Abstract

This document updates RFC6265 by removing the ability for a non-secure origin to set cookies with a ‘secure’ flag, and to overwrite cookies whose ‘secure’ flag is set. This deprecation improves the isolation between HTTP and HTTPS origins, and reduces the risk of malicious interference.

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Section 8.5 and Section 8.6 of [RFC6265] spell out some of the drawbacks of cookies’ implementation: due to historical accident, non-secure origins can set cookies which will be delivered to secure origins in a manner indistinguishable from cookies set by that origin itself. This enables a number of attacks, which have been recently spelled out in some detail in [COOKIE-INTEGRITY].

We can mitigate the risk of these attacks by making it more difficult for non-secure origins to influence the state of secure origins. Accordingly, this document recommends the deprecation and removal of non-secure origins’ ability to write cookies with a ‘secure’ flag, and their ability to overwrite cookies whose ‘secure’ flag is set.

2. Terminology and notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The "scheme" component of a URI is defined in Section 3 of [RFC3986].

3. Recommendations

This document updates Section 5.3 of [RFC6265] as follows:

1. After step 8 of the current algorithm, which sets the cookie’s "secure-only-flag", execute the following step:

   1. If the "scheme" component of the "request-uri" does not denote a "secure" protocol (as defined by the user agent),
and the cookie’s "secure-only-flag" is "true", then abort these steps and ignore the newly created cookie entirely.

2. Before step 3 of step 11 of the current algorithm, execute the following step:

   1. If the "scheme" component of the "request-uri" does not denote a "secure" protocol (as defined by the user agent), and the "old-cookie"'s "secure-only-flag" is set, then abort these steps and ignore the newly create cookie entirely.

4. Security Considerations

This specification increases a site’s confidence that secure cookies it sets will remain unmodified by insecure pages on hosts which it domain-matches. Ideally, sites would use HSTS as described in [RFC6797] to defend more robustly against the dangers of non-secure transport in general, but until adoption of that protection becomes ubiquitous, this deprecation this document recommends will mitigate a number of risks.

5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

Richard Barnes encouraged a formalization of the deprecation proposal. [COOKIE-INTEGRITY] was a useful exploration of the issues [RFC6265] described.

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