draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-11.txt   draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-12.txt 
IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Updates: 2464, 2467, 2470, 2491, 2492, A. Cooper Updates: 2464, 2467, 2470, 2491, 2492, A. Cooper
2497, 2590, 3146, 3315, 3572, Cisco 2497, 2590, 3146, 3315, 3572, Cisco
4291, 4338, 4391, 5072, 5121 D. Thaler 4291, 4338, 4391, 5072, 5121 D. Thaler
(if approved) Microsoft (if approved) Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track W. Liu Intended status: Standards Track W. Liu
Expires: October 29, 2016 Huawei Technologies Expires: January 9, 2017 Huawei Technologies
April 27, 2016 July 8, 2016
Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers
draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-11 draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-12
Abstract Abstract
This document changes the default scheme for generating stable This document changes the recommended default IID generation scheme
Interface Identifiers with SLAAC to that specified in RFC7217, and for cases where SLAAC is used to generate a stable IPv6 address. It
recommends against embedding link-layer addresses in IPv6 Interface recommends using the mechanism specified in RFC7217 in such cases,
Identifiers. It formally updates RFC2464, RFC2467, RFC2470, RFC2491, and recommends embedding stable link-layer addresses in IPv6
RFC2492, RFC2497, RFC2590, RFC3146, RFC3572, RFC4291, RFC4338, Interface Identifiers. It formally updates RFC2464, RFC2467,
RFC4391, RFC5072, and RFC5121, by removing the text in these RFCs RFC2470, RFC2491, RFC2492, RFC2497, RFC2590, RFC3146, RFC3572,
that required the IPv6 Interface Identifiers to be derived from the RFC4291, RFC4338, RFC4391, RFC5072, and RFC5121, by removing the text
underlying link-layer address, and replacing the aforementioned text in these RFCs that required the IPv6 Interface Identifiers to be
with a pointer to this document. Additionally, this document updates derived from the underlying stable link-layer address, and replacing
RFC3315 by specifying additional requirements on the generation of this text with recommendations consistent with those in this
Interface Identifiers used in Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol document. Additionally, this document updates RFC3315 by specifying
version 6 (DHCPv6). It also provides advice to system administrators additional requirements on the generation of Interface Identifiers
who employ manual configuration. This document does not change any used in Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6). It
existing recommendations concerning the use of temporary addresses as also provides advice to system administrators who employ manual
configuration. This document does not change any existing
recommendations concerning the use of temporary addresses as
specified in RFC 4941. specified in RFC 4941.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 28 skipping to change at page 2, line 29
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC . . . . . 4 3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC . . . . . 4
4. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with DHCPv6 . . . . 5 4. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with DHCPv6 . . . . 5
5. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with Manual 5. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with Manual
Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Update to existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Update to existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC4862] specifies Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for [RFC4862] specifies Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for
IPv6 [RFC2460], which typically results in hosts configuring one or IPv6 [RFC2460], which typically results in hosts configuring one or
more "stable" addresses composed of a network prefix advertised by a more "stable" addresses composed of a network prefix advertised by a
local router, and an Interface Identifier (IID) [RFC4291] that local router, and an Interface Identifier (IID) [RFC4291] that
typically embeds a link-layer address (e.g., an IEEE LAN MAC typically embeds a stable link-layer address (e.g., an IEEE LAN MAC
address). address).
In some network technologies and adaptation layers, the use of an IID In some network technologies and adaptation layers, the use of an IID
based on a link-layer address may offer some advantages. For based on a link-layer address may offer some advantages. For
example, the IP-over-IEEE802.15.4 standard in [RFC6775] allows for example, the IP-over-IEEE802.15.4 standard in [RFC6775] allows for
compression of IPv6 addresses when the IID is based on the underlying compression of IPv6 addresses when the IID is based on the underlying
link-layer address. link-layer address.
The security and privacy implications of embedding a link-layer The security and privacy implications of embedding a stable link-
address in an IPv6 IID have been known for some time now, and are layer address in an IPv6 IID have been known for some time now, and
discussed in great detail in [RFC7721]. They include: are discussed in great detail in [RFC7721]. They include:
o Network activity correlation o Network activity correlation
o Location tracking o Location tracking
o Address scanning o Address scanning
o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation
More generally, the reuse of identifiers that have their own More generally, the reuse of identifiers that have their own
semantics or properties across different contexts or scopes can be semantics or properties across different contexts or scopes can be
detrimental for security and privacy detrimental for security and privacy
[I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids]. In the case of traditional [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids]. In the case of traditional
stable IPv6 IIDs, some of the security and privacy implications are stable IPv6 IIDs, some of the security and privacy implications are
dependent on the properties of the underlying link-layer addresses dependent on the properties of the underlying link-layer addresses
(e.g., whether the link-layer address is ephemeral or randomly (e.g., whether the link-layer address is ephemeral or randomly
generated), while other implications (e.g., reduction of the entropy generated), while other implications (e.g., reduction of the entropy
of the IID) depend on the algorithm for generating the IID itself. of the IID) depend on the algorithm for generating the IID itself.
In standardized recommendations for IPv6 IID generation meant to In standardized recommendations for stable IPv6 IID generation meant
achieve particular security and privacy properties, it is therefore to achieve particular security and privacy properties, it is
necessary to recommend against embedding link-layer addresses in IPv6 therefore necessary to recommend against embedding stable link-layer
IIDs. addresses in IPv6 IIDs.
Furthermore, some popular IPv6 implementations have already deviated Furthermore, some popular IPv6 implementations have already deviated
from the traditional stable IID generation scheme to mitigate the from the traditional stable IID generation scheme to mitigate the
aforementioned security and privacy implications [Microsoft]. aforementioned security and privacy implications [Microsoft].
As a result of the aforementioned issues, this document changes the As a result of the aforementioned issues, this document changes the
default IID generation scheme for SLAAC to that specified in recommended default IID generation scheme for generating stable IPv6
[RFC7217], and recommends against embedding link-layer addresses in addresses with SLAAC to that specified in [RFC7217], and recommends
IPv6 Interface Identifiers, such that the aforementioned issues are against embedding stable link-layer addresses in IPv6 Interface
mitigated. That is, this document simply replaces the default Identifiers, such that the aforementioned issues are mitigated. That
algorithm that must be employed when generating stable IPv6 IIDs. is, this document simply replaces the default algorithm that is
recommended to be employed when generating stable IPv6 IIDs.
NOTE: [RFC4291] defines the "Modified EUI-64 format" for IIDs. NOTE: [RFC4291] defines the "Modified EUI-64 format" for IIDs.
Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE
EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an
EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64 EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64
format. format.
In a variety of scenarios, addresses that remain stable for the In a variety of scenarios, addresses that remain stable for the
lifetime of a host's connection to a single subnet, are viewed as lifetime of a host's connection to a single subnet, are viewed as
desirable. For example, stable addresses may be viewed as beneficial desirable. For example, stable addresses may be viewed as beneficial
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Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE
EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an
EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64 EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64
format. format.
In a variety of scenarios, addresses that remain stable for the In a variety of scenarios, addresses that remain stable for the
lifetime of a host's connection to a single subnet, are viewed as lifetime of a host's connection to a single subnet, are viewed as
desirable. For example, stable addresses may be viewed as beneficial desirable. For example, stable addresses may be viewed as beneficial
for network management, event logging, enforcement of access control, for network management, event logging, enforcement of access control,
provision of quality of service, or for server or routing interfaces. provision of quality of service, or for server or routing interfaces.
Similarly, stable addresses (as opposed to temporary addresses Similarly, stable addresses (as opposed to temporary addresses
[RFC4941]) allow for long-lived TCP connections, and are also usually [RFC4941]) allow for long-lived TCP connections, and are also usually
desirable when performing server-like functions (i.e., receiving desirable when performing server-like functions (i.e., receiving
incoming connections). incoming connections).
The recommendations in this document apply only in cases where The recommendations in this document apply only in cases where
implementations otherwise would have configured a stable IPv6 IID implementations otherwise would have configured a stable IPv6 IID
containing a link layer address. That is, this document does not containing a link layer address. For example, this document does not
change any existing recommendations concerning the use of temporary change any existing recommendations concerning the use of temporary
addresses as specified in [RFC4941], nor does it introduce any new addresses as specified in [RFC4941], nor do the recommendations apply
requirements regarding when stable addresses are to be configured. to cases where SLAAC is employed to generate non-stable IPv6
Thus, the recommendations in this document simply improve the addresses (e.g. by embedding a link-layer address that is
security and privacy properties of stable addresses. periodically randomized), nor does it introduce any new requirements
regarding when stable addresses are to be configured. Thus, the
recommendations in this document simply improve the security and
privacy properties of stable addresses.
Finally this document updates [RFC3315] by specifying additional Finally this document updates [RFC3315] by specifying additional
requirements on the generation of Interface Identifiers used in requirements on the generation of Interface Identifiers used in
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6), and also Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6), and also
provides advice to system administrators who employ manual provides advice to system administrators who employ manual
configuration. configuration.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
Stable address: Stable address:
An address that does not vary over time within the same network An address that does not vary over time within the same network
(as defined in [RFC7721]). (as defined in [RFC7721]).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC 3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC
Link layers MUST define a mechanism that provides mitigation of the
security and privacy implications discussed in Section 1. Such
mechanism MUST meet the following requirements:
1. The resulting Interface Identifiers remain stable for each prefix
used with SLAAC within each subnet for the same network
interface. That is, the algorithm generates the same Interface
Identifier when configuring an address (for the same interface)
belonging to the same prefix within the same subnet
2. The resulting Interface Identifiers must change when addresses
are configured for different prefixes. That is, if different
autoconfiguration prefixes are used to configure addresses for
the same network interface card, the resulting Interface
Identifiers must be (statistically) different. This means that,
given two addresses, it must be difficult for an outside entity
to tell whether the addresses have been generated by the same
host.
3. It must be difficult for an outside entity to predict the
Interface Identifiers that will be generated by the algorithm,
even with knowledge of the Interface Identifiers generated for
configuring other addresses.
4. The resulting Interface Identifiers must be semantically opaque.
Nodes SHOULD implement and employ [RFC7217] as the default scheme for Nodes SHOULD implement and employ [RFC7217] as the default scheme for
generating stable IPv6 addresses with SLAAC. A link layer MAY also generating stable IPv6 addresses with SLAAC. A link layer MAY also
define a mechanism that is more efficient and does not comply with define a mechanism for stable IPv6 address generation that is more
the aforementioned requirements. The choice of whether to enable the efficient and does not address the security and privacy
security- and privacy-preserving mechanism or not SHOULD be considerations discussed in Section 1. The choice of whether to
configurable in such a case. enable the security- and privacy-preserving mechanism or not SHOULD
be configurable in such a case.
By default, nodes SHOULD NOT employ IPv6 address generation schemes By default, nodes SHOULD NOT employ IPv6 address generation schemes
that embed the underlying link-layer address in the IID. In that embed a stable link-layer address in the IID. In particular,
particular, this document RECOMMENDS that nodes do not generate IIDs this document RECOMMENDS that nodes do not generate stable IIDs with
with the schemes specified in [RFC2464], [RFC2467], [RFC2470], the schemes specified in [RFC2464], [RFC2467], [RFC2470], [RFC2491],
[RFC2491], [RFC2492], [RFC2497], [RFC2590], [RFC3146], [RFC3572],
[RFC4338], [RFC4391], [RFC5121], and [RFC5072]. The recommendations [RFC2492], [RFC2497], [RFC2590], [RFC3146], [RFC3572], [RFC4338],
in this document override any other recommendations on the generation [RFC4391], [RFC5121], and [RFC5072]. The specific updates to these
of IIDs in the updated RFCs. The specific updates to these documents documents to effectuate this recommendation are included in
to effectuate this recommendation are included in Section 6. Section 6.
4. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with DHCPv6 4. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with DHCPv6
By default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate By default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate
predictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are predictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are
consecutive small numbers). [I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] consecutive small numbers).
specifies one possible algorithm that could be employed to comply [I-D.gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses] specifies one possible
with this requirement. Another possible algorithm would be to select algorithm that could be employed to comply with this requirement.
a pseudo-random value chosen from a discrete uniform distribution, Another possible algorithm would be to select a pseudo-random value
while avoiding the reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453] chosen from a discrete uniform distribution, while avoiding the
[IANA-RESERVED-IID]. reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453] [IANA-RESERVED-IID].
5. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with Manual Configuration 5. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with Manual Configuration
Network administrators should be aware of the security implications Network administrators should be aware of the security implications
of predictable Interface Identifiers [RFC7721], and avoid the use of of predictable Interface Identifiers [RFC7721], and avoid the use of
predictable addresses when the aforementioned issues are of concern. predictable addresses when the aforementioned issues are of concern.
6. Update to existing RFCs 6. Update to existing RFCs
The following subsections clarify how each of the RFCs affected by The following subsections clarify how each of the RFCs affected by
skipping to change at page 6, line 22 skipping to change at page 5, line 44
replaced with the RFC number assigned to this document, and this replaced with the RFC number assigned to this document, and this
note to the RFC Editor should be removed before publication of note to the RFC Editor should be removed before publication of
this document as an RFC. this document as an RFC.
6.1. Update to RFC2464 6.1. Update to RFC2464
The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2464] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2464] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an Ethernet interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an Ethernet interface SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable
link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The following text from Section 6 of [RFC2464]: The following text from Section 6 of [RFC2464]:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Ethernet Address Ethernet Address
The 48 bit Ethernet IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit The 48 bit Ethernet IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit
order. This is the address the interface currently order. This is the address the interface currently
responds to, and may be different from the built-in responds to, and may be different from the built-in
address used to derive the Interface Identifier. address used to derive the Interface Identifier.
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order. This is the address the interface currently order. This is the address the interface currently
responds to. responds to.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.2. Update to RFC2467 6.2. Update to RFC2467
The entire text of Section 5 of [RFC2467] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 5 of [RFC2467] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an FDDI interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an FDDI interface SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable
link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The following text from Section 7 of [RFC2467]: The following text from Section 7 of [RFC2467]:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
FDDI Address FDDI Address
The 48 bit FDDI IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order. The 48 bit FDDI IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order.
This is the address the interface currently responds to, This is the address the interface currently responds to,
and may be different from the built-in address used to and may be different from the built-in address used to
derive the Interface Identifier. derive the Interface Identifier.
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The 48 bit FDDI IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order. The 48 bit FDDI IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order.
This is the address the interface currently responds to. This is the address the interface currently responds to.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.3. Update to RFC2470 6.3. Update to RFC2470
The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2470] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2470] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for a Token Ring interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for a Token Ring interface SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable
link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The following text from Section 6 of [RFC2470]: The following text from Section 6 of [RFC2470]:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Token Ring Address: The 48 bit Token Ring IEEE 802 Token Ring Address: The 48 bit Token Ring IEEE 802
address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the
interface currently responds to, and may be different from interface currently responds to, and may be different from
the built-in address used to derive the Interface the built-in address used to derive the Interface
Identifier. Identifier.
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6.4. Update to RFC2491 6.4. Update to RFC2491
The entire text of Section 5.1, Section 5.1.1, and Section 5.1.2 of The entire text of Section 5.1, Section 5.1.1, and Section 5.1.2 of
[RFC2491] is replaced with the following text: [RFC2491] is replaced with the following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
5.1 Interface Tokens 5.1 Interface Tokens
The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6 The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6
interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. interface SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding
a stable link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface
tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on
a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface
tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses. tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses.
All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length. All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.5. Update to RFC2492 6.5. Update to RFC2492
The entire text of Section 5 (and all the corresponding subsections) The entire text of Section 5 (and all the corresponding subsections)
of of [RFC2492] is replaced with the following text: of of [RFC2492] is replaced with the following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
5.1 Interface Tokens 5.1 Interface Tokens
The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6 The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6
interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. interface SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding
a stable link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface
tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on
a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface
tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses. tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses.
All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length. All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.6. Update to RFC2497 6.6. Update to RFC2497
The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2497] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 4 of [RFC2497] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an ARCnet interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an ARCnet interface SHOULD be
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer
address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
The entire text of Section 8 of [RFC2497] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 8 of [RFC2497] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Interface Identifiers generated as specified in [RFCXXXX] mitigate Interface Identifiers generated as specified in [RFCXXXX] mitigate
the security and privacy implications discussed in Section 1 of the security and privacy implications discussed in Section 1 of
such document. such document.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.7. Update to RFC2590 6.7. Update to RFC2590
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the following text: the following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
4. Stateless Autoconfiguration 4. Stateless Autoconfiguration
An interface identifier [AARCH] for an IPv6 Frame Relay interface An interface identifier [AARCH] for an IPv6 Frame Relay interface
MUST be unique on a Frame Relay link [AARCH], and MUST be unique on MUST be unique on a Frame Relay link [AARCH], and MUST be unique on
each of the virtual links represented by the VCs terminated on the each of the virtual links represented by the VCs terminated on the
interface. interface.
The interface identifier for the Frame Relay interface MUST be The interface identifier for the Frame Relay interface SHOULD be
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer
address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
We note that each virtual circuit in a Frame Relay network is uniquely We note that each virtual circuit in a Frame Relay network is uniquely
identified on a Frame Relay interface by a DLCI. Furthermore, a DLCI identified on a Frame Relay interface by a DLCI. Furthermore, a DLCI
can be seen as an identification of the end point of a virtual circuit can be seen as an identification of the end point of a virtual circuit
on a Frame Relay interface. Since each Frame Relay VC is configured or on a Frame Relay interface. Since each Frame Relay VC is configured or
established separately, and acts like an independent virtual-link established separately, and acts like an independent virtual-link
from other VCs in the network, or on the interface, link, wire or from other VCs in the network, or on the interface, link, wire or
fiber, it seems beneficial to view each VC's termination point on the fiber, it seems beneficial to view each VC's termination point on the
Frame Relay interface as a "pseudo-interface" or "logical-interface" Frame Relay interface as a "pseudo-interface" or "logical-interface"
overlaid on the Frame Relay interface. Furthermore, it seems overlaid on the Frame Relay interface. Furthermore, it seems
skipping to change at page 11, line 8 skipping to change at page 10, line 28
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.8. Update to RFC3146 6.8. Update to RFC3146
The entire Section 6 of [RFC3146] is replaced with the following The entire Section 6 of [RFC3146] is replaced with the following
text: text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6. STATELESS AUTOCONFIGURATION 6. STATELESS AUTOCONFIGURATION
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an IEEE1394 interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an IEEE1394 interface SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable
link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
An IPv6 address prefix used for stateless autoconfiguration [ACONF] An IPv6 address prefix used for stateless autoconfiguration [ACONF]
of an IEEE1394 interface MUST have a length of 64 bits. of an IEEE1394 interface MUST have a length of 64 bits.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.9. Update to RFC3315 6.9. Update to RFC3315
The following text in Section 11 of of [RFC3315]: The following text in Section 11 of of [RFC3315]:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Any address assigned by a server that is based on an EUI-64 Any address assigned by a server that is based on an EUI-64
identifier MUST include an interface identifier with the "u" identifier MUST include an interface identifier with the "u"
(universal/local) and "g" (individual/group) bits of the interface (universal/local) and "g" (individual/group) bits of the interface
identifier set appropriately, as indicated in section 2.5.1 of RFC identifier set appropriately, as indicated in section 2.5.1 of RFC
2373 [5]. 2373 [5].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
is formally replaced with: is formally replaced with:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
By default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate By default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate
predictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are predictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are
consecutive small numbers). [I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] consecutive small numbers). [I-D.gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses]
specifies one possible algorithm that could be employed to comply specifies one possible algorithm that could be employed to comply
with this requirement. Another possible algorithm would be to select with this requirement. Another possible algorithm would be to select
a pseudo-random value chosen from a discrete uniform distribution, a pseudo-random value chosen from a discrete uniform distribution,
while avoiding the reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453] while avoiding the reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453]
[IANA-RESERVED-IID]. [IANA-RESERVED-IID].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Additionally, the following references should be added to Section 26 Additionally, the following references should be added to Section 26
of [RFC3315]: of [RFC3315]:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
[IANA-RESERVED-IID] [IANA-RESERVED-IID]
IANA, "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", IANA, "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-interface-ids>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-interface-ids>.
[RFC5453] Krishnan, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", [RFC5453] Krishnan, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
RFC 5453, DOI 10.17487/RFC5453, February 2009, RFC 5453, DOI 10.17487/RFC5453, February 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5453>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5453>.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] [I-D.gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses]
Gont, F. and S. LIU, "A Method for Generating Semantically Gont, F. and S. LIU, "A Method for Generating Semantically
Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Host Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft-ietf-dhc- Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in progress), April draft-gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in
2015. progress), June 2016.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.10. Update to RFC3572 6.10. Update to RFC3572
The entire text of Section 3 of [RFC3572] is replaced as follows: The entire text of Section 3 of [RFC3572] is replaced as follows:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
3. Interface Identifier 3. Interface Identifier
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for a MAPOS interface MUST be The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for a MAPOS interface SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable
link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Additionally, Section 6.2 ("Uniqueness of Interface Identifiers") of Additionally, Section 6.2 ("Uniqueness of Interface Identifiers") of
[RFC3572] is entirely eliminated. [RFC3572] is entirely eliminated.
6.11. Update to RFC4291 6.11. Update to RFC4291
The entire text of Section 2.5.1 of [RFC4291] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 2.5.1 of [RFC4291] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
skipping to change at page 13, line 17 skipping to change at page 12, line 22
Interface identifiers in IPv6 unicast addresses are used to identify Interface identifiers in IPv6 unicast addresses are used to identify
interfaces on a link. They are required to be unique within a subnet interfaces on a link. They are required to be unique within a subnet
prefix. It is recommended that the same interface identifier not be prefix. It is recommended that the same interface identifier not be
assigned to different nodes on a link. They may also be unique over assigned to different nodes on a link. They may also be unique over
a broader scope. The same interface identifier may be used on a broader scope. The same interface identifier may be used on
multiple interfaces on a single node, as long as they are attached to multiple interfaces on a single node, as long as they are attached to
different subnets. different subnets.
For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary
value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long, and MUST be value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long, and SHOULD
generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. be generated as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer
address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
The details of forming interface identifiers are defined in the The details of forming interface identifiers are defined in the
appropriate "IPv6 over <link>" specification, such as "IPv6 over appropriate "IPv6 over <link>" specification, such as "IPv6 over
Ethernet" [ETHER], and "IPv6 over FDDI" [FDDI]. Ethernet" [ETHER], and "IPv6 over FDDI" [FDDI].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.12. Update to RFC4338 6.12. Update to RFC4338
The entire text of Section 5 (and of all the corresponding The entire text of Section 5 (and of all the corresponding
subsections) of [RFC4338] is replaced with the following text: subsections) of [RFC4338] is replaced with the following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
5. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 5. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] for an Nx_Port MUST be generated The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] for an Nx_Port SHOULD be generated
as specified in [RFCXXXX]. as specified in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer address
in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration MUST be performed as IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration MUST be performed as
specified in [ACONF]. An IPv6 Address Prefix used for stateless specified in [ACONF]. An IPv6 Address Prefix used for stateless
address autoconfiguration of an Nx_Port MUST have a length of 64 address autoconfiguration of an Nx_Port MUST have a length of 64
bits. bits.
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.13. Update to RFC4391 6.13. Update to RFC4391
The entire text of Section 8 of [RFC4391] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 8 of [RFC4391] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
8. IPv6 Stateless Autoconfiguration 8. IPv6 Stateless Autoconfiguration
The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] MUST be generated as specified in The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] SHOULD be generated as specified in
[RFCXXXX]. [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer address in the IID is NOT
RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
6.14. Update to RFC5072 6.14. Update to RFC5072
The entire text of Section 4.1 of [RFC5072] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 4.1 of [RFC5072] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
4.1. Interface Identifier 4.1. Interface Identifier
skipping to change at page 14, line 33 skipping to change at page 13, line 46
Before this Configuration Option is requested, an implementation Before this Configuration Option is requested, an implementation
chooses its tentative interface identifier. The non-zero value of chooses its tentative interface identifier. The non-zero value of
the tentative interface identifier SHOULD be chosen such that the the tentative interface identifier SHOULD be chosen such that the
value is unique to the link and, preferably, consistently value is unique to the link and, preferably, consistently
reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state
machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc.). The machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc.). The
rationale for preferring a consistently reproducible unique interface rationale for preferring a consistently reproducible unique interface
identifier to a completely random interface identifier is to provide identifier to a completely random interface identifier is to provide
stability to global scope addresses (see Appendix A) that can be stability to global scope addresses (see Appendix A) that can be
formed from the interface identifier. Additionally, the tentative formed from the interface identifier. Additionally, the tentative
interface identifier SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. interface identifier SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFC7217].
Embedding a stable link-layer address in the IID is NOT
RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
If neither a unique number nor a random number can be generated, it If neither a unique number nor a random number can be generated, it
is recommended that a zero value be used for the interface identifier is recommended that a zero value be used for the interface identifier
transmitted in the Configure-Request. In this case, the PPP peer may transmitted in the Configure-Request. In this case, the PPP peer may
provide a valid non-zero interface identifier in its response as provide a valid non-zero interface identifier in its response as
described below. Note that if at least one of the PPP peers is able described below. Note that if at least one of the PPP peers is able
to generate separate non-zero numbers for itself and its peer, the to generate separate non-zero numbers for itself and its peer, the
identifier negotiation will succeed. identifier negotiation will succeed.
When a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier When a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier
skipping to change at page 15, line 4 skipping to change at page 14, line 19
When a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier When a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier
Configuration Option and the receiving peer implements this option, Configuration Option and the receiving peer implements this option,
the received interface identifier is compared with the interface the received interface identifier is compared with the interface
identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer. Depending identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer. Depending
on the result of the comparison, an implementation MUST respond in on the result of the comparison, an implementation MUST respond in
one of the following ways: one of the following ways:
If the two interface identifiers are different but the received If the two interface identifiers are different but the received
interface identifier is zero, a Configure-Nak is sent with a non-zero interface identifier is zero, a Configure-Nak is sent with a non-zero
interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer. interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer.
Such a suggested interface identifier MUST be different from the Such a suggested interface identifier MUST be different from the
interface identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer. interface identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer.
It is recommended that the value suggested be consistently It is recommended that the value suggested be consistently
reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state
machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc). machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc).
Additionally, the value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified Additionally, the value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified
in [RFCXXXX]. in [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer address in the IID is
NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
If the two interface identifiers are different and the received If the two interface identifiers are different and the received
interface identifier is not zero, the interface identifier MUST be interface identifier is not zero, the interface identifier MUST be
acknowledged, i.e., a Configure-Ack is sent with the requested acknowledged, i.e., a Configure-Ack is sent with the requested
interface identifier, meaning that the responding peer agrees with interface identifier, meaning that the responding peer agrees with
the interface identifier requested. the interface identifier requested.
If the two interface identifiers are equal and are not zero, If the two interface identifiers are equal and are not zero,
Configure-Nak MUST be sent specifying a different non-zero Configure-Nak MUST be sent specifying a different non-zero
interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer. It interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer. It
is recommended that the value suggested be consistently reproducible is recommended that the value suggested be consistently reproducible
across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state machine across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state machine
(administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc). Additionally, the (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc). Additionally, the
value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX]. value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFC7217].
Embedding a stable link-layer address in the IID is NOT RECOMMENDED
[RFCXXXX].
If the two interface identifiers are equal to zero, the interface If the two interface identifiers are equal to zero, the interface
identifier's negotiation MUST be terminated by transmitting the identifier's negotiation MUST be terminated by transmitting the
Configure-Reject with the interface-identifier value set to zero. In Configure-Reject with the interface-identifier value set to zero. In
this case, a unique interface identifier cannot be negotiated. this case, a unique interface identifier cannot be negotiated.
If a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier If a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier
Configuration Option and the receiving peer does not implement this Configuration Option and the receiving peer does not implement this
option, Configure-Reject is sent. option, Configure-Reject is sent.
skipping to change at page 18, line 14 skipping to change at page 17, line 33
6.15. Update to RFC5121 6.15. Update to RFC5121
The entire text of Section 9.1 of [RFC5121] is replaced with the The entire text of Section 9.1 of [RFC5121] is replaced with the
following text: following text:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
9.1. Interface Identifier 9.1. Interface Identifier
The MS SHOULD generate interface identifiers as specified in The MS SHOULD generate interface identifiers as specified in
[RFCXXXX]. [RFC7217]. Embedding a stable link-layer address in the IID is
NOT RECOMMENDED [RFCXXXX].
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
Additionally, Section 9.2 is replaced as follows: Additionally, Section 9.2 is replaced as follows:
---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ---------------- ---------------- cut here -------------- cut here ----------------
9.2. Duplicate Address Detection 9.2. Duplicate Address Detection
DAD SHOULD be performed as per "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 DAD SHOULD be performed as per "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6
(IPv6)", [RFC4861] and "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration" (IPv6)", [RFC4861] and "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"
[RFC4862]. The IPv6 link over 802.16 is specified in this document [RFC4862]. The IPv6 link over 802.16 is specified in this document
skipping to change at page 19, line 9 skipping to change at page 18, line 44
o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks" o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks"
[RFC4944] [RFC4944]
o "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless o "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)"[RFC6775] Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)"[RFC6775]
o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks"[RFC7428] o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks"[RFC7428]
Future revisions or updates of these documents should take the issues Future revisions or updates of these documents should take the issues
of privacy and security mentioned in Section 1 and explain any design of privacy and security mentioned in Section 1 and explain any design
and engineering considerations that lead to the use of IIDs based on and engineering considerations that lead to the use of stable IIDs
a node's link-layer address. based on a node's link-layer address.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor
can remove this section before publication of this document as an can remove this section before publication of this document as an
RFC. RFC.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
This recommends against the (default) use of predictable Interface This recommends against the (default) use of predictable Interface
Identifiers in IPv6 addresses. It recommends [RFC7217] as the Identifiers in IPv6 addresses. It recommends [RFC7217] as the
default scheme for generating IPv6 stable addresses with SLAAC, such default scheme for generating IPv6 stable addresses with SLAAC, such
that the security and privacy issues of IIDs that embed link-layer that the security and privacy issues of IIDs that embed stable link-
addresses are mitigated. Additionally, it recommends against layer addresses are mitigated. Additionally, it recommends against
predictable IIDs in DHCPv6 and manual configuration predictable IIDs in DHCPv6 and manual configuration
10. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Bob Hinden, The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Bob Hinden,
Ray Hunter and Erik Nordmark, for providing a detailed review of this Ray Hunter and Erik Nordmark, for providing a detailed review of this
document. document.
The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Fred Baker, The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Fred Baker,
Carsten Bormann, Scott Brim, Brian Carpenter, Samita Chakrabarti, Tim Carsten Bormann, Scott Brim, Brian Carpenter, Samita Chakrabarti, Tim
skipping to change at page 22, line 18 skipping to change at page 22, line 12
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.
[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets [RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses]
Gont, F. and S. (Will), "A Method for Generating
Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft-
gont-dhcpv6-stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in
progress), June 2016.
[I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids] [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids]
Gont, F. and I. Arce, "Security and Privacy Implications Gont, F. and I. Arce, "Security and Privacy Implications
of Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols", of Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols",
draft-gont-predictable-numeric-ids-00 (work in progress), draft-gont-predictable-numeric-ids-00 (work in progress),
February 2016. February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses]
Gont, F. and S. LIU, "A Method for Generating Semantically
Opaque Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft-ietf-dhc-
stable-privacy-addresses-02 (work in progress), April
2015.
[IANA-RESERVED-IID] [IANA-RESERVED-IID]
IANA, "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", IANA, "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-interface-ids>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-interface-ids>.
[Microsoft] [Microsoft]
Davies, J., "Understanding IPv6, 3rd. ed", page 83, Davies, J., "Understanding IPv6, 3rd. ed", page 83,
Microsoft Press, 2012, <http://it-ebooks.info/book/1022/>. Microsoft Press, 2012, <http://it-ebooks.info/book/1022/>.
[RFC3572] Ogura, T., Maruyama, M., and T. Yoshida, "Internet [RFC3572] Ogura, T., Maruyama, M., and T. Yoshida, "Internet
Protocol Version 6 over MAPOS (Multiple Access Protocol Protocol Version 6 over MAPOS (Multiple Access Protocol
 End of changes. 43 change blocks. 
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