draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-05.txt   draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-06.txt 
IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Informational W. Liu Intended status: Informational W. Liu
Expires: July 23, 2016 Huawei Technologies Expires: October 6, 2016 Huawei Technologies
T. Anderson T. Anderson
Redpill Linpro Redpill Linpro
January 20, 2016 April 4, 2016
Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments Considered Harmful Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments Considered Harmful
draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-05 draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-06
Abstract Abstract
RFC2460 requires that when a host receives an ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" This document discusses the security implications of the generation
message reporting an MTU smaller than 1280 bytes, the host includes a of IPv6 atomic fragments and a number of interoperability issues
Fragment Header in all subsequent packets sent to that destination,
without reducing the assumed Path-MTU. The simplicity with which
ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" messages can be forged means that an attacker
can leverage this functionality (the generation of IPv6 atomic
fragments) to trigger the use of fragmentation for any arbitrary IPv6
flow, and subsequently perform any fragmentation-based attack. This
document discusses the security implications of the generation of
IPv6 atomic fragments and a number of interoperability issues
associated with IPv6 atomic fragments, and concludes that the associated with IPv6 atomic fragments, and concludes that the
aforementioned functionality is undesirable, thus documenting the aforementioned functionality is undesirable, thus documenting the
motivation for removing this functionality in the revision of the motivation for removing this functionality in the revision of the
core IPv6 protocol specification [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis]. core IPv6 protocol specification.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Security Implications of the Generation of IPv6 Atomic
3. Security Implications of the Generation of IPv6 Atomic
Fragments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fragments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Small Survey of OSes that Fail to Produce IPv6 Appendix A. Small Survey of OSes that Fail to Produce IPv6
Atomic Fragments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Atomic Fragments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC2460] specifies the IPv6 fragmentation mechanism, which allows [RFC2460] specifies the IPv6 fragmentation mechanism, which allows
IPv6 packets to be fragmented into smaller pieces such that they can IPv6 packets to be fragmented into smaller pieces such that they can
fit in the Path-MTU to the intended destination(s). fit in the Path-MTU to the intended destination(s).
Section 5 of [RFC2460] states that, when a host receives an ICMPv6 Section 5 of [RFC2460] states that, when a host receives an ICMPv6
"Packet Too Big" message [RFC4443] advertising an MTU smaller than "Packet Too Big" message [RFC4443] advertising an MTU smaller than
1280 bytes (the minimum IPv6 MTU), the host is not required to reduce 1280 bytes (the minimum IPv6 MTU), the host is not required to reduce
the assumed Path-MTU, but must simply include a Fragment Header in the assumed Path-MTU, but must simply include a Fragment Header in
all subsequent packets sent to that destination. The resulting all subsequent packets sent to that destination. The resulting
packets will thus *not* be actually fragmented into several pieces, packets will thus *not* be actually fragmented into several pieces,
but rather just include a Fragment Header with both the "Fragment but rather be "atomic fragments" [RFC6946] (i.e., just include a
Offset" and the "M" flag set to 0 (i.e., "atomic fragments" Fragment Header with both the "Fragment Offset" and the "M" flag set
[RFC6946]). [RFC6946] requires that these atomic fragments be to 0). [RFC6946] requires that these atomic fragments be essentially
essentially processed by the destination host as non-fragmented processed by the destination host as non-fragmented traffic (since
traffic (since there are not really any fragments to be reassembled). there are not really any fragments to be reassembled). The goal of
The goal of these atomic fragments is simply to convey an appropriate these atomic fragments is simply to convey an appropriate
Identification value to be employed by IPv6/IPv4 translators for the Identification value to be employed by IPv6/IPv4 translators for the
resulting IPv4 fragments. resulting IPv4 fragments.
While atomic fragments might seem rather benign, there are scenarios While atomic fragments might seem rather benign, there are scenarios
in which the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments can be leveraged for in which the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments can be leveraged for
performing a number of attacks against the corresponding IPv6 flows. performing a number of attacks against the corresponding IPv6 flows.
Since there are concrete security implications arising from the Since there are concrete security implications arising from the
generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and there is no real gain in generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and there is no real gain in
generating IPv6 atomic fragments (as opposed to e.g. having IPv6/IPv4 generating IPv6 atomic fragments (as opposed to e.g. having IPv6/IPv4
translators generate a Fragment Identification value themselves), we translators generate a Fragment Identification value themselves), we
conclude that this functionality is undesirable. conclude that this functionality is undesirable.
Section 3 briefly discusses the security implications of the Section 2 briefly discusses the security implications of the
generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and describes a specific Denial generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and describes a specific Denial
of Service (DoS) attack vector that leverages the widespread of Service (DoS) attack vector that leverages the widespread
filtering of IPv6 fragments in the public Internet. Section 4 filtering of IPv6 fragments in the public Internet. Section 3
provides additional considerations regarding the usefulness of provides additional considerations regarding the usefulness of
generating IPv6 atomic fragments. generating IPv6 atomic fragments.
2. Terminology 2. Security Implications of the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments
IPv6 atomic fragments:
IPv6 packets that contain a Fragment Header with the Fragment
Offset set to 0 and the M flag set to 0 (as defined by [RFC6946]).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Security Implications of the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments
The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at
length in [RFC6274] and [I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id]. An length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the
attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of
trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow and fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow and subsequently perform any
subsequently perform any fragmentation-based attack against legacy fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not
IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. implement [RFC6946].
Unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be Unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be
subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic
fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Server B, fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Server B,
and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that
contain extension headers (including fragmentation) contain extension headers (including fragmentation)
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world], some intermediate node [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world], some intermediate node
filters fragments between Host A and Server B. If an attacker sends filters fragments between Host A and Server B. If an attacker sends
a forged ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" (PTB) error message to server B, a forged ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" (PTB) error message to server B,
reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation
skipping to change at page 5, line 5 skipping to change at page 4, line 33
headers, the ICMPv6 payload might not even contain any useful headers, the ICMPv6 payload might not even contain any useful
information on which to perform validation checks. information on which to perform validation checks.
o Upon receipt of one of the aforementioned ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" o Upon receipt of one of the aforementioned ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big"
error messages, the Destination Cache [RFC4861] is usually updated error messages, the Destination Cache [RFC4861] is usually updated
to reflect that any subsequent packets to such destination should to reflect that any subsequent packets to such destination should
include a Fragment Header. This means that a single ICMPv6 include a Fragment Header. This means that a single ICMPv6
"Packet Too Big" error message might affect multiple communication "Packet Too Big" error message might affect multiple communication
instances (e.g., TCP connections) with such destination. instances (e.g., TCP connections) with such destination.
o As noted in Section 4, SIIT [RFC6145] (including derivative o As noted in Section 3, SIIT [RFC6145] (including derivative
protocols such as Stateful NAT64 [RFC6146]) is the only technology protocols such as Stateful NAT64 [RFC6146]) is the only technology
which currently makes use of atomic fragments. Unfortunately, an which currently makes use of atomic fragments. Unfortunately, an
IPv6 node cannot easily limit its exposure to the aforementioned IPv6 node cannot easily limit its exposure to the aforementioned
attack vector by only generating IPv6 atomic fragments towards attack vector by only generating IPv6 atomic fragments towards
IPv4 destinations behind a stateless translator. This is due to IPv4 destinations behind a stateless translator. This is due to
the fact that Section 3.3 of [RFC6052] encourages operators to use the fact that Section 3.3 of [RFC6052] encourages operators to use
a Network-Specific Prefix (NSP) that maps the IPv4 address space a Network-Specific Prefix (NSP) that maps the IPv4 address space
into IPv6. When an NSP is being used, IPv6 addresses representing into IPv6. When an NSP is being used, IPv6 addresses representing
IPv4 nodes (reached through a stateless translator) are IPv4 nodes (reached through a stateless translator) are
indistinguishable from native IPv6 addresses. indistinguishable from native IPv6 addresses.
4. Additional Considerations 3. Additional Considerations
Besides the security assessment provided in Section 3, it is Besides the security assessment provided in Section 2, it is
interesting to evaluate the pros and cons of having an IPv6-to-IPv4 interesting to evaluate the pros and cons of having an IPv6-to-IPv4
translating router rely on the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. translating router rely on the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments.
Relying on the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments implies a reliance Relying on the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments implies a reliance
on: on:
1. ICMPv6 packets arriving from the translator to the IPv6 node 1. ICMPv6 packets arriving from the translator to the IPv6 node
2. The ability of the nodes receiving ICMPv6 PTB messages reporting 2. The ability of the nodes receiving ICMPv6 PTB messages reporting
an MTU smaller than 1280 bytes to actually produce atomic an MTU smaller than 1280 bytes to actually produce atomic
skipping to change at page 6, line 47 skipping to change at page 6, line 26
3. ECMP routing [RFC2992] with more than one translator is employed 3. ECMP routing [RFC2992] with more than one translator is employed
for e.g., redundancy purposes for e.g., redundancy purposes
In such a scenario, if each translator were to select the IPv4 In such a scenario, if each translator were to select the IPv4
Identification on its own (rather than selecting the IPv4 Identification on its own (rather than selecting the IPv4
Identification from the low-order 16-bits of the Fragment Identification from the low-order 16-bits of the Fragment
Identification of IPv6 atomic fragments), this could possibly lead to Identification of IPv6 atomic fragments), this could possibly lead to
IPv4 Identification collisions. However, since a number of IPv4 Identification collisions. However, since a number of
implementations set the IPv6 Fragment Identification according to the implementations set the IPv6 Fragment Identification according to the
output of a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) (see Appendix B of output of a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) (see Appendix B of
[I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id]) and the translator only [RFC7739]) and the translator only employs the low-order 16-bits of
employs the low-order 16-bits of such value, it is very unlikely that such value, it is very unlikely that relying on the Fragment
relying on the Fragment Identification of the IPv6 atomic fragment Identification of the IPv6 atomic fragment will result in a reduced
will result in a reduced IPv4 Identification collision rate (when IPv4 Identification collision rate (when compared to the case where
compared to the case where the translator selects each IPv4 the translator selects each IPv4 Identification on its own).
Identification on its own).
Finally, we note that [RFC6145] is currently the only "consumer" of Finally, we note that [RFC6145] is currently the only "consumer" of
IPv6 atomic fragments, and it correctly and diligently notes (in IPv6 atomic fragments, and it correctly and diligently notes (in
Section 6) the possible interoperability problems of relying on IPv6 Section 6) the possible interoperability problems of relying on IPv6
atomic fragments, proposing as a workaround that leads to more robust atomic fragments, proposing as a workaround that leads to more robust
behavior and simplified code. behavior and simplified code.
5. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor There are no IANA registries within this document.
can remove this section before publication of this document as an
RFC.
6. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document briefly discusses the security implications of the This document briefly discusses the security implications of the
generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and describes a specific Denial generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and describes a specific Denial
of Service (DoS) attack vector that leverages the widespread of Service (DoS) attack vector that leverages the widespread
filtering of IPv6 fragments in the public Internet. It concludes filtering of IPv6 fragments in the public Internet. It concludes
that the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments is an undesirable that the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments is an undesirable
feature, and documents the motivation for removing this functionality feature, and documents the motivation for removing this functionality
from [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis]. from [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis].
7. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Congxiao Bao, The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Congxiao Bao,
Bob Briscoe, Brian Carpenter, Tatuya Jinmei, Bob Hinden, Alberto Bob Briscoe, Brian Carpenter, Tatuya Jinmei, Bob Hinden, Alberto
Leiva, Xing Li, Jeroen Massar, Erik Nordmark, Qiong Sun, Ole Troan, Leiva, Xing Li, Jeroen Massar, Erik Nordmark, Qiong Sun, Ole Troan,
and Tina Tsou, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of and Tina Tsou, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of
this document. this document.
Fernando Gont would like to thank Jan Zorz / Go6 Lab Fernando Gont would like to thank Jan Zorz / Go6 Lab
<http://go6lab.si/>, and Jared Mauch / NTT America, for providing <http://go6lab.si/>, and Jared Mauch / NTT America, for providing
access to systems and networks that were employed to produce some of access to systems and networks that were employed to produce some of
tests that resulted in the publication of this document. tests that resulted in the publication of this document.
Additionally, he would like to thank SixXS <https://www.sixxs.net> Additionally, he would like to thank SixXS <https://www.sixxs.net>
for providing IPv6 connectivity. for providing IPv6 connectivity.
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>. December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU [RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007, Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007, DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC6145] Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation [RFC6145] Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation
Algorithm", RFC 6145, DOI 10.17487/RFC6145, April 2011, Algorithm", RFC 6145, DOI 10.17487/RFC6145, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6145>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6145>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery",
RFC 2923, DOI 10.17487/RFC2923, September 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2923>.
[RFC2992] Hopps, C., "Analysis of an Equal-Cost Multi-Path [RFC2992] Hopps, C., "Analysis of an Equal-Cost Multi-Path
Algorithm", RFC 2992, DOI 10.17487/RFC2992, November 2000, Algorithm", RFC 2992, DOI 10.17487/RFC2992, November 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2992>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2992>.
[RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, [RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5927>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5927>.
[RFC6052] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X. [RFC6052] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
skipping to change at page 9, line 13 skipping to change at page 8, line 27
April 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>. April 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC6274] Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol [RFC6274] Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol
Version 4", RFC 6274, DOI 10.17487/RFC6274, July 2011, Version 4", RFC 6274, DOI 10.17487/RFC6274, July 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6274>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6274>.
[RFC6946] Gont, F., "Processing of IPv6 "Atomic" Fragments", [RFC6946] Gont, F., "Processing of IPv6 "Atomic" Fragments",
RFC 6946, DOI 10.17487/RFC6946, May 2013, RFC 6946, DOI 10.17487/RFC6946, May 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6946>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6946>.
[I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id] [RFC7739] Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment
Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values", RFC 7739, DOI 10.17487/RFC7739,
Identification Values", draft-ietf-6man-predictable- February 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7739>.
fragment-id-10 (work in progress), October 2015.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world] [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world]
Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and S. LIU, Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and S. LIU,
"Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6 "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
Extension Headers in the Real World", draft-ietf-v6ops- Extension Headers in the Real World", draft-ietf-v6ops-
ipv6-ehs-in-real-world-02 (work in progress), December ipv6-ehs-in-real-world-02 (work in progress), December
2015. 2015.
[I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis] [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis]
Deering, S. and B. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 Deering, S. and B. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-02 (work (IPv6) Specification", draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-04 (work
in progress), December 2015. in progress), March 2016.
[Morbitzer] [Morbitzer]
Morbitzer, M., "TCP Idle Scans in IPv6", Master's Thesis. Morbitzer, M., "TCP Idle Scans in IPv6", Master's Thesis.
Thesis number: 670. Department of Computing Science, Thesis number: 670. Department of Computing Science,
Radboud University Nijmegen. August 2013, Radboud University Nijmegen. August 2013,
<http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/769526/ <http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/769526/
m_morbitzer_masterthesis.pdf>. m_morbitzer_masterthesis.pdf>.
[JOOL] Leiva Popper, A., "nf_defrag_ipv4 and nf_defrag_ipv6", [JOOL] Leiva Popper, A., "nf_defrag_ipv4 and nf_defrag_ipv6",
April 2015, <https://github.com/NICMx/Jool/wiki/ April 2015, <https://github.com/NICMx/Jool/wiki/
 End of changes. 28 change blocks. 
82 lines changed or deleted 50 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/