draft-ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon-12.txt   draft-ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon-13.txt 
6tisch Working Group D. Dujovne 6tisch Working Group D. Dujovne
Internet-Draft Universidad Diego Portales Internet-Draft Universidad Diego Portales
Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson
Expires: 18 August 2020 Sandelman Software Works Expires: 20 August 2020 Sandelman Software Works
15 February 2020 17 February 2020
IEEE 802.15.4 Information Element encapsulation of 6TiSCH Join and IEEE 802.15.4 Information Element encapsulation of 6TiSCH Join and
Enrollment Information Enrollment Information
draft-ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon-12 draft-ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon-13
Abstract Abstract
In TSCH mode of IEEE STD 802.15.4, opportunities for broadcasts are In TSCH mode of IEEE STD 802.15.4, opportunities for broadcasts are
limited to specific times and specific channels. Nodes in a TSCH limited to specific times and specific channels. Routers in a Time-
network typically frequently transmit Enhanced Beacon (EB) frames to Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) network transmit Enhanced Beacon (EB)
announce the presence of the network. This document provides a frames to announce the presence of the network. This document
mechanism by which information critical for new nodes (pledges) and provides a mechanism by which additional information critical for new
long sleeping nodes may be carried within the Enhanced Beacon. nodes (pledges) and long sleeping nodes may be carried within the
Enhanced Beacon in order to conserve use of broadcast opportunities.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 18 August 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 August 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 15 skipping to change at page 2, line 16
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Use of BCP 14 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Use of BCP 14 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3. Layer-3 synchronization: IPv6 Router Solicitations and 1.3. Layer-3 synchronization: IPv6 Router Solicitations and
Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC7554] describes the use of the time-slotted channel hopping [RFC7554] describes the use of the Time-Slotted Channel Hopping
(TSCH) mode of [ieee802154]. As further detailed in [RFC8180], an (TSCH) mode of [ieee802154]. As further detailed in [RFC8180], an
Enhanced Beacon (EB) is transmitted during a slot designated as a Enhanced Beacon (EB) is transmitted during a slot designated as a
broadcast slot. broadcast slot.
1.1. Use of BCP 14 Terminology 1.1. Use of BCP 14 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Other terminology can be found in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] in Other terminology can be found in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] in
section 2.1. section 2.1.
1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization 1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization
As explained in section 6 of [RFC8180], the Enhanced Beacon (EB) has As explained in section 6 of [RFC8180], the Enhanced Beacon (EB) has
a number of purposes: synchronization of ASN and Join Metric, a number of purposes: synchronization of Absolute Slot Number (ASN)
carrying timeslot template identifier, carrying the channel hopping and Join Metric, carrying timeslot template identifier, carrying the
sequence identifier, and indicating the TSCH SlotFrame. channel hopping sequence identifier, and indicating the TSCH
SlotFrame.
An EB announces the existence of a TSCH network, and of the nodes An EB announces the existence of a TSCH network, and of the nodes
already joined to that network. Receiving an EB allows a Joining already joined to that network. Receiving an EB allows a Joining
Node (pledge) to learn about the network and synchronize to it. Node (pledge) to learn about the network and synchronize to it.
The EB may also be used as a means for a node already part of the The EB may also be used as a means for a node already part of the
network to re-synchronize [RFC7554]. network to re-synchronize [RFC7554].
There are a limited number of timeslots designated as broadcast slots There are a limited number of timeslots designated as broadcast slots
by each router in the network. Considering 10ms slots and a slot- by each router in the network. Considering 10ms slots and a slot-
frame length of 100, these slots are rare and could result in only 1 frame length of 100, these slots are rare and could result in only 1
slot per second for broadcasts, which needs to be used for the slot per second for broadcasts, which needs to be used for the
beacon. Additional broadcasts for Router Advertisements, or Neighbor beacon. Additional broadcasts for Router Advertisements (RS), or
Discovery could even more scarce. Neighbor Discovery (ND) could even more scarce.
1.3. Layer-3 synchronization: IPv6 Router Solicitations and 1.3. Layer-3 synchronization: IPv6 Router Solicitations and
Advertisements Advertisements
At layer 3, [RFC4861] defines a mechanism by which nodes learn about At layer 3, [RFC4861] defines a mechanism by which nodes learn about
routers by receiving multicast Router Advertisements (RA). If no RA routers by receiving multicast Router Advertisements (RA). If no RA
is received within a set time, then a Router Solicitation (RS) may be is received within a set time, then a Router Solicitation (RS) may be
transmitted as a multicast, to which an RA will be received, usually transmitted as a multicast, to which an RA will be received, usually
unicast. unicast.
Although [RFC6775] reduces the amount of multicast necessary to do Although However, even in this case, a unicast RS may be transmitted
in response[RFC6775] reduces the amount of multicast necessary to do
address resolution via Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages, it still address resolution via Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages, it still
requires multicast of either RAs or RS. This is an expensive requires multicast of either RAs or RS. This is an expensive
operation for two reasons: First, there are few multicast timeslots operation for two reasons: there are few multicast timeslots for
for unsolicited RAs; and second, if a pledge node does not receive an unsolicited RAs; and if a pledge node does not receive an RA, and
RA, and decides to transmit an RS, a broadcast aloha slot is consumed decides to transmit an RS, a broadcast aloha slot (see {?RFC7554}
with unencrypted traffic. In this case, a unicast RS may be section A.5) is consumed with unencrypted traffic.
transmitted in response.
This is a particularly acute issue for the join process for the This is a particularly acute issue for the join process for the
following reasons: following reasons:
1. Use of a multicast slot by even a non-malicious unauthenticated 1. Use of a multicast slot by even a non-malicious unauthenticated
node for a Router Solicitation (RS) may overwhelm that time slot. node for a Router Solicitation (RS) may overwhelm that time slot.
2. It may require many seconds of on-time before a new pledge 2. It may require many seconds of on-time before a new pledge
receives a Router Advertisement (RA) that it can use. receives a Router Advertisement (RA) that it can use.
3. A new pledge may have to receive many Enhanced Beacons (EB) 3. A new pledge may have to receive many Enhanced Beacons (EB)
before it can pick an appropriate network and/or closest Join before it can pick an appropriate network and/or closest Join
Assistant to attach to. If it must remain in the receive state Assistant to attach to. If it must remain in the receive state
for an RA as well as find the Enhanced Beacon (EB), then the for an RA as well as find the Enhanced Beacon (EB), then the
process may take a very long time. process may take a very long time.
This document defines a new IETF Information Element (IE) subtype to This document defines a new IETF Information Element (IE) subtype to
provide join and enrollment information to prospective pledges in a place into the Enhanced Beacon (EB) to provide join and enrollment
more efficient way. information to prospective pledges in a more efficient way.
2. Protocol Definition 2. Protocol Definition
[RFC8137] creates a registry for new IETF IE subtypes. This document [RFC8137] creates a registry for new IETF IE subtypes. This document
allocates a new subtype. allocates a new subtype.
The new IE subtype structure is as follows. As explained in The new IE subtype structure is as follows. As explained in
[RFC8137] the length of the Sub-Type Content can be calculated from [RFC8137] the length of the Sub-Type Content can be calculated from
the container, so no length information is necessary. the container, so no length information is necessary.
1 2 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TBD-XXX |R|P| res | proxy prio | rank priority | | TBD-XXX |R|P| res | proxy prio | rank priority |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+-------------+-----------------+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+-------------+-----------------+
| pan priority | | | pan priority | |
+---------------+ + +---------------+ +
| Join Proxy lower-64 | | Join Proxy Interface-ID |
+ (present if P=1) + + (present if P=1) +
| | | |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| network ID | | network ID |
+ variable length, up to 16 bytes + + variable length, up to 16 bytes +
~ ~ ~ ~
+ + + +
| | | |
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R: The Router Advertisement R-flag is set if the sending node will R: The Router Advertisement R-flag is set if the sending node will
act as a Router for host-only nodes that need addressing via act as a Router for host-only nodes that need addressing via
unicast Router Solicitation messages. unicast Router Solicitation messages.
In most cases, every node sending a beacon will set this flag, and In most cases, every node sending a beacon will set this flag, and
in a typical mesh, this will be every single node. When this bit in a typical mesh, this will be every single node. When this bit
is not set, it indicates that this node may be under provisioned, is not set, it indicates that this node may be under provisioned,
or may have no additional slots for additional nodes. This could or may have no additional slots for additional nodes. This could
make this node more interesting to an attacker. make this node more interesting to an attacker.
P: If the Proxy Address P-flag is set, then the Join Proxy lower-64 P: If the Proxy Address P-flag is set, then the Join Proxy Interface
bit field is present. Otherwise, it is not provided. ID bit field is present. Otherwise, it is not provided.
This bit only indicates if another part of the structure is This bit only indicates if another part of the structure is
present, and has little security or privacy impact. present, and has little security or privacy impact.
proxy priority (proxy prio): This field indicates the willingness of proxy priority (proxy prio): This field indicates the willingness of
the sender to act as join proxy. Lower value indicates greater the sender to act as join proxy. Lower value indicates greater
willingness to act as a Join Proxy as described in willingness to act as a Join Proxy as described in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. Values range 0x00 (most [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. Values range 0x00 (most
willing) to 0x7e (least willing). A priority of 0x7f indicates willing) to 0x7e (least willing). A priority of 0x7f indicates
that the announcer should never be considered as a viable that the announcer should never be considered as a viable
enrollment proxy. Only unenrolled pledges look at this value. enrollment proxy.
Only unenrolled pledges look at this value.
Lower values in this field indicate that the transmitter may have Lower values in this field indicate that the transmitter may have
more capacity to handle unencrypted traffic. A higher value may more capacity to handle unencrypted traffic.
indicate that the transmitter is low on neighbor cache entries, or
other resources. A higher value may indicate that the transmitter is low on
neighbor cache entries, or other resources.
rank priority: The rank "priority" is set by the 6LR which sent the rank priority: The rank "priority" is set by the 6LR which sent the
beacon and is an indication of how willing this 6LR is to serve as beacon and is an indication of how willing this 6LR is to serve as
an RPL parent within a particular network ID. This is a local an RPL {?RFC6550} parent within a particular network ID.
value to be determined in other work. It might be calculated from
RPL rank, and it may include some modifications based upon current Lower values indicate more willing, and higher values indicate
number of children, or number of neighbor cache entries available. less willing. This value is calculated by each 6LR according to
This value MUST be ignored by pledges, it is for enrolled devices algorithms specific to the routing metrics used by the RPL
only. Lower values are better. ({?RFC6550}).
The exact process is a subject of significant research work.
It will typically be calculated from the RPL rank, and it may
include some modifications based upon current number of children,
or number of neighbor cache entries available.
This value MUST be ignored by pledges, it is to help enrolled
devices only to compare different connection points.
An attacker can use this value to determine which nodes are An attacker can use this value to determine which nodes are
potentially more interesting. Nodes which are less willing to be potentially more interesting. Nodes which are less willing to be
parents likely have more traffic, and an attacker could use this parents likely have more traffic, and an attacker could use this
information to determine which nodes would be more interesting to information to determine which nodes would be more interesting to
attack or disrupt. attack or disrupt.
pan priority: The pan priority is a value set by the DODAG root to pan priority: The pan priority is a value set by the Destination-
indicate the relative priority of this LLN compared to those with Oriented Directed Acycling Graph (DODAG) root (see {?RFC6550},
different PANIDs. This value may be used as part of the typically, the 6LBR) to indicate the relative priority of this LLN
enrollment priority, but typically is used by devices which have compared to those with different PANIDs that the operator might
already enrolled, and need to determine which PAN to pick. control.
This value may be used as part of the enrollment priority, but
typically is used by devices which have already enrolled, and need
to determine which PAN to pick when resuming from a long sleep.
Unenrolled pledges MAY consider this value when selecting a PAN to Unenrolled pledges MAY consider this value when selecting a PAN to
join. Enrolled devices MAY consider this value when looking for join. Enrolled devices MAY consider this value when looking for
an eligible parent device. an eligible parent device. Lower values indicate a higher
willingness to accept new nodes.
An attacker can use this value, along with the observed PANID in An attacker can use this value, along with the observed PANID in
the Beacon to determine which PANIDs have more network resources, the Beacon to determine which PANIDs have more network resources,
and may have more interesting traffic. and may have more interesting traffic.
Join Proxy lower-64: If the P bit is set, then 64 bits (8 bytes) of Join Proxy Interface ID: If the P bit is set, then 64 bits (8 bytes)
address are present. This field provides the suffix (IID) of the of address are present. This field provides the Interface ID
Link-Local address of the Join Proxy. The associated prefix is (IID) of the Link-Local address of the Join Proxy. The associated
well-known as fe80::/64. If this field is not present, then IID prefix is well-known as fe80::/64. If this field is not present,
is derived from the layer-2 address of the sender. then IID is derived from the layer-2 address of the sender as per
SLAAC ({?RFC4662}).
This field communicates a lower-64 bits that should be used for This field communicates an Interface ID bits that should be used
this nodes' layer-3 address, if it should not be derived from the for this nodes' layer-3 address, if it should not be derived from
layer-2 address. Communication with the Join Proxy occurs in the the layer-2 address. Communication with the Join Proxy occurs in
clear, this field avoids the need for an additional service the clear, this field avoids the need for an additional service
discovery process for the case where the L3 address is not derived discovery process for the case where the L3 address is not derived
from the L2 address. An attacker will see both L2 and L3 from the L2 address. An attacker will see both L2 and L3
addresses, so this field provides no new information. addresses, so this field provides no new information.
network ID: This is a variable length field, up to 16-bytes in size network ID: This is a variable length field, up to 16-bytes in size
that uniquely identifies this network, potentially among many that uniquely identifies this network, potentially among many
networks that are operating in the same frequencies in overlapping networks that are operating in the same frequencies in overlapping
physical space. The length of this field can be calculated as physical space. The length of this field can be calculated as
being whatever is left in the Information Element. being whatever is left in the Information Element.
In a 6tisch network, where RPL [RFC6550] is used as the mesh In a 6tisch network, where RPL [RFC6550] is used as the mesh
routing protocol, the network ID can be constructed from a SHA256 routing protocol, the network ID can be constructed from a
hash of the prefix (/64) of the network. That is just a truncated SHA256 hash of the prefix (/64) of the network. This
suggestion for a default value. In some LLNs where multiple will be done by the RPL DODAG root and communicated by the RPL
PANIDs may lead to the same management device (the JRC), then a Configuration Option payloads, so it is not calculated more than
common value that is the same across all PANs MUST be configured. once. That is just a suggestion for a default algorithm: it may
be set in any convenience way that results in a non-identifing
value. In some LLNs where multiple PANIDs may lead to the same
management device (the JRC), then a common value that is the same
across all PANs MUST be configured so that pledges that attempt to
enroll do not waste time attempting multiple times with the same
network that has multiple attachment points.
If the the network ID is derived as suggested, then it will an If the network ID is derived as suggested, then it will an opaque,
opaque, seemingly random value, and will reveal nothing in of seemingly random value, and will reveal nothing in of itself. An
itself. An attacker can match this value across many attacker can match this value across many transmissions to map the
transmissions to map the extent of a network beyond what the PANID extent of a network beyond what the PANID might already provide.
might already provide.
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
All of the contents of this Information Element are transmitted in All of the contents of this Information Element are transmitted in
the clear. The content of the Enhanced Beacon is not encrypted. the clear. The content of the Enhanced Beacon is not encrypted.
This is a restriction in the cryptographic architecture of the This is a restriction in the cryptographic architecture of the
802.15.4 mechanism. In order to decrypt or do integrity checking of 802.15.4 mechanism. In order to decrypt or do integrity checking of
layer-2 frames in TSCH, the TSCH Absolute Slot Number (ASN) is layer-2 frames in TSCH, the TSCH Absolute Slot Number (ASN) is
needed. The Enhanced Beacon provides the ASN to new (and long- needed. The Enhanced Beacon provides the ASN to new (and long-
sleeping) nodes. sleeping) nodes.
The sensitivity of each field is describe within the description of
each field.
The Enhanced Beacon is authenticated at the layer-2 level using The Enhanced Beacon is authenticated at the layer-2 level using
802.15.4 mechanisms using the network-wide keying material. Nodes 802.15.4 mechanisms using the network-wide keying material. Nodes
which are enrolled will have the network-wide keying material and can which are enrolled will have the network-wide keying material and can
validate the beacon. validate the beacon.
Pledges which have not yet enrolled are unable to authenticate the Pledges which have not yet enrolled are unable to authenticate the
beacons, and will be forced to temporarily take the contents on beacons, and will be forced to temporarily take the contents on
faith. After enrollment, a newly enrolled node will be able to faith. After enrollment, a newly enrolled node will be able to
return to the beacon and validate it. return to the beacon and validate it.
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attacker to more efficiently jam communications, although there is attacker to more efficiently jam communications, although there is
future work being considered to make some of the schedule less future work being considered to make some of the schedule less
visible. Encrypting the schedule does not prevent an attacker from visible. Encrypting the schedule does not prevent an attacker from
jamming, but rather increases the energy cost of doing that jamming. jamming, but rather increases the energy cost of doing that jamming.
4. Privacy Considerations 4. Privacy Considerations
The use of a network ID may reveal information about the network. The use of a network ID may reveal information about the network.
The use of a SHA256 hash of the DODAGID, rather than using the The use of a SHA256 hash of the DODAGID, rather than using the
DODAGID (which is usually derived from the LLN prefix) directly DODAGID (which is usually derived from the LLN prefix) directly
provides some privacy for the the addresses used within the network. provides some privacy for the the addresses used within the network,
The DODAGID is usually the IPv6 address of the root of the RPL mesh. as the DODAGID is usually the IPv6 address of the root of the RPL
mesh.
An interloper with a radio sniffer would be able to use the network An interloper with a radio sniffer would be able to use the network
ID to map out the extent of the mesh network. ID to map out the extent of the mesh network.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
Allocate a new number TBD-XXX from Registry IETF Information Element IANA is asked to assign a new number TBD-XXX from Registry "IEEE Std
(IE) Sub-type ID, as defined by [RFC8137]. This entry should be 802.15.4 IETF IE Subtype IDs" as defined by [RFC8137].
called 6tisch-Join-Info, and should refer to this document.
This entry should be called 6tisch-Join-Info, and should refer to
this document.
Value Subtype-ID Reference
---- ---------- -----------
TBD-XXX 6tisch-Join-Inbfo [this document]
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Thomas Watteyne provided extensive editorial comments on the Thomas Watteyne provided extensive editorial comments on the
document. Carles Gomez Montenegro generated a detailed review of the document. Carles Gomez Montenegro generated a detailed review of the
document at WGLC. Tim Evens provided a number of useful editorial document at WGLC. Tim Evens provided a number of useful editorial
suggestions. suggestions.
7. References 7. References
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