draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-08.txt   draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-09.txt 
ACE Working Group L. Seitz ACE Working Group L. Seitz
Internet-Draft Combitech Internet-Draft Combitech
Intended status: Standards Track December 21, 2019 Intended status: Standards Track December 22, 2019
Expires: June 23, 2020 Expires: June 24, 2020
Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained
Environments (ACE) Environments (ACE)
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-08 draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-09
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and
introspection endpoints when used with the framework for introspection endpoints when used with the framework for
authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE). authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE).
These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the client These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the client
whishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the AS has selected, wishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the Authorization
and the key the RS should use to authenticate to the client. Server has selected, and the key the Resource Server should use to
authenticate to the client.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Confirmation Method Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Confirmation Method Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.2. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.3. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 10 9.4. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 10
9.5. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . . . . 10 9.5. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registraton . . . . . . . 11
9.6. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings 9.6. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new (ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new
parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and
introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in
access tokens. These parameters and claims can also be used in other access tokens. These parameters and claims can also be used in other
contexts and have therefore been put into a dedicated document, to contexts and have therefore been put into a dedicated document, to
facilitate their use in a manner independent of facilitate their use in a manner independent of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Note that although all examples are shown in CBOR [RFC7049], JSON
[RFC8259] MAY be used as an alternative for HTTP-based
communications, as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Readers are assumed to be familiar with the terminology from Readers are assumed to be familiar with the terminology from
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], especially the terminology for entities
in the architecture such as client (C), resource server (RS) and
authorization server (AS).
Terminology from [RFC8152] is used in the examples, especially
COSE_Key defined in section 7 of [RFC8152].
Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth 2.0 Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] definition, which is to denote resources such as token and [RFC6749] definition, which is to denote resources such as token and
introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS. The CoAP [RFC7252] introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS. The CoAP [RFC7252]
definition, which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol" definition, which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol"
is not used in this specification. is not used in this specification.
3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint 3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint
This section defines additional parameters for the interations with
the token endpoint in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
3.1. Client-to-AS Request 3.1. Client-to-AS Request
This document defines the following additional parameters for This section defines the "req_cnf" parameter allowing clients to
requesting an access token from a token endpoint in the ACE framework request a specific proof-of-possession key in an access token from a
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]: token endpoint in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]:
req_cnf req_cnf
OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the
client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of- client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of-
possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS reject a request possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS reject a request
containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field, since the containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field
AS is expected to be able to generate better symmetric keys than a (kty=Symmetric), since the AS is expected to be able to generate
constrained client. The AS MUST verify that the client really is better symmetric keys than a constrained client. The AS MUST
in possession of the corresponding key. Values of this parameter verify that the client really is in possession of the
follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of corresponding key. Values of this parameter follow the syntax of
the "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf" Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf"
parameter to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession parameter to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession
key. The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without key. The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without
abbreviations and with linebreaks for better readability. abbreviations and with line-breaks for better readability.
Header: POST (Code=0.02) Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com" Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token" Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"req_cnf" : { "req_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'11', "kid" : h'11',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24 "x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24
4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF', 4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF',
"y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3 "y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3
A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E' A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 1: Example request for an access token bound to an asymmetric Figure 1: Example request for an access token bound to an asymmetric
key. key.
3.2. AS-to-Client Response 3.2. AS-to-Client Response
This document defines the following additional parameters for an AS This section defines the following additional parameters for an AS
response to a request to the token endpoint: response to a request to the token endpoint:
cnf cnf
REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used. REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used.
MAY be present for asymmetric proof-of-possession keys. This MAY be present for asymmetric proof-of-possession keys. This
field contains the proof-of-possession key that the AS selected field contains the proof-of-possession key that the AS selected
for the token. Values of this parameter follow the syntax of the for the token. Values of this parameter follow the syntax of the
"cnf" claim from section 3.1 of "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See Section 5 for [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See Section 5 for
additional discussion of the usage of this parameter. additional discussion of the usage of this parameter.
skipping to change at page 5, line 40 skipping to change at page 6, line 14
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"access_token" : h'D08343A1010AA1054D2A45DF6FBC5A5A ... "access_token" : h'D08343A1010AA1054D2A45DF6FBC5A5A ...
(remainder of CWT omitted for brevity; (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)', CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)',
"rs_cnf" : { "rs_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'12', "kid" : h'12',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220 "x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220
B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1', B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1',
"y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D "y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D
75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416' 75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416'
} }
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 6, line 14 skipping to change at page 6, line 36
3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim 3.3. The Resource Server Confirmation Claim
If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which key it should If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which key it should
use to authenticate towards the client, this specification defines use to authenticate towards the client, this specification defines
the "rs_cnf" claim, which MAY be used in the access token, with the the "rs_cnf" claim, which MAY be used in the access token, with the
same syntax and semantics as defined in for the "rs_cnf" parameter. same syntax and semantics as defined in for the "rs_cnf" parameter.
4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint 4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint
This section defines additional parameters for the interations with
the introspection endpoint in the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
4.1. AS-to-RS Response 4.1. AS-to-RS Response
This document defines the following additional parameters for an AS This section defines the following additional parameters for an AS
response to a request to the introspection endpoint: response to a request to the introspection endpoint:
cnf cnf
OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the proof-of- OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the proof-of-
possession key that binds the client to the access token. Values possession key that binds the client to the access token. Values
of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from
section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See
Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this
parameter. parameter.
rs_cnf rs_cnf
OPTIONAL. If the RS uses asymmetric keys to authenticate towards OPTIONAL. If the RS uses asymmetric keys to authenticate towards
the client (e.g. with a DTLS-RPK handshake) and it has several the client (e.g., with a DTLS Raw Public Key handshake [RFC7250]
such keys (e.g. for different elliptic curves), the AS can give and it has several such keys (e.g., for different elliptic
the RS a hint using this parameter, as to which key it should use. curves), the AS can give the RS a hint using this parameter, as to
Values of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from which key it should use. Values of this parameter follow the
section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See syntax of the "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. See Section 5 for
parameter. additional discussion of the usage of this parameter.
Figure 4 shows an AS response to an introspection request including Figure 4 shows an AS response to an introspection request including
the "cnf" parameter to indicate the proof-of-possession key bound to the "cnf" parameter to indicate the proof-of-possession key bound to
the token and the "rs_cnf" parameter to indicate the key the RS is the token and the "rs_cnf" parameter to indicate the key the RS is
supposed to use to authenticate to the client. supposed to use to authenticate to the client.
Header: Created Code=2.01) Header: Created Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"active" : true, "active" : true,
"scope" : "read", "scope" : "read",
"aud" : "tempSensor4711", "aud" : "tempSensor4711",
"cnf" : { "cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'11', "kid" : h'11',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24 "x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24
4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF', 4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF',
"y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3 "y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3
A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E' A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E'
} }
}, },
"rs_cnf" : { "rs_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'12', "kid" : h'12',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220 "x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220
B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1', B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1',
"y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D "y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D
75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416' 75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416'
} }
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 8, line 17 skipping to change at page 8, line 33
possession token, absent otherwise. Indicates the proof-of- possession token, absent otherwise. Indicates the proof-of-
possession key bound to the access token. possession key bound to the access token.
o "rs_cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL to indicate the o "rs_cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL to indicate the
public key of the RS, if it uses one to authenticate itself to the public key of the RS, if it uses one to authenticate itself to the
client and the binding between key and RS identity is not client and the binding between key and RS identity is not
established through other means. established through other means.
o "rs_cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, OPTIONAL, o "rs_cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, OPTIONAL,
contains the public key that the RS should use for authenticating contains the public key that the RS should use for authenticating
itself to the client (e.g. if the RS has several different public itself to the client (e.g., if the RS has several different public
keys, and there may be ambiguity as to which key to use). keys, and there may be ambiguity as to which key to use).
Note that the COSE_Key structure in a confirmation claim or parameter Note that the COSE_Key structure in a confirmation claim or parameter
may contain an "alg" or "key_ops" parameter. If such parameters are may contain an "alg" or "key_ops" parameter. If such parameters are
present, a client MUST NOT use a key that is incompatible with the present, a client MUST NOT use a key that is incompatible with the
profile or proof-of-possession algorithm according to those profile or proof-of-possession algorithm according to those
parameters. An RS MUST reject a proof-of-possession using such a parameters. An RS MUST reject a proof-of-possession using such a
key. key.
If an access token is issued for an audience that includes several If an access token is issued for an audience that includes several
skipping to change at page 12, line 24 skipping to change at page 12, line 50
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Ludwig Seitz Ludwig Seitz
Combitech Combitech
Djaeknegatan 31 Djaeknegatan 31
 End of changes. 27 change blocks. 
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