draft-ietf-6man-ug-02.txt   draft-ietf-6man-ug-03.txt 
6MAN B. Carpenter 6MAN B. Carpenter
Internet-Draft Univ. of Auckland Internet-Draft Univ. of Auckland
Updates: 4291 (if approved) S. Jiang Updates: 4291 (if approved) S. Jiang
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Expires: February 07, 2014 August 06, 2013 Expires: February 27, 2014 August 26, 2013
Significance of IPv6 Interface Identifiers Significance of IPv6 Interface Identifiers
draft-ietf-6man-ug-02 draft-ietf-6man-ug-03
Abstract Abstract
The IPv6 addressing architecture includes a unicast interface The IPv6 addressing architecture includes a unicast interface
identifier that is used in the creation of many IPv6 addresses. identifier that is used in the creation of many IPv6 addresses.
Interface identifiers are formed by a variety of methods. This Interface identifiers are formed by a variety of methods. This
document clarifies that the bits in an interface identifier have no document clarifies that the bits in an interface identifier have no
generic meaning and that the identifier should be treated as an generic meaning and that the identifier should be treated as an
opaque value. In particular, RFC 4291 defines a method by which the opaque value. In particular, RFC 4291 defines a method by which the
Universal and Group bits of an IEEE link-layer address are mapped Universal and Group bits of an IEEE link-layer address are mapped
into an IPv6 unicast interface identifier. This document clarifies into an IPv6 unicast interface identifier. This document clarifies
that those bits apply only to interface identifiers that are derived that those two bits are significant only in interface identifiers
from an IEEE link-layer address. It updates RFC 4291 accordingly. that are derived from an IEEE link-layer address, and updates RFC
4291 accordingly.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 07, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 27, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Usefulness of the U and G Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Usefulness of the U and G Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. The Role of Duplicate Address Detection . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. The Role of Duplicate Address Detection . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Clarification of Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Clarification of Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
IPv6 unicast addresses consist of a subnet prefix followed by an IPv6 unicast addresses consist of a prefix followed by an Interface
Interface Identifier (IID), the latter supposedly unique on the links Identifier (IID). The IID is supposed to be unique on the links
reached by routing to that prefix. According to the IPv6 addressing reached by routing to that prefix, giving a globally unique address.
architecture [RFC4291], when a 64-bit IPv6 unicast IID is formed on According to the IPv6 addressing architecture [RFC4291], when a
the basis of an IEEE EUI-64 address, usually itself expanded from a 64-bit IPv6 unicast IID is formed on the basis of an IEEE EUI-64
48-bit MAC address, a particular format must be used: address, usually itself expanded from a 48-bit MAC address, a
particular format must be used:
"For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary "For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary
value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long and to be value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long and to be
constructed in Modified EUI-64 format." constructed in Modified EUI-64 format."
Thus the specification assumes that that the normal case is to Thus the specification assumes that the normal case is to transform
transform an Ethernet-style address into an IID, but in practice, an Ethernet-style address into an IID, but in practice, there are
there are various methods of forming such an interface identifier. various methods of forming such an interface identifier.
The Modified EUI-64 format preserves the information provided by two The Modified EUI-64 format preserves the information provided by two
particular bits in the MAC address: particular bits in the MAC address:
o The "u/l" bit in a MAC address [IEEE802] is set to 0 to indicate o The "u/l" bit in a MAC address [IEEE802] is set to 0 to indicate
universal scope (implying uniqueness) or to 1 to indicate local universal scope (implying uniqueness) or to 1 to indicate local
scope (without implying uniqueness). In an IID formed from a MAC scope (without implying uniqueness). In an IID formed from a MAC
address, this bit is simply known as the "u" bit and its value is address, this bit is simply known as the "u" bit and its value is
inverted, i.e., 1 for universal scope and 0 for local scope. inverted, i.e., 1 for universal scope and 0 for local scope.
According to RFC 4291 and [RFC5342], the reason for this was to According to RFC 4291 and [RFC5342], the reason for this was to
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preserved in an IID, where it is known as the "g" bit. preserved in an IID, where it is known as the "g" bit.
In an IID, this bit is in position 7, i.e., position 71 in the In an IID, this bit is in position 7, i.e., position 71 in the
complete IPv6 address. complete IPv6 address.
This document discusses problems observed with the "u" and "g" bits This document discusses problems observed with the "u" and "g" bits
as a result of the above requirements and the fact that various other as a result of the above requirements and the fact that various other
methods of forming an IID have been defined, quite independently of methods of forming an IID have been defined, quite independently of
the method described in Appendix A of RFC 4291. It then discusses the method described in Appendix A of RFC 4291. It then discusses
the usefulness of these two bits and the significance of the bits in the usefulness of these two bits and the significance of the bits in
an IID in general. Finally it updates RFC 4291 accordingly. an IID in general. Finally, it updates RFC 4291 accordingly.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Problem statement 2. Problem statement
In addition to IIDs formed from IEEE EUI-64 addresses, various new In addition to IIDs formed from IEEE EUI-64 addresses, various new
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that "for interface identifiers in EUI-64 format, the universal/local that "for interface identifiers in EUI-64 format, the universal/local
bit in the interface identifier MUST be set to 0" (i.e., local) and bit in the interface identifier MUST be set to 0" (i.e., local) and
requires that "g" bit to be set to 1. However, the text neither requires that "g" bit to be set to 1. However, the text neither
states nor implies any semantics for these bits in anycast addresses. states nor implies any semantics for these bits in anycast addresses.
A common operational practice for well-known servers is to manually A common operational practice for well-known servers is to manually
assign a small number as the IID, in which case "u" and "g" are both assign a small number as the IID, in which case "u" and "g" are both
zero. zero.
These cases illustrate that the statement quoted above from RFC 4291 These cases illustrate that the statement quoted above from RFC 4291
requiring "Modified EUI-64 format" is rather meaningless when applied requiring "Modified EUI-64 format" is inapplicable when applied to
to forms of IID that are not in fact based on an underlying EUI-64 forms of IID that are not in fact based on an underlying EUI-64
address. In practice, the IETF has chosen to assign some 64-bit IIDs address. In practice, the IETF has chosen to assign some 64-bit IIDs
that have nothing to do with EUI-64. that have nothing to do with EUI-64.
A particular case is that of /127 prefixes for point-to-point links A particular case is that of /127 prefixes for point-to-point links
between routers, as standardised by [RFC6164]. The addresses on between routers, as standardised by [RFC6164]. The addresses on
these links are undoubtedly global unicast addresses, but they do not these links are undoubtedly global unicast addresses, but they do not
have a 64-bit IID. The bits in the positions named "u" and "g" in have a 64-bit IID. The bits in the positions named "u" and "g" in
such an IID have no special significance and their values are not such an IID have no special significance and their values are not
specified. specified.
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There was a presumption when IPv6 was designed and the IID format was There was a presumption when IPv6 was designed and the IID format was
first specified that a universally unique IID might prove to be very first specified that a universally unique IID might prove to be very
useful, for example to contribute to solving the multihoming problem. useful, for example to contribute to solving the multihoming problem.
Indeed, the addressing architecture [RFC4291] states this explicitly: Indeed, the addressing architecture [RFC4291] states this explicitly:
"The use of the universal/local bit in the Modified EUI-64 format "The use of the universal/local bit in the Modified EUI-64 format
identifier is to allow development of future technology that can take identifier is to allow development of future technology that can take
advantage of interface identifiers with universal scope." advantage of interface identifiers with universal scope."
However, this has not so far proved to be the case. Also, there is However, this has not so far proved to be the case. Also, there is
evidence from the field that IEEE MAC addresses with universal scope evidence from the field that despite the IEEE standard [IEEE802], MAC
are sometime incorrectly assigned to multiple MAC interfaces. addresses with universal scope are sometime incorrectly assigned to
Firstly, there are recurrent reports of manufacturers assigning the multiple MAC interfaces. Firstly, there are recurrent reports of
same MAC address to multiple devices. Secondly, significant re-use manufacturers assigning the same MAC address to multiple devices.
of the same virtual MAC address is reported in virtual machine Secondly, significant re-use of the same virtual MAC address is
environments. Once transformed into IID format (with "u" = 1) these reported in virtual machine environments. Once transformed into IID
identifiers would purport to be universally unique but would in fact format (with "u" = 1) these identifiers would purport to be
be ambiguous. This has no known harmful effect as long as the universally unique but would in fact be ambiguous. This has no known
replicated MAC addresses and IIDs are used on different layer 2 harmful effect as long as the replicated MAC addresses and IIDs are
links. If they are used on the same link, of course there will be a used on different layer 2 links. If they are used on the same link,
problem, very likely interfering with link-layer transmission. If of course there will be a problem, very likely interfering with link-
not, the problem will be detected by duplicate address detection layer transmission. If not, the problem will be detected by
[RFC4862], [RFC6775], but such an error can usually only be resolved duplicate address detection [RFC4862] [RFC6775], but such an error
by human intervention. can usually only be resolved by human intervention.
The conclusion from this is that the "u" bit is not a reliable The conclusion from this is that the "u" bit is not a reliable
indicator of universal uniqueness. indicator of universal uniqueness.
We note that Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP), a We note that Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP), a
multihoming solution that might be expected to benefit from multihoming solution that might be expected to benefit from
universally unique IIDs in modified EUI-64 format, does not in fact universally unique IIDs in modified EUI-64 format, does not in fact
rely on them. ILNP uses its own format, defined as a Node Identifier rely on them. ILNP uses its own format, defined as a Node Identifier
[RFC6741]. ILNP has the constraint that a given Node Identifier must [RFC6741]. ILNP has the constraint that a given Node Identifier must
be unique within the context of a given Locator (i.e. within a single be unique within the context of a given Locator (i.e. within a single
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address detection is available. address detection is available.
Thus, we can conclude that the value of the "u" bit in IIDs has no Thus, we can conclude that the value of the "u" bit in IIDs has no
particular meaning. In the case of an IID created from a MAC address particular meaning. In the case of an IID created from a MAC address
according to RFC 4291, its value is determined by the MAC address, according to RFC 4291, its value is determined by the MAC address,
but that is all. but that is all.
An IPv6 IID should not be created from a MAC group address, so the An IPv6 IID should not be created from a MAC group address, so the
"g" bit will normally be zero, but this value also has no particular "g" bit will normally be zero, but this value also has no particular
meaning. Additionally, the "u" and the "g" bits are both meaningless meaning. Additionally, the "u" and the "g" bits are both meaningless
in the format of an IPv6 multicast group ID [RFC3306], [RFC3307]. in the format of an IPv6 multicast group ID [RFC3306] [RFC3307].
None of the above implies that there is a problem with using the "u" None of the above implies that there is a problem with using the "u"
and "g" bits in MAC addresses as part of the process of generating and "g" bits in MAC addresses as part of the process of generating
IIDs from MAC addresses, or with specifying their values in other IIDs from MAC addresses, or with specifying their values in other
methods of generating IIDs. What it does imply is that, after an IID methods of generating IIDs. What it does imply is that, after an IID
is generated by any method, no reliable deductions can be made from is generated by any method, no reliable deductions can be made from
the state of the "u" and "g" bits; in other words, these bits have no the state of the "u" and "g" bits; in other words, these bits have no
useful semantics in an IID. useful semantics in an IID.
Once this is recognised, we can avoid the problematic confusion Once this is recognised, we can avoid the problematic confusion
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If an IID is known or guessed to have been created according to RFC If an IID is known or guessed to have been created according to RFC
4291, it could be transformed back into a MAC address. This can be 4291, it could be transformed back into a MAC address. This can be
very helpful during operational fault diagnosis. For that reason, very helpful during operational fault diagnosis. For that reason,
mapping the IEEE "u" and "g" bits into the IID has operational mapping the IEEE "u" and "g" bits into the IID has operational
usefulness. However, it should be stressed that an IID with "u" = 1 usefulness. However, it should be stressed that an IID with "u" = 1
and "g" = 0 might not be formed from a MAC address; on the contrary, and "g" = 0 might not be formed from a MAC address; on the contrary,
it might equally result from another method. With other methods, it might equally result from another method. With other methods,
there is no reverse transformation available. there is no reverse transformation available.
To the extent that each method of IID creation specifies the values Given that the values of the "u" and "g" bits in an IID have no
of the "u" and "g" bits, and that each new method is carefully particular meaning, new methods of IID formation are at liberty to
designed in the light of its predecessors, these bits tend to reduce use them as they wish, for example as additional pseudo-random bits
the chances of duplicate IIDs. to reduce the chances of duplicate IIDs.
4. The Role of Duplicate Address Detection 4. The Role of Duplicate Address Detection
As mentioned above, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] is As mentioned above, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] is
able to detect any case where a collision of two IIDs on the same able to detect any case where a collision of two IIDs on the same
link leads to a duplicated IPv6 address. The scope of DAD may be link leads to a duplicated IPv6 address. The scope of DAD may be
extended to a set of links by a DAD proxy [RFC6957] or by Neighbor extended to a set of links by a DAD proxy [RFC6957] or by Neighbor
Discovery Optimization [RFC6775]. Since DAD is mandatory for all Discovery Optimization [RFC6775]. Since DAD is mandatory for all
nodes, there will be no case in which an IID collision, however nodes, there will be almost no case in which an IID collision,
unlikely it may be, is not detected. It is out of scope of most however unlikely it may be, is not detected. It is out of scope of
existing specifications to define the recovery action after a DAD most existing specifications to define the recovery action after a
failure, which is an implementation issue. If a manually created DAD failure, which is an implementation issue. If a manually created
IID, or an IID derived from a MAC address according to RFC 4291, IID, or an IID derived from a MAC address according to RFC 4291,
leads to a DAD failure, human intervention will most likely be leads to a DAD failure, human intervention will most likely be
required. However, as mentioned above, some methods of IID formation required. However, as mentioned above, some methods of IID formation
might produce IID values with "u" = 1 and "g" = 0 that are not based might produce IID values with "u" = 1 and "g" = 0 that are not based
on a MAC address. With very low probability, such a value might on a MAC address. With very low probability, such a value might
collide with an IID based on a MAC address. collide with an IID based on a MAC address.
As stated in RFC 4862: As stated in RFC 4862:
"On the other hand, if the duplicate link-local address is not formed "On the other hand, if the duplicate link-local address is not formed
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result from the above discussion. Their aim is to reduce confusion result from the above discussion. Their aim is to reduce confusion
while retaining the useful aspects of the "u" and "g" bits in IIDs. while retaining the useful aspects of the "u" and "g" bits in IIDs.
The EUI-64 to IID transformation defined in the IPv6 addressing The EUI-64 to IID transformation defined in the IPv6 addressing
architecture [RFC4291] MUST be used for all cases where an IPv6 IID architecture [RFC4291] MUST be used for all cases where an IPv6 IID
is derived from an IEEE MAC or EUI-64 address. With any other form is derived from an IEEE MAC or EUI-64 address. With any other form
of link layer address, an equivalent transformation SHOULD be used. of link layer address, an equivalent transformation SHOULD be used.
Specifications of other forms of 64-bit IID MUST specify how all 64 Specifications of other forms of 64-bit IID MUST specify how all 64
bits are set, but need not treat the "u" and "g" bits in any special bits are set, but need not treat the "u" and "g" bits in any special
way. A general semantic meaning for these bits MUST NOT be defined. way. A generic semantic meaning for these bits MUST NOT be defined.
However, the method of generating IIDs for specific link types MAY However, the method of generating IIDs for specific link types MAY
define some local significance for certain bits. define some local significance for certain bits.
In all cases, the bits in an IID have no general semantics; in other In all cases, the bits in an IID have no generic semantics; in other
words, they have opaque values. In fact, the whole IID value MUST be words, they have opaque values. In fact, the whole IID value MUST be
viewed as an opaque bit string by third parties, except possibly in viewed as an opaque bit string by third parties, except possibly in
the local context. the local context.
The following statement in section 2.5.1 of the IPv6 addressing The following statement in section 2.5.1 of the IPv6 addressing
architecture [RFC4291]: architecture [RFC4291]:
"For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary "For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary
value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long and to be value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long and to be
constructed in Modified EUI-64 format." constructed in Modified EUI-64 format."
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advantage of interface identifiers with universal scope." advantage of interface identifiers with universal scope."
As far as is known, no existing implementation will be affected by As far as is known, no existing implementation will be affected by
these changes. The benefit is that future design discussions are these changes. The benefit is that future design discussions are
simplified. simplified.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
No new security exposures or issues are raised by this document. No new security exposures or issues are raised by this document.
In some contexts, unpredictable IID values are considered beneficial
to enhance privacy and defeat scanning attacks. The recognition that
the IID value should be regarded as an opaque bit string is
consistent with methods of IID formation that result in
unpredictable, pseudo-random values.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document requests no immediate action by IANA. However, the This document requests no immediate action by IANA. However, the
following should be noted when considering any future proposed following should be noted when considering any future proposed
addition to the registry of reserved IID values, which requires addition to the registry of reserved IID values, which requires
Standards Action according to [RFC5453]. Standards Action according to [RFC5453].
Full deployment of a new reserved IID value would require updates to Full deployment of a new reserved IID value would require updates to
IID generation code in every deployed IPv6 stack, so the technical IID generation code in every deployed IPv6 stack, so the technical
justification for such a Standards Action would need to be extremely justification for such a Standards Action would need to be extremely
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Christian Huitema, Ray Hunter, Tatuya Jinmei, Mark Smith, Bernie Volz Christian Huitema, Ray Hunter, Tatuya Jinmei, Mark Smith, Bernie Volz
and other participants in the 6MAN working group. and other participants in the 6MAN working group.
Brian Carpenter was a visitor at the Computer Laboratory, Cambridge Brian Carpenter was a visitor at the Computer Laboratory, Cambridge
University during part of this work. University during part of this work.
This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629]. This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
9. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] 9. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
draft-ietf-6man-ug-03: some clarifications, text on unpredictable
IIDs, minor corrections, 2013-08-26.
draft-ietf-6man-ug-02: incorporated WG Last Call comments: removed draft-ietf-6man-ug-02: incorporated WG Last Call comments: removed
open issue, clarified IEEE bit names, clarified DAD text, updated open issue, clarified IEEE bit names, clarified DAD text, updated
references, minor editorial corrections, 2013-08-06. references, minor editorial corrections, 2013-08-06.
draft-ietf-6man-ug-01: emphasised "opaque" nature of IID, added text draft-ietf-6man-ug-01: emphasised "opaque" nature of IID, added text
about DAD failures, expanded IANA considerations, 2013-05-25. about DAD failures, expanded IANA considerations, 2013-05-25.
draft-ietf-6man-ug-00: first WG version, text clarified, added draft-ietf-6man-ug-00: first WG version, text clarified, added
possibility of link-local significance, 2013-03-28. possibility of link-local significance, 2013-03-28.
skipping to change at page 9, line 30 skipping to change at page 10, line 4
[RFC5342] Eastlake, D., "IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol Usage [RFC5342] Eastlake, D., "IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol Usage
for IEEE 802 Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 5342, September for IEEE 802 Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 5342, September
2008. 2008.
[RFC5453] Krishnan, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC [RFC5453] Krishnan, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC
5453, February 2009. 5453, February 2009.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses] [I-D.ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses]
Gont, F., "A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Addresses with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
(SLAAC)", draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-10 Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", draft-ietf-6man-stable-
(work in progress), June 2013. privacy-addresses-12 (work in progress), August 2013.
[I-D.ietf-softwire-4rd] [I-D.ietf-softwire-4rd]
Despres, R., Jiang, S., Penno, R., Lee, Y., Chen, G., and Despres, R., Jiang, S., Penno, R., Lee, Y., Chen, G., and
M. Chen, "IPv4 Residual Deployment via IPv6 - a Stateless M. Chen, "IPv4 Residual Deployment via IPv6 - a Stateless
Solution (4rd)", draft-ietf-softwire-4rd-06 (work in Solution (4rd)", draft-ietf-softwire-4rd-06 (work in
progress), July 2013. progress), July 2013.
[IEEE802] , "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: [IEEE802] , "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
Overview and Architecture", IEEE Std 802-2001 (R2007) , Overview and Architecture", IEEE Std 802-2001 (R2007) ,
2007. 2007.
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