< draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-04.txt   draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-05.txt >
Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft Dell EMC Internet-Draft Dell EMC
Updates: 8465 8422 8261 7568 7562 7525 S. Farrell Updates: 8465 8422 8261 7568 7562 7525 S. Farrell
7507 7465 7030 6750 6749 6739 Trinity College Dublin 7507 7465 7030 6750 6749 6739 Trinity College Dublin
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(if approved) (if approved)
Intended status: Best Current Practice Intended status: Best Current Practice
Expires: November 11, 2019 Expires: December 22, 2019
Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-04 draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-05
Abstract Abstract
This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support
for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. RFCs Updated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. RFCs Updated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . 5 3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . 5
4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1
[RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now [RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now
itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely
to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that
TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3. TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3.
TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0 are also actively being deprecated in accordance
with guidance from government agencies (e.g. NIST SP 80052r2
[NIST800-52r2]) and industry consortia such as the Payment Card
Industry Association (PCI) [PCI-TLS1].
3GPP have deprecated TLSv1.0 and DTLSv1.0 since their release-14 in
2016. [TGPP33310]
The primary technical reasons for deprecating these versions include: The primary technical reasons for deprecating these versions include:
o They require implementation of older cipher suites that are no o They require implementation of older cipher suites that are no
longer desirable for cryptographic reasons, e.g. TLSv1.0 makes longer desirable for cryptographic reasons, e.g. TLSv1.0 makes
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA mandatory to implement TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA mandatory to implement
o Lack of support for current recommended cipher suites, especially o Lack of support for current recommended cipher suites, especially
using AEAD ciphers which are not supported prior to TLSv1.2. using AEAD ciphers which are not supported prior to TLSv1.2.
Note: registry entries for no-longer-desirable ciphersuites remain Note: registry entries for no-longer-desirable ciphersuites remain
in the registries, but many TLS registries are being updated in the registries, but many TLS registries are being updated
through [RFC8447] which denotes such entries as "not recommended." through [RFC8447] which denotes such entries as "not recommended."
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TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant
change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over
the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new
key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites
that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of
operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with
TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably. TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably.
The German Federal Office for Information Security, recommends
against use of TLS versions less than 1.2 in the publication
Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths
[TR-02102-2].
3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1 The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a
downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77 downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin. operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and
SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8465>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8465>.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[Bhargavan2016] [Bhargavan2016]
Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision
Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH
https://www.mitls.org/downloads/ https://www.mitls.org/downloads/
transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016. transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016.
[Canada] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Implementing HTTPS
for Secure Web Connections: Information Technology Policy
Implementation Notice (ITPIN)", June 2018,
<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
secretariat/services/information-technology/
policy-implementation-notices/
implementing-https-secure-web-connections-itpin.html>.
[NIST800-52r2] [NIST800-52r2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/ SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/
sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf", sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf",
2018. 2018.
[PCI-TLS1]
PCI Security Standards Council, "Migrating from SSL and
Early TLS https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf", 2016.
[RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J., and J. [RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J., and J.
Wiljakka, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some Wiljakka, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some
Second and Third Generation Cellular Hosts", RFC 3316, Second and Third Generation Cellular Hosts", RFC 3316,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3316, April 2003, DOI 10.17487/RFC3316, April 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3316>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3316>.
[RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy, [RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489, Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3489, March 2003, DOI 10.17487/RFC3489, March 2003,
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2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261>. 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS [RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018, and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[TGPP33310]
3GPP, "TS 33.310 - Network Domain Security (NDS);
Authentication Framework (AF)", 2016.
[TR-02102-2]
The German Federal Office for Information Security https:/
/www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/
TechGuidelines/TG02102/BSI-TR-02102-2.pdf, "Technical
Guideline TR-02102-2 Cryptographic Mechanisms:
Recommendations and Key Lengths", 2019.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
[[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]] [[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]]
From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-04 to draft-ietf-tls-
oldversions-deprecate-05:
o Removed references to goverment related deprecation statements:
US, Canada, and Germany. NIST documentation rationale remains as
a reference describing the relevent RFCs and justification.
From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02 to draft-ietf-tls- From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02 to draft-ietf-tls-
oldversions-deprecate-03: oldversions-deprecate-03:
o Added 8261 to updates list based on IETF-104 meeting. o Added 8261 to updates list based on IETF-104 meeting.
From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01 to draft-ietf-tls- From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01 to draft-ietf-tls-
oldversions-deprecate-02: oldversions-deprecate-02:
o Correction: 2nd list of referenced RFCs in Section 1.1 aren't o Correction: 2nd list of referenced RFCs in Section 1.1 aren't
informatively refering to tls1.0/1.1 informatively refering to tls1.0/1.1
 End of changes. 12 change blocks. 
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