< draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11.txt >
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: RFC3370 (if approved) Q. Dang Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Intended status: Standards Track NIST
Expires: October 27, 2019 April 25, 2019 Expires: December 19, 2019 June 17, 2019
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
are also described. are also described.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
* Minor nits.
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID * Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments. assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nit. * Fixed minor text nit.
* Updates in Sec Considerations section. * Updates in Sec Considerations section.
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algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type. Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
corresponding collision and second preimage resistance strengths for And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance
SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively. strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits
respectively.
A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message
authentication code and as the mask generating function in RSASSA- authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in
PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
used in CMS and their meaning. to be used in CMS and their meaning.
2.1. Terminology 2.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Identifiers 3. Identifiers
This section defines six new object identifiers (OIDs) for using This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs) for using
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS. SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.
EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say
the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.
Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
convenience. convenience.
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256
algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the
identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
We define two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs. [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
when it is ready ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures
using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 } TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 } TBD2 }
The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
public keys and signatures. public keys and signatures.
We define two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs. [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
when it is ready ] also defines two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA
signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 } TBD3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 } TBD4 }
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID. component, the OID.
Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as
defined below. defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are
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Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures. be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
4.2. Signatures 4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature. SignerInfo signature field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3. corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for
2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits. 2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.
SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or
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4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash and mask generating algorithm and trailer and salt are embedded hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the
in the OID definition. OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output- the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
64 bytes respectively. respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS- the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
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the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. 256 or 512 bits respectively.
It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA
with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a
deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. these standards. These standards have not specified SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively can be used
instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and
SHA512 used in the standards.
4.3. Public Keys 4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480]. [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
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One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was
requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry: (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry:
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +---------+----------------------+--------------------+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +---------+----------------------+--------------------+
| TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | | TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +---------+----------------------+--------------------+
IANA has assigned four OID identifiers in the SMI Security for PKIX
Algorithms [SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 }
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section
of that document applies to this specification as well. of that document applies to this specification as well.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
various security scenarios. various security scenarios.
skipping to change at page 12, line 19 skipping to change at page 12, line 5
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley- the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017. lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake]
Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-
shake-11 (work in progress), June 2019.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>. 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
skipping to change at page 13, line 11 skipping to change at page 13, line 5
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids] [shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017, Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects- <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>. Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SMI-PKIX]
IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", March 2019,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6>.
[SP800-107] [SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved "SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved
Hash Algorithms", May 2014, Hash Algorithms", May 2014,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/
rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>. rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.
[SP800-78-4] [SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for "SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
skipping to change at page 15, line 25 skipping to change at page 15, line 14
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 } TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 } TBD2 }
-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used -- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier -- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm -- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or -- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or
-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generating -- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generation
-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length -- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
-- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n -- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n
-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST -- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST
-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1, -- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1,
-- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value -- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
-- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being -- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being
-- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, -- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey,
-- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey -- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey
-- type. -- type.
 End of changes. 23 change blocks. 
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