< draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-01.txt   draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-02.txt >
Network Working Group C. Wendt Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft D. Hancock Internet-Draft D. Hancock
Intended status: Standards Track Comcast Intended status: Standards Track Comcast
Expires: April 25, 2019 M. Barnes Expires: September 12, 2019 M. Barnes
iconectiv iconectiv
J. Peterson J. Peterson
Neustar Inc. Neustar Inc.
October 22, 2018 March 11, 2019
TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token
draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-01 draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and
authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to
support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined
by STI certificates. by STI certificates.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 8 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 9
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 9 7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and prove effective control over resources like domain names, and
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates. automates the process of generating and issuing certificates.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general
method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to
control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the
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Section 9, defines the ability to associate a STI certificate with a Section 9, defines the ability to associate a STI certificate with a
specific set of Service Provider Codes (SPCs), Telephone Numbers specific set of Service Provider Codes (SPCs), Telephone Numbers
(TNs), or Telephone Number ranges (TN ranges). Typically, these (TNs), or Telephone Number ranges (TN ranges). Typically, these
identifiers have been assigned to a Communications Service Provider identifiers have been assigned to a Communications Service Provider
(CSP) that is authorized to use a set of telephone numbers or (CSP) that is authorized to use a set of telephone numbers or
telephone number ranges in association with a Service Provider Code telephone number ranges in association with a Service Provider Code
as defined in [RFC8226]. The SPC is a unique code or string managed as defined in [RFC8226]. The SPC is a unique code or string managed
by a national regulatory body that has the authority over those code- by a national regulatory body that has the authority over those code-
to-CSP associations. to-CSP associations.
This document will also incorporate the ability for a telephone
authority to authorize the creation of CA types of certificates for
delegation as defined in [I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList
In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an
ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certification ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certification
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time that the TNAuthList Authority Token expires. time that the TNAuthList Authority Token expires.
5.3. "jti" claim 5.3. "jti" claim
The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList
Authority Token transaction. Authority Token transaction.
5.4. "atc" claim 5.4. "atc" claim
The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this
document. It contains an array of three elements; a string set to document. It contains a JSON object of three elements.
"TNAuthList", the TNAuthList identifier "value" string, and a
fingerprint.
The "fingerprint" value is a fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949] of o a "TNAuthList" key with a string value equal to the TNAuthList
the ACME account credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is identifier "value" string which MUST contain the base64 encoding
a secure one-way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the TN Authorization List certificate extension ASN.1 object.
of the public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create
the account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of o a "ca" key with a boolean value set to either true when the
the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this requested certificate is allowed to be a CA cert for delegation
specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value is uses or false when the requested certificate MUST NOT be a CA cert
represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated and only an end-entity certificate
by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash function.
o a "fingerprint" key with a fingerprint value equal to the
fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949], of the ACME account
credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is a secure one-
way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the
public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create the
account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of
the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this
specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value
is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes,
separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash
function.
An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows, An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows,
{ "typ":"JWT", { "typ":"JWT",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert "x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert
} }
{ {
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz", "iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"jti":"id6098364921", "jti":"id6098364921",
"atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==", "atc":{"TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50: "ca":false,
9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"] "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:
9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}
} }
Similar to the definition for the TNAuthList identifier "value"
string, the identifier value in the "atc" claim must contain the
base64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate extension
ASN.1 object.
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority
The specifics of how the token is acquired from the authority is out Following [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] Section 5, the authority
of the scope of this document token should be acquired using a RESTful HTTP POST transaction as
follows
POST /at/account/:id/token HTTP/1.1
Host: authority.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
The request will pass the account id as a string in the request
parameter "id". This string will be managed as an identifier
specific to the authorities relationship with a CSP. There is
assumed to also be a corresponding authentication procedure that can
be verified for the success of this transaction. For example, an
HTTP authorization header containing a valid authorization
credentials as defined in [RFC2616] Section 14.8.
The body of the POST request MUST contain the "atc" JSON object that
should be embedded in the token that is requested, for example the
body should contain a JSON object as shown:
{
"atc":{"TNAuthList":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"ca":false,
"fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3 \
:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}
}
The response to the POST request if successful MUST return a 200 OK
with a JSON body that contains the TNAuthList Authority Token as a
JSON object with a single key of "ATC" and the base64 encoded string
representing the ATC token.
An example successful response would be as follows:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{"ATC": "DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE"}
If the request is not successful, the response should indicate the
error condition. Specifically, for the case that the authorization
credentials are invalid, the response code MUST be 403 - Forbidden.
If the Account ID provided does not exist or does not match
credentials in Authorization header, the response MUST be 404 -
Invalid account ID. Other 4xx and 5xx responses SHOULD follow
standard [RFC2616] HTTP error condition conventions.
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities
When the Token Authority creates the TnAuthList Authority Token, it When the Token Authority creates the TnAuthList Authority Token, it
is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the
information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents
the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized
to represent. to represent.
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token
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o Verify that the "atc" claim contains the equivalent base64 encoded o Verify that the "atc" claim contains the equivalent base64 encoded
TNAuthList certificate extension string value as the Identifier TNAuthList certificate extension string value as the Identifier
specified in the original challenge. specified in the original challenge.
o Verify that the remaining claims are valid (e.g., verify that o Verify that the remaining claims are valid (e.g., verify that
token has not expired) token has not expired)
o Verify that the "atc" claim "fingerprint" is valid o Verify that the "atc" claim "fingerprint" is valid
o Verify that the "ca" claim boolean corresponds to the CSR request
for either CA certificate or end-entity certificate
If all steps in the token validation process pass, then the CA MUST If all steps in the token validation process pass, then the CA MUST
set the challenge object "status" to "valid". If any step of the set the challenge object "status" to "valid". If any step of the
validation process fails, the "status" in the challenge object MUST validation process fails, the "status" in the challenge object MUST
be set to "invalid". be set to "invalid".
7. Usage Considerations 7. Usage Considerations
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values 7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values
There are many scenarios and reasons to have various combinations of There are many scenarios and reasons to have various combinations of
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We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable
contributions to this document. contributions to this document.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-16 (work in progress), (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-18 (work in progress),
October 2018. December 2018.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]
Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme- Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme-
authority-token-00 (work in progress), July 2018. authority-token-02 (work in progress), March 2019.
[I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation]
Peterson, J., "STIR Certificate Delegation", draft-
peterson-stir-cert-delegation-00 (work in progress), March
2019.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2616>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
 End of changes. 17 change blocks. 
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