draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-03.txt   draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-04.txt 
IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Standards Track January 27, 2013 Intended status: Standards Track March 21, 2013
Expires: July 31, 2013 Expires: September 22, 2013
A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6 A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-03 draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-04
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface This document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface
Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
(SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable (SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable
within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts
move from one network to another. The aforementioned method is meant move from one network to another. The aforementioned method is meant
to be an alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on to be an alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on
IEEE identifiers, such that the benefits of stable addresses can be IEEE identifiers, such that the benefits of stable addresses can be
skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 8, line 34 skipping to change at page 8, line 34
non-volatile memory). See Section 4 for additional details. non-volatile memory). See Section 4 for additional details.
secret_key: secret_key:
A secret key that is not known by the attacker. The secret A secret key that is not known by the attacker. The secret
key MUST be initialized at system installation time to a key MUST be initialized at system installation time to a
pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness
requirements for security). An implementation MAY provide the requirements for security). An implementation MAY provide the
means for the user to change the secret key. means for the user to change the secret key.
2. The Interface Identifier is finally obtained by taking the 2. The Interface Identifier is finally obtained by taking the
leftmost 64 bits of the RID value computed in the previous step, leftmost 64 bits of the RID value computed in the previous step.
and setting bit 6 (the leftmost bit is numbered 0) to zero. This The resulting Interface Identifier should be compared against the
creates an interface identifier with the universal/local bit list of reserved interface identifiers [IANA-RESERVED-IID], and
indicating local significance only. The resulting Interface against those interface identifiers already employed in an
Identifier should be compared against the list of reserved address of the same network interface and the same network
interface identifiers [IANA-RESERVED-IID], and to those interface prefix. In the event that an unacceptable identifier has been
identifiers already employed in an address of the same network generated, this situation should be handled in the same way as
interface and the same network prefix. In the event that an the case of duplicate addresses (see Section 4).
unacceptable identifier has been generated, this situation should
be handled in the same way as the case of duplicate addresses
(see Section 4).
This document does not require the use of any specific PRF for the This document does not require the use of any specific PRF for the
function F() above, since the choice of such PRF is usually a trade- function F() above, since the choice of such PRF is usually a trade-
off between a number of properties (processing requirements, ease of off between a number of properties (processing requirements, ease of
implementation, possible intellectual property rights, etc.), and implementation, possible intellectual property rights, etc.), and
since the best possible choice for F() might be different for since the best possible choice for F() might be different for
different types of devices (e.g. embedded systems vs. regular different types of devices (e.g. embedded systems vs. regular
servers) and might possibly change over time. servers) and might possibly change over time.
Note that the result of F() in the algorithm above is no more secure Note that the result of F() in the algorithm above is no more secure
 End of changes. 4 change blocks. 
15 lines changed or deleted 12 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/