draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-03.txt   draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-04.txt 
ACE Working Group L. Seitz ACE Working Group L. Seitz
Internet-Draft RISE Internet-Draft RISE
Intended status: Standards Track January 30, 2019 Intended status: Standards Track February 11, 2019
Expires: August 3, 2019 Expires: August 15, 2019
Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained
Environments (ACE) Environments (ACE)
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-03 draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-04
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and
introspection endpoints when used with the framework for introspection endpoints when used with the framework for
authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE). authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE).
These are used to express the desired audience of a requested access These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the client
token, the desired proof-of-possession key, the proof-of-possession whishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the AS has selected,
key that the AS has selected, and the key the RS should use to and the key the RS should use to authenticate to the client.
authenticate to the client.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
skipping to change at page 2, line 24 skipping to change at page 2, line 23
3.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Confirmation Method Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Confirmation Method Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 10 9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 10
9.5. Token Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . . . . . 11 9.5. Token Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . . . . . 10
9.6. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . 11 9.6. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . 10
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Overlap with OAuth work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Overlap with OAuth work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new (ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new
parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and
introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in
access tokens. These parameters and claims can also be used in other access tokens. These parameters and claims can also be used in other
contexts, and may need to be updated to align them with ongoing OAuth contexts, and may need to be updated to align them with ongoing OAuth
work. Therefore they have been split out into this document, which work. Therefore they have been split out into this document, which
skipping to change at page 3, line 24 skipping to change at page 3, line 24
is not used in this specification. is not used in this specification.
3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint 3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint
3.1. Client-to-AS Request 3.1. Client-to-AS Request
This document defines the following additional parameters for This document defines the following additional parameters for
requesting an access token from a token endpoint in the ACE framework requesting an access token from a token endpoint in the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]: [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]:
req_aud
OPTIONAL. Specifies the audience for which the client is
requesting an access token. If this parameter is missing, it is
assumed that the AS has a default audience for access tokens
issued to this client. If a client submits a request for an
access token without specifying a "req_aud" parameter, and the AS
does not have a default audience value for this client, then the
AS MUST respond with an error message using a response code
equivalent to the CoAP response code 4.00 (Bad Request). Values
of this parameter follow the syntax of the "aud" claim from
section 3.1.3 of [RFC8392].
req_cnf req_cnf
OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the
client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of- client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of-
possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS reject a request possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS reject a request
containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field, since the containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field, since the
AS is expected to be able to generate better symmetric keys than a AS is expected to be able to generate better symmetric keys than a
potentially constrained client. The AS MUST verify that the potentially constrained client. The AS MUST verify that the
client really is in possession of the corresponding key. Values client really is in possession of the corresponding key. Values
of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from
section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_aud" Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf"
parameter to request a specific audience and the "req_cnf" parameter parameter to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession
to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession key. The key. The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without
content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without
abbreviations for better readability. abbreviations for better readability.
Header: POST (Code=0.02) Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com" Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token" Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"req_aud" : "tempSensor4711",
"req_cnf" : { "req_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC", "kty" : "EC",
"kid" : h'11', "kid" : h'11',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8', "x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
"y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4' "y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
} }
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 8, line 35 skipping to change at page 8, line 38
6. CBOR Mappings 6. CBOR Mappings
If CBOR is used, the new parameters and claims defined in this If CBOR is used, the new parameters and claims defined in this
document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 5, using document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 5, using
the given integer abbreviation for the map key. the given integer abbreviation for the map key.
/-----------------+----------+----------------------------------\ /-----------------+----------+----------------------------------\
| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Value Type | | Parameter name | CBOR Key | Value Type |
|-----------------+----------+----------------------------------| |-----------------+----------+----------------------------------|
| req_aud | 3 | text string |
| cnf | 8 | map | | cnf | 8 | map |
| rs_cnf | 11 | map | | rs_cnf | 11 | map |
| req_cnf | 12 | map | | req_cnf | 12 | map |
\-----------------+----------+----------------------------------/ \-----------------+----------+----------------------------------/
Figure 5: CBOR mappings for new parameters. Figure 5: CBOR mappings for new parameters.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All
security considerations from that document apply here as well. security considerations from that document apply here as well.
The audience claim as defined in [RFC7519] and the equivalent
"req_aud" parameter are intentionally vague on how to match the
audience value to a specific RS. This is intended to allow
application specific semantics to be used. This section attempts to
give some general guidance for the use of audiences in constrained
environments.
URLs are not a good way of identifying mobile devices that can switch
networks and thus be associated with new URLs. If the audience
represents a single RS, and asymmetric keys are used, the RS can be
uniquely identified by a hash of its public key. If this approach is
used this framework RECOMMENDS to apply the procedure from section 3
of [RFC6920].
If the audience addresses a group of resource servers, the mapping of
group identifier to individual RS has to be provisioned to each RS
before the group-audience is usable. Managing dynamic groups could
be an issue, if the RS is not always reachable when the group
memberships change. Furthermore issuing access tokens bound to
symmetric proof-of-possession keys that apply to a group-audience is
problematic, as an RS that is in possession of the access token can
impersonate the client towards the other RSs that are part of the
group. It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED to issue access tokens bound
to a group audience and symmetric proof-of possession keys.
Even the client must be able to determine the correct values to put
into the "req_aud" parameter, in order to obtain a token for the
intended RS. Errors in this process can lead to the client
inadvertantly communicating with the wrong RS. The correct values
for "req_aud" can either be provisioned to the client as part of its
configuration, or dynamically looked up by the client in some
directory. In the latter case the integrity and correctness of the
directory data must be assured.
8. Privacy Considerations 8. Privacy Considerations
This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All
privacy considerations from that document apply here as well. privacy considerations from that document apply here as well.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims 9.1. JSON Web Token Claims
This specification registers the following new claim in the JSON Web This specification registers the following new claim in the JSON Web
skipping to change at page 10, line 24 skipping to change at page 9, line 43
o Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 40) o Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 40)
o Claim Value Type(s): map o Claim Value Type(s): map
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [this document] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [this document]
9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration 9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration
This section registers the following parameters in the "OAuth This section registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]: Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]:
o Name: "req_aud"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request, token request
o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document]
o Name: "req_cnf" o Name: "req_cnf"
o Parameter Usage Location: token request o Parameter Usage Location: token request
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] o Reference: Section 5 of [this document]
o Name: "rs_cnf" o Name: "rs_cnf"
o Parameter Usage Location: token response o Parameter Usage Location: token response
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] o Reference: Section 5 of [this document]
o Name: "cnf" o Name: "cnf"
o Parameter Usage Location: token response o Parameter Usage Location: token response
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] o Reference: Section 5 of [this document]
9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration 9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration
This section registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token This section registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token
Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]. Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse].
skipping to change at page 11, line 4 skipping to change at page 10, line 18
9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration 9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration
This section registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token This section registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token
Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]. Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse].
o Name: "cnf" o Name: "cnf"
o Description: Key to prove the right to use a PoP token. o Description: Key to prove the right to use a PoP token.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document] o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]
o Name: "rs_cnf" o Name: "rs_cnf"
o Description: The key the RS should use to authenticate to the o Description: The key the RS should use to authenticate to the
client. client.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document] o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]
9.5. Token Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton 9.5. Token Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton
This section registers teh following parameter mappings in the "Token This section registers the following parameter mappings in the "Token
Endpoint CBOR Mappings" registry established in section 8.9. of Endpoint CBOR Mappings" registry established in section 8.9. of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
o Name: "req_aud"
o CBOR key: 18
o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document]
o Name: "req_cnf" o Name: "req_cnf"
o CBOR key: 19 o CBOR key: 19
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document] o Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document]
o Name: "cnf" o Name: "cnf"
o CBOR key: 8 o CBOR key: 8
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document] o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document]
o Name: "rs_cnf" o Name: "rs_cnf"
o CBOR key: 17 o CBOR key: 17
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document] o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document]
9.6. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton 9.6. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registraton
This section registers teh following parameter mappings in the This section registers the following parameter mappings in the
"Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings" registry established in "Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings" registry established in
section 8.11. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. section 8.11. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
o Name: "cnf" o Name: "cnf"
o CBOR key: 8 o CBOR key: 8
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document] o Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]
o Name: "rs_cnf" o Name: "rs_cnf"
o CBOR key: 17 o CBOR key: 17
skipping to change at page 12, line 31 skipping to change at page 11, line 41
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-18 Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-18
(work in progress), January 2019. (work in progress), January 2019.
[IANA.CborWebTokenClaims] [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml#claims- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/
registry>. cwt.xhtml#claims-registry>.
[IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims] [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#claims>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#claims>.
[IANA.OAuthParameters] [IANA.OAuthParameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters", IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/
parameters.xhtml#parameters>. oauth-parameters.xhtml#parameters>.
[IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse] [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]
IANA, "OAuth Token Introspection Response", IANA, "OAuth Token Introspection Response",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/
parameters.xhtml#token-introspection-response>. oauth-parameters.xhtml#token-introspection-response>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6920] Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,
Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with
Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
editor.org/info/rfc7252>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., Tschofenig, H., and M. Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., Tschofenig, H., and M.
Mihaly, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Mihaly, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization
Server to Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop- Server to Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-
key-distribution-04 (work in progress), October 2018. key-distribution-04 (work in progress), October 2018.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators]
Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-oauth-resource-
indicators-02 (work in progress), January 2019.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
Appendix A. Overlap with OAuth work Appendix A. Overlap with OAuth work
This document overlaps with draft work from OAuth, namely This document overlaps with draft work from OAuth on proof-of-
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] and possesion keys [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution].
[I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators].
The former specifies the use of "req_cnf" and "cnf" for requesting
proof-of-possession tokens and indicating the key that the AS has
selected. It it was initially deemed that the work at OAuth had been
discontinued and therefore equivalent functionality was defined here.
Work in OAuth has since resumed, but it is lagging behind the planned
milestones of the ACE working group. We have therefore split this
work out into a separate document so that it can later be updated or
obsoleted to align it with the final result of the OAuth work,
without affecting [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
The latter defines the use of the "resource" parameter, allowing to The OAuth draft specifies the use of "req_cnf" and "cnf" for
indicate the location fo the target service or resource where access requesting proof-of-possession tokens and indicating the key that the
is being requested. This partially overlaps with the "req_aud" AS has selected. It it was initially deemed that the work at OAuth
parameter specified here, however the definition of "req_aud" is more had been discontinued and therefore equivalent functionality was
broad, since it can be used in an application specific way that is defined here. Work in OAuth has since resumed, but it is lagging
not necessarily bound to the location of the target audience (e.g. a behind the planned milestones of the ACE working group. We have
group identifier referring to several resource servers, or the public therefore split this work out into a separate document so that it can
key of a resource server). later be updated or obsoleted to align it with the final result of
the OAuth work, without affecting [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Author's Address Author's Address
Ludwig Seitz Ludwig Seitz
RISE RISE
Scheelevaegen 17 Scheelevaegen 17
Lund 223 70 Lund 223 70
Sweden Sweden
Email: ludwig.seitz@ri.se Email: ludwig.seitz@ri.se
 End of changes. 29 change blocks. 
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