< draft-marques-pep-rating-01.txt   draft-marques-pep-rating-02.txt >
Network Working Group H. Marques Network Working Group H. Marques
Internet-Draft pEp Foundation Internet-Draft pEp Foundation
Intended status: Informational B. Hoeneisen Intended status: Informational B. Hoeneisen
Expires: September 12, 2019 Ucom.ch Expires: January 8, 2020 Ucom.ch
March 11, 2019 July 07, 2019
pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating
draft-marques-pep-rating-01 draft-marques-pep-rating-02
Abstract Abstract
In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is
automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to
provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication. provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication.
Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different
peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted, peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted,
encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Per-Message Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Per-Message Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Color Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes . . . 6 2.2. Color Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes . . . 6
3.4.1. Red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.2. No Color . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4.1. Red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.3. Yellow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.2. No Color . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.4. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.3. Yellow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Per-Identity Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.4. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Per-Identity Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation . . . 11 Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation . . . 11
A.1. pEp rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A.1. pEp rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix B. Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix C. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In many Opportunistic Security [RFC7435] scenarios end-to-end In many Opportunistic Security [RFC7435] scenarios end-to-end
encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is
often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out
authentication. authentication.
Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different
identities may have a different Privacy Status, e.g. identities may have a different Privacy Status, e.g.
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applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This
document is targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and document is targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and
Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in
other applications as suitable. other applications as suitable.
Note: The pEp [I-D.birk-pep] framework proposes to automatize the use Note: The pEp [I-D.birk-pep] framework proposes to automatize the use
of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other
messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow
authentication. authentication.
2. Terms 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
o pEp Handshake: The process when Alice - e.g., in-person or via 1.2. Terms
phone - contacts Bob to verify Trustwords (or by fallback:
fingerprints) is called pEp Handshake. The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:
o pEp Handshake: The process of one user contacting another over an
independent channel in order to verify Trustwords (or by fallback:
fingerprints). This can be done in-person or through established
verbal communication channels, like a phone call.
[I-D.marques-pep-handshake] [I-D.marques-pep-handshake]
o Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0 o Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0
to 65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake, to 65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake,
peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved
to ease the comparison. [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] to ease the comparison. [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]
o Trust on First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435] o Trust On First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435], which states: "In a
protocol, TOFU calls for accepting and storing a public key or
credential associated with an asserted identity, without
authenticating that assertion. Subsequent communication that is
authenticated using the cached key or credential is secure against
an MiTM attack, if such an attack did not succeed during the
vulnerable initial communication."
o Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): cf. [RFC4949] o Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. [RFC4949], which states: "A
form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts
and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or
more of the entities involved in a communication association."
3. Per-Message Privacy Rating 2. Per-Message Privacy Rating
3.1. Rating Codes 2.1. Rating Codes
To rate messages (cf. also Appendix A.1), the following 13 Rating To rate messages (cf. also Appendix A.1), the following 13 Rating
codes are defined as scalar values (decimal): codes are defined as scalar values (decimal):
+-------------+------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------+
| Rating code | Rating label | | Rating code | Rating label |
+-------------+------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------+
| -3 | under attack | | -3 | under attack |
| | | | | |
| -2 | broken | | -2 | broken |
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| | | | | |
| 6 | reliable | | 6 | reliable |
| | | | | |
| 7 | trusted | | 7 | trusted |
| | | | | |
| 8 | trusted and anonymized | | 8 | trusted and anonymized |
| | | | | |
| 9 | fully anonymous | | 9 | fully anonymous |
+-------------+------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------+
3.2. Color Codes 2.2. Color Codes
For an Internet user to understand what the available Privacy Status For an Internet user to understand what the available Privacy Status
is, the following colors (traffic-light semantics) are defined: is, the following colors (traffic-light semantics) are defined:
+------------+-------------+ +------------+-------------+
| Color code | Color label | | Color code | Color label |
+------------+-------------+ +------------+-------------+
| -1 | red | | -1 | red |
| | | | | |
| 0 | no color | | 0 | no color |
| | | | | |
| 1 | yellow | | 1 | yellow |
| | | | | |
| 2 | green | | 2 | green |
+------------+-------------+ +------------+-------------+
3.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes 2.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes
Corresponding User Experience (UX) implementations use a surjective Corresponding User Experience (UX) implementations use a surjective
mapping of the Rating Codes into the Color Codes (in traffic light mapping of the Rating Codes into the Color Codes (in traffic light
semantics) as follows: semantics) as follows:
+--------------+------------+-------------+ +--------------+------------+-------------+
| Rating codes | Color code | Color label | | Rating codes | Color code | Color label |
+--------------+------------+-------------+ +--------------+------------+-------------+
| -3 to -1 | -1 | red | | -3 to -1 | -1 | red |
| | | | | | | |
| 0 to 5 | 0 | no color | | 0 to 5 | 0 | no color |
| | | | | | | |
| 6 | 1 | yellow | | 6 | 1 | yellow |
| | | | | | | |
| 7 to 9 | 2 | green | | 7 to 9 | 2 | green |
+--------------+------------+-------------+ +--------------+------------+-------------+
This mapping is used in current pEp implementations to signal the This mapping is used in current pEp implementations to signal the
Privacy Status (cf. Section 6.2). Privacy Status (cf. Section 7.2).
3.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes 2.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes
3.4.1. Red 2.4.1. Red
The red color MUST only be used in three cases: The red color MUST only be used in three cases:
o Rating code -3: A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack could be o Rating code -3: A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack could be
detected. detected.
o Rating code -2: The message was tempered with. o Rating code -2: The message was tempered with.
o Rating code -1: The user explicitly states he mistrusts a peer, o Rating code -1: The user explicitly states he mistrusts a peer,
e.g., because a Handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] mismatched e.g., because a Handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] mismatched
or when the user learns the communication partner was attacked and or when the user learns the communication partner was attacked and
might have gotten the corresponding secret key leaked. might have gotten the corresponding secret key leaked.
3.4.2. No Color 2.4.2. No Color
No specific (or a gray color) MUST be shown in the following cases: No specific (or a gray color) MUST be shown in the following cases:
o Rating code 0: A message can be rendered, but the encryption o Rating code 0: A message can be rendered, but the encryption
status is not clear, i.e., undefined status is not clear, i.e., undefined
o Rating code 1: A message cannot be decrypted (because of an error o Rating code 1: A message cannot be decrypted (because of an error
not covered by rating code 2 below). not covered by rating code 2 below).
o Rating code 2: No key is available to decrypt a message (because o Rating code 2: No key is available to decrypt a message (because
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encrypt a message to a recipient). encrypt a message to a recipient).
o Rating code 4: A message is sent out unencrypted for some of the o Rating code 4: A message is sent out unencrypted for some of the
recipients of a group (because there's at least one recipient in recipients of a group (because there's at least one recipient in
the group whose public key is not available to the sender). the group whose public key is not available to the sender).
o Rating code 5: A message is encrypted, but cryptographic o Rating code 5: A message is encrypted, but cryptographic
parameters (e.g., the cryptographic method employed or key length) parameters (e.g., the cryptographic method employed or key length)
are insufficient. are insufficient.
3.4.3. Yellow 2.4.3. Yellow
o Rating code 6: Whenever a message can be encrypted or decrypted o Rating code 6: Whenever a message can be encrypted or decrypted
with sufficient cryptographic parameters, it's considered with sufficient cryptographic parameters, it's considered
reliable. It is mapped into the yellow color code. reliable. It is mapped into the yellow color code.
3.4.4. Green 2.4.4. Green
o Rating code 7: A message is mapped into the green color code only o Rating code 7: A message is mapped into the green color code only
if a pEp handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully if a pEp handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully
carried out. carried out.
By consequence that means, that the pEp propositions don't strictly By consequence that means, that the pEp propositions don't strictly
follow the TOFU (cf. [RFC7435]) approach, in order to avoid follow the TOFU (cf. [RFC7435]) approach, in order to avoid
signaling trust without peers verifying their channel first. signaling trust without peers verifying their channel first.
In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 6) only rating code 7 is In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 7) only rating code 7 is
achieved. achieved.
The rating codes 8 and 9 are reserved for future use in pEp The rating codes 8 and 9 are reserved for future use in pEp
implementations which also secure meta-data (rating code 8), by using implementations which also secure meta-data (rating code 8), by using
a peer-to-peer framework like GNUnet [GNUnet], and/or allow for fully a peer-to-peer framework like GNUnet [GNUnet], and/or allow for fully
anonymous communications (rating code 9), where sender and receiver anonymous communications (rating code 9), where sender and receiver
don't know each other, but trust between the endpoints could be don't know each other, but trust between the endpoints could be
established nevertheless. established nevertheless.
4. Per-Identity Privacy Rating 3. Per-Identity Privacy Rating
The same Color Codes (red, no color, yellow and green) as for The same Color Codes (red, no color, yellow and green) as for
messages (cf. Section 3.2) MUST be applied for identities (peers), messages (cf. Section 2.2) MUST be applied for identities (peers),
so that a user can easily understand, which identities private so that a user can easily understand, which identities private
communication is possible with. communication is possible with.
The green color code MUST be applied to an identity whom the pEp The green color code MUST be applied to an identity whom the pEp
handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully carried out handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully carried out
with. with.
The yellow color code MUST be set whenever a public key could be The yellow color code MUST be set whenever a public key could be
obtained to securely encrypt messages to an identity, although a MITM obtained to securely encrypt messages to an identity, although a MITM
attack cannot be excluded. attack cannot be excluded.
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available to engage in private communications with an identity. available to engage in private communications with an identity.
The red color code MUST only be used when an identity is marked as The red color code MUST only be used when an identity is marked as
mistrusted. mistrusted.
[[ It's not yet clear if there are proper cases where it makes sense [[ It's not yet clear if there are proper cases where it makes sense
to set an identity automatically to the red color code, as it appears to set an identity automatically to the red color code, as it appears
to be difficult to detect attacks (e.g., secret key leakage) at the to be difficult to detect attacks (e.g., secret key leakage) at the
other endpoint with certainty. ]] other endpoint with certainty. ]]
5. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
[[ TODO ]] [[ TODO ]]
6. Implementation Status 5. Privacy Considerations
6.1. Introduction [[ TODO ]]
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
7. Implementation Status
7.1. Introduction
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 9, line 26
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist. exist.
According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working
groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit
of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this
information as they see fit." information as they see fit."
6.2. Current software implementing pEp 7.2. Current software implementing pEp
The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying
degrees) already exists: degrees) already exists:
o pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release o pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release
[SRC.pepforoutlook] [SRC.pepforoutlook]
o pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release o pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release
[SRC.pepforandroid] [SRC.pepforandroid]
skipping to change at page 9, line 29 skipping to change at page 10, line 5
o pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta [SRC.pepforios] o pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta [SRC.pepforios]
pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a
commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp
while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the
pEp Foundation. pEp Foundation.
All software is available as Free Software and published also in All software is available as Free Software and published also in
source form. source form.
7. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people who have The authors would like to thank the following people who have
provided feedback or significant contributions to the development of provided feedback or significant contributions to the development of
this document: Leon Schumacher and Volker Birk this document: Leon Schumacher and Volker Birk
This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed
and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net
Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet] Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet]
8. References 9. References
8.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[I-D.birk-pep] [I-D.birk-pep]
Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress), Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress),
March 2019. March 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection [RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>. December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
8.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[GNUnet] Grothoff, C., "The GNUnet System", October 2017, [GNUnet] Grothoff, C., "The GNUnet System", October 2017,
<https://grothoff.org/christian/habil.pdf>. <https://grothoff.org/christian/habil.pdf>.
[I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]
Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA
Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA
Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-02 (work in Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-03 (work in
progress), June 2018. progress), March 2019.
[I-D.marques-pep-handshake] [I-D.marques-pep-handshake]
Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake", Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake",
draft-marques-pep-handshake-01 (work in progress), October draft-marques-pep-handshake-02 (work in progress), March
2018. 2019.
[ISOC.bnet] [ISOC.bnet]
Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects
Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy
via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's
protocols", June 2017, <https://www.internetsociety.org/ protocols", June 2017, <https://www.internetsociety.org/
blog/2017/06/12-innovative-projects-selected-for-beyond- blog/2017/06/12-innovative-projects-selected-for-beyond-
the-net-funding/>. the-net-funding/>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[SRC.enigmailpep] [SRC.enigmailpep]
"Source code for Enigmail/pEp", March 2019, "Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2019,
<https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>. <https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>.
[SRC.pepforandroid] [SRC.pepforandroid]
"Source code for pEp for Android", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for Android", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>. <https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>.
[SRC.pepforios] [SRC.pepforios]
"Source code for pEp for iOS", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>. <https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>.
[SRC.pepforoutlook] [SRC.pepforoutlook]
"Source code for pEp for Outlook", March 2019, "Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2019,
<https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>. <https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>.
Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation
This section provides excerpts of the running code from the pEp This section provides excerpts of the running code from the pEp
reference implementation pEp engine (C99 programming language). reference implementation pEp engine (C99 programming language).
A.1. pEp rating A.1. pEp rating
From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/ From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/
skipping to change at page 11, line 44 skipping to change at page 12, line 26
PEP_rating_mistrust = -1, PEP_rating_mistrust = -1,
PEP_rating_b0rken = -2, PEP_rating_b0rken = -2,
PEP_rating_under_attack = -3 PEP_rating_under_attack = -3
} PEP_rating; } PEP_rating;
Appendix B. Document Changelog Appendix B. Document Changelog
[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]] [[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]
o draft-birk-pep-rating-00: o draft-marques-pep-rating-02:
* Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections
* Updated Terms
o draft-marques-pep-rating-01:
* Update references
* Minor edits
o draft-marques-pep-rating-00:
* Initial version * Initial version
Appendix C. Open Issues Appendix C. Open Issues
[[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed [[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed
before publication ]] before publication ]]
o Better explain usage of Color Codes in Per-Identity Privacy Rating o Better explain usage of Color Codes in Per-Identity Privacy Rating
o Decide whether rating code scalars 6 and 7-9 should be raised to o Decide whether rating code scalars 6 and 7-9 should be raised to
leave space for future extensions leave space for future extensions
o Add Security Considerations o Add Security Considerations
o Add more source code excerpts to Appendix o Add more source code excerpts to Appendix
o Add rating codes for secure cryptographic methods and parameters o Add rating codes for secure cryptographic methods and parameters
and reference them and reference them
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hernani Marques Hernani Marques
pEp Foundation pEp Foundation
Oberer Graben 4 Oberer Graben 4
skipping to change at page 12, line 32 skipping to change at page 13, line 25
Switzerland Switzerland
Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation
URI: https://pep.foundation/ URI: https://pep.foundation/
Bernie Hoeneisen Bernie Hoeneisen
Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH
CH-8046 Zuerich CH-8046 Zuerich
Switzerland Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 500 52 44 Phone: +41 44 500 52 40
Email: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch) Email: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch)
URI: https://ucom.ch/ URI: https://ucom.ch/
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