< draft-marques-pep-handshake-02.txt   draft-marques-pep-handshake-03.txt >
Network Working Group H. Marques Network Working Group H. Marques
Internet-Draft pEp Foundation Internet-Draft pEp Foundation
Intended status: Standards Track B. Hoeneisen Intended status: Standards Track B. Hoeneisen
Expires: September 26, 2019 Ucom.ch Expires: January 8, 2020 Ucom.ch
March 25, 2019 July 07, 2019
pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through
Handshake Handshake
draft-marques-pep-handshake-02 draft-marques-pep-handshake-03
Abstract Abstract
In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key
distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed; the distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed; the
latter to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. latter to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
This document proposes a new method to easily verify a public key is This document proposes a new method to easily verify a public key is
authentic by a Handshake process that allows users to easily authentic by a Handshake process that allows users to easily
authenticate their communication channel. The new method is targeted authenticate their communication channel. The new method is targeted
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 26, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Existing Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The pEp Handshake Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Existing Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Verification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. The pEp Handshake Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. Short, Long and Full Trustword Mapping . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Verification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Display Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. Short, Long and Full Trustword Mapping . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. Display Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key
distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed. distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed.
Examples for key distribution include: Examples for key distribution include:
o Exchange public keys out-of-band before encrypted communication o Exchange public keys out-of-band before encrypted communication
o Use of centralized public key stores (e.g., OpenPGP Key Servers) o Use of centralized public key stores (e.g., OpenPGP Key Servers)
o Ship public keys in-band when communicating o Ship public keys in-band when communicating
To prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, additionally the To prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, additionally the
authenticity of a public key needs to be verified. Methods to authenticity of a public key needs to be verified. Methods to
authenticate public keys of peers include, e.g., to verify digital authenticate public keys of peers include, e.g., to verify digital
signatures of public keys (which may be signed in a hierarchical or signatures of public keys (which may be signed in a hierarchical or
flat manner, e.g., by a Web of Trust (WoT)), to compare the public flat manner, e.g., by a Web of Trust (WoT)), to compare the public
key's fingerprints via a suitable independent channel, or to scan a key's fingerprints via a suitable independent channel, or to scan a
QR mapping of the fingerprint (cf. Section 3). QR mapping of the fingerprint (cf. Section 2).
This document proposes a new method to verify the authenticity of This document proposes a new method to verify the authenticity of
public keys by a Handshake process that allows users to easily verify public keys by a Handshake process that allows users to easily verify
their communication channel. Fingerprints of the involved peers are their communication channel. Fingerprints of the involved peers are
combined and mapped to (common) Trustwords [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]. combined and mapped to (common) Trustwords [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords].
The successful manual comparison of these Trustwords is used to The successful manual comparison of these Trustwords is used to
consider the communication channel as trusted. consider the communication channel as trusted.
The proposed method is already implemented and used in applications The proposed method is already implemented and used in applications
of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This document is of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This document is
targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and Opportunistic targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and Opportunistic
Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in other Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in other
applications as suitable. applications as suitable.
Note: The pEp framework [I-D.birk-pep] proposes to automatize the use Note: The pEp framework [I-D.birk-pep] proposes to automatize the use
of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other
messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow
authentication. authentication.
2. Terms 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Terms
The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:
o Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0 o Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0
to 65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake, to 65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake,
peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved
to ease the comparison. [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] to ease the comparison. [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]
o Trust on First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435] o Trust On First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435], which states: "In a
protocol, TOFU calls for accepting and storing a public key or
credential associated with an asserted identity, without
authenticating that assertion. Subsequent communication that is
authenticated using the cached key or credential is secure against
an MiTM attack, if such an attack did not succeed during the
vulnerable initial communication."
o Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): cf. [RFC4949] o Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. [RFC4949], which states: "A
form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts
and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or
more of the entities involved in a communication association."
3. Problem Statement 2. Problem Statement
To secure a communication channel, in public key cryptography each To secure a communication channel, in public key cryptography each
involved peer needs a key pair. Its public key needs to be shared to involved peer needs a key pair. Its public key needs to be shared to
other peers by some means. However, the key obtained by the receiver other peers by some means. However, the key obtained by the receiver
may have been substituted or tampered with to allow for re-encryption may have been substituted or tampered with to allow for re-encryption
attacks. To prevent such man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, an attacks. To prevent such man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, an
important step is to verify the authenticity of a public key important step is to verify the authenticity of a public key
obtained. obtained.
3.1. Use Cases 2.1. Use Cases
Such a verification process is useful in at least two scenarios: Such a verification process is useful in at least two scenarios:
o Verify channels to peers, e.g., to make sure opportunistically o Verify channels to peers, e.g., to make sure opportunistically
exchanged keys for end-to-end encryption are authentic. exchanged keys for end-to-end encryption are authentic.
o Verify channels between own devices (in multi-device contexts), o Verify channels between own devices (in multi-device contexts),
e.g., for the purpose of importing and synchronizing keys among e.g., for the purpose of importing and synchronizing keys among
different devices belonging to the same user (cf. different devices belonging to the same user (cf.
[E-D.birk-pep-keysync]). This scenario is comparable to Bluetooth [I-D.hoeneisen-pep-keysync]). This scenario is comparable to
pairing before starting data transfers. Bluetooth pairing before starting data transfers.
3.2. Existing Solutions 2.2. Existing Solutions
Current methods to authenticate public keys of peers include: Current methods to authenticate public keys of peers include:
o Digitally signed public keys are verified by a chain of trust. o Digitally signed public keys are verified by a chain of trust.
Two trust models are common in today's implementations. Two trust models are common in today's implementations.
* Signing is carried out hierarchically, e.g. in a Public Key * Signing is carried out hierarchically, e.g. in a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [RFC5280], in which case the verification Infrastructure (PKI) [RFC5280], in which case the verification
is based on a chain of trust with a Trust Anchor (TA) at the is based on a chain of trust with a Trust Anchor (TA) at the
root. root.
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always preferred over security (e.g., the Web of Trust contradicts always preferred over security (e.g., the Web of Trust contradicts
privacy) privacy)
o No central entities o No central entities
Most of today's systems lack easy ways for users to authenticate Most of today's systems lack easy ways for users to authenticate
their communication channel. Some methods leak private data (e.g., their communication channel. Some methods leak private data (e.g.,
their social graph) or depend on central entities. Thus, none of their social graph) or depend on central entities. Thus, none of
today's systems fulfills all of the pEp requirements (cf. above). today's systems fulfills all of the pEp requirements (cf. above).
4. The pEp Handshake Proposal 3. The pEp Handshake Proposal
In pretty Easy privacy (pEp), the proposed approach for peers to In pretty Easy privacy (pEp), the proposed approach for peers to
authenticate each other is to engage in the pEp Handshake. authenticate each other is to engage in the pEp Handshake.
In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 8.2), the same kinds of In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 7.2), the same kinds of
keys as in OpenPGP are used. Such keys include a fingerprint as keys as in OpenPGP are used. Such keys include a fingerprint as
cryptographic hash over the public key. This fingerprint is normally cryptographic hash over the public key. This fingerprint is normally
represented in a hexadecimal form, consisting of ten 4-digit represented in a hexadecimal form, consisting of ten 4-digit
hexadecimal blocks, e.g.: hexadecimal blocks, e.g.:
8E31 EF52 1D47 5183 3E9D EADC 0FFE E7A5 7E5B AD19 8E31 EF52 1D47 5183 3E9D EADC 0FFE E7A5 7E5B AD19
Each block may also be represented in decimal numbers from 0 to 65535 Each block may also be represented in decimal numbers from 0 to 65535
or in other numerical forms, e.g. or in other numerical forms, e.g.
o Hexadecimal: 8E31 o Hexadecimal: 8E31
o Decimal: 36401 o Decimal: 36401
o Binary: 1000111000110001 o Binary: 1000111000110001
4.1. Verification Process 3.1. Verification Process
In the pEp Handshake the fingerprints of any two peers involved are In the pEp Handshake the fingerprints of any two peers involved are
combined and displayed in form of Trustwords combined and displayed in form of Trustwords
[I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] for easy comparison by the involved [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] for easy comparison by the involved
parties. parties.
The default verification process involves three steps: The default verification process involves three steps:
1. Combining fingerprints by XOR function 1. Combining fingerprints by XOR function
Any two peers' fingerprints are combined bit-by-bit using the Any two peers' fingerprints are combined bit-by-bit using the
Exclusive-OR (XOR) function resulting in the Combined Fingerprint Exclusive-OR (XOR) function resulting in the Combined Fingerprint
(CFP). (CFP).
2. Mapping result to Trustwords: 2. Mapping result to Trustwords:
The CFP is then mapped to 16-bit Trustwords (i.e., every 4-digit The CFP is then mapped to 16-bit Trustwords (i.e., every 4-digit
hexadecimal block is mapped to a given Trustword) resulting in hexadecimal block is mapped to a given Trustword) resulting in
the Trustword Mapping (TWM). the Trustword Mapping (TWM).
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Note: In prior implementations of pEp the fingerprints of any two Note: In prior implementations of pEp the fingerprints of any two
peers were concatenated. While this has the advantage that the own peers were concatenated. While this has the advantage that the own
identity's Trustwords can be printed on a business card (like with identity's Trustwords can be printed on a business card (like with
fingerprints) or on contact sites or in signature texts of emails, fingerprints) or on contact sites or in signature texts of emails,
this at the same time has the drawback that users might not carefully this at the same time has the drawback that users might not carefully
compare the words as they start to remember and recognize their compare the words as they start to remember and recognize their
Trustwords in the concatenated mapping. The avoid this undesired Trustwords in the concatenated mapping. The avoid this undesired
training effect, Trustwords for any peer-to-peer combination shall training effect, Trustwords for any peer-to-peer combination shall
(very likely) differ. (very likely) differ.
4.1.1. Short, Long and Full Trustword Mapping 3.1.1. Short, Long and Full Trustword Mapping
The more an ordinary user needs to contribute to a process, the less The more an ordinary user needs to contribute to a process, the less
likely a user will carry out all steps carefully. In particular, it likely a user will carry out all steps carefully. In particular, it
was observed that a simple (manual) comparison of OpenPGP was observed that a simple (manual) comparison of OpenPGP
fingerprints is rarely carried out to the full extent, i.e., mostly fingerprints is rarely carried out to the full extent, i.e., mostly
only parts of the fingerprint are compared, if at all. only parts of the fingerprint are compared, if at all.
For usability reasons and to create incentives for people to actually For usability reasons and to create incentives for people to actually
carry out a Handshake (while maintaining an certain level of carry out a Handshake (while maintaining an certain level of
entropy), pEp allows for different entropy levels, i.e.: entropy), pEp allows for different entropy levels, i.e.:
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results into at least four Trustwords to be compared by the user. results into at least four Trustwords to be compared by the user.
E.g., the fingerprint E.g., the fingerprint
F482 E952 2F48 618B 01BC [ 31DC 5428 D7FA ACDC 3F13 ] F482 E952 2F48 618B 01BC [ 31DC 5428 D7FA ACDC 3F13 ]
is mapped to is mapped to
dog house brother town fat [ remaining Trustwords omitted ] dog house brother town fat [ remaining Trustwords omitted ]
4.1.2. Display Modes 3.1.2. Display Modes
The pEp Handshake has three display modes for the verification The pEp Handshake has three display modes for the verification
process. All of the following modes MUST be implemented: process. All of the following modes MUST be implemented:
1. S-TWM mode (default) 1. S-TWM mode (default)
By default the S-TWM SHOULD be displayed to the user for By default the S-TWM SHOULD be displayed to the user for
comparison and verification. An easy way to switch to L-TWM mode comparison and verification. An easy way to switch to L-TWM mode
MUST be implemented. An easy way to switch to fingerprint mode MUST be implemented. An easy way to switch to fingerprint mode
(see below) SHOULD be implemented. An easy way to switch to (see below) SHOULD be implemented. An easy way to switch to
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nothing about Trustwords), the fingerprint mode, a fallback to nothing about Trustwords), the fingerprint mode, a fallback to
compare the original fingerprints (usually in hexadecimal form) compare the original fingerprints (usually in hexadecimal form)
MAY be used. An easy way to switch to a least one of the TWM MAY be used. An easy way to switch to a least one of the TWM
modes MUST be implemented. modes MUST be implemented.
If the verification process was successful, the user confirms it, If the verification process was successful, the user confirms it,
e.g. by setting a check mark. Once the user has confirmed it, the e.g. by setting a check mark. Once the user has confirmed it, the
Privacy Status [I-D.marques-pep-rating] for this channel MUST be Privacy Status [I-D.marques-pep-rating] for this channel MUST be
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
5. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
A (global) adversary can pre-generate all Trustwords any two users A (global) adversary can pre-generate all Trustwords any two users
expect to compare and try to engage in MITM attacks which fit - it expect to compare and try to engage in MITM attacks which fit - it
MUST NOT be assumed public keys and thus fingerprints to be something MUST NOT be assumed public keys and thus fingerprints to be something
to stay secret, especially as in pEp public keys are aggressively to stay secret, especially as in pEp public keys are aggressively
distributed to all peers. Also similar Trustwords can be generated, distributed to all peers. Also similar Trustwords can be generated,
which spelled on the phone might sound very similar. which spelled on the phone might sound very similar.
6. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
[[ TODO ]] [[ TODO ]]
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
8. Implementation Status 7. Implementation Status
8.1. Introduction 7.1. Introduction
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
skipping to change at page 9, line 20 skipping to change at page 9, line 39
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist. exist.
According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working
groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit
of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this
information as they see fit." information as they see fit."
8.2. Current software implementing pEp 7.2. Current software implementing pEp
The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying
degrees) already exists: degrees) already exists:
o pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release o pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release
[SRC.pepforoutlook] [SRC.pepforoutlook]
o pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release o pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release
[SRC.pepforandroid] [SRC.pepforandroid]
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pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a
commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp
while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the
pEp Foundation. pEp Foundation.
All software is available as Free Software and published also in All software is available as Free Software and published also in
source form. source form.
Handshake is already implemented in all platforms listed above. Handshake is already implemented in all platforms listed above.
9. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Volker Birk and Leon Schumacher who developed the Special thanks to Volker Birk and Leon Schumacher who developed the
original concept of the pEp Handshake. original concept of the pEp Handshake.
This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed
and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net
Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet] Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet]
10. References 9. References
10.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[I-D.birk-pep] [I-D.birk-pep]
Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress), Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress),
March 2019. March 2019.
[I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]
Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA
Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA
Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-03 (work in Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-03 (work in
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection [RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>. December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
10.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[E-D.birk-pep-keysync]
Birk, V. and H. Marques, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Key
Synchronization Protocol", June 2018,
<https://pep.foundation/dev/repos/internet-
drafts/file/tip/pep-keysync/
draft-birk-pep-keysync-NN.txt>.
Early draft [I-D.hoeneisen-pep-keysync]
Hoeneisen, B. and H. Marques, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
Key Synchronization Protocol", draft-hoeneisen-pep-
keysync-00 (work in progress), July 2019.
[I-D.marques-pep-rating] [I-D.marques-pep-rating]
Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
Mapping of Privacy Rating", draft-marques-pep-rating-01 Mapping of Privacy Rating", draft-marques-pep-rating-01
(work in progress), March 2019. (work in progress), March 2019.
[ISOC.bnet] [ISOC.bnet]
Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects
Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy
via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's
skipping to change at page 11, line 36 skipping to change at page 11, line 48
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[signal] "Signal", n.d., <https://signal.org/>. [signal] "Signal", n.d., <https://signal.org/>.
[SRC.enigmailpep] [SRC.enigmailpep]
"Source code for Enigmail/pEp", March 2019, "Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2019,
<https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>. <https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>.
[SRC.pepforandroid] [SRC.pepforandroid]
"Source code for pEp for Android", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for Android", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>. <https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>.
[SRC.pepforios] [SRC.pepforios]
"Source code for pEp for iOS", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>. <https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>.
[SRC.pepforoutlook] [SRC.pepforoutlook]
"Source code for pEp for Outlook", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>. <https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>.
[threema] "Threema - Seriously secure messaging", n.d., [threema] "Threema - Seriously secure messaging", n.d.,
<https://threema.ch>. <https://threema.ch>.
Appendix A. Document Changelog Appendix A. Document Changelog
[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]] [[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]
o draft-marques-pep-handshake-03:
* Updated Terms and References
o draft-marques-pep-handshake-02: o draft-marques-pep-handshake-02:
* Update Sections "Display modes" and "Short, Long and Full * Update Sections "Display modes" and "Short, Long and Full
Trustword Mapping" Trustword Mapping"
* Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections * Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections
* Minor editorial changes * Minor editorial changes
o draft-marques-pep-handshake-01: o draft-marques-pep-handshake-01:
skipping to change at page 13, line 4 skipping to change at page 13, line 23
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hernani Marques Hernani Marques
pEp Foundation pEp Foundation
Oberer Graben 4 Oberer Graben 4
CH-8400 Winterthur CH-8400 Winterthur
Switzerland Switzerland
Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation
URI: https://pep.foundation/ URI: https://pep.foundation/
Bernie Hoeneisen Bernie Hoeneisen
Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH
CH-8046 Zuerich CH-8046 Zuerich
Switzerland Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 500 52 44 Phone: +41 44 500 52 40
Email: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch) Email: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch)
URI: https://ucom.ch/ URI: https://ucom.ch/
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