this document, particularly with regard to the wide variety of DNS zones in use on the Internet.

Additionally, the ZONEMD record defined in this document includes a Reserved field in the form of an 8-bit integer. The authors have a particular future use in mind for this field, namely to support efficient digests in large, dynamic zones. We intend to conduct future experiments using Merkle trees of varying depth. The choice of tree depth can be encoded in this reserved field. We expect values for tree depth to range from 0 to 10, requiring at most four bits of this field. This leaves another four bits available for other future uses, if absolutely necessary.

FOR DISCUSSION: The authors are willing to remove the Reserved field from this specification if the working group would prefer it. It would mean, however, that a future version of this protocol designed to efficiently support large, dynamic zones would most likely require a new RR type.

The duration of the experiment is expected to be no less than two years from the publication of this document. If the experiment is successful, it is expected that the findings of the experiment will result in an updated document for Standards Track approval.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. ZONEMD RRtype

This document defines a new DNS RR type, ZONEMD, whose value 63 has been allocated by IANA from the "Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" subregistry of the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters" registry:

Type: ZONEMD
Value: 63
Meaning: Message Digest Over Zone Data
Reference: This document
6.2. ZONEMD Digest Type

This document asks IANA to create a new "ZONEMD Digest Types" registry with initial contents as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SHA384</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>[RFC6605]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: ZONEMD Digest Types

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Attacks Against the Zone Digest

The zone digest allows the receiver to verify that the zone contents haven’t been modified since the zone was generated/published. Verification is strongest when the zone is also signed with DNSSEC. An attacker, whose goal is to modify zone content before it is used by the victim, may consider a number of different approaches.

The attacker might perform a downgrade attack to an unsigned zone. This is why Section 4 RECOMMENDS that the verifier determine whether or not to expect DNSSEC signatures for the zone in step 1.

The attacker might perform a downgrade attack by removing the ZONEMD record. This is why Section 4 REQUIRES that the verifier checks DNSSEC denial-of-existence proofs in step 2.

The attacker might alter the Digest Type or Digest fields of the ZONEMD record. Such modifications are detectable only with DNSSEC validation.

7.2. Attacks Utilizing the Zone Digest

Nothing in this specification prevents clients from making, and servers from responding to, ZONEMD queries. One might consider how well ZONEMD responses could be used in a distributed denial-of-service amplification attack.

The ZONEMD RR is moderately sized, much like the DS RR. A single ZONEMD RR contributes approximately 40 to 65 octets to a DNS response, for currently defined digest types. Certainly other query types result in larger amplification effects (i.e., DNSKEY).
8. Privacy Considerations

This specification has no impacts on user privacy.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank David Blacka, Scott Hollenbeck, and Rick Wilhelm for providing feedback on early drafts of this document. Additionally, they thank Joe Abley, Mark Andrews, Olafur Gudmundsson, Paul Hoffman, Evan Hunt, Shumon Huque, Tatuya Jinmei, Burt Kaliski, Shane Kerr, Matt Larson, John Levine, Ed Lewis, Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, Ondrej Sury, Florian Weimer, Tim Wicinski, Paul Wouters, and other members of the dnsop working group for their input.

10. Implementation Status

10.1. Authors’ Implementation

The authors have an open source implementation in C, using the ldns library [ldns-zone-digest]. This implementation is able to perform the following functions:

- Read an input zone and output a zone with the ZONEMD placeholder.
- Compute zone digest over signed zone and update the ZONEMD record.
- Re-compute DNSSEC signature over the ZONEMD record.
- Verify the zone digest from an input zone.

This implementation does not:

- Perform DNSSEC validation of the ZONEMD record.
- Support the Gost digest algorithm.
- Output the ZONEMD record in its defined presentation format.

10.2. Shane Kerr’s Implementation

Shane Kerr wrote an implementation of this specification during the IETF 102 hackathon [ZoneDigestHackathon]. This implementation is in Python and is able to perform the following functions:

- Read an input zone and a output zone with ZONEMD record.
- Verify the zone digest from an input zone.
Output the ZONEMD record in its defined presentation format.

Generate Gost digests.

This implementation does not:

- Re-compute DNSSEC signature over the ZONEMD record.
- Perform DNSSEC validation of the ZONEMD record.

11. Change Log

RFC Editor: Please remove this section.

This section lists substantial changes to the document as it is being worked on.

From -00 to -01:

- Removed requirement to sort by RR CLASS.
- Added Kumari and Hardaker as coauthors.
- Added Change Log section.
- Added Kumari and Hardaker as coauthors.
- Added Change Log section.
- Minor clarifications and grammatical edits.

From -01 to -02:

- Emphasize desire for data security over channel security.
- Expanded motivation into its own subsection.
- Removed discussion topic whether or not to include serial in ZONEMD.
- Clarified that a zone’s NS records always sort before the SOA record.
- Clarified that all records in the zone must be digested, except as specified in the exclusion rules.
- Added for discussion out-of-zone and occluded records.
- Clarified that update of ZONEMD signature must not cause a serial number change.
- Added persons to acknowledgments.
From -02 to -03:

- Added recommendation to set ZONEMD TTL to SOA TTL.
- Clarified that digest input uses uncompressed names.
- Updated Implementations section.
- Changed intended status from Standards Track to Experimental and added Scope of Experiment section.
- Updated Motivation, Introduction, and Design Overview sections in response to working group discussion.
- Gave ZONEMD digest types their own status, separate from DS digest types. Request IANA to create a registry.
- Added Reserved field for future work supporting dynamic updates.
- Be more rigorous about having just ONE ZONEMD record in the zone.
- Expanded use cases.

From -03 to -04:

- Added an appendix with example zones and digests.
- Clarified that only apex ZONEMD RRs shall be processed.

From -04 to -05:

- Made SHA384 the only supported ZONEMD digest type.
- Disassociated ZONEMD digest types from DS digest types.
- Updates to Introduction based on list feedback.
- Changed "zone file" to "zone" everywhere.
- Restored text about why ZONEMD has a Serial field.
- Clarified ordering of RRSets having same owner to be numerically ascending.
- Clarified that all duplicate RRs (not just SOA) must be suppressed in digest calculation.
Clarified that the Reserved field must be set to zero and checked for zero in verification.

Clarified that occluded data must be included.

Clarified procedure for verification, using temporary location for received digest.

Explained why Reserved field is 8-bits.

IANA Considerations section now more specific.

Added complex zone to examples.

From -05 to -06:

RR type code 63 was assigned to ZONEMD by IANA.

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Example Zones With Digests

This appendix contains example zones with accurate ZONEMD records. These can be used to verify an implementation of the zone digest protocol.

A.1. Simple EXAMPLE Zone

Here, the EXAMPLE zone contains an SOA record, NS and glue records, and a ZONEMD record.

```
example. 86400 IN SOA ns1 admin 2018031900 ( 1800 900 604800 86400 )
86400 IN NS ns1
86400 IN NS ns2
86400 IN ZONEMD 2018031900 1 0 ( f32765ce15c50477 42a08be15d9a0efb 749417eaadcf087b 1bf751b6bc49f9be a615c4a386cf06a5 d85e2d2182691249 )
ns1 3600 IN A 127.0.0.1
ns2 3600 IN AAAA ::1
```

A.2. Complex EXAMPLE Zone

Here, the EXAMPLE zone contains duplicate RRs, and an occluded RR, and one out-of-zone RR.

```
ns1  3600 IN A  127.0.0.1
ns2  3600 IN AAAA ::1
```
The URI.ARPA zone

The URI.ARPA zone retrieved 2018-10-21.

A.3. The URI.ARPA Zone

The URI.ARPA zone retrieved 2018-10-21.
chHgtwj70mXU72GefVgo8TxrFyXzuEF5ZTP92t97F7VWVvYyF0d86sbB
6DZj3uA2wEvqBVLcGqJLrMQ997vMueJL13UA4h4E6202JYYy0pG9w9ogQ
dkgkkwTYwzogyYfpFmpG9A3G91J2h6cHtFjEZe2MnaY2glniZOWT9vXXd
uFmp0KDK9U77Ac+ZtctAF9tsZwSaOoL365E2L1usZbA+K0BnPnpqGFJRk
5RgA1w==

uri.arpa. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 2 3600 (20181028152832 20181007175821 55480 uri.arpa.
1WpQV/5szQjkXmbcD47/+rOW8kJKPsRFLhxxmzt906+DBYyfrH6uq5X
nHrprU0Q6M12uhqDeL+bDFvgqSpNy+42/OaZvaK3J8ezPZVBPJHykKMV
6378aAiJrAyHzoAEdmzLCpalqGEE2ImzLHSafManRfJL8Yu+JDZf2
WDWFEcUuwmkIZWX11zxpx+DxwzyULr1l7x4+ok5iKZWg5UnBAf6BBT75
WnPz1lCh3f2pX0a5iQy7113Tpx/xhJn6y9j9Gl1Rf5b9jB5zr2a3z2R
PK1098Sn6uWyHyF1mdaV58mQzLGrnCjwvAXA7ho2m+vv4SP5dUdXf+GTeA
1Hd1fw==

uri.arpa. 3600 IN RRSIG SOA 8 2 3600 (20181028114753 20181008222815 47155 uri.arpa.
qny8BN0hDqGdT79U2wU91Iah0S0PogP81G+qwPrzr21BwGiHywuoUa2
Mx6BWZ2lg+Hdyaxj2i1qMs+Ilg0UhXUB071UkJF1grOKGcRAr2tDHRXu
9BUQHy9soV16eWYm3kBTEpynx5Fm8vcdnKAF77sxSY8BbaYNpRIeJdx4A
Juc=)

uri.arpa. 3600 IN NSEC ftp.uri.arpa. NS SOA (MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY)

uri.arpa. 86400 IN NS a.iana-servers.net.

uri.arpa. 86400 IN NS b.iana-servers.net.

uri.arpa. 86400 IN NS c.iana-servers.net.

uri.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns2.lacnic.net.

uri.arpa. 86400 IN MX 10 pechora.icann.org.

uri.arpa. 86400 IN NS sec3.apnic.net.

uri.arpa. 600 IN MX 10 pechora.icann.org.

uri.arpa. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 (AwEAAA5bi7tSart2J599zbWspMNfG70IBw4ziqyY9HM28VCz6WyUK
uXunwjlJbBQ3bClqTLWEnl314B6cTMHrjpTAb5WAw4Gw4CwU8mdcpTIL
Bl6qVRLrX0DFcTzuUYfkwsh1Rbr7rvrxSQhF5r71IzSpwV5jip6SWx
1Hd1fHOb)

uri.arpa. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 (AwEAAAbNVv6ulgRod301MtAehz7j3J3ALrwZgIwesnzy1Ql/7hBRZrQ9Cy
co2I+Dk04Q1NKko4DUIxj8x5Po3GwUD0F9r2/qFi2g0M2zfadbVtWc
3zSdBbi3jQcwcx17Gug9gq1l+pg7mdk9dgDZfIBw0LqntDD8ebLrso/
17dKbajyOGfM12h2f+2h600JZHtYJ3KIULssy5BPSsE0vzo5s6z09
iKXe5u+8WtMgDY49vG80JPAKE7ezMiHh/NSCUIEMEOFRZ83df0q2dy5u5
ym+va8327v8A+Rw94UGn.jKB8zmr803V0ASAmHz/gwu5VboNhLOBwFt
13wpbb+Wpm8=)

uri.arpa. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 (AwEAAAbwFtaCvaUKsXji4gmxxZUUlj1ygbnGahbkmFEE01L6v+TchKR
wcgZVfzXUGa2wMmeAAhgkAoo3U+7tM0psgy8ug/JA1j2DjJHz46bL8d
Fk/qMdVqFpYSHeg2vV5ojkusx4oe4KsaFWYN0czRZgH5oGJ2ajNAG
m3rIm++XChpGskgsCoSY165MizUfffJyyJx1Avons+eCAIiIeQZaqFzJ8R
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e/UJz5EiHpWDS1L7Xe8A0elo1GfPtJx9Zn3bapltaJ5yw5+5XOCkGyY
XmJVVQlwdE=)
ftp.uri.arpa.     3600 IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 3 3600 ( 20181028080856 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
HCl1AgquxzgYkAT7Q/QfNTq8x6yRkP6EPoef9QqO5/2zngwAewXEAIQiyF9 jD1US5jrcMo1lQrS3v3a1dW/LXORS4Ex3hLcKNO1cKHsOuWAqzmE+BPP Arfh8N95jqh/q6vpaB9UtMqK53tM2fYUI1GszOLN0knxbHgDHAh2axMGH 1qM= )
ftp.uri.arpa.     604800 IN      RRSIG   NAPTR 8 3 604800 ( 20181028103644 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
W0Li+vZkkzLoLr2IGznwkJv6Fh6xiWq1DwZP/U/AvWNv7MiiqjSP2af0 9toREr6GoFOiOASNxZ1BGJrRgjmaVOM9U+LZSconP9zrNFD4dU6k5p 5YxiQJ0U0v11ZHFcj61At1ACUIw04ZhytMNd17c8MzEOMepvn7iH7r7 k7k= )
ftp.uri.arpa.     3600 IN      NSEC    http.uri.arpa. NAPTR ( RRSIG NSEC )
ftp.uri.arpa.     604800 IN      NAPTR 0 0 ** " " ( "!*ftp://[(^://?#]*)".*$!*\1!i" . )
http.uri.arpa.     3600 IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 3 3600 ( 20181029010647 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
U03NntQ73LHwpFLmUK8mMqk5sVw5oGw2Kd5yHAYAJqS3vKb5mv77BMe H1+I3z+wtfDM2By5ac/6sdx69HF2J5s16xumycM1Ay6325DTK0bMN+ ift9GkK7C/TcOd2mSp/uzSrYxxg4MQjzBPv1kwXnY3b7eJ8S1IXsB1N7 3b8= )
http.uri.arpa.     604800 IN      RRSIG   NAPTR 8 3 604800 ( 20181029011815 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
T7mmrdag+WSMnGn2n2mtB5Q/Y3vr+rdDnFqY90LN5q32N5k2IyFaj7F 7F Tp56oOznycL4fHrqOe0wRc9NWOCCUec9C7WalgJQcc1Evg0AM+L6f0 RsEJWq6+9yvl1KMKvQ0xQuMx1739uoDl/xiAFQsNDbiQKxWMq4VAlm5 7Zs= )
http.uri.arpa.     3600 IN      NSEC    mailto.uri.arpa. NAPTR ( RRSIG NSEC )
http.uri.arpa.     604800 IN      NAPTR 0 0 ** " " ( "!*http://[(^://?#]*)".*$!*\1!i" . )
mailto.uri.arpa.  3600 IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 3 3600 ( 20181028110727 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
GvxzVL85rEukwGqtuUxek9ipwjBMfTOFIEy7jafC8xhVMS6m6fa/nEM/ lDfsvFtg1cYo35QYuSAYVY13xPbgmxVSLK125QctCFMD+yJuZEnq5cl fQciMR07R+3zn2Fmd88u/snLVw4D+1TB2rJJJbe1Ec8evum7V7819 Z0Y= )
mailto.uri.arpa.  604800 IN      RRSIG   NAPTR 8 3 604800 ( 20181028141825 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
MaADUgc3fc5v+++MYmQgK3JbdflA5rU62hUIlPSF04k37erjICGFf jg+84yc+QgsbDe0PQh5zv9f/+SU5X1S9YdcbsZ2xp2erFpZOTcphrg 916T4vk6i59scojdj016bDy2+mtIPrc1w6b4HuyOUGaJYxdfEuMg Vy4= )
mailto.uri.arpa.  3600 IN      NSEC    urn.uri.arpa. NAPTR ( RRSIG NSEC )
mailto.uri.arpa.  604800 IN      NAPTR 0 0 ** " " ( "!*mailto:.(.*)@(.*)!*$!*\2!i" . )
urn.uri.arpa.     3600 IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 3 3600 ( 20181028123243 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
HgsW4Deops108uWyELG66hp/0EgCnTThahlwiQKnHhO5CSEQrhmFAW eU0kmGAdTEYrSz+skLRTu1TRMWyZyPf40uKzIghGyhZyzHbcwWfuDc/Pd/9 D5156deBwylev5n5wIMsyWQVKnphbJH395gRq2uaJs3LD/qtJ5Dp Lva= )
urn.uri.arpa.     604800 IN      RRSIG   NAPTR 8 3 604800 (
A.4. The ROOT-SERVERS.NET Zone

The ROOT-SERVERS.NET zone retrieved 2018-10-21.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. (nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2018091100 14400 7200 1209600 3600000 )
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS a.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS b.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS c.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS d.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS e.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS f.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS g.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS h.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS i.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS j.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS k.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS l.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN NS m.root-servers.net.
a.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:503:ba3e::2:30
a.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 198.41.0.4
b.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN MX 20 mail.isi.edu.
b.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:200::b
b.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 199.9.14.201
c.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:2::c
c.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.33.4.12
d.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:2d::d
d.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 199.7.91.13
e.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:a8::e
e.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.203.230.10
f.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:2f::f
f.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.5.5.241
g.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:12::d0d
g.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.112.36.4
h.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:1::53
h.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 198.97.190.53
i.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN MX 10 mx.i.root-servers.org.
i.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:7fe::53
i.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.36.148.17
j.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:503:cc27::2:30
j.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 192.58.128.30
k.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:7fd::1
k.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 193.0.14.129
l.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:500:9f::42
l.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 199.7.83.42
m.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN AAAA 2001:dc3::35
m.root-servers.net. 3600000 IN A 202.12.27.33
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. (nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2018091100 14400 7200 1209600 3600000 )
root-servers.net. 3600000 IN ZONEMD 2018091100 1 0 (aadf7a017bccc8c8e6040494800249f5dec3d49e2e8ce8db7522f47f
97f168db794bb5f679f5e0c8433fb66f7a0ce26 )
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