draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02.txt   draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03.txt 
ANIMA WG M. Behringer, Ed. ANIMA WG M. Behringer, Ed.
Internet-Draft S. Bjarnason Internet-Draft T. Eckert
Intended status: Standards Track Balaji. BL Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems
Expires: September 22, 2016 T. Eckert Expires: January 9, 2017 S. Bjarnason
Cisco Systems Arbor Networks
March 21, 2016 July 8, 2016
An Autonomic Control Plane An Autonomic Control Plane
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03
Abstract Abstract
Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which
depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane
should ideally be self-managing, and as independent as possible of should ideally be self-managing, and as independent as possible of
configuration. This document defines an "Autonomic Control Plane", configuration. This document defines an "Autonomic Control Plane",
with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It
also serves as a "virtual out of band channel" for OAM communications also serves as a "virtual out of band channel" for OAM communications
over a network that is not configured, or mis-configured. over a network that is not configured, or mis-configured.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Secure Bootstrap over an Unconfigured Network . . . . . . 4 2.2. Secure Bootstrap over an Unconfigured Network . . . . . . 4
2.3. Data Plane Independent Permanent Reachability . . . . . . 5 2.3. Data Plane Independent Permanent Reachability . . . . . . 5
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1.1. Domain Certificate with ANIMA information . . . . . . 8
5.3. Capability Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1.2. AN Adjacency Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Channel Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Neighbor discovery via mDNS/DNS-SD . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Context Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.6. Addressing inside the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4. Channel Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.6.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing . . . . 11 5.5. Security Association protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.6.2. The Base Addressing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.5.1. ACP via IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6.3. Possible Sub-Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.5.2. ACP via GRE/IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6.4. Usage of the Zone Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.5.3. ACP via dTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.7. Routing in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.5.4. GRASP/TLS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Workarounds for Non-Autonomic Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.5.5. ACP Security Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Connecting a Non-Autonomic Controller / NMS system . . . 16 5.6. GRASP instance details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. ACP through Non-Autonomic L3 Clouds . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.7. Context Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Building the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.8. Addressing inside the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Neighbor discovery via GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.8.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing . . . . 15
7.2. Channel Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.8.2. The ACP Addressing Base Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.3. Security Association protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.8.3. ACP Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3.1. ACP via IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.8.4. Usage of the Zone Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3.2. ACP via GRE/IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.8.5. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.3. ACP via dTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.9. Routing in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.4. GRASP/TLS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.10. General ACP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.5. ACP Security Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Workarounds for Non-Autonomic Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.4. GRASP instance details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Connecting a Non-Autonomic Controller / NMS system . . . 20
8. Self-Healing Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.2. ACP through Non-Autonomic L3 Clouds . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Self-Protection Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. Self-Healing Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. The Administrator View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. Self-Protection Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9. The Administrator View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.1. Why GRASP to discover autonomic neighbors . . . . . . . 23 10. Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.1. Why GRASP to discover autonomic neighbors . . . . . . . 23
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 26 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.1. Initial version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . 26 14.1. Initial version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
15.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . 26 14.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . 26
15.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . 26 14.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . 26
15.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . 27 14.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . 26
15.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . . . 27 14.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . 26
15.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . . . 27 14.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . . . 27
15.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . . . 28 14.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . . . 27
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 14.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . . . 28
Appendix A. Background on the choice of routing protocol . . . . 29 14.9. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. Alternative: An ACP without Separation . . . . . . . 31 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Appendix A. Background on the choice of routing protocol . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Autonomic Networking is a concept of self-management: Autonomic Autonomic Networking is a concept of self-management: Autonomic
functions self-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings functions self-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings
across the network. [RFC7575] defines the fundamental ideas and across the network. [RFC7575] defines the fundamental ideas and
design goals of Autonomic Networking. A gap analysis of Autonomic design goals of Autonomic Networking. A gap analysis of Autonomic
Networking is given in [RFC7576]. The reference architecture for Networking is given in [RFC7576]. The reference architecture for
Autonomic Networking in the IETF is currently being defined in the Autonomic Networking in the IETF is currently being defined in the
document [I-D.behringer-anima-reference-model] document [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Autonomic functions need a stable and robust infrastructure to Autonomic functions need a stable and robust infrastructure to
communicate on. This infrastructure should be as robust as possible, communicate on. This infrastructure should be as robust as possible,
and it should be re-usable by all autonomic functions. [RFC7575] and it should be re-usable by all autonomic functions. [RFC7575]
calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane". This document defines the calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane". This document defines the
Autonomic Control Plane. Autonomic Control Plane.
Today, the management and control plane of networks typically runs in Today, the management and control plane of networks typically runs in
the global routing table, which is dependent on correct configuration the global routing table, which is dependent on correct configuration
and routing. Misconfigurations or routing problems can therefore and routing. Misconfigurations or routing problems can therefore
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self-protecting "Autonomic Control Plane" (ACP) which is inband on self-protecting "Autonomic Control Plane" (ACP) which is inband on
the network, yet as independent as possible of configuration, the network, yet as independent as possible of configuration,
addressing and routing problems (for details how this achieved, see addressing and routing problems (for details how this achieved, see
Section 5). It therefore remains operational even in the presence of Section 5). It therefore remains operational even in the presence of
configuration errors, addressing or routing issues, or where policy configuration errors, addressing or routing issues, or where policy
could inadvertently affect control plane connectivity. The Autonomic could inadvertently affect control plane connectivity. The Autonomic
Control Plane serves several purposes at the same time: Control Plane serves several purposes at the same time:
o Autonomic functions communicate over the ACP. The ACP therefore o Autonomic functions communicate over the ACP. The ACP therefore
supports directly Autonomic Networking functions, as described in supports directly Autonomic Networking functions, as described in
[I-D.behringer-anima-reference-model]. For example, GRASP [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]. For example, GRASP
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] can run inside the ACP. [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] can run inside the ACP.
o An operator can use it to log into remote devices, even if the o An operator can use it to log into remote devices, even if the
data plane is misconfigured or unconfigured. data plane is misconfigured or unconfigured.
o A controller or network management system can use it to securely o A controller or network management system can use it to securely
bootstrap network devices in remote locations, even if the network bootstrap network devices in remote locations, even if the network
in between is not yet configured; no data-plane dependent in between is not yet configured; no data-plane dependent
bootstrap configuration is required. An example of such a secure bootstrap configuration is required. An example of such a secure
bootstrap process is described in bootstrap process is described in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
This document describes some use cases for the ACP in Section 2, it This document describes some use cases for the ACP in Section 2, it
defines the requirements in Section 3, Section 4 gives an overview defines the requirements in Section 3, Section 4 gives an overview
how an Autonomic Control Plane is constructed, and in Section 5 the how an Autonomic Control Plane is constructed, and in Section 5 the
detailed process is explained. Section 6 explains how non-autonomic detailed process is explained. Section 6 explains how non-autonomic
nodes and networks can be integrated, Section 7 defines the nodes and networks can be integrated, and Section 5.5 the first
negotiation protocol, and Section 7.3 the first channel types for the channel types for the ACP.
ACP.
The document "Autonomic Network Stable Connectivity" The document "Autonomic Network Stable Connectivity"
[I-D.eckert-anima-stable-connectivity] describes how the ACP can be [I-D.eckert-anima-stable-connectivity] describes how the ACP can be
used to provide stable connectivity for OAM applications. It also used to provide stable connectivity for OAM applications. It also
explains on how existing management solutions can leverage the ACP in explains on how existing management solutions can leverage the ACP in
parallel with traditional management models, when to use the ACP parallel with traditional management models, when to use the ACP
versus the data plane, how to integrate IPv4 based management, etc. versus the data plane, how to integrate IPv4 based management, etc.
2. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane 2. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane
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5. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane 5. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane
This section describes the steps to set up an Autonomic Control This section describes the steps to set up an Autonomic Control
Plane, and highlights the key properties which make it Plane, and highlights the key properties which make it
"indestructible" against many inadvert changes to the data plane, for "indestructible" against many inadvert changes to the data plane, for
example caused by misconfigurations. example caused by misconfigurations.
5.1. Preconditions 5.1. Preconditions
An autonomic node can be a router, switch, controller, NMS host, or An autonomic node can be a router, switch, controller, NMS host, or
any other IP device. We assume an autonomic node has: any other IP device. We assume an autonomic node has a globally
unique domain certificate (LDevID), as well as an adjacency table.
o A globally unique domain certificate, with which it can 5.1.1. Domain Certificate with ANIMA information
cryptographically assert its membership of the domain. The
document [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] describes how a
domain certificate can be automatically and securely derived from
a vendor specific Unique Device Identifier (UDI) or IDevID
certificate. (Note the UDI used in this document is NOT the UUID
specified in [RFC4122].)
o An adjacency table, which contains information about adjacent To establish an ACP securely, an Autnomic Node MUST have a globally
autonomic nodes, at a minimum: node-ID, IP address, domain, unique domain certificate (LDevID), with which it can
certificate. An autonomic device maintains this adjacency table cryptographically assert its membership of the domain. The document
up to date. Where the next autonomic device is not directly [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] describes how a domain
adjacent, the information in the adjacency table can be certificate can be automatically and securely derived from a vendor
supplemented by configuration. For example, the node-ID and IP specific Unique Device Identifier (UDI) or IDevID certificate.
address could be configured. (Note: the UDI used in this document is NOT the UUID specified in
[RFC4122].)
The domain certificate (LDevID) of an autonomic node MUST contain
ANIMA specific information, specifically the domain name, and its ACP
address with the zone-ID set to zero. This information MUST be
encoded in the LDevID in the subjectAltName / rfc822Name field in the
following way:
anima.acp+<ACP address>@<domain>
An example:
anima.acp+FD99:B02D:8EC3:0:200:0:6400:1@example.com
The ACP address MUST be specified in its canonical form, as specified
in [RFC5952], to allow for easy textual comparisons.
The bootstrap process defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] MUST in an ANIMA network pass
on ACP address and domain to a new node, such that the new node can
add this to its enrolment request.
The Certificate Authority in an ANIMA network MUST honor these
parameters, and create the respective subjectAltName / rfc822Name in
the certificate.
ANIMA nodes can therefore find ACP address and domain using this
field in the domain certificate, both for themselves, as well as for
other nodes.
See section 4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280] for details on the subjectAltName
field.
5.1.2. AN Adjacency Table
To know to which nodes to establish an ACP channel, every autonomic
node maintains an adjacency table. The adjacency table contains
information about adjacent autonomic nodes, at a minimum: node-ID, IP
address, domain, certificate. An autonomic device MUST maintain this
adjacency table up to date. This table is used to determine to which
neighbor an ACP connection is established.
Where the next autonomic device is not directly adjacent, the
information in the adjacency table can be supplemented by
configuration. For example, the node-ID and IP address could be
configured.
The adjacency table MAY contain information about the validity and The adjacency table MAY contain information about the validity and
trust of the adjacent autonomic node's certificate. However, trust of the adjacent autonomic node's certificate. However,
subsequent steps MUST always start with authenticating the peer. subsequent steps MUST always start with authenticating the peer.
The adjacency table contains information about adjacent autonomic The adjacency table contains information about adjacent autonomic
nodes in general, independently of their domain and trust status. nodes in general, independently of their domain and trust status.
The next step determines to which of those autonomic nodes an ACP The next step determines to which of those autonomic nodes an ACP
connection should be established. connection should be established.
5.2. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection 5.2. Neighbor discovery via mDNS/DNS-SD
Autonomic devices use DNS-SD/mDNS to discover the IPv6 link-local
address of autonomic neighbors across L2 adjacencies. The result is
stored in the AN Adjacency Table, see Section 5.1.2.
o If a node is not part an autonomic domain, it starts autonomic
enrollment with an adjacent node as the proxy using procedures
described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
o If a node is part of an autonomic domain (eg: enrolled with a
certificate) and has a working ACP towards one or more registrars
(including when it is a registrar herself), it MUST announce the
"_bootstrapks._tcp.local." service to indicate that it can act as
a proxy for bootstrap. This can be superceeded by Intent.
o If a node is part of an autonomic domain, it also announces the
"_anima_acp_ll._udp.local" service via DNS-based Service Discovery
[RFC6763] over Multicast DNS [RFC6762] and searches for that
services to discover neighbors. This can be superceeded by Intent
or future work (see below).
o TBD: Should the domain also be announced with the
"_anima_acp_ll._udp.local" service? Pro: Then a node "sees" which
domain a neighbor is and can make selection more efficient. Con:
A proxy exposes its domain by default.
o To prevent unaccceptable levels of network traffic the congestion
avoidance mechanisms specified in [RFC6762] section 7 MUST be
followed. Announcements for the "_anima_acp._udp.local" service
MUST only use the IPv6 link-local address of the announcing
interface. Other service parameters (SRV parameters, TXT records)
are ignored to avoid creating additional attack vectors from bogus
announcements by third parties.
o Note that two different service names are used between bootstrap
and ACP because these functions may not always go along with each
other. For example, an autonomic device connecting to the
Internet can still provide Bootstrap proxy functions via any of
the discovery mechanisms specified in the bootstrap document,
while building the ACP is only defined in this document to be
across IPv6 LL adjacencies. The reason for this difference is
that in case of non-L2-adjacent devices, it is appropriate to
perform bootstrap via a centralized bootstrap proxy, but the ACP
should be built towards the nearest possible ACP neighbors, and in
the absence of L2 adjacencies this is a more complex discovery
problem, left for future work - and different discovery
mechanisms.
o An autonomic node stores the results of the neighbor discovery in
the AN Adjacency table.
5.3. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection
An autonomic node must determine to which other autonomic nodes in An autonomic node must determine to which other autonomic nodes in
the adjacency table it should build an ACP connection. the adjacency table it should build an ACP connection. This is based
on the information in the AN Adjacency table.
The ACP is by default established exclusively between nodes in the The ACP is by default established exclusively between nodes in the
same domain. same domain.
Intent can change this default behaviour. The precise format for Intent can change this default behaviour. The precise format for
this Intent needs to be defined outside this document. Example this Intent needs to be defined outside this document. Example
Intent policies are: Intent policies are:
o The ACP should be built between all sub-domains for a given parent o The ACP should be built between all sub-domains for a given parent
domain. For example: For domain "example.com", nodes of domain. For example: For domain "example.com", nodes of
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example "example1.com" should establish the ACP also with nodes example "example1.com" should establish the ACP also with nodes
from "example2.com". For this case, the two domains must be able from "example2.com". For this case, the two domains must be able
to validate their trust, typically by cross-signing their to validate their trust, typically by cross-signing their
certificate infrastructure. certificate infrastructure.
The result of the candidate ACP neighbor selection process is a list The result of the candidate ACP neighbor selection process is a list
of adjacent or configured autonomic neighbors to which an ACP channel of adjacent or configured autonomic neighbors to which an ACP channel
should be established. The next step begins that channel should be established. The next step begins that channel
establishment. establishment.
5.3. Capability Negotiation 5.4. Channel Selection
Autonomic devices may have different capabilities based on the type To avoid attacks, initial discovery of candidate ACP peers can not
of device, OS version, etc. To establish a trusted secure ACP include any non-protected negotiation. To avoid re-inventing and
channel, devices must first negotiate their mutual capabilities in validating security association mechanisms, the next step after
the data plane. This allows for the support of different channel discoving the address of a candidate neighbor can only be to try
types in the future. first to establish a security association with that neighbor using a
well-known security association method.
For each node on the candidate ACP neighbor list, capabilities need At this time in the lifecycle of autonomic devices, it is unclear
to be exchanged. The capability negotiation is based on GRASP whether it is feasible to even decide on a single MTI (mandatory to
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]. The relevant protocol details are defined in implement) security association protocol across all autonomic
Section 7. This negotiation MUST be secure: The identity of the devices.
other node MUST be validated during capability negotiation, and the
exchange MUST be authenticated.
The first parameter to be negotiated is the ACP Channel type. The From the use-cases it is clear that not all type of autonomic devices
channel types are defined in Section 7.3. Other parameters may be can or need to connect directly to each other or are able to support
added later. or prefer all possible mechanisms. For example, code space limited
IoT devices may only support dTLS (because that code exists already
on them for end-to-end security use-cases), but low-end in-ceiling L2
switches may only want to support MacSec because that is also
supported in HW, and only a more flexible garteway device may need to
support both of these mechanisms and potentially more.
Intent may also influence the capability negotiation. For example, To support these requirements, and make ACP channel negotiation also
Intent may require a minimum ACP tunnel security. This is outside easily extensible, the secure channel selection between Alice and Bob
scope for this document. is a potentially two stage process. In the first stage, Alice and
Bob directly try to establish a secure channel using the security-
association and channel protocols they support. One or more of these
protocols may simply be protocols not directly resulting in an ACP
channel, but instead establishing a secure negotiation channel
through which the final secure channel protocol is decided. If both
Alice and Bob support such a negotiation step, then this secured
negotiation channel is the first step, and the secure channel
protocol is the second step.
5.4. Channel Establishment If Alice supports multiple security association protocols in the
first step, it is a matter of Alices local policy to determine the
order in which she will try to build the connection to Bob. To
support multiple security association protocols, Alice must be able
to simultaneously act as a responder in parallel for all of them - so
that she can respond to any order in which Bob wants to prefer
building the security association.
After authentication and capability negotiation autonomic nodes When ACP setup between Alice and Bob results in the first secure
establish a secure channel towards the AN neighbors with the above association to be established, the peer with the higher Device-ID in
negotiated parameters. the certificate will stop building new security associations. The
peer with the lower certificate Device-ID is now responsible to
continue building its most preferred security association and to tear
down all but that most preferred one - unless the secure association
is one of a negotation protocols whose rules superceed this.
The channel establishment MUST be authenticated. Whether or not, and All this negotiation is in the context of an "L2 interface". Alice
how, a channel is encrypted is part of the capability negotiation, and Bob will build ACP connections to each other on every "L2
potentially controlled by Intent. interface" that they both connect to.
In order to be independent of configured link addresses, channels 5.5. Security Association protocols
SHOULD use IPv6 link local addresses between adjacent neighbors
wherever possible. This way, the ACP tunnels are independent of
correct network wide routing.
Since channels are by default established between adjacent neighbors, The following sections define the security association protocols that
the resulting overlay network does hop by hop encryption. Each node we consider to be important and feasible to specify in this document.
decrypts incoming traffic from the ACP, and encrypts outgoing traffic In all cases, the mutual authentication is done via the autonomic
to its neighbors in the ACP. Routing is discussed in Section 5.7. domain certificate of the peer as follows - unless superceeded by
intent:
If two nodes are connected via several links, the ACP SHOULD be o The certificate is valid as proven by the security associations
established on every link, but it is possible to establish the ACP protocol exchanges.
only on a sub-set of links. Having an ACP channel on every link has
a number of advantages, for example it allows for a faster failover
in case of link failure, and it reflects the physical topology more
closely. Using a subset of links (for example, a single link),
reduces resource consumption on the devices, because state needs to
be kept per ACP channel.
5.5. Context Separation o The peers certificate is signed by the same CA as the devices
domain certificate.
o The peers OU (Organizational Unit) field in the certificates
Subject is the same as in the devices certificate.
5.5.1. ACP via IPsec
To run ACP via IPsec transport mode, no further IANA assignments/
definitions are required. All autonomic devices suppoting IPsec MUST
support IPsec security setup via IKEv2, transport mode encapsulation
via the device and peer link-local IPv6 addresses and AES256
encryption. Further parameter options can be negotiated via IKEv2 or
via GRASP/TLS.
5.5.2. ACP via GRE/IPsec
In network devices it is often easier to provide virtual interfaces
on top of GRE encapsulation than natively on top of a simple IPsec
association. On those devices it may be necessary to run the ACP
secure channel on top of a GRE connection protected by the IPsec
association. The requirements for the IPsec association are the same
as described above, but instead of directly carrying the ACP IPv6
packets, the payload is an ACP IPv6 packet inside GRE/IPv6.
Note that without explicit negotiation (eg: via GRASP/TLS), this
method is incompatible to direct ACP via IPsec, so it must only be
used as an option during GRASP/TLS negotiation.
5.5.3. ACP via dTLS
To run ACP via UDP and dTLS v1.2 [RFC6347] an IANA assigned port
[TBD] is used. All autonomic devices supporting ACP via dTLS must
support AES256 encryption.
5.5.4. GRASP/TLS negotiation
To explicitly allow negotiation of the ACP channel protocol, GRASP
over a TLS connection using the GRASP_LISTEN_PORT and the devices and
peers link-local IPv6 address is used. When Alice and Bob support
GRASP negotiation, they do prefer it over any other non-explicitly
negotiated security association protocol and should wait trying any
non-negotiated ACP channel protocol until after it is clear that
GRASP/TLS will not work to the peer.
When Alice and Bob successfully establish the GRASP/TSL session, they
will initially negotiate the channel mechanism to use. Bob and Alice
each have a list of channel mehanisms they support, sorted by
preference. They negotiate the best mechansm supported by both of
them. In the absence of Intent, the mechanism choosen is the best
one for the device with the lower Device-ID.
After agreeing on a channel mechanism, Alice and Bob start the
selected Channel protocol. The GRASP/TLS connection can be kept
alive or timed out as long as the seelected channel protocol has a
secure association between Alice and Bob. When it terminates, it
needs to be re-negotiated via GRASP/TLS.
Negotiation of a channel type may require IANA assignments of code
points. See IANA Considerations (Section 12) for the formal
definition of those code points.
TBD: The exact negotiation steps in GRASP to achieve this outcome.
5.5.5. ACP Security Profiles
A baseline autonomic device MUST support IPsec and SHOULD support
GRASP/TLS and dTLS. A constrained autonomic device MUST support
dTLS.
Autonomic devices need to specify in documentation the set of secure
ACP mechanisms they suppport.
5.6. GRASP instance details
Received GRASP packets are assigned to an instance of GRASP by the
context they are received on:
o GRASP packets received on an ACP (virtual) interfaces are assigned
to the ACP instance of GRASP
o GRASP packets received inside a TLS connection established for
GRASP/TLS ACP negotiation are assigned to a separate instance of
GRASP for that negotiation.
TBD: The Details of the GRASP objective/packet formats still need to
be defined. Eg: Need to define an allocation for the objective of
"Autonomic Node".
5.7. Context Separation
The ACP is in a separate context from the normal data plane of the The ACP is in a separate context from the normal data plane of the
device. This context includes the ACP channels IPv6 forwarding and device. This context includes the ACP channels IPv6 forwarding and
routing as well as any required higher layer ACP functions. routing as well as any required higher layer ACP functions.
In classical network device platforms, a dedicated so called "Virtual In classical network device platforms, a dedicated so called "Virtual
routing and forwarding instance" (VRF) is one logical implementation routing and forwarding instance" (VRF) is one logical implementation
option for the ACP. If possible by the platform SW architecture, option for the ACP. If possible by the platform SW architecture,
separation options that minimize shared components are preferred. separation options that minimize shared components are preferred.
The context for the ACP needs to be established automatically during The context for the ACP needs to be established automatically during
bootstrap of a device. As much as possible it should be protected bootstrap of a device. As much as possible it should be protected
from being modified unintentionally by data plane configuration. from being modified unintentionally by data plane configuration.
Context separation improves security, because the ACP is not Context separation improves security, because the ACP is not
reachable from the global routing table. Also, configuration errors reachable from the global routing table. Also, configuration errors
from the data plane setup do not affect the ACP. from the data plane setup do not affect the ACP.
[EDNOTE: Previous versions of this document also discussed an option 5.8. Addressing inside the ACP
where the ACP runs in the data plane without logical separation.
Consensus is to focus only on the separated ACP now, and to remove
the ACP in the data plane from this document. See Appendix B for the
reasons for this decision.]
5.6. Addressing inside the ACP
The channels explained above typically only establish communication The channels explained above typically only establish communication
between two adjacent nodes. In order for communication to happen between two adjacent nodes. In order for communication to happen
across multiple hops, the autonomic control plane requires internal across multiple hops, the autonomic control plane requires internal
network wide valid addresses and routing. Each autonomic node must network wide valid addresses and routing. Each autonomic node must
create a virtual interface with a network wide unique address inside create a virtual interface with a network wide unique address inside
the ACP context mentioned in Section 5.5. This address may be used the ACP context mentioned in Section 5.7. This address may be used
also in other virtual contexts. also in other virtual contexts.
With the algorithm introduced here, all autonomic devices in the same With the algorithm introduced here, all autonomic devices in the same
domain have the same /48 prefix. Conversely, global IDs from domain have the same /48 prefix. Conversely, global IDs from
different domains are unlikely to clash, such that two networks can different domains are unlikely to clash, such that two networks can
be merged, as long as the policy allows that merge. See also be merged, as long as the policy allows that merge. See also
Section 8 for a discussion on merging domains. Section 7 for a discussion on merging domains.
Links inside the ACP only use link-local IPv6 addressing, such that Links inside the ACP only use link-local IPv6 addressing, such that
each node only requires one routable virtual address. each node only requires one routable virtual address.
5.6.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing 5.8.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing
o Usage: Autonomic addresses are exclusively used for self- o Usage: Autonomic addresses are exclusively used for self-
management functions inside a trusted domain. They are not used management functions inside a trusted domain. They are not used
for user traffic. Communications with entities outside the for user traffic. Communications with entities outside the
trusted domain use another address space, for example normally trusted domain use another address space, for example normally
managed routable address space. managed routable address space.
o Separation: Autonomic address space is used separately from user o Separation: Autonomic address space is used separately from user
address space and other address realms. This supports the address space and other address realms. This supports the
robustness requirement. robustness requirement.
skipping to change at page 12, line 26 skipping to change at page 16, line 23
o Autonomic functions do not require IPv4: Autonomic functions and o Autonomic functions do not require IPv4: Autonomic functions and
autonomic service agents are new concepts. They can be autonomic service agents are new concepts. They can be
exclusively built on IPv6 from day one. There is no need for exclusively built on IPv6 from day one. There is no need for
backward compatibility. backward compatibility.
o OAM protocols no not require IPv4: The ACP may carry OAM o OAM protocols no not require IPv4: The ACP may carry OAM
protocols. All relevant protocols (SNMP, TFTP, SSH, SCP, Radius, protocols. All relevant protocols (SNMP, TFTP, SSH, SCP, Radius,
Diameter, ...) are available in IPv6. Diameter, ...) are available in IPv6.
5.6.2. The Base Addressing Scheme 5.8.2. The ACP Addressing Base Scheme
The Base ULA addressing scheme for autonomic nodes has the following The Base ULA addressing scheme for autonomic nodes has the following
format: format:
8 40 3 77 8 40 3 77
+--+--------------+------+------------------------------------------+ +--+--------------+------+------------------------------------------+
|FD| hash(domain) | Type | (sub-scheme) | |FD| hash(domain) | Type | (sub-scheme) |
+--+--------------+------+------------------------------------------+ +--+--------------+------+------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Base Addressing Scheme Figure 2: ACP Addressing Base Scheme
The first 48 bits follow the ULA scheme, as defined in [RFC4193], to The first 48 bits follow the ULA scheme, as defined in [RFC4193], to
which a type field is added: which a type field is added:
o "FD" identifies a locally defined ULA address. o "FD" identifies a locally defined ULA address.
o The "global ID" is set here to be a hash of the domain name, which o The ULA "global ID" is set here to be a hash of the domain name,
results in a pseudo-random 40 bit value. It is calculated as the which results in a pseudo-random 40 bit value. It is calculated
first 40 bits of the MD5 hash of the domain name, in the example as the first 40 bits of the MD5 hash of the domain name, in the
"example.com". example "example.com".
o Type: Set to 000 (3 zero bits). This field allows different o Type: This field allows different address sub-schemes in the
address sub-schemes in the future. The goal is to start with a future. The goal is to start with a single sub-schemes, but to
minimal number (ideally one) of sub-schemes initially, but to
allow for extensions later if and when required. This addresses allow for extensions later if and when required. This addresses
the "upgradability" requirement. Assignment of types for this the "upgradability" requirement. Assignment of types for this
field should be maintained by IANA. field should be maintained by IANA.
5.6.3. Possible Sub-Schemes 5.8.3. ACP Addressing Sub-Scheme
The sub-schemes listed here are not intended to be all supported
initially, but are listed for discussion. The final document should
define ideally only a single sub-scheme for now, and leave the other
"types" for later assignment.
5.6.3.1. Sub-Scheme 1 The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 0 (zero) in
the base scheme.
51 13 64 51 13 63 1
+------------------------+---------+--------------------------------+ +------------------------+---------+----------------------------+---+
| (base scheme) | Zone ID | Device ID | | (base scheme) | Zone ID | Device ID | V |
+------------------------+---------+--------------------------------+ +------------------------+---------+----------------------------+---+
Figure 3: Addressing Scheme 1 Figure 3: ACP Addressing Sub-Scheme
The fields are defined as follows: [Editor's note: The lengths of the The fields are defined as follows: [Editor's note: The lengths of the
fields is for discussion.] fields is for discussion.]
o Zone ID: If set to all zero bits: The device ID bits are used as o Zone ID: If set to all zero bits: The device ID bits are used as
an identifier (as opposed to a locator). This results in a non- an identifier (as opposed to a locator). This results in a non-
hierarchical, flat addressing scheme. Any other value indicates a hierarchical, flat addressing scheme. Any other value indicates a
zone. See section Section 5.6.4 on how this field is used in zone. See section Section 5.8.4 on how this field is used in
detail. detail.
o Device ID: A unique value for each device. o Device ID: A unique value for each device.
o V: Virtualization bit: 0: autonomic node base system; 1: a virtual
context on an autonomic node.
The device ID is derived as follows: In an Autonomic Network, a The device ID is derived as follows: In an Autonomic Network, a
registrar is enrolling new devices. As part of the enrolment process registrar is enrolling new devices. As part of the enrolment process
the registrar assigns a number to the device, which is unique for the registrar assigns a number to the device, which is unique for
this registrar, but not necessarily unique in the domain. The 64 bit this registrar, but not necessarily unique in the domain. The 64 bit
device ID is then composed as: device ID is then composed as:
o 48 bit: Registrar ID, a number unique inside the domain that o 48 bit: Registrar ID, a number unique inside the domain that
identifies the registrar which assigned the name to the device. A identifies the registrar which assigned the name to the device. A
MAC address of the registrar can be used for this purpose. MAC address of the registrar can be used for this purpose.
o 16 bit: Device number, a number which is unique for a given o 15 bit: Device number, a number which is unique for a given
registrar, to identify the device. This can be a sequentially registrar, to identify the device. This can be a sequentially
assigned number. assigned number.
The "device ID" itself is unique in a domain (i.e., the Zone-ID is The "device ID" itself is unique in a domain (i.e., the Zone-ID is
not required for uniqueness). Therefore, a device can be addressed not required for uniqueness). Therefore, a device can be addressed
either as part of a flat hierarchy (zone ID = 0), or with an either as part of a flat hierarchy (zone ID = 0), or with an
aggregation scheme (any other zone ID). A address with zone-ID could aggregation scheme (any other zone ID). A address with zone-ID = 0
be interpreted as an identifier, with another zone-ID as a locator. is an identifier, with another zone-ID as a locator. See
See Section 5.6.4 for a description of the zone bits. Section 5.8.4 for a description of the zone bits.
5.6.3.2. Sub-Scheme 2
51 13 64-V ?
+------------------------+---------+----------------------------+---+
| (base scheme) | Zone ID | Device ID | V |
+------------------------+---------+----------------------------+---+
Figure 4: Addressing Scheme 2
The fields are defined as follows: [Editor's note: The lengths of the
fields is for discussion.]
o Zone ID: As in sub-scheme 1.
o Device ID: As in sub-scheme 1.
o V: Virtualization bit(s): 1 or more bits that indicate a virtual
context on an autonomic node.
In addition the scheme 1 (Section 5.6.3.1), this scheme allows the This addressing sub-scheme allows the direct addressing of specific
direct addressing of specific virtual containers / VMs on an virtual containers / VMs on an autonomic node. An increasing number
autonomic node. An increasing number of hardware platforms have a of hardware platforms have a distributed architecture, with a base OS
distributed architecture, with a base OS for the node itself, and the for the node itself, and the support for hardware blades with
support for hardware blades with potentially different OSs. The VMs potentially different OSs. The VMs on the blades could be considered
on the blades could be considered as separate autonomic nodes, in as separate autonomic nodes, in which case it would make sense to be
which case it would make sense to be able to address them directly. able to address them directly. Autonomic Service Agents (ASAs) could
Autonomic Service Agents (ASAs) could be instantiated in either the be instantiated in either the base OS, or one of the VMs on a blade.
base OS, or one of the VMs on a blade. This addressing scheme allows This addressing scheme allows for the easy separation of the hardware
for the easy separation of the hardware context. context.
The location of the V bit(s) at the end of the address allows to The location of the V bit(s) at the end of the address allows to
announce a single prefix for each autonomic node, while having announce a single prefix for each autonomic node, while having
separate virtual contexts addressable directly. separate virtual contexts addressable directly.
5.6.4. Usage of the Zone Field 5.8.4. Usage of the Zone Field
The "zone ID" allows for the introduction of structure in the The "zone ID" allows for the introduction of structure in the
addressing scheme. addressing scheme.
Zone = zero is the default addressing scheme in an autonomic domain. Zone = zero is the default addressing scheme in an autonomic domain.
Every autonomic node MUST respond to its ACP address with zone=0. Every autonomic node MUST respond to its ACP address with zone=0.
Used on its own this leads to a non-hierarchical address scheme, Used on its own this leads to a non-hierarchical address scheme,
which is suitable for networks up to a certain size. In this case, which is suitable for networks up to a certain size. In this case,
the addresses primarily act as identifiers for the nodes, and the addresses primarily act as identifiers for the nodes, and
aggregation is not possible. aggregation is not possible.
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is required at this point, but a new type could be used in the future is required at this point, but a new type could be used in the future
to support such a scheme.) to support such a scheme.)
Note: Another way to introduce hierarchy is to use sub-domains in the Note: Another way to introduce hierarchy is to use sub-domains in the
naming scheme. The node names "node17.subdomainA.example.com" and naming scheme. The node names "node17.subdomainA.example.com" and
"node4.subdomainB.example.com" would automatically lead to different "node4.subdomainB.example.com" would automatically lead to different
ULA prefixes, which can be used to introduce a routing hierarchy in ULA prefixes, which can be used to introduce a routing hierarchy in
the network, assuming that the subdomains are aligned with routing the network, assuming that the subdomains are aligned with routing
areas. areas.
5.7. Routing in the ACP 5.8.5. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes
Other ACP addressing sub-schemes can be defined if and when required.
IANA will assign a new "type" for each new addressing sub-scheme.
5.9. Routing in the ACP
Once ULA address are set up all autonomic entities should run a Once ULA address are set up all autonomic entities should run a
routing protocol within the autonomic control plane context. This routing protocol within the autonomic control plane context. This
routing protocol distributes the ULA created in the previous section routing protocol distributes the ULA created in the previous section
for reachability. The use of the autonomic control plane specific for reachability. The use of the autonomic control plane specific
context eliminates the probable clash with the global routing table context eliminates the probable clash with the global routing table
and also secures the ACP from interference from the configuration and also secures the ACP from interference from the configuration
mismatch or incorrect routing updates. mismatch or incorrect routing updates.
The establishment of the routing plane and its parameters are The establishment of the routing plane and its parameters are
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All routing updates are automatically secured in transit as the All routing updates are automatically secured in transit as the
channels of the autonomic control plane are by default secured. channels of the autonomic control plane are by default secured.
The routing protocol inside the ACP should be light weight and highly The routing protocol inside the ACP should be light weight and highly
scalable to ensure that the ACP does not become a limiting factor in scalable to ensure that the ACP does not become a limiting factor in
network scalability. We suggest the use of RPL [RFC6550] as one such network scalability. We suggest the use of RPL [RFC6550] as one such
protocol which is light weight and scales well for the control plane protocol which is light weight and scales well for the control plane
traffic. See Appendix A for more details on the choice of RPL. traffic. See Appendix A for more details on the choice of RPL.
5.10. General ACP Considerations
In order to be independent of configured link addresses, channels
SHOULD use IPv6 link local addresses between adjacent neighbors
wherever possible. This way, the ACP tunnels are independent of
correct network wide routing.
Since channels are by default established between adjacent neighbors,
the resulting overlay network does hop by hop encryption. Each node
decrypts incoming traffic from the ACP, and encrypts outgoing traffic
to its neighbors in the ACP. Routing is discussed in Section 5.9.
If two nodes are connected via several links, the ACP SHOULD be
established on every link, but it is possible to establish the ACP
only on a sub-set of links. Having an ACP channel on every link has
a number of advantages, for example it allows for a faster failover
in case of link failure, and it reflects the physical topology more
closely. Using a subset of links (for example, a single link),
reduces resource consumption on the devices, because state needs to
be kept per ACP channel.
6. Workarounds for Non-Autonomic Nodes 6. Workarounds for Non-Autonomic Nodes
6.1. Connecting a Non-Autonomic Controller / NMS system 6.1. Connecting a Non-Autonomic Controller / NMS system
The Autonomic Control Plane can be used by management systems, such The Autonomic Control Plane can be used by management systems, such
as controllers or network management system (NMS) hosts (henceforth as controllers or network management system (NMS) hosts (henceforth
called simply "NMS hosts"), to connect to devices through it. For called simply "NMS hosts"), to connect to devices through it. For
this, an NMS host must have access to the ACP. By default, the ACP this, an NMS host must have access to the ACP. By default, the ACP
is a self-protecting overlay network, which only allows access to is a self-protecting overlay network, which only allows access to
trusted systems. Therefore, a traditional, non-autonomic NMS system trusted systems. Therefore, a traditional, non-autonomic NMS system
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One workaround is to manually configure IP tunnels between autonomic One workaround is to manually configure IP tunnels between autonomic
nodes across a non-autonomic Layer-3 cloud. The tunnels are nodes across a non-autonomic Layer-3 cloud. The tunnels are
represented on each autonomic node as virtual interfaces, and all represented on each autonomic node as virtual interfaces, and all
autonomic transactions work across such tunnels. autonomic transactions work across such tunnels.
Such manually configured tunnels are less "indestructible" than an Such manually configured tunnels are less "indestructible" than an
automatically created ACP based on link local addressing, since they automatically created ACP based on link local addressing, since they
depend on correct data plane operations, such as routing and depend on correct data plane operations, such as routing and
addressing. addressing.
7. Building the ACP 7. Self-Healing Properties
7.1. Neighbor discovery via GRASP
Autonomic devices use inscure GRASP to discovery candidate autonomic
neighbors across L2 adjacencies. When Alice discovers Bob:
o If Alice is not part an autonomic domain, she starts autonomic
enrollment with Bob as the proxy using procedures described in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
o If Alice is part of an autonomic domain, Alice attempts to build
the ACP to Bob. Bob will do the same.
7.2. Channel Selection
To avoid attacks, initial discovery of candidate ACP peers can not
include any non-protected negotiation. To avoid re-inventing and
validating security association mechanisms, the next step after
discoving the address of a candidate neighbor can only be to try
first to establish a security association with that neighbor using a
well-known security association method.
At this time in the lifecycle of autonomic devices, it is unclear
whether it is feasible to even decide on a single MTI (mandatory to
implement) security association protocol across all autonomic
devices.
From the use-cases it is clear that not all type of autonomic devices
can or need to connect directly to each other or are able to support
or prefer all possible mechanisms. For example, code space limited
IoT devices may only support dTLS (because that code exists already
on them for end-to-end security use-cases), but low-end in-ceiling L2
switches may only want to support MacSec because that is also
supported in HW, and only a more flexible garteway device may need to
support both of these mechanisms and potentially more.
To support these requirements, and make ACP channel negotiation also
easily extensible, the secure channel selection between Alice and Bob
is a potentially two stage process. In the first stage, Alice and
Bob directly try to establish a secure channel using the security-
association and channel protocols they support. One or more of these
protocols may simply be protocols not directly resulting in an ACP
channel, but instead establishing a secure negotiation channel
through which the final secure channel protocol is decided. If both
Alice and Bob support such a negotiation step, then this secured
negotiation channel is the first step, and the secure channel
protocol is the second step.
If Alice supports multiple security association protocols in the
first step, it is a matter of Alices local policy to determine the
order in which she will try to build the connection to Bob. To
support multiple security association protocols, Alice must be able
to simultaneously act as a responder in parallel for all of them - so
that she can respond to any order in which Bob wants to prefer
building the security association.
When ACP setup between Alice and Bob results in the first secure
association to be established, the peer with the higher Device-ID in
the certificate will stop building new security associations. The
peer with the lower certificate Device-ID is now responsible to
continue building its most preferred security association and to tear
down all but that most preferred one - unless the secure association
is one of a negotation protocols whose rules superceed this.
All this negotiation is in the context of an "L2 interface". Alice
and Bob will build ACP connections to each other on every "L2
interface" that they both connect to.
7.3. Security Association protocols
The following sections define the security association protocols that
we consider to be important and feasible to specify in this document.
In all cases, the mutual authentication is done via the autonomic
domain certificate of the peer as follows - unless superceeded by
intent:
o The certificate is valid as proven by the security associations
protocol exchanges.
o The peers certificate is signed by the same CA as the devices
domain certificate.
o The peers OU (Organizational Unit) field in the certificates
Subject is the same as in the devices certificate.
7.3.1. ACP via IPsec
To run ACP via IPsec transport mode, no further IANA assignments/
definitions are required. All autonomic devices suppoting IPsec MUST
support IPsec security setup via IKEv2, transpoort mode encapsulation
via the device and peer link-local IPv6 addresses and AES256
encryption. Further parameter options can be negotiated via IKEv2 or
via GRASP/TLS.
7.3.2. ACP via GRE/IPsec
In network devices it is often easier to provide virtual interfaces
on top of GRE encapsulation than natively on top of a simple IPsec
association. On those devices it may be necessary to run the ACP
secure channel on top of a GRE connection protected by the IPsec
association. The requirements for the IPsec association are the same
as described above, but instead of directly carrying the ACP IPv6
packets, the payload is an ACP IPv6 packet inside GREP/IPv6.
Note that without explicit negotiation (eg: via GRASP/TLS), this
method is incompatible to direct ACP via IPsec, so it must only be
used as an option during GRASP/TLS negotiation.
7.3.3. ACP via dTLS
To run ACP via UDP and dTLS v1.2 [RFC6347] an IANA assigned port
[TBD] is used. All autonomic devices supporting ACP via dTLS must
support AES256 encryption.
7.3.4. GRASP/TLS negotiation
To explicitly allow negotiation of the ACP channel protocol, GRASP
over a TLS connection using the GRASP_LISTEN_PORT and the devices and
peers link-local IPv6 address is used. When Alice and Bob support
GRASP negotiation, they do prefer it over any other non-explicitly
negotiated security association protocol and should wait trying any
non-negotiated ACP channel protocol until after it is clear that
GRASP/TLS will not work to the peer.
When Alice and Bob successfully establish the GRASP/TSL session, they
will initially negotiate the channel mechanism to use. Bob and Alice
each have a list of channel mehanisms they support, sorted by
preference. They negotiate the best mechansm supported by both of
them. In the absence of Intent, the mechanism choosen is the best
one for the device with the lower Device-ID.
After agreeing on a channel mechanism, Alice and Bob start the
selected Channel protocol. The GRASP/TLS connection can be kept
alive or timed out as long as the seelected channel protocol has a
secure association between Alice and Bob. When it terminates, it
needs to be re-negotiated via GRASP/TLS.
Negotiation of a channel type may require IANA assignments of code
points. See IANA Considerations (Section 13) for the formal
definition of those code points.
TBD: The exact negotiation steps in GRASP to achieve this outcome.
7.3.5. ACP Security Profiles
A baseline autonomic device MUST support IPsec and SHOULD support
GRASP/TLS and dTLS. A constrained autonomic device MUST support
dTLS.
Autonomic devices need to specify in documentation the set of secure
ACP mechanisms they suppport.
7.4. GRASP instance details
GRASP run to (insecurely) discover autonomic neighbors are isolated
instances from each other and other uses of GRASP - GRASP/TLS
sessions of L2 interfaces and GRASP inside the ACP
Received GRASP packets are assigned to an instance of GRASP by the
context they are received on:
o GRASP packets received on an ACP (virtual) interfaces are assigned
to the ACP instance of GRASP
o GRASP/UDP packets received on L2 interfaces where the device is
willing to run ACP across are are assigned to a separate instance
of GRASP for that L2 interface. We call those instances of GRASP
the "insecure L2 GRASP instances" and the ASA to perform the
discovery the "insecure L2 discovery ASA" (IL2D).
o GRASP packets received inside a TLS connection established for
GRASP/TLS ACP negotiation are assigned to a separate instance of
GRASP for that negotiation
All insecure L2 discovery of candidate ACP neighbors via GRASP and
the potentially following GRASP/TLS negotiation is per-L2 interface:
If Alice and Bob connect to each other via multiple interfaces, they
will independently establish the ACP to each other across each of
these interfaces.
For every L2-discovery instance of GRASP and its IL2D, the following
rules apply, amending and overriding the recommendations in
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]:
o GRASP link-local multicast discovery messages MUST use GTSM
[RFC5082]. With GTSM, discovery packets are sent with a TTL of
255 and packets received with a TTL smaller than 255 are ignored
upon receipt.
o The GRASP loop count of GRASP discovery packets must be set to 1
on sending.
o GRASP MUST send response messages for the discovery objected
defined here (overriding the MAY).
o GRASP MUST NOT respond to discovery objectives with the Divert
option - objectives learned and cached are solely for local
consumption.
o GRASP MUST NOT relay discovery or any other messages across
different interfaces.
TBD: The Details of the GRASP objective/packet formats still need to
be defined. Eg: Need to define an allocation for the objective of
"Autonomic Node".
8. Self-Healing Properties
The ACP is self-healing: The ACP is self-healing:
o New neighbors will automatically join the ACP after successful o New neighbors will automatically join the ACP after successful
validation and will become reachable using their unique ULA validation and will become reachable using their unique ULA
address across the ACP. address across the ACP.
o When any changes happen in the topology, the routing protocol used o When any changes happen in the topology, the routing protocol used
in the ACP will automatically adapt to the changes and will in the ACP will automatically adapt to the changes and will
continue to provide reachability to all devices. continue to provide reachability to all devices.
skipping to change at page 22, line 21 skipping to change at page 22, line 10
prevent the enrolment of new devices during the partition. prevent the enrolment of new devices during the partition.
After a network partition, a re-merge will just establish the After a network partition, a re-merge will just establish the
previous status, certificates can be renewed, the CRL is available, previous status, certificates can be renewed, the CRL is available,
and new devices can be enrolled everywhere. Since all devices use and new devices can be enrolled everywhere. Since all devices use
the same trust anchor, a re-merge will be smooth. the same trust anchor, a re-merge will be smooth.
Merging two networks with different trust anchors requires the trust Merging two networks with different trust anchors requires the trust
anchors to mutually trust each other (for example, by cross-signing). anchors to mutually trust each other (for example, by cross-signing).
As long as the domain names are different, the addressing will not As long as the domain names are different, the addressing will not
overlap (see Section 5.6). overlap (see Section 5.8).
9. Self-Protection Properties 8. Self-Protection Properties
As explained in Section 5, the ACP is based on channels being built As explained in Section 5, the ACP is based on channels being built
between devices which have been previously authenticated based on between devices which have been previously authenticated based on
their domain certificates. The channels themselves are protected their domain certificates. The channels themselves are protected
using standard encryption technologies like DTLS or IPsec which using standard encryption technologies like DTLS or IPsec which
provide additional authentication during channel establishment, data provide additional authentication during channel establishment, data
integrity and data confidentiality protection of data inside the ACP integrity and data confidentiality protection of data inside the ACP
and in addition, provide replay protection. and in addition, provide replay protection.
An attacker will therefore not be able to join the ACP unless having An attacker will therefore not be able to join the ACP unless having
skipping to change at page 22, line 47 skipping to change at page 22, line 36
The remaining attack vector would be to attack the underlying AN The remaining attack vector would be to attack the underlying AN
protocols themselves, either via directed attacks or by denial-of- protocols themselves, either via directed attacks or by denial-of-
service attacks. However, as the ACP is built using link-local IPv6 service attacks. However, as the ACP is built using link-local IPv6
address, remote attacks are impossible. The ULA addresses are only address, remote attacks are impossible. The ULA addresses are only
reachable inside the ACP context, therefore unreachable from the data reachable inside the ACP context, therefore unreachable from the data
plane. Also, the ACP protocols should be implemented to be attack plane. Also, the ACP protocols should be implemented to be attack
resistant and not consume unnecessary resources even while under resistant and not consume unnecessary resources even while under
attack. attack.
10. The Administrator View 9. The Administrator View
An ACP is self-forming, self-managing and self-protecting, therefore An ACP is self-forming, self-managing and self-protecting, therefore
has minimal dependencies on the administrator of the network. has minimal dependencies on the administrator of the network.
Specifically, since it is independent of configuration, there is no Specifically, since it is independent of configuration, there is no
scope for configuration errors on the ACP itself. The administrator scope for configuration errors on the ACP itself. The administrator
may have the option to enable or disable the entire approach, but may have the option to enable or disable the entire approach, but
detailed configuration is not possible. This means that the ACP must detailed configuration is not possible. This means that the ACP must
not be reflected in the running configuration of devices, except a not be reflected in the running configuration of devices, except a
possible on/off switch. possible on/off switch.
skipping to change at page 23, line 25 skipping to change at page 23, line 15
be separated from visibility of data plane so automated systems will be separated from visibility of data plane so automated systems will
never have to deal with ACP aspect unless they explicitly desire to never have to deal with ACP aspect unless they explicitly desire to
do so. do so.
Since an ACP is self-protecting, a device not supporting the ACP, or Since an ACP is self-protecting, a device not supporting the ACP, or
without a valid domain certificate cannot connect to it. This means without a valid domain certificate cannot connect to it. This means
that by default a traditional controller or network management system that by default a traditional controller or network management system
cannot connect to an ACP. See Section 6.1 for more details on how to cannot connect to an ACP. See Section 6.1 for more details on how to
connect an NMS host into the ACP. connect an NMS host into the ACP.
11. Explanations 10. Explanations
This section is non-normative and intended to provide further This section is non-normative and intended to provide further
explanations for the choices made in this document. explanations for the choices made in this document.
11.1. Why GRASP to discover autonomic neighbors 10.1. Why GRASP to discover autonomic neighbors
None of the considered mechanisms to establish security associations None of the considered mechanisms to establish security associations
(eg: IPsec or dTLS) include mechanisms to discover candidate (eg: IPsec or dTLS) include mechanisms to discover candidate
neighbors, so these security mechanisms themselves are insufficient neighbors, so these security mechanisms themselves are insufficient
for the discovery. for the discovery.
Existing L2 mechanisms such as LLDP (or vendor speccific alternatives Existing L2 mechanisms such as LLDP (or vendor speccific alternatives
like Ciscos CDP) are L2 link-local. If an autonomic device connects like Ciscos CDP) are L2 link-local. If an autonomic device connects
via an LLDP capable, but non-autonomic capable L2 switch to another via an LLDP capable, but non-autonomic capable L2 switch to another
autonomic device, then the non-autonomic L2 switch would not autonomic device, then the non-autonomic L2 switch would not
skipping to change at page 24, line 44 skipping to change at page 24, line 34
option for secure ACP channel negotiation (GRASP/TLS). Using it for option for secure ACP channel negotiation (GRASP/TLS). Using it for
discovery allows to reuse that already necessary code basis. If any discovery allows to reuse that already necessary code basis. If any
other protocol was used for discovery, then autonomic discovery might other protocol was used for discovery, then autonomic discovery might
be the only purpose for which the protocol code exists in the device. be the only purpose for which the protocol code exists in the device.
None of the above arguments individually are strong reasons not to None of the above arguments individually are strong reasons not to
use one of these GRASP alternatives, but together they make it use one of these GRASP alternatives, but together they make it
reasonable to first define GRASP as the MTI (Mandatory To Implement) reasonable to first define GRASP as the MTI (Mandatory To Implement)
for the discovery step. for the discovery step.
12. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
An ACP is self-protecting and there is no need to apply configuration An ACP is self-protecting and there is no need to apply configuration
to make it secure. Its security therefore does not depend on to make it secure. Its security therefore does not depend on
configuration. configuration.
However, the security of the ACP depends on a number of other However, the security of the ACP depends on a number of other
factors: factors:
o The usage of domain certificates depends on a valid supporting PKI o The usage of domain certificates depends on a valid supporting PKI
infrastructure. If the chain of trust of this PKI infrastructure infrastructure. If the chain of trust of this PKI infrastructure
skipping to change at page 25, line 19 skipping to change at page 25, line 11
o Security can be compromised by implementation errors (bugs), as in o Security can be compromised by implementation errors (bugs), as in
all products. all products.
Fundamentally, security depends on correct operation, implementation Fundamentally, security depends on correct operation, implementation
and architecture. Autonomic approaches such as the ACP largely and architecture. Autonomic approaches such as the ACP largely
eliminate the dependency on correct operation; implementation and eliminate the dependency on correct operation; implementation and
architectural mistakes are still possible, as in all networking architectural mistakes are still possible, as in all networking
technologies. technologies.
13. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
Section 7.3.3 describes ACP over dTLS, which requires a well-known Section 5.5.3 describes ACP over dTLS, which requires a well-known
UDP port. We request IANA to assign this UDP port for 'ACP over UDP port. We request IANA to assign this UDP port for 'ACP over
dTLS'. dTLS'.
Section 7.3.4 describes an option for the channel negotiation, the Section 5.5.4 describes an option for the channel negotiation, the
'ACP channel type'. We request IANA to create a registry for 'ACP 'ACP channel type'. We request IANA to create a registry for 'ACP
channel type'. channel type'.
The ACP channel type is a 8-bit unsigned integer. This document only The ACP channel type is a 8-bit unsigned integer. This document only
assigns the first value. assigns the first value.
Number | Channel Type | RFC Number | Channel Type | RFC
---------+-----------------------------------+------------ ---------+-----------------------------------+------------
0 | GRE tunnel protected with | this document 0 | GRE tunnel protected with | this document
| IPsec transport mode | | IPsec transport mode |
1-255 | reserved for future channel types | 1-255 | reserved for future channel types |
Section 5.6.2 describes a 'type' field in the base addressing scheme. Section 5.8.2 describes a 'type' field in the base addressing scheme.
We request IANA to create a registry for the 'ACP addressing scheme We request IANA to create a registry for the 'ACP addressing scheme
type'. The initial value and definition will be determined in a type'. The initial value and definition will be determined in a
later version of this document. later version of this document.
14. Acknowledgements 13. Acknowledgements
This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at Cisco This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at Cisco
Systems, which started in early 2010. Many people contributed to Systems, which started in early 2010. Many people contributed to
this project and the idea of the Autonomic Control Plane, amongst this project and the idea of the Autonomic Control Plane, amongst
which (in alphabetical order): Ignas Bagdonas, Parag Bhide, Alex which (in alphabetical order): Ignas Bagdonas, Parag Bhide, Balaji
Clemm, Yves Hertoghs, Bruno Klauser, Max Pritikin, Ravi Kumar BL, Alex Clemm, Yves Hertoghs, Bruno Klauser, Max Pritikin, Ravi
Vadapalli. Kumar Vadapalli.
Further input and suggestions were received from: Rene Struik, Brian Further input and suggestions were received from: Rene Struik, Brian
Carpenter, Benoit Claise. Carpenter, Benoit Claise.
15. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] 14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
14.1. Initial version
15.1. Initial version
First version of this document: First version of this document: draft-behringer-autonomic-control-
[I-D.behringer-autonomic-control-plane] plane
15.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 14.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00
Initial version of the anima document; only minor edits. Initial version of the anima document; only minor edits.
15.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 14.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01
o Clarified that the ACP should be based on, and support only IPv6. o Clarified that the ACP should be based on, and support only IPv6.
o Clarified in intro that ACP is for both, between devices, as well o Clarified in intro that ACP is for both, between devices, as well
as for access from a central entity, such as an NMS. as for access from a central entity, such as an NMS.
o Added a section on how to connect an NMS system. o Added a section on how to connect an NMS system.
o Clarified the hop-by-hop crypto nature of the ACP. o Clarified the hop-by-hop crypto nature of the ACP.
o Added several references to GDNP as a candidate protocol. o Added several references to GDNP as a candidate protocol.
o Added a discussion on network split and merge. Although, this o Added a discussion on network split and merge. Although, this
should probably go into the certificate management story longer should probably go into the certificate management story longer
term. term.
15.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 14.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02
Addresses (numerous) comments from Brian Carpenter. See mailing list Addresses (numerous) comments from Brian Carpenter. See mailing list
for details. The most important changes are: for details. The most important changes are:
o Introduced a new section "overview", to ease the understanding of o Introduced a new section "overview", to ease the understanding of
the approach. the approach.
o Merged the previous "problem statement" and "use case" sections o Merged the previous "problem statement" and "use case" sections
into a mostly re-written "use cases" section, since they were into a mostly re-written "use cases" section, since they were
overlapping. overlapping.
o Clarified the relationship with draft-eckert-anima-stable- o Clarified the relationship with draft-eckert-anima-stable-
connectivity connectivity
15.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 14.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03
o Took out requirement for IPv6 --> that's in the reference doc. o Took out requirement for IPv6 --> that's in the reference doc.
o Added requirement section. o Added requirement section.
o Changed focus: more focus on autonomic functions, not only virtual o Changed focus: more focus on autonomic functions, not only virtual
out of band. This goes a bit throughout the document, starting out of band. This goes a bit throughout the document, starting
with a changed abstract and intro. with a changed abstract and intro.
15.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 14.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00
No changes; re-submitted as WG document. No changes; re-submitted as WG document.
15.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 14.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01
o Added some paragraphs in addressing section on "why IPv6 only", to o Added some paragraphs in addressing section on "why IPv6 only", to
reflect the discussion on the list. reflect the discussion on the list.
o Moved the data-plane ACP out of the main document, into an o Moved the data-plane ACP out of the main document, into an
appendix. The focus is now the virtually separated ACP, since it appendix. The focus is now the virtually separated ACP, since it
has significant advantages, and isn't much harder to do. has significant advantages, and isn't much harder to do.
o Changed the self-creation algorithm: Part of the initial steps go o Changed the self-creation algorithm: Part of the initial steps go
into the reference document. This document now assumes an into the reference document. This document now assumes an
skipping to change at page 28, line 7 skipping to change at page 28, line 5
o Introduce a section for the capability negotiation protocol o Introduce a section for the capability negotiation protocol
(section 7). This needs to be worked out in more detail. This (section 7). This needs to be worked out in more detail. This
will likely be based on GRASP. will likely be based on GRASP.
o Introduce a new parameter: ACP tunnel type. And defines it in the o Introduce a new parameter: ACP tunnel type. And defines it in the
IANA considerations section. Suggest GRE protected with IPSec IANA considerations section. Suggest GRE protected with IPSec
transport mode as the default tunnel type. transport mode as the default tunnel type.
o Updated links, lots of small edits. o Updated links, lots of small edits.
15.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 14.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02
o Added explicitly text for the ACP channel negotiation. o Added explicitly text for the ACP channel negotiation.
o Merged draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-addressing-02 into this o Merged draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-addressing-02 into this
document, as suggested by WG chairs. document, as suggested by WG chairs.
16. References 14.9. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03
[I-D.behringer-anima-autonomic-addressing] o Changed Neighbor discovery protocol from GRASP to mDNS. Bootstrap
Behringer, M., "An Autonomic IPv6 Addressing Scheme", protocol team decided to go with mDNS to discover bootstrap proxy,
draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-addressing-02 (work in and ACP should be consistent with this. Reasons to go with mDNS
progress), October 2015. in bootstrap were a) Bootstrap should be reuseable also outside of
full anima solutions and introduce as few as possible new
elements. mDNS was considered well-known and very-likely even pre-
existing in low-end devices (IoT). b) Using GRASP both for the
insecure neighbor discovery and secure ACP operatations raises the
risk of introducing security issues through implementation issues/
non-isolation between those two instances of GRASP.
[I-D.behringer-anima-reference-model] o Shortened the section on GRASP instances, because with mDNS being
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L., used for discovery, there is no insecure GRASP session any longer,
Liu, B., Jeff, J., and J. Strassner, "A Reference Model simplifying the GRASP considerations.
for Autonomic Networking", draft-behringer-anima-
reference-model-04 (work in progress), October 2015.
[I-D.behringer-autonomic-control-plane] o Added certificate requirements for ANIMA in section 5.1.1,
Behringer, M., Bjarnason, S., BL, B., and T. Eckert, "An specifically how the ANIMA information is encoded in
Autonomic Control Plane", draft-behringer-autonomic- subjectAltName.
control-plane-00 (work in progress), June 2014.
o Deleted the appendix on "ACP without separation", as originally
planned, and the paragraph in the main text referring to it.
o Deleted one sub-addressing scheme, focusing on a single scheme
now.
o Included information on how ANIMA information must be encoded in
the domain certificate in Section 5.1.
o Editorial changes, updated draft references, etc.
15. References
[I-D.eckert-anima-stable-connectivity] [I-D.eckert-anima-stable-connectivity]
Eckert, T. and M. Behringer, "Using Autonomic Control Eckert, T. and M. Behringer, "Using Autonomic Control
Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM", draft- Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM", draft-
eckert-anima-stable-connectivity-02 (work in progress), eckert-anima-stable-connectivity-02 (work in progress),
October 2015. October 2015.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and S. Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and S.
Bjarnason, "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft- Bjarnason, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-02 (work in progress), Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
March 2016. keyinfra-03 (work in progress), June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic Bormann, D., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima- Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
grasp-04 (work in progress), March 2016. grasp-06 (work in progress), June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
Pierre, P., Liu, B., Nobre, J., and J. Strassner, "A
Reference Model for Autonomic Networking", draft-ietf-
anima-reference-model-02 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C. [RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007, (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J., [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC7404] Behringer, M. and E. Vyncke, "Using Only Link-Local [RFC7404] Behringer, M. and E. Vyncke, "Using Only Link-Local
Addressing inside an IPv6 Network", RFC 7404, Addressing inside an IPv6 Network", RFC 7404,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7404, November 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7404, November 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7404>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7404>.
[RFC7575] Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A., [RFC7575] Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575, Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.
skipping to change at page 31, line 14 skipping to change at page 32, line 9
several parallel DODAGs, should this be required. This could be several parallel DODAGs, should this be required. This could be
used to create different topologies to reach different roots. used to create different topologies to reach different roots.
o No need for path optimisation: RPL does not necessarily compute o No need for path optimisation: RPL does not necessarily compute
the optimal path between any two nodes. However, the ACP does not the optimal path between any two nodes. However, the ACP does not
require this today, since it carries mainly non-delay-sensitive require this today, since it carries mainly non-delay-sensitive
feedback loops. It is possible that different optimisation feedback loops. It is possible that different optimisation
schemes become necessary in the future, but RPL can be expanded schemes become necessary in the future, but RPL can be expanded
(see point "Extensibility" above). (see point "Extensibility" above).
Appendix B. Alternative: An ACP without Separation
Section 5 explains how the ACP is constructed as a virtually
separated overlay network. An alternative ACP design can be achieved
without the VRFs. In this case, the autonomic virtual addresses are
part of the data plane, and subject to routing, filtering, QoS, etc
on the data plane. The secure tunnels are in this case used by
traffic to and from the autonomic address space. They are still
required to provide the authentication function for all autonomic
packets.
At IETF 93 in Prague, the suggestion was made to not advance with the
data plane ACP, and only continue with the virtually separate ACP.
The reason for this decision is that the contextual separation of the
ACP provides a range of benefits (more robustness, less potential
interactions with user configurations), while it is not much harder
to achieve.
This appendix serves to explain the decision; it will be removed in
the next version of the draft.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Michael H. Behringer (editor) Michael H. Behringer (editor)
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Building D, 45 Allee des Ormes Building D, 45 Allee des Ormes
Mougins 06250 Mougins 06250
France France
Email: mbehring@cisco.com Email: mbehring@cisco.com
Steinthor Bjarnason
Cisco Systems
Email: sbjarnas@cisco.com
Balaji BL
Cisco Systems
Email: blbalaji@cisco.com
Toerless Eckert Toerless Eckert
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: eckert@cisco.com Email: eckert@cisco.com
Steinthor Bjarnason
Arbor Networks
2727 South State Street, Suite 200
Ann Arbor MI 48104
United States
Email: sbjarnason@arbor.net
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