draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-20.txt   draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-21.txt 
6lo P. Thubert, Ed. 6lo P. Thubert, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cisco Internet-Draft Cisco
Updates: 8505 (if approved) B. Sarikaya Updates: 8505 (if approved) B. Sarikaya
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 10 September 2020 M. Sethi Expires: 22 October 2020 M. Sethi
Ericsson Ericsson
R. Struik R. Struik
Struik Security Consultancy Struik Security Consultancy
9 March 2020 20 April 2020
Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-20 draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-21
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol This document updates the 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol
defined in RFC 6775 and RFC 8505. The new extension is called defined in RFC 6775 and RFC 8505. The new extension is called
Address Protected Neighbor Discovery (AP-ND) and it protects the Address Protected Neighbor Discovery (AP-ND) and it protects the
owner of an address against address theft and impersonation attacks owner of an address against address theft and impersonation attacks
in a low-power and lossy network (LLN). Nodes supporting this in a low-power and lossy network (LLN). Nodes supporting this
extension compute a cryptographic identifier (Crypto-ID) and use it extension compute a cryptographic identifier (Crypto-ID) and use it
with one or more of their Registered Addresses. The Crypto-ID with one or more of their Registered Addresses. The Crypto-ID
skipping to change at page 1, line 46 skipping to change at page 1, line 46
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 October 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. BCP 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. BCP 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Additional References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Additional References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Updating RFC 8505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Updating RFC 8505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. New Fields and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. New Fields and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. New Crypto-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. New Crypto-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Updated EARO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Updated EARO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Crypto-ID Parameters Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. Crypto-ID Parameters Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. NDP Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. NDP Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Protocol Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.5. Extensions to the Capability Indication Option . . . . . 11
6. Protocol Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Protocol Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. First Exchange with a 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Protocol Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. NDPSO generation and verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.1. First Exchange with a 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3. Multihop Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. NDPSO generation and verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3. Multihop Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Inheriting from RFC 3971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Related to 6LoWPAN ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.1. Inheriting from RFC 3971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. ROVR Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. Related to 6LoWPAN ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.4. Implementation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.3. ROVR Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.5. Cross-Algorithm and Cross-Protocol Attacks . . . . . . . 20 7.4. Implementation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.6. Compromised 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.5. Cross-Algorithm and Cross-Protocol Attacks . . . . . . . 21
7.6. Compromised 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7. Correlating Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.7. Correlating Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. CGA Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.1. CGA Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2. IPv6 ND option types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2. IPv6 ND option types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.3. Crypto-Type Subregistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.3. Crypto-Type Subregistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.4. New Codepoints Associated to JWK Encoding . . . . . . . . 22 8.4. New Codepoints Associated to JWK Encoding . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.1. COSE Elliptic Curves Registration . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.4.1. JOSE Elliptic Curves Registration . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.2. COSE Algorithms Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.4.2. JOSE Algorithms Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.4.3. JOSE Elliptic Curves Registration . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.4. JOSE Algorithms Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Requirements Addressed in this Document . . . . . . 28 Appendix A. Requirements Addressed in this Document . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. Representation Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Appendix B. Representation Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B.1. Signature Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 B.1. Signature Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B.2. Integer Representation for ECDSA signatures . . . . . . . 29 B.2. Integer Representation for ECDSA signatures . . . . . . . 30
B.3. Alternative Representations of Curve25519 . . . . . . . . 30 B.3. Alternative Representations of Curve25519 . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Neighbor Discovery Optimizations for 6LoWPAN networks [RFC6775] Neighbor Discovery Optimizations for 6LoWPAN networks [RFC6775]
(6LoWPAN ND) adapts the original IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (IPv6 ND) (6LoWPAN ND) adapts the original IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (IPv6 ND)
protocols defined in [RFC4861] and [RFC4862] for constrained low- protocols defined in [RFC4861] and [RFC4862] for constrained low-
power and lossy network (LLN). In particular, 6LoWPAN ND introduces power and lossy network (LLN). In particular, 6LoWPAN ND introduces
a unicast host Address Registration mechanism that reduces the use of a unicast host Address Registration mechanism that reduces the use of
multicast compared to the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) mechanism multicast compared to the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) mechanism
defined in IPv6 ND. 6LoWPAN ND defines a new Address Registration defined in IPv6 ND. 6LoWPAN ND defines a new Address Registration
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use of an address if that address is already registered in the subnet use of an address if that address is already registered in the subnet
(first come first serve). In order to validate address ownership, (first come first serve). In order to validate address ownership,
the registration mechanism enables the 6LR and 6LBR to validate the the registration mechanism enables the 6LR and 6LBR to validate the
association between the registered address of a node, and its association between the registered address of a node, and its
Registration Ownership Verifier (ROVR). The ROVR is defined in Registration Ownership Verifier (ROVR). The ROVR is defined in
"Registration Extensions for 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery" [RFC8505] "Registration Extensions for 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery" [RFC8505]
and it can be derived from the MAC address of the device (using the and it can be derived from the MAC address of the device (using the
64-bit Extended Unique Identifier EUI-64 address format specified by 64-bit Extended Unique Identifier EUI-64 address format specified by
IEEE). However, the EUI-64 can be spoofed, and therefore, any node IEEE). However, the EUI-64 can be spoofed, and therefore, any node
connected to the subnet and aware of a registered-address-to-ROVR connected to the subnet and aware of a registered-address-to-ROVR
mapping could effectively fake the ROVR. This would allow the an mapping could effectively fake the ROVR. This would allow an
attacker to steal the address and redirect traffic for that address. attacker to steal the address and redirect traffic for that address.
[RFC8505] defines an Extended Address Registration Option (EARO) [RFC8505] defines an Extended Address Registration Option (EARO)
option that allows to transport alternate forms of ROVRs, and is a option that transports alternate forms of ROVRs, and is a pre-
pre-requisite for this specification. requisite for this specification.
In this specification, a 6LN generates a cryptographic ID (Crypto-ID) In this specification, a 6LN generates a cryptographic ID (Crypto-ID)
and places it in the ROVR field during the registration of one (or and places it in the ROVR field during the registration of one (or
more) of its addresses with the 6LR(s). Proof of ownership of the more) of its addresses with the 6LR(s). Proof of ownership of the
Crypto-ID is passed with the first registration exchange to a new Crypto-ID is passed with the first registration exchange to a new
6LR, and enforced at the 6LR. The 6LR validates ownership of the 6LR, and enforced at the 6LR. The 6LR validates ownership of the
cryptographic ID before it creates any new registration state, or cryptographic ID before it creates any new registration state, or
changes existing information. changes existing information.
The protected address registration protocol proposed in this document The protected address registration protocol proposed in this document
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2. Terminology 2. Terminology
2.1. BCP 14 2.1. BCP 14
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Abbreviations 2.2. Additional References
The reader may get additional context for this specification from the
following references:
* "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)" [RFC3971],
* "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)" [RFC3972],
* "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6" [RFC4861] ,
* "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration" [RFC4862], and
* "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals " [RFC4919].
2.3. Abbreviations
This document uses the following abbreviations: This document uses the following abbreviations:
6BBR: 6LoWPAN Backbone Router 6BBR: 6LoWPAN Backbone Router
6LBR: 6LoWPAN Border Router 6LBR: 6LoWPAN Border Router
6LN: 6LoWPAN Node 6LN: 6LoWPAN Node
6LR: 6LoWPAN Router 6LR: 6LoWPAN Router
CGA: Cryptographically Generated Address
EARO: Extended Address Registration Option EARO: Extended Address Registration Option
ECDH: Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
CIPO: Crypto-ID Parameters Option CIPO: Crypto-ID Parameters Option
LLN: Low-Power and Lossy Network LLN: Low-Power and Lossy Network
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
JOSE: JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption
JWK: JSON Web Key
JWS: JSON Web Signature
NA: Neighbor Advertisement NA: Neighbor Advertisement
ND: Neighbor Discovery ND: Neighbor Discovery
NDP: Neighbor Discovery Protocol
NDPSO: Neighbor Discovery Protocol Signature Option NDPSO: Neighbor Discovery Protocol Signature Option
NS: Neighbor Solicitation NS: Neighbor Solicitation
ROVR: Registration Ownership Verifier ROVR: Registration Ownership Verifier
RA: Router Advertisement RA: Router Advertisement
RS: Router Solicitation RS: Router Solicitation
RSAO: RSA Signature Option RSAO: RSA Signature Option
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm
SLAAC: Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
TID: Transaction ID TID: Transaction ID
2.3. Additional References
The reader may get additional context for this specification from the
following references:
* "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)" [RFC3971],
* "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)" [RFC3972],
* "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6" [RFC4861] ,
* "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration" [RFC4862], and
* "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals " [RFC4919].
3. Updating RFC 8505 3. Updating RFC 8505
Section 5.3 of [RFC8505] introduces the ROVR that is used to detect Section 5.3 of [RFC8505] introduces the ROVR that is used to detect
and reject duplicate registrations in the DAD process. The ROVR is a and reject duplicate registrations in the DAD process. The ROVR is a
generic object that is designed for both backward compatibility and generic object that is designed for both backward compatibility and
the capability to introduce new computation methods in the future. the capability to introduce new computation methods in the future.
Using a Crypto-ID per this specification is the RECOMMENDED method. Using a Crypto-ID per this specification is the RECOMMENDED method.
Section 7.3 discusses collisions when heterogeneous methods to Section 7.3 discusses collisions when heterogeneous methods to
compute the ROVR field coexist inside a same network. compute the ROVR field coexist inside a same network.
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Modifier: 8-bit unsigned integer. Set to an arbitrary value by the Modifier: 8-bit unsigned integer. Set to an arbitrary value by the
creator of the Crypto-ID. The role of the modifier is to enable creator of the Crypto-ID. The role of the modifier is to enable
the formation of multiple Crypto-IDs from a same key pair, which the formation of multiple Crypto-IDs from a same key pair, which
reduces the traceability and thus improves the privacy of a reduces the traceability and thus improves the privacy of a
constrained node that could not maintain many key-pairs. constrained node that could not maintain many key-pairs.
EARO Length: 8-bit unsigned integer. The option length of the EARO EARO Length: 8-bit unsigned integer. The option length of the EARO
that contains the Crypto-ID associated with the CIPO. that contains the Crypto-ID associated with the CIPO.
Reserved2: 16-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the Reserved2: 8-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the
sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Public Key: A variable-length field, size indicated in the Public Public Key: A variable-length field, size indicated in the Public
Key Length field. JWK-Encoded Public Key [RFC7517]. Key Length field. JWK-encoded Public Key [RFC7517].
Padding: A variable-length field completing the Public Key field to Padding: A variable-length field completing the Public Key field to
align to the next 8-bytes boundary. It MUST be set to zero by the align to the next 8-bytes boundary. It MUST be set to zero by the
sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The implementation of multiple hash functions in a constrained The implementation of multiple hash functions in a constrained
devices may consume excessive amounts of program memory. This devices may consume excessive amounts of program memory. This
specification enables the use of SHA-256 [RFC6234] for all the specification enables the use of SHA-256 [RFC6234] for all the
supported ECC curves. supported ECC curves.
Some code factorization is also possible for the ECC computation Some code factorization is also possible for the ECC computation
itself. [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS] provides information on how to itself. [CURVE-REPR] provides information on how to represent
represent Montgomery curves and (twisted) Edwards curves as curves in Montgomery curves and (twisted) Edwards curves as curves in short-
short-Weierstrass form and illustrates how this can be used to Weierstrass form and illustrates how this can be used to implement
implement elliptic curve computations using existing implementations elliptic curve computations using existing implementations that
that already provide, e.g., ECDSA and ECDH using NIST [FIPS186-4] already provide, e.g., ECDSA and ECDH using NIST [FIPS186-4] prime
prime curves. For more details on representation conventions, we curves. For more details on representation conventions, we refer to
refer to Appendix B. Appendix B.
4.4. NDP Signature Option 4.4. NDP Signature Option
This specification defines the NDP Signature Option (NDPSO). The This specification defines the NDP Signature Option (NDPSO). The
NDPSO carries the signature that proves the ownership of the Crypto- NDPSO carries the signature that proves the ownership of the Crypto-
ID. The format of the NDPSO is illustrated in Figure 3. ID. The format of the NDPSO is illustrated in Figure 3.
As opposed to the RSA Signature Option (RSAO) defined in section 5.2. As opposed to the RSA Signature Option (RSAO) defined in section 5.2.
of SEND [RFC3971], the NDPSO does not have a key hash field. of SEND [RFC3971], the NDPSO does not have a key hash field.
Instead, the leftmost 128 bits of the ROVR field in the EARO are used Instead, the leftmost 128 bits of the ROVR field in the EARO are used
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Reserved1: 5-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the Reserved1: 5-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the
sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Digital Signature Length: 11-bit unsigned integer. The length of Digital Signature Length: 11-bit unsigned integer. The length of
the Digital Signature field in bytes. the Digital Signature field in bytes.
Reserved2: 32-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the Reserved2: 32-bit unsigned integer. It MUST be set to zero by the
sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Digital Signature: A variable-length field containing a digital Digital Signature: A variable-length field containing the JWS-
signature. The length and computation of the digital signature encoded digital signature[RFC7515]. The length and computation of
both depend on the Crypto-Type which is found in the associated the digital signature both depend on the Crypto-Type which is
CIPO. For the values of the Crypto-Type that are defined in this found in the associated CIPO, see Appendix B.2. For the values of
specification, and unless specified otherwise for a future value the Crypto-Type defined in this specification, and for future
of the Crypto-Type, the signature is computed as detailed in values of the Crypto-Type unless specified otherwise, the
Section 6.2. signature is computed as detailed in Section 6.2.
Padding: A variable-length field completing the Digital Signature Padding: A variable-length field completing the Digital Signature
field to align to the next 8-bytes boundary. It MUST be set to field to align to the next 8-bytes boundary. It MUST be set to
zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
4.5. Extensions to the Capability Indication Option
This specification defines 2 new capability bits in the 6CIO, defined
by [RFC7400] for use by the 6LR and 6LBR in IPv6 ND RA messages.
The "A" flag indicates that AP-ND is enabled in the network. It is
set by the 6LBR that serves the network and propagated by the 6LRs.
The "J" flag indicates that the 6LR supports JWK-encoded keys in the
CIPO option.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length = 1 | Reserved |J|A|D|L|B|P|E|G|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: New Capability Bits in the 6CIO
New Option Fields:
J: 1-bit flag. This 6LR supports AP-ND with JWK encoding
A: 1-bit flag. This network supports AP-ND
5. Protocol Scope 5. Protocol Scope
The scope of the protocol specified here is a 6LoWPAN LLN, typically The scope of the protocol specified here is a 6LoWPAN LLN, typically
a stub network connected to a larger IP network via a Border Router a stub network connected to a larger IP network via a Border Router
called a 6LBR per [RFC6775]. A 6LBR has sufficient capability to called a 6LBR per [RFC6775]. A 6LBR has sufficient capability to
satisfy the needs of duplicate address detection. satisfy the needs of duplicate address detection.
The 6LBR maintains registration state for all devices in its attached The 6LBR maintains registration state for all devices in its attached
LLN. Together with the first-hop router (the 6LR), the 6LBR assures LLN. Together with the first-hop router (the 6LR), the 6LBR assures
uniqueness and grants ownership of an IPv6 address before it can be uniqueness and grants ownership of an IPv6 address before it can be
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| |
+-----+ +-----+
| | 6LBR | | 6LBR
+-----+ +-----+
o o o o o o
o o o o o o o o
o o LLN o o o o o LLN o o o
o o o (6LR) o o o (6LR)
o (6LN) o (6LN)
Figure 4: Basic Configuration Figure 5: Basic Configuration
In a mesh network, the 6LR is directly connected to the host device. In a mesh network, the 6LR is directly connected to the host device.
This specification mandates that the peer-wise layer-2 security is This specification mandates that the peer-wise layer-2 security is
deployed so that all the packets from a particular host are securely deployed so that all the packets from a particular host are securely
identifiable by the 6LR. The 6LR may be multiple hops away from the identifiable by the 6LR. The 6LR may be multiple hops away from the
6LBR. Packets are routed between the 6LR and the 6LBR via other 6LBR. Packets are routed between the 6LR and the 6LBR via other
6LRs. This specification mandates that a chain of trust is 6LRs.
established so that a packet that was validated by the first 6LR can
be safely routed by other on-path 6LRs to the 6LBR. This specification mandates that a chain of trust is established so
that a packet that was validated by the first 6LR can be safely
routed by other on-path 6LRs to the 6LBR.
6. Protocol Flows 6. Protocol Flows
The 6LR/6LBR ensures first-come/first-serve by storing the ROVR The 6LR/6LBR ensures first-come/first-serve by storing the ROVR
associated to the address being registered upon the first associated to the address being registered upon the first
registration and rejecting a registration with a different ROVR registration and rejecting a registration with a different ROVR
value. A 6LN can claim any address as long as it is the first to value. A 6LN can claim any address as long as it is the first to
make that claim. After a successful registration, the 6LN becomes make that claim. After a successful registration, the 6LN becomes
the owner of the registered address and the address is bound to the the owner of the registered address and the address is bound to the
ROVR value in the 6LR/6LBR registry. ROVR value in the 6LR/6LBR registry.
This specification protects the ownership of the address. Its use in
a network is signaled by the 6LBR by setting the 'A' flag in the
6CIO. This is echoed by the 6LRs, that also indicate the key
encoding format that they support in another 6CIO flag, currently the
'J' flag for JWK.
When using a ROVR that is a Crypto-ID, a 6LN MUST use a 6LR that
supports the key encoding used in the CIPO. If the 6LR does not
support the Crypto-Type, it MUST reply with an EARO Status 10
"Validation Failed" without a challenge. In that case, the 6LN may
try another Crypto-Type until it falls back to Crypto-Type 0 that
MUST be supported by all 6LRs.
This specification enables the 6LR to challenge the 6LN to verify its This specification enables the 6LR to challenge the 6LN to verify its
ownership of the binding by placing a Crypto-ID in the ROVR. The ownership of the binding by placing a Crypto-ID in the ROVR. The
challenge can happen at any time at the discretion of the 6LR. The challenge can happen at any time at the discretion of the 6LR. The
6LR MUST challenge the 6LN when it creates a binding and when a new 6LR MUST challenge the 6LN when it creates a binding and when a new
registration attempts to change a parameter of the binding that registration attempts to change a parameter of the binding that
identifies the 6LN, for instance its Source Link-Layer Address. The identifies the 6LN, for instance its Source Link-Layer Address. The
verification protects against a rogue that would steal an address and verification protects against a rogue that would steal an address and
attract its traffic, or use it as source address. attract its traffic, or use it as source address.
The challenge can also triggered by the 6LBR, e.g., to enforce a The challenge can also triggered by the 6LBR, e.g., to enforce a
skipping to change at page 13, line 11 skipping to change at page 14, line 11
addresses. The 6LN MAY use the same Crypto-ID to prove the ownership addresses. The 6LN MAY use the same Crypto-ID to prove the ownership
of multiple IPv6 addresses. The 6LN MAY also derive multiple Crypto- of multiple IPv6 addresses. The 6LN MAY also derive multiple Crypto-
IDs from a same key. IDs from a same key.
6.1. First Exchange with a 6LR 6.1. First Exchange with a 6LR
A 6LN registers to a 6LR that is one hop away from it with the "C" A 6LN registers to a 6LR that is one hop away from it with the "C"
flag set in the EARO, indicating that the ROVR field contains a flag set in the EARO, indicating that the ROVR field contains a
Crypto-ID. The Target Address in the NS message indicates the IPv6 Crypto-ID. The Target Address in the NS message indicates the IPv6
address that the 6LN is trying to register [RFC8505]. The on-link address that the 6LN is trying to register [RFC8505]. The on-link
(local) protocol interactions are shown in Figure 5. If the 6LR does (local) protocol interactions are shown in Figure 6. If the 6LR does
not have a state with the 6LN that is consistent with the NS(EARO), not have a state with the 6LN that is consistent with the NS(EARO),
then it replies with a challenge NA (EARO, status=Validation then it replies with a challenge NA (EARO, status=Validation
Requested) that contains a Nonce Option (shown as NonceLR in Requested) that contains a Nonce Option (shown as NonceLR in
Figure 5). Figure 6).
The Nonce option contains a nonce value that, to the extent possible
for the implementation, was never employed in association with the
key pair used to generate the Crypto-ID. This specification inherits
from [RFC3971] that simply indicates that the nonce is a random
value. Ideally, an implementation uses an unpredictable
cryptographically random value [BCP 106]. But that may be
impractical in some LLN scenarios where the devices do not have a
guaranteed sense of time and for which computing complex hashes is
detrimental to the battery lifetime. Alternatively, the device may
use an always-incrementing value saved in the same stable storage as
the key, so they are lost together, and starting at a best effort
random value, either as the nonce value or as a component to its
computation.
The 6LN replies to the challenge with an NS(EARO) that includes a new
Nonce option (shown as NonceLN in Figure 5), the CIPO (Section 4.3),
and the NDPSO containing the signature. Both Nonces are included in
the signed material. This provides a "contributory behavior", so
that either party that knows it generates a good quality nonce knows
that the protocol will be secure.
The 6LR MUST store the information associated to a Crypto-ID on the
first NS exchange where it appears in a fashion that the CIPO
parameters can be retrieved from the Crypto-ID alone.
6LN 6LR 6LN 6LR
| | | |
|<------------------------- RA -------------------------| |<------------------------- RA -------------------------|
| | ^ | | ^
|---------------- NS with EARO (Crypto-ID) ------------>| | |---------------- NS with EARO (Crypto-ID) ------------>| |
| | option | | option
|<- NA with EARO (status=Validation Requested), NonceLR-| | |<- NA with EARO (status=Validation Requested), NonceLR-| |
| | v | | v
|------- NS with EARO, CIPO, NonceLN and NDPSO -------->| |------- NS with EARO, CIPO, NonceLN and NDPSO -------->|
skipping to change at page 14, line 30 skipping to change at page 14, line 42
| | | |
|<------------------- NA with EARO ---------------------| |<------------------- NA with EARO ---------------------|
| | | |
... ...
| | | |
|--------------- NS with EARO (Crypto-ID) ------------->| |--------------- NS with EARO (Crypto-ID) ------------->|
| | | |
|<------------------- NA with EARO ---------------------| |<------------------- NA with EARO ---------------------|
| | | |
Figure 5: On-link Protocol Operation Figure 6: On-link Protocol Operation
The Nonce option contains a nonce value that, to the extent possible
for the implementation, was never employed in association with the
key pair used to generate the Crypto-ID. This specification inherits
from [RFC3971] that simply indicates that the nonce is a random
value. Ideally, an implementation uses an unpredictable
cryptographically random value [BCP 106]. But that may be
impractical in some LLN scenarios where the devices do not have a
guaranteed sense of time and for which computing complex hashes is
detrimental to the battery lifetime.
Alternatively, the device may use an always-incrementing value saved
in the same stable storage as the key, so they are lost together, and
starting at a best effort random value, either as the nonce value or
as a component to its computation.
The 6LN replies to the challenge with an NS(EARO) that includes a new
Nonce option (shown as NonceLN in Figure 6), the CIPO (Section 4.3),
and the NDPSO containing the signature. Both Nonces are included in
the signed material. This provides a "contributory behavior", so
that either party that knows it generates a good quality nonce knows
that the protocol will be secure.
The 6LR MUST store the information associated to a Crypto-ID on the
first NS exchange where it appears in a fashion that the CIPO
parameters can be retrieved from the Crypto-ID alone.
The steps for the registration to the 6LR are as follows: The steps for the registration to the 6LR are as follows:
* Upon the first exchange with a 6LR, a 6LN will be challenged to * Upon the first exchange with a 6LR, a 6LN will be challenged to
prove ownership of the Crypto-ID and the Target Address being prove ownership of the Crypto-ID and the Target Address being
registered in the Neighbor Solicitation message. When a 6LR registered in the Neighbor Solicitation message. When a 6LR
receives a NS(EARO) registration with a new Crypto-ID as a ROVR, receives a NS(EARO) registration with a new Crypto-ID as a ROVR,
and unless the registration is rejected for another reason, it and unless the registration is rejected for another reason, it
MUST challenge by responding with a NA(EARO) with a status of MUST challenge by responding with a NA(EARO) with a status of
"Validation Requested". "Validation Requested".
skipping to change at page 15, line 16 skipping to change at page 16, line 8
steps as the 6LN and rebuilds the Crypto-ID based on the steps as the 6LN and rebuilds the Crypto-ID based on the
parameters in the CIPO. If the rebuilt Crypto-ID matches the parameters in the CIPO. If the rebuilt Crypto-ID matches the
ROVR, the 6LN also verifies the signature contained in the NDPSO ROVR, the 6LN also verifies the signature contained in the NDPSO
option. If at that point the signature in the NDPSO option can be option. If at that point the signature in the NDPSO option can be
verified, then the validation succeeds. Otherwise the validation verified, then the validation succeeds. Otherwise the validation
fails. fails.
* If the 6LR fails to validate the signed NS(EARO), it responds with * If the 6LR fails to validate the signed NS(EARO), it responds with
a status of "Validation Failed". After receiving a NA(EARO) with a status of "Validation Failed". After receiving a NA(EARO) with
a status of "Validation Failed", the registering node SHOULD try a status of "Validation Failed", the registering node SHOULD try
to register an alternate target address in the NS message. and alternate Crypto-Type and if even Crypto-Type 0 fails, it may
try to register a different address in the NS message.
6.2. NDPSO generation and verification 6.2. NDPSO generation and verification
The signature generated by the 6LN to provide proof-of-ownership of The signature generated by the 6LN to provide proof-of-ownership of
the private-key is carried in the NDP Signature Option (NDPSO). It the private-key is carried in the NDP Signature Option (NDPSO). It
is generated by the 6LN in a fashion that depends on the Crypto-Type is generated by the 6LN in a fashion that depends on the Crypto-Type
(see Table 2 in Section 8.3) chosen by the 6LN as follows: (see Table 2 in Section 8.3) chosen by the 6LN as follows:
* Concatenate the following in the order listed: * Concatenate the following in the order listed:
1. The 128-bit Message Type tag [RFC3972] (in network byte 1. The 128-bit Message Type tag [RFC3972] (in network byte
order). For this specification the tag is 0x8701 55c8 0cca order). For this specification the tag is 0x8701 55c8 0cca
dd32 6ab7 e415 f148 84d0. (The tag value has been generated dd32 6ab7 e415 f148 84d0. (The tag value has been generated
by the editor of this specification on random.org). by the editor of this specification on random.org).
2. JWK-encoded public key 2. the CIPO
3. the 16-byte Target Address (in network byte order) sent in the 3. the 16-byte Target Address (in network byte order) sent in the
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message. It is the address which Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message. It is the address which
the 6LN is registering with the 6LR and 6LBR. the 6LN is registering with the 6LR and 6LBR.
4. NonceLR received from the 6LR (in network byte order) in the 4. NonceLR received from the 6LR (in network byte order) in the
Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. The nonce is at least 6 Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. The nonce is at least 6
bytes long as defined in [RFC3971]. bytes long as defined in [RFC3971].
5. NonceLN sent from the 6LN (in network byte order). The nonce 5. NonceLN sent from the 6LN (in network byte order). The nonce
is at least 6 bytes long as defined in [RFC3971]. is at least 6 bytes long as defined in [RFC3971].
6. 1-byte Option Length of the EARO containing the Crypto-ID. 6. 1-byte Option Length of the EARO containing the Crypto-ID.
7. 1-byte Crypto-Type value sent in the CIPO.
* Apply the hash function (if any) specified by the Crypto-Type to * Apply the hash function (if any) specified by the Crypto-Type to
the concatenated data, e.g., hash the resulting data using SHA- the concatenated data, e.g., hash the resulting data using SHA-
256. 256.
* Apply the signature algorithm specified by the Crypto-Type, e.g., * Apply the signature algorithm specified by the Crypto-Type, e.g.,
sign the hash output with ECDSA (if curve P-256 is used) or sign sign the hash output with ECDSA (if curve P-256 is used) or sign
the hash with EdDSA (if curve Ed25519 (PureEdDSA)). the hash with EdDSA (if curve Ed25519 (PureEdDSA)).
The 6LR on receiving the NDPSO and CIPO options first checks that the The 6LR on receiving the NDPSO and CIPO options first checks that the
EARO Length in the CIPO matches the length of the EARO. If so it EARO Length in the CIPO matches the length of the EARO. If so it
regenerates the Crypto-ID based on the CIPO to make sure that the regenerates the Crypto-ID based on the CIPO to make sure that the
leftmost bits up to the size of the ROVR match. leftmost bits up to the size of the ROVR match.
If and only if the check is successful, it tries to verify the If and only if the check is successful, it tries to verify the
signature in the NDPSO option using the following: signature in the NDPSO option using the following:
* Concatenate the following in the order listed: * Concatenate the following in the order listed:
1. 128-bit type tag (in network byte order) 1. The 128-bit Message Type tag specified above (in network byte
2. JWK-encoded public key received in the CIPO order)
2. the CIPO
3. the 16-byte Target Address (in network byte order) received in 3. the 16-byte Target Address (in network byte order) received in
the Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message. It is the address the Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message. It is the address
which the 6LN is registering with the 6LR and 6LBR. which the 6LN is registering with the 6LR and 6LBR.
4. NonceLR sent in the Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. The 4. NonceLR sent in the Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. The
nonce is at least 6 bytes long as defined in [RFC3971]. nonce is at least 6 bytes long as defined in [RFC3971].
5. NonceLN received from the 6LN (in network byte order) in the 5. NonceLN received from the 6LN (in network byte order) in the
NS message. The nonce is at least 6 bytes long as defined in NS message. The nonce is at least 6 bytes long as defined in
[RFC3971]. [RFC3971].
6. 1-byte EARO Length received in the CIPO. 6. 1-byte EARO Length received in the CIPO.
7. 1-byte Crypto-Type value received in the CIPO.
* Apply the hash function (if any) specified by the Crypto-Type * Apply the hash function (if any) specified by the Crypto-Type
indicated by the 6LN in the CIPO to the concatenated data. indicated by the 6LN in the CIPO to the concatenated data.
* Verify the signature with the public-key in the CIPO and the * Verify the signature with the public-key in the CIPO and the
locally computed values using the signature algorithm specified by locally computed values using the signature algorithm specified by
the Crypto-Type. If the verification succeeds, the 6LR propagates the Crypto-Type. If the verification succeeds, the 6LR propagates
the information to the 6LBR using a EDAR/EDAC flow. the information to the 6LBR using a EDAR/EDAC flow.
* Due to the first-come/first-serve nature of the registration, if * Due to the first-come/first-serve nature of the registration, if
skipping to change at page 16, line 49 skipping to change at page 17, line 39
ID and Target Address being registered to their respective ID and Target Address being registered to their respective
abstract database. abstract database.
6.3. Multihop Operation 6.3. Multihop Operation
A new 6LN that joins the network auto-configures an address and A new 6LN that joins the network auto-configures an address and
performs an initial registration to a neighboring 6LR with an NS performs an initial registration to a neighboring 6LR with an NS
message that carries an Address Registration Option (EARO) [RFC8505]. message that carries an Address Registration Option (EARO) [RFC8505].
In a multihop 6LoWPAN, the registration with Crypto-ID is propagated In a multihop 6LoWPAN, the registration with Crypto-ID is propagated
to 6LBR as shown in Figure 6, which illustrates the registration flow to 6LBR as shown in Figure 7, which illustrates the registration flow
all the way to a 6LowPAN Backbone Router (6BBR) [BACKBONE-ROUTER]. all the way to a 6LowPAN Backbone Router (6BBR) [BACKBONE-ROUTER].
The 6LR and the 6LBR communicate using ICMPv6 Extended Duplicate The 6LR and the 6LBR communicate using ICMPv6 Extended Duplicate
Address Request (EDAR) and Extended Duplicate Address Confirmation Address Request (EDAR) and Extended Duplicate Address Confirmation
(EDAC) messages [RFC8505] as shown in Figure 6. This specification (EDAC) messages [RFC8505] as shown in Figure 7. This specification
extends EDAR/EDAC messages to carry cryptographically generated ROVR. extends EDAR/EDAC messages to carry cryptographically generated ROVR.
The assumption is that the 6LR and the 6LBR maintain a security The assumption is that the 6LR and the 6LBR maintain a security
association to authenticate and protect the integrity of the EDAR and association to authenticate and protect the integrity of the EDAR and
EDAC messages, so there is no need to propagate the proof of EDAC messages, so there is no need to propagate the proof of
ownership to the 6LBR. The 6LBR implicitly trusts that the 6LR ownership to the 6LBR. The 6LBR implicitly trusts that the 6LR
performs the verification when the 6LBR requires it, and if there is performs the verification when the 6LBR requires it, and if there is
no further exchange from the 6LR to remove the state, that the no further exchange from the 6LR to remove the state, that the
verification succeeded. verification succeeded.
skipping to change at page 17, line 40 skipping to change at page 18, line 35
| | | | <wait> | | | | <wait>
| | | | | | | |
| | | proxy NA(EARO) | | | | proxy NA(EARO) |
| | |<---------------| | | |<---------------|
| | Extended DAC | | | | Extended DAC | |
| |<--------------| | | |<--------------| |
| NA(EARO) | | | | NA(EARO) | | |
|<---------------| | | |<---------------| | |
| | | | | | | |
Figure 6: (Re-)Registration Flow Figure 7: (Re-)Registration Flow
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
7.1. Inheriting from RFC 3971 7.1. Inheriting from RFC 3971
Observations regarding the following threats to the local network in Observations regarding the following threats to the local network in
[RFC3971] also apply to this specification. [RFC3971] also apply to this specification.
Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing: Threats in section Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing: Threats in section
9.2.1 of RFC3971 apply. AP-ND counters the threats on NS(EARO) 9.2.1 of RFC3971 apply. AP-ND counters the threats on NS(EARO)
skipping to change at page 22, line 15 skipping to change at page 23, line 5
8.3. Crypto-Type Subregistry 8.3. Crypto-Type Subregistry
IANA is requested to create a new subregistry "Crypto-Type IANA is requested to create a new subregistry "Crypto-Type
Subregistry" in the "Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 Subregistry" in the "Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6) Parameters". The registry is indexed by an integer in the (ICMPv6) Parameters". The registry is indexed by an integer in the
interval 0..255 and contains an Elliptic Curve, a Hash Function, a interval 0..255 and contains an Elliptic Curve, a Hash Function, a
Signature Algorithm, and Representation Conventions, as shown in Signature Algorithm, and Representation Conventions, as shown in
Table 2, which together specify a signature scheme. The following Table 2, which together specify a signature scheme. The following
Crypto-Type values are defined in this document: Crypto-Type values are defined in this document:
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Crypto-Type | 0 (ECDSA256) | 1 (Ed25519) | 2 | | Crypto-Type | 0 (ECDSA256) | 1 (Ed25519) | 2 |
| value | | | (ECDSA25519) | | value | | | (ECDSA25519) |
+================+===============+===============+===============+ +================+================+================+================+
| Elliptic curve | NIST P-256 | Curve25519 | Curve25519 | | Elliptic curve | NIST P-256 | Curve25519 | Curve25519 |
| | [FIPS186-4] | [RFC7748] | [RFC7748] | | | [FIPS186-4] | [RFC7748] | [RFC7748] |
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hash function | SHA-256 | SHA-512 | SHA-256 | | Hash function | SHA-256 | SHA-512 | SHA-256 |
| | [RFC6234] | [RFC6234] | [RFC6234] | | | [RFC6234] | [RFC6234] | [RFC6234] |
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Signature | ECDSA | Ed25519 | ECDSA | | Signature | ECDSA | Ed25519 | ECDSA |
| algorithm | [FIPS186-4] | [RFC8032] | [FIPS186-4] | | algorithm | [FIPS186-4] | [RFC8032] | [FIPS186-4] |
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Representation | Weierstrass, | Edwards, | Weierstrass, | | Representation | Weierstrass, | Edwards, | Weierstrass, |
| conventions | uncompressed, | compressed, | compressed, | | conventions | uncompressed, | compressed, | compressed, |
| | MSB/msb first | LSB/lsb first | MSB/msb first | | | MSB/msb first, | LSB/lsb first, | MSB/msb |
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | [RFC7518] | [RFC8037] | first, |
| Defining | This document | This document | This document | | | | | [CURVE-REPR] |
| specification | | | | +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
+----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Defining | This document | This document | This |
| specification | | | document |
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Table 2: Crypto-Types Table 2: Crypto-Types
New Crypto-Type values providing similar or better security may be New Crypto-Type values providing similar or better security may be
defined in the future. defined in the future.
Assignment of new values for new Crypto-Type MUST be done through Assignment of new values for new Crypto-Type MUST be done through
IANA with either "Specification Required" or "IESG Approval" as IANA with either "Specification Required" or "IESG Approval" as
defined in BCP 26 [RFC8126]. defined in BCP 26 [RFC8126].
The "Defining specification" column indicates the document that The "Defining specification" column indicates the document that
defines the length and computation of the digital signature, which defines the length and computation of the digital signature, which
could be this for values defined through "IESG Approval". could be this for values defined through "IESG Approval".
8.4. New Codepoints Associated to JWK Encoding 8.4. New Codepoints Associated to JWK Encoding
Code points are requested for curve Wei25519 and its use with ECDSA, Code points are requested for curve Wei25519 and its use with ECDSA,
using the representation conventions of this document. using the representation conventions of this document.
8.4.1. COSE Elliptic Curves Registration 8.4.1. JOSE Elliptic Curves Registration
This section registers the following value in the IANA "COSE Elliptic
Curves" registry [IANA.COSE.Curves].
Name: Wei25519
Value: TBD (Requested value: -1)
Key Type: EC2 or OKP (where OKP uses the MSB/msb representation of
this specification)
Description: short-Weierstrass curve Wei25519
Change Controller: IESG
Reference: Appendix E.3 of [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS]
Recommended: Yes.
(Note that The "kty" value for Wei25519 may be "OKP" or "EC2".)
8.4.2. COSE Algorithms Registration
This section registers the following value in the IANA "COSE
Algorithms" registry [IANA.COSE.Algorithms].
Name: ECDSA25519
Value: TBD (Requested value: -1)
Description: ECDSA using SHA-256 and curve Wei25519
Change Controller: IESG
Reference: Section 4.3 of [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS]
Recommended: Yes.
8.4.3. JOSE Elliptic Curves Registration
This section registers the following value in the IANA "JSON Web Key This section registers the following value in the IANA "JSON Web Key
Elliptic Curve" registry [IANA.JOSE.Curves]. Elliptic Curve" registry [IANA.JOSE.Curves].
Curve Name: Wei25519 Curve Name: Wei25519
Curve Description: short-Weierstrass curve Wei25519 Curve Description: short-Weierstrass curve Wei25519
JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IESG
Reference: Appendix E.3 of [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS] Reference: Appendix E.3 of [CURVE-REPR]
8.4.4. JOSE Algorithms Registration 8.4.2. JOSE Algorithms Registration
This section registers the following value in the IANA "JSON Web This section registers the following value in the IANA "JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA.JOSE.Algorithms]. Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA.JOSE.Algorithms].
Algorithm Name: ECDSA25519 Algorithm Name: ECDSA25519
Algorithm Description: ECDSA using SHA-256 and curve Wei25519 Algorithm Description: ECDSA using SHA-256 and curve Wei25519
Algorithm Usage Locations: alg Algorithm Usage Locations: alg
JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IESG
Reference: Section 4.3 of [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS] Reference: Section 4.3 of [CURVE-REPR]
Algorithm Analysis Document(s): Section 4.3 of Algorithm Analysis Document(s): Section 4.3 of [CURVE-REPR]
[CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS]
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Charlie Perkins for his in-depth review and Many thanks to Charlie Perkins for his in-depth review and
constructive suggestions. The authors are also especially grateful constructive suggestions. The authors are also especially grateful
to Robert Moskowitz and Benjamin Kaduk for their comments and to Robert Moskowitz and Benjamin Kaduk for their comments and
discussions that led to many improvements. The authors wish to also discussions that led to many improvements. The authors wish to also
thank Roman Danyliw, Alissa Cooper, Mirja Kuhlewind, Eric Vyncke, thank Roman Danyliw, Alissa Cooper, Mirja Kuhlewind, Eric Vyncke,
Vijay Gurbani, Al Morton and Adam Montville for their constructive Vijay Gurbani, Al Morton and Adam Montville for their constructive
reviews during the IESG process. reviews during the IESG process.
10. Normative References 10. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. [RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012, RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
[RFC7400] Bormann, C., "6LoWPAN-GHC: Generic Header Compression for
IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs)", RFC 7400, DOI 10.17487/RFC7400, November
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7400>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves [RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C. [RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C.
Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power
Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor
Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018, Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[FIPS186-4] [FIPS186-4]
FIPS 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal FIPS 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4", US Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4", US
Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and
Technology , July 2013. Technology , July 2013.
[SEC1] SEC1, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0", [SEC1] SEC1, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography , June 2009. Standards for Efficient Cryptography , June 2009.
11. Informative references 11. Informative references
[IANA.COSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms", IANA,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/
cose.xhtml#algorithms.
[IANA.COSE.Curves]
IANA, "COSE Elliptic Curves", IANA,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#elliptic-
curves.
[IANA.JOSE.Algorithms] [IANA.JOSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms", IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
IANA, IANA,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web- https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-
signature-encryption-algorithms. signature-encryption-algorithms.
[IANA.JOSE.Curves] [IANA.JOSE.Curves]
IANA, "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve", IANA, IANA, "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve", IANA,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-key- https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-key-
elliptic-curve. elliptic-curve.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.
[BCP 106] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007, DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007, DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, [RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007, Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 [RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.
[BCP 106] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC7039] Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed., [RFC7039] Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
"Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework", "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",
RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013, RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>.
[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[BCP 201] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm [BCP 201] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms", Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015, BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.
[RFC8037] Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption
(JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037>.
[RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu, [RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu,
"Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017, RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>.
[RFC8065] Thaler, D., "Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation- [RFC8065] Thaler, D., "Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation-
Layer Mechanisms", RFC 8065, DOI 10.17487/RFC8065, Layer Mechanisms", RFC 8065, DOI 10.17487/RFC8065,
February 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8065>. February 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8065>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[BACKBONE-ROUTER] [BACKBONE-ROUTER]
Thubert, P., Perkins, C., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "IPv6 Thubert, P., Perkins, C., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "IPv6
Backbone Router", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Backbone Router", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-6lo-backbone-router-19, 3 March 2020, ietf-6lo-backbone-router-20, 23 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6lo-backbone- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-
router-19>. router-20>.
[CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS] [CURVE-REPR]
Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations", Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve- Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
representations-08, 24 July 2019, representations-09, 9 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
representations-08>. representations-09>.
[breaking-ed25519] [breaking-ed25519]
Samwel, N., Batina, L., Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., and R. Samwel, N., Batina, L., Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., and R.
Susella, "Breaking Ed25519 in WolfSSL", Cryptographers' Susella, "Breaking Ed25519 in WolfSSL", Cryptographers'
Track at the RSA Conference , 2018, Track at the RSA Conference , 2018,
<https://link.springer.com/ <https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_1>. chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_1>.
Appendix A. Requirements Addressed in this Document Appendix A. Requirements Addressed in this Document
skipping to change at page 30, line 19 skipping to change at page 30, line 30
represented as a point of a twisted Edwards curve or as a point of an represented as a point of a twisted Edwards curve or as a point of an
elliptic curve in short-Weierstrass form, via a coordinate elliptic curve in short-Weierstrass form, via a coordinate
transformation (a so-called isomorphic mapping). The parameters of transformation (a so-called isomorphic mapping). The parameters of
the Montgomery curve and the corresponding isomorphic curves in the Montgomery curve and the corresponding isomorphic curves in
twisted Edwards curve and short-Weierstrass form are as indicated twisted Edwards curve and short-Weierstrass form are as indicated
below. Here, the domain parameters of the Montgomery curve below. Here, the domain parameters of the Montgomery curve
Curve25519 and of the twisted Edwards curve Edwards25519 are as Curve25519 and of the twisted Edwards curve Edwards25519 are as
specified in [RFC7748]; the domain parameters of the elliptic curve specified in [RFC7748]; the domain parameters of the elliptic curve
Wei25519 in short-Weierstrass curve comply with Section 6.1.1 of Wei25519 in short-Weierstrass curve comply with Section 6.1.1 of
[FIPS186-4]. For details of the coordinate transformations [FIPS186-4]. For details of the coordinate transformations
referenced above, see [RFC7748] and [CURVE-REPRESENTATIONS]. referenced above, see [RFC7748] and [CURVE-REPR].
General parameters (for all curve models): General parameters (for all curve models):
p 2^{255}-19 p 2^{255}-19
(=0x7fffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff (=0x7fffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff
ffffffed) ffffffed)
h 8 h 8
n n
723700557733226221397318656304299424085711635937990760600195093828 723700557733226221397318656304299424085711635937990760600195093828
5454250989 5454250989
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