draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-19.txt   draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-20.txt 
ANIMA WG T. Eckert, Ed. ANIMA WG T. Eckert, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei Internet-Draft Futurewei USA
Intended status: Standards Track M. Behringer, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Behringer, Ed.
Expires: September 12, 2019 Expires: January 23, 2020
S. Bjarnason S. Bjarnason
Arbor Networks Arbor Networks
March 11, 2019 July 22, 2019
An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-19 draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-20
Abstract Abstract
Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which
depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Management depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Management
and Control Plane should ideally be self-managing, and as independent and Control Plane should ideally be self-managing, and as independent
as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and
calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a
control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual
out-of-band channel" for Operations Administration and Management out-of-band channel" for Operations Administration and Management
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Applicability and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1. Applicability and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Acronyms and Terminology (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Acronyms and Terminology (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane (Informative) . . . 15 3. Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane (Informative) . . . 16
3.1. An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions . . . . . . . . 16
3.2. Secure Bootstrap over a not configured Network . . . . . 16 3.2. Secure Bootstrap over a not configured Network . . . . . 16
3.3. Data-Plane Independent Permanent Reachability . . . . . . 16 3.3. Data-Plane Independent Permanent Reachability . . . . . . 16
4. Requirements (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4. Requirements (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Overview (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Overview (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative) 20 6. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative) 20
6.1. ACP Domain, Certificate and Network . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. ACP Domain, Certificate and Network . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1.1. Certificate ACP Domain Information Field . . . . . . 21 6.1.1. ACP Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1.2. ACP domain membership check . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.1.2. ACP Certificate ACP Domain Information Field . . . . 22
6.1.3. Trust Points and Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6.1.3. ACP domain membership check . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.4. Certificate and Trust Point Maintenance . . . . . . . 27 6.1.4. Trust Points and Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1.4.1. GRASP objective for EST server . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1.5. Certificate and Trust Point Maintenance . . . . . . . 29
6.1.4.2. Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.1.5.1. GRASP objective for EST server . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.4.3. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) . . . . . . . 29 6.1.5.2. Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1.4.4. Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.1.5.3. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) . . . . . . . 31
6.1.4.5. Re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.1.5.4. Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.1.4.6. Failing Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.1.5.5. Re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2. ACP Adjacency Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.1.5.6. Failing Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3. Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2. ACP Adjacency Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.4. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 6.3. Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.5. Channel Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 6.4. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.6. Candidate ACP Neighbor verification . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.5. Channel Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.7. Security Association protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.6. Candidate ACP Neighbor verification . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.7.1. ACP via IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.7. Security Association protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.7.1.1. Native IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.7.1. ACP via IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.7.1.2. IPsec with GRE encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . 40 6.7.1.1. Native IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.7.2. ACP via DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6.7.1.2. IPsec with GRE encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.7.3. ACP Secure Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.7.2. ACP via DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.8. GRASP in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.7.3. ACP Secure Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.8.1. GRASP as a core service of the ACP . . . . . . . . . 42 6.8. GRASP in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.8.2. ACP as the Security and Transport substrate for GRASP 42 6.8.1. GRASP as a core service of the ACP . . . . . . . . . 46
6.8.2.1. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.8.2. ACP as the Security and Transport substrate for GRASP 46
6.8.2.1. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.9. Context Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.10. Addressing inside the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.10.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing . . . . 51
6.10.2. The ACP Addressing Base Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.10.3. ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.10.3.1. Usage of the Zone-ID Field . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.10.4. ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.10.5. ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.10.6. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.10.7. ACP Registrars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.10.7.1. Use of BRSKI or other Mechanism/Protocols . . . 60
6.10.7.2. Unique Address/Prefix allocation . . . . . . . . 60
6.10.7.3. Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies . . . . . . . . . 61
6.10.7.4. Address/Prefix Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.10.7.5. Further Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.11. Routing in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.11.1. RPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.11.1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.11.1.2. RPL Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.3. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.4. DAO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.5. Path Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.6. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.7. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.11.1.8. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.11.1.9. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.11.1.10. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.11.1.11. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.11.1.12. Administrative parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.11.1.13. RPL Data-Plane artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.11.1.14. Unknown Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.12. General ACP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.12.1. Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.12.2. Addressing of Secure Channels . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.12.3. MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.12.4. Multiple links between nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.12.5. ACP interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7. ACP support on L2 switches/ports (Normative) . . . . . . . . 72
7.1. Why (Benefits of ACP on L2 switches) . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2. How (per L2 port DULL GRASP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8. Support for Non-ACP Components (Normative) . . . . . . . . . 75
8.1. ACP Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.1.1. Non-ACP Controller / NMS system . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.1.2. Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8.1.3. Auto Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8.1.4. Combined ACP/Data-Plane Interface (VRF Select) . . . 79
8.1.5. Use of GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.9. Context Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.2. ACP through Non-ACP L3 Clouds (Remote ACP neighbors) . . 81
6.10. Addressing inside the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.2.1. Configured Remote ACP neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.10.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing . . . . 47 8.2.2. Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.10.2. The ACP Addressing Base Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.2.3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.10.3. ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 50 9. Benefits (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.10.3.1. Usage of the Zone-ID Field . . . . . . . . . . . 51 9.1. Self-Healing Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.10.4. ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 52 9.2. Self-Protection Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.10.5. ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 53 9.2.1. From the outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.10.6. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 54 9.2.2. From the inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.10.7. ACP Registrars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 9.3. The Administrator View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.10.7.1. Use of BRSKI or other Mechanism/Protocols . . . 55 10. ACP Operations (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.10.7.2. Unique Address/Prefix allocation . . . . . . . . 56 10.1. ACP (and BRSKI) Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.10.7.3. Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies . . . . . . . . . 56 10.2. ACP Registrars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.10.7.4. Address/Prefix Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.2.1. Registrar interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.10.7.5. Further Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.2. Registrar Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.11. Routing in the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.3. Certificate renewal and limitations . . . . . . . . 94
6.11.1. RPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.4. ACP Registrars with sub-CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.11.1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.5. Centralized Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.11.1.2. RPL Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.3. Enabling and disabling ACP/ANI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.11.1.3. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.3.1. Filtering for non-ACP/ANI packets . . . . . . . . . 96
6.11.1.4. DAO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.3.2. Admin Down State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.11.1.5. Path Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.3.2.1. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.11.1.6. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.2.2. Fast state propagation and Diagnostics . . . . . 98
6.11.1.7. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.2.3. Low Level Link Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.11.1.8. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.2.4. Power Consumption Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.11.1.9. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.3. Interface level ACP/ANI enable . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.11.1.10. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.4. Which interfaces to auto-enable? . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.11.1.11. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.3.5. Node Level ACP/ANI enable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.11.1.12. Administrative parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3.5.1. Brownfield nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.11.1.13. RPL Data-Plane artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3.5.2. Greenfield nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.11.1.14. Unknown Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3.6. Undoing ANI/ACP enable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.12. General ACP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3.7. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.12.1. Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4. Configuration and the ACP (summary) . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.12.2. Addressing of Secure Channels . . . . . . . . . . . 63 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.12.3. MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.12.4. Multiple links between nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.12.5. ACP interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7. ACP support on L2 switches/ports (Normative) . . . . . . . . 67 14.1. Initial version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.1. Why (Benefits of ACP on L2 switches) . . . . . . . . . . 67 14.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . 109
7.2. How (per L2 port DULL GRASP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 14.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . 109
8. Support for Non-ACP Components (Normative) . . . . . . . . . 70 14.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . 109
8.1. ACP Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 14.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . 110
8.1.1. Non-ACP Controller / NMS system . . . . . . . . . . . 70 14.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . . . 110
8.1.2. Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 14.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . . . 110
8.1.3. Auto Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 14.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . . . 111
8.1.4. Combined ACP/Data-Plane Interface (VRF Select) . . . 74 14.9. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . . . 111
8.1.5. Use of GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 14.10. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-04 . . . . . . 112
8.2. ACP through Non-ACP L3 Clouds (Remote ACP neighbors) . . 76 14.11. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-05 . . . . . . 112
8.2.1. Configured Remote ACP neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . 76 14.12. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-06 . . . . . . 112
8.2.2. Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 14.13. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-07 . . . . . . 113
8.2.3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 14.14. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-08 . . . . . . 114
9. Benefits (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 14.15. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-09 . . . . . . 116
9.1. Self-Healing Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 14.16. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-10 . . . . . . 118
9.2. Self-Protection Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 14.17. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-11 . . . . . . 120
9.2.1. From the outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 14.18. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-12 . . . . . . 120
9.2.2. From the inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 14.19. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-13 . . . . . . 122
9.3. The Administrator View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 14.20. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-14 . . . . . . 124
10. ACP Operations (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 14.21. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-15 . . . . . . 128
10.1. ACP (and BRSKI) Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 14.22. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-16 . . . . . . 128
10.2. ACP Registrars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 14.23. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-17 . . . . . . 129
10.2.1. Registrar interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 14.24. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-18 . . . . . . 131
10.2.2. Registrar Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 14.25. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-19 . . . . . . 131
10.2.3. Certificate renewal and limitations . . . . . . . . 89 14.26. Open Issues in -19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.2.4. ACP Registrars with sub-CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 14.27. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-20 . . . . . . 133
10.2.5. Centralized Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
10.3. Enabling and disabling ACP/ANI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
10.3.1. Filtering for non-ACP/ANI packets . . . . . . . . . 91 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
10.3.2. Admin Down State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
10.3.2.1. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Appendix A. Background and Futures (Informative) . . . . . . . . 147
10.3.2.2. Fast state propagation and Diagnostics . . . . . 93 A.1. ACP Address Space Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
10.3.2.3. Low Level Link Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A.2. BRSKI Bootstrap (ANI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
10.3.2.4. Power Consumption Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A.3. ACP Neighbor discovery protocol selection . . . . . . . . 149
10.3.3. Interface level ACP/ANI enable . . . . . . . . . . . 95 A.3.1. LLDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
10.3.4. Which interfaces to auto-enable? . . . . . . . . . . 95 A.3.2. mDNS and L2 support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
10.3.5. Node Level ACP/ANI enable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 A.3.3. Why DULL GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
10.3.5.1. Brownfield nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 A.4. Choice of routing protocol (RPL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
10.3.5.2. Greenfield nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 A.5. ACP Information Distribution and multicast . . . . . . . 151
10.3.6. Undoing ANI/ACP enable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 A.6. Extending ACP channel negotiation (via GRASP) . . . . . . 153
10.3.7. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 A.7. CAs, domains and routing subdomains . . . . . . . . . . . 154
10.4. Configuration and the ACP (summary) . . . . . . . . . . 99 A.8. Intent for the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 A.9. Adopting ACP concepts for other environments . . . . . . 157
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 A.10. Further (future) options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 A.10.1. Auto-aggregation of routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 104 A.10.2. More options for avoiding IPv6 Data-Plane dependency 159
14.1. Initial version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 A.10.3. ACP APIs and operational models (YANG) . . . . . . . 159
14.2. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . 104 A.10.4. RPL enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
14.3. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . 104 A.10.5. Role assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
14.4. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . 104 A.10.6. Autonomic L3 transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
14.5. draft-behringer-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . 104 A.10.7. Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
14.6. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-00 . . . . . . 105 A.10.8. Avoiding and dealing with compromised ACP nodes . . 162
14.7. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-01 . . . . . . 105 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
14.8. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-02 . . . . . . 106
14.9. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-03 . . . . . . 106
14.10. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-04 . . . . . . 106
14.11. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-05 . . . . . . 107
14.12. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-06 . . . . . . 107
14.13. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-07 . . . . . . 108
14.14. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-08 . . . . . . 109
14.15. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-09 . . . . . . 111
14.16. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-10 . . . . . . 113
14.17. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-11 . . . . . . 115
14.18. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-12 . . . . . . 115
14.19. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-13 . . . . . . 116
14.20. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-14 . . . . . . 118
14.21. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-15 . . . . . . 122
14.22. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-16 . . . . . . 123
14.23. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-17 . . . . . . 123
14.24. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-18 . . . . . . 125
14.25. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-19 . . . . . . 125
14.26. Open Issues in -19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Appendix A. Background and Futures (Informative) . . . . . . . . 137
A.1. ACP Address Space Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.2. BRSKI Bootstrap (ANI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A.3. ACP Neighbor discovery protocol selection . . . . . . . . 139
A.3.1. LLDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.3.2. mDNS and L2 support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.3.3. Why DULL GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.4. Choice of routing protocol (RPL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.5. ACP Information Distribution and multicast . . . . . . . 142
A.6. Extending ACP channel negotiation (via GRASP) . . . . . . 143
A.7. CAs, domains and routing subdomains . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A.8. Intent for the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.9. Adopting ACP concepts for other environments . . . . . . 146
A.10. Further options / futures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.10.1. Auto-aggregation of routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.10.2. More options for avoiding IPv6 Data-Plane dependency 149
A.10.3. ACP APIs and operational models (YANG) . . . . . . . 149
A.10.4. RPL enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.10.5. Role assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A.10.6. Autonomic L3 transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.10.7. Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.10.8. Avoiding and dealing with compromised ACP nodes . . 151
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
1. Introduction (Informative) 1. Introduction (Informative)
Autonomic Networking is a concept of self-management: Autonomic Autonomic Networking is a concept of self-management: Autonomic
functions self-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings functions self-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings
across the network. [RFC7575] defines the fundamental ideas and across the network. [RFC7575] defines the fundamental ideas and
design goals of Autonomic Networking. A gap analysis of Autonomic design goals of Autonomic Networking. A gap analysis of Autonomic
Networking is given in [RFC7576]. The reference architecture for Networking is given in [RFC7576]. The reference architecture for
Autonomic Networking in the IETF is specified in the document Autonomic Networking in the IETF is specified in the document
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]. [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model].
skipping to change at page 8, line 15 skipping to change at page 8, line 20
autonomic Operations Administration and Management (OAM) autonomic Operations Administration and Management (OAM)
applications. That document also explains how existing management applications. That document also explains how existing management
solutions can leverage the ACP in parallel with traditional solutions can leverage the ACP in parallel with traditional
management models, when to use the ACP and how to integrate with management models, when to use the ACP and how to integrate with
potentially IPv4 only OAM backends. potentially IPv4 only OAM backends.
Combining ACP with Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures Combining ACP with Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures
(BRSKI), see [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) results in the (BRSKI), see [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) results in the
"Autonomic Network Infrastructure" as defined in "Autonomic Network Infrastructure" as defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model], which provides autonomic [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model], which provides autonomic
connectivity (from ACP) with fully secure zero-touch (automated) connectivity (from ACP) with secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap
bootstrap from BRSKI. The ANI itself does not constitute an from BRSKI. The ANI itself does not constitute an Autonomic Network,
Autonomic Network, but it allows the building of more or less but it allows the building of more or less autonomic networks on top
autonomic networks on top of it - using either centralized, Software of it - using either centralized, Software Defined Networking-
Defined Networking- (SDN-)style (see [RFC7426]) automation or (SDN-)style (see [RFC7426]) automation or distributed automation via
distributed automation via Autonomic Service Agents (ASA) / Autonomic Autonomic Service Agents (ASA) / Autonomic Functions (AF) - or a
Functions (AF) - or a mixture of both. See mixture of both. See [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] for more
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] for more information. information.
1.1. Applicability and Scope 1.1. Applicability and Scope
Please see the following Terminology section (Section 2) for Please see the following Terminology section (Section 2) for
explanations of terms used in this section. explanations of terms used in this section.
The design of the ACP as defined in this document is considered to be The design of the ACP as defined in this document is considered to be
applicable to all types of "professionally managed" networks: Service applicable to all types of "professionally managed" networks: Service
Provider, Local Area Network (LAN), Metro(politan networks), Wide Provider, Local Area Network (LAN), Metro(politan networks), Wide
Area Network (WAN), Enterprise Information Technology (IT) and Area Network (WAN), Enterprise Information Technology (IT) and
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addresses that the node can assign for different purposes. This addresses that the node can assign for different purposes. This
address range/set is derived by the node from the format of the address range/set is derived by the node from the format of the
ACP address called the "addressing sub-scheme". ACP address called the "addressing sub-scheme".
ACP connect interface: An interface on an ACP node providing access ACP connect interface: An interface on an ACP node providing access
to the ACP for non ACP capable nodes without using an ACP secure to the ACP for non ACP capable nodes without using an ACP secure
channel. See Section 8.1.1. channel. See Section 8.1.1.
ACP domain: The ACP domain is the set of nodes with ->"ACP domain ACP domain: The ACP domain is the set of nodes with ->"ACP domain
certificates" that allow them to authenticate each other as certificates" that allow them to authenticate each other as
members of the ACP domain. See also Section 6.1.2. members of the ACP domain. See also Section 6.1.3.
ACP (ANI/AN) Domain Certificate: A provisioned [RFC5280] certificate ACP (ANI/AN) Domain Certificate: A [RFC5280] certificate (LDevID)
(LDevID) carrying the domain information field which is used by carrying the domain information field which is used by the ACP to
the ACP to learn its address in the ACP and to derive and learn its address in the ACP and to derive and cryptographically
cryptographically assert its membership in the ACP domain. assert its membership in the ACP domain.
domain information (field): An rfc822Name information element (e.g., domain information (field): An rfc822Name information element (e.g.,
field) in the domain certificate in which the ACP relevant field) in the domain certificate in which the ACP relevant
information is encoded: the domain name and the ACP address. information is encoded: the domain name and the ACP address.
ACP Loopback interface: The Loopback interface in the ACP Virtual ACP Loopback interface: The Loopback interface in the ACP Virtual
Routing and Forwarding (VRF) that has the ACP address assigned to Routing and Forwarding (VRF) that has the ACP address assigned to
it. it.
ACP network: The ACP network constitutes all the nodes that have ACP network: The ACP network constitutes all the nodes that have
access to the ACP. It is the set of active and transitively access to the ACP. It is the set of active and transitively
connected nodes of an ACP domain plus all nodes that get access to connected nodes of an ACP domain plus all nodes that get access to
the ACP of that domain via ACP edge nodes. the ACP of that domain via ACP edge nodes.
ACP (ULA) prefix(es): The /48 IPv6 address prefixes used across the ACP (ULA) prefix(es): The /48 IPv6 address prefixes used across the
ACP. In the normal/simple case, the ACP has one ULA prefix, see ACP. In the normal/simple case, the ACP has one ULA prefix, see
Section 6.10. The ACP routing table may include multiple ULA Section 6.10. The ACP routing table may include multiple ULA
prefixes if the "rsub" option is used to create addresses from prefixes if the "rsub" option is used to create addresses from
more than one ULA prefix. See Section 6.1.1. The ACP may also more than one ULA prefix. See Section 6.1.2. The ACP may also
include non-ULA prefixes if those are configured on ACP connect include non-ULA prefixes if those are configured on ACP connect
interfaces. See Section 8.1.1. interfaces. See Section 8.1.1.
ACP secure channel: A cryptographically authenticated and encrypted ACP secure channel: A cryptographically authenticated and encrypted
data connection established between (normally) adjacent ACP nodes data connection established between (normally) adjacent ACP nodes
to carry traffic of the ACP VRF secure and isolated from Data- to carry traffic of the ACP VRF securely and isolated from Data-
Plane traffic in-band over the same link/path as the Data-Plane. Plane traffic in-band over the same link/path as the Data-Plane.
ACP secure channel protocol: The protocol used to build an ACP ACP secure channel protocol: The protocol used to build an ACP
secure channel, e.g., Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 secure channel, e.g., Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2
(IKEv2) with IPsec or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). (IKEv2) with IPsec or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
ACP virtual interface: An interface in the ACP VRF mapped to one or ACP virtual interface: An interface in the ACP VRF mapped to one or
more ACP secure channels. See Section 6.12.5. more ACP secure channels. See Section 6.12.5.
AN "Autonomic Network": A network according to AN "Autonomic Network": A network according to
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]. Its main components are ANI, [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]. Its main components are ANI,
Autonomic Functions and Intent. Autonomic Functions and Intent.
(AN) Domain Name: An FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) in the (AN) Domain Name: An FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) in the
domain information field of the Domain Certificate. See domain information field of the Domain Certificate. See
Section 6.1.1. Section 6.1.2.
ANI (nodes/network): "Autonomic Network Infrastructure". The ANI is ANI (nodes/network): "Autonomic Network Infrastructure". The ANI is
the infrastructure to enable Autonomic Networks. It includes ACP, the infrastructure to enable Autonomic Networks. It includes ACP,
BRSKI and GRASP. Every Autonomic Network includes the ANI, but BRSKI and GRASP. Every Autonomic Network includes the ANI, but
not every ANI network needs to include autonomic functions beyond not every ANI network needs to include autonomic functions beyond
the ANI (nor Intent). An ANI network without further autonomic the ANI (nor Intent). An ANI network without further autonomic
functions can for example support secure zero-touch (automated) functions can for example support secure zero-touch (automated)
bootstrap and stable connectivity for SDN networks - see bootstrap and stable connectivity for SDN networks - see
[RFC8368]. [RFC8368].
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Network node, the Data-Plane is managed autonomically via Network node, the Data-Plane is managed autonomically via
Autonomic Functions and Intent. Note that other (non-ANIMA) RFCs Autonomic Functions and Intent. Note that other (non-ANIMA) RFCs
use the Data-Plane to refer to what is better called the use the Data-Plane to refer to what is better called the
forwarding plane. This is not the way the term is used in this forwarding plane. This is not the way the term is used in this
document! document!
device: A physical system, or physical node. device: A physical system, or physical node.
Enrollment: The process where a node presents identification (for Enrollment: The process where a node presents identification (for
example through keying material such as the private key of an example through keying material such as the private key of an
IDevID) to a network and acquires a network specific identity and IDevID) to a network and acquires a network specific identity uch
trust anchor such as an LDevID. as an LDevID and trust anchors such as Certificate Authority (CA)
certificates.
EST: "Enrollment over Secure Transport" ([RFC7030]). IETF standard- EST: "Enrollment over Secure Transport" ([RFC7030]). IETF standard-
track protocol for enrollment of a node with an LDevID. BRSKI is track protocol for enrollment of a node with an LDevID. BRSKI is
based on EST. based on EST.
GRASP: "Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol". An extensible GRASP: "Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol". An extensible
signaling protocol required by the ACP for ACP neighbor discovery. signaling protocol required by the ACP for ACP neighbor discovery.
The ACP also provides the "security and transport substrate" for The ACP also provides the "security and transport substrate" for
the "ACP instance of GRASP". This instance of GRASP runs across the "ACP instance of GRASP". This instance of GRASP runs across
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[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]. [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model].
Loopback interface: The conventional name for an internal IP Loopback interface: The conventional name for an internal IP
interface to which addresses may be assigned, but which transmits interface to which addresses may be assigned, but which transmits
no external traffic. no external traffic.
LDevID: A "Local Device IDentity" is an X.509 certificate installed LDevID: A "Local Device IDentity" is an X.509 certificate installed
during "enrollment". The Domain Certificate used by the ACP is an during "enrollment". The Domain Certificate used by the ACP is an
LDevID. See [AR8021]. LDevID. See [AR8021].
MIC: "Manufacturer Installed Certificate". Another word not used in MIC: "Manufacturer Installed Certificate". This is another word to
this document to describe an IDevID. describe an IDevID in referenced materials. This term is not used
in this document.
native interface: Interfaces existing on a node without native interface: Interfaces existing on a node without
configuration of the already running node. On physical nodes configuration of the already running node. On physical nodes
these are usually physical interfaces. On virtual nodes their these are usually physical interfaces. On virtual nodes their
equivalent. equivalent.
node: A system, e.g., supporting the ACP according to this document. node: A system, e.g., supporting the ACP according to this document.
Can be virtual or physical. Physical nodes are called devices. Can be virtual or physical. Physical nodes are called devices.
Node-ID: The identifier of an ACP node inside that ACP. It is the Node-ID: The identifier of an ACP node inside that ACP. It is the
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used as part of the BRSKI protocol. used as part of the BRSKI protocol.
(ACP/ANI/BRSKI) Registrar: An ACP registrar is an entity (software (ACP/ANI/BRSKI) Registrar: An ACP registrar is an entity (software
and/or person) that is orchestrating the enrollment of ACP nodes and/or person) that is orchestrating the enrollment of ACP nodes
with the ACP domain certificate. ANI nodes use BRSKI, so ANI with the ACP domain certificate. ANI nodes use BRSKI, so ANI
registrars are also called BRSKI registrars. For non-ANI ACP registrars are also called BRSKI registrars. For non-ANI ACP
nodes, the registrar mechanisms are undefined by this document. nodes, the registrar mechanisms are undefined by this document.
See Section 6.10.7. Renewal and other maintenance (such as See Section 6.10.7. Renewal and other maintenance (such as
revocation) of ACP domain certificates may be performed by other revocation) of ACP domain certificates may be performed by other
entities than registrars. EST must be supported for ACP domain entities than registrars. EST must be supported for ACP domain
certificate renewal (see Section 6.1.4). BRSKI is an extension of certificate renewal (see Section 6.1.5). BRSKI is an extension of
EST, so ANI/BRSKI registrars can easily support ACP domain EST, so ANI/BRSKI registrars can easily support ACP domain
certificate renewal in addition to initial enrollment. certificate renewal in addition to initial enrollment.
sUDI: "secured Unique Device Identifier". Another term not used in sUDI: "secured Unique Device Identifier". This is another word to
this document to refer to an IDevID. describe an IDevID in referenced material. This term is not used
in this document.
UDI: "Unique Device Identifier". In the context of this document UDI: "Unique Device Identifier". In the context of this document
unsecured identity information of a node typically consisting of unsecured identity information of a node typically consisting of
at least device model/type and serial number, often in a vendor at least device model/type and serial number, often in a vendor
specific format. See sUDI and LDevID. specific format. See sUDI and LDevID.
ULA: (Global ID prefix) A "Unique Local Address" (ULA) is an IPv6 ULA: (Global ID prefix) A "Unique Local Address" (ULA) is an IPv6
address in the block fc00::/7, defined in [RFC4193]. It is the address in the block fc00::/7, defined in [RFC4193]. It is the
approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4 private address approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4 private address
([RFC1918]). The ULA Global ID prefix are the first 48-bits of a ([RFC1918]). The ULA Global ID prefix are the first 48-bits of a
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1. An ACP node creates a Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) 1. An ACP node creates a Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF)
instance, or a similar virtual context. instance, or a similar virtual context.
2. It determines, following a policy, a candidate peer list. This 2. It determines, following a policy, a candidate peer list. This
is the list of nodes to which it should establish an Autonomic is the list of nodes to which it should establish an Autonomic
Control Plane. Default policy is: To all link-layer adjacent Control Plane. Default policy is: To all link-layer adjacent
nodes supporting ACP. nodes supporting ACP.
3. For each node in the candidate peer list, it authenticates that 3. For each node in the candidate peer list, it authenticates that
node (according to Section 6.1.2) and negotiates a mutually node (according to Section 6.1.3) and negotiates a mutually
acceptable channel type. acceptable channel type.
4. For each node in the candidate peer list, it then establishes a 4. For each node in the candidate peer list, it then establishes a
secure tunnel of the negotiated type. The resulting tunnels are secure tunnel of the negotiated channel type. The resulting
then placed into the previously set up VRF. This creates an tunnels are then placed into the previously set up VRF. This
overlay network with hop-by-hop tunnels. creates an overlay network with hop-by-hop tunnels.
5. Inside the ACP VRF, each node assigns its ULA IPv6 address to a 5. Inside the ACP VRF, each node assigns its ULA IPv6 address to a
Loopback interface assigned to the ACP VRF. Loopback interface assigned to the ACP VRF.
6. Each node runs a lightweight routing protocol, to announce 6. Each node runs a lightweight routing protocol, to announce
reachability of the virtual addresses inside the ACP (see reachability of the virtual addresses inside the ACP (see
Section 6.12.5). Section 6.12.5).
Note: Note:
o Non-autonomic NMS ("Network Management Systems") or SDN o Non-ACP NMS ("Network Management Systems") or SDN controllers have
controllers have to be explicitly configured for connection into to be explicitly configured for connection into the ACP.
the ACP.
o Connecting over non-ACP Layer-3 clouds requires explicit o Connecting over non-ACP Layer-3 clouds requires explicit
configuration. See Section 8.2. configuration. See Section 8.2.
o None of the above operations (except explicit configured ones) are o None of the above operations (except explicit configured ones) are
reflected in the configuration of the node. reflected in the configuration of the node.
The following figure illustrates the ACP. The following figure illustrates the ACP.
ACP node 1 ACP node 2 ACP node 1 ACP node 2
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routing problems. routing problems.
6. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative) 6. Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative)
This section describes the components and steps to set up an This section describes the components and steps to set up an
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP), and highlights the key properties Autonomic Control Plane (ACP), and highlights the key properties
which make it "indestructible" against many inadvertent changes to which make it "indestructible" against many inadvertent changes to
the Data-Plane, for example caused by misconfigurations. the Data-Plane, for example caused by misconfigurations.
An ACP node can be a router, switch, controller, NMS host, or any An ACP node can be a router, switch, controller, NMS host, or any
other IP capable node. Initially, it must have it's ACP domain other IP capable node. Initially, it must have its ACP domain
certificate, as well as an (empty) ACP Adjacency Table (described in certificate, as well as an (empty) ACP Adjacency Table (described in
Section 6.2). It then can start to discover ACP neighbors and build Section 6.2). It then can start to discover ACP neighbors and build
the ACP. This is described step by step in the following sections: the ACP. This is described step by step in the following sections:
6.1. ACP Domain, Certificate and Network 6.1. ACP Domain, Certificate and Network
The ACP relies on group security. An ACP domain is a group of nodes The ACP relies on group security. An ACP domain is a group of nodes
that trust each other to participate in ACP operations. To establish that trust each other to participate in ACP operations. To establish
trust, each ACP member requires keying material: An ACP node MUST trust, each ACP member requires keying material: An ACP node MUST
have a certificate (LDevID) and a Trust Anchor (TA) consisting of a have a certificate (LDevID) and a Trust Anchor (TA) consisting of a
certificate (chain) used to sign the LDevID of all ACP domain certificate (chain) used to sign the LDevID of all ACP domain
members. The LDevID is used to cryptographically authenticate the members. The LDevID is used to cryptographically authenticate the
membership of its owner node in the ACP domain to other ACP domain membership of its owner node in the ACP domain to other ACP domain
members, the TA is used to authenticate the ACP domain membership of members. The TA is used to authenticate the ACP domain membership of
other nodes (see Section 6.1.2). other nodes (see Section 6.1.3).
The LDevID is called the ACP domain certificate, the TA is the The LDevID is called the ACP domain certificate, the TA is the
Certificate Authority (CA) of the ACP domain. Certificate Authority (CA) of the ACP domain.
The ACP does not mandate specific mechanisms by which this keying The ACP does not mandate specific mechanisms by which this keying
material is provisioned into the ACP node, it only requires the material is provisioned into the ACP node. It only requires the
Domain information field as specified in Section 6.1.1 in its domain Domain information field as specified in Section 6.1.2 in its domain
certificate as well as those of candidate ACP peers. See certificate as well as those of candidate ACP peers. See
Appendix A.2 for more information about enrollment or provisioning Appendix A.2 for more information about enrollment or provisioning
options. options.
This document uses the term ACP in many places where the Autonomic This document uses the term ACP in many places where the Autonomic
Networking reference documents [RFC7575] and Networking reference documents [RFC7575] and
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] use the word autonomic. This is [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] use the word autonomic. This is
done because those reference documents consider (only) fully done because those reference documents consider (only) fully
autonomic networks and nodes, but support of ACP does not require autonomic networks and nodes, but support of ACP does not require
support for other components of autonomic networks. Therefore the support for other components of autonomic networks except for relying
word autonomic might be misleading to operators interested in only on GRASP and providing security and transport for GRASP. Therefore
the ACP. the word autonomic might be misleading to operators interested in
only the ACP.
[RFC7575] defines the term "Autonomic Domain" as a collection of [RFC7575] defines the term "Autonomic Domain" as a collection of
autonomic nodes. ACP nodes do not need to be fully autonomic, but autonomic nodes. ACP nodes do not need to be fully autonomic, but
when they are, then the ACP domain is an autonomic domain. Likewise, when they are, then the ACP domain is an autonomic domain. Likewise,
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] defines the term "Domain [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] defines the term "Domain
Certificate" as the certificate used in an autonomic domain. The ACP Certificate" as the certificate used in an autonomic domain. The ACP
domain certificate is that domain certificate when ACP nodes are domain certificate is that domain certificate when ACP nodes are
(fully) autonomic nodes. Finally, this document uses the term ACP (fully) autonomic nodes. Finally, this document uses the term ACP
network to refer to the network created by active ACP nodes in an ACP network to refer to the network created by active ACP nodes in an ACP
domain. The ACP network itself can extend beyond ACP nodes through domain. The ACP network itself can extend beyond ACP nodes through
the mechanisms described in Section 8.1. the mechanisms described in Section 8.1.
6.1.1. ACP Certificates
ACP domain certificates are [RFC5280] compliant X.509 certificates.
An ACP domain certificate MUST have an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) public key. It SHOULD be signed with an ECDH public key.
Otherwise it MUST be signed with an RSA key. Any secure channel
protocols used for the ACP as specified in this document or
extensions MUST therefore support authentication (e.g.:signing)
starting with these type of certificates. See [RFC4492] for more
information.
The ACP domain certificate SHOULD be used for any authentication The ACP domain certificate SHOULD be used for any authentication
between nodes with ACP domain certificates (ACP nodes and NOC nodes) between nodes with ACP domain certificates (ACP nodes and NOC nodes)
where the required condition is ACP domain membership, such as ACP where the required authorization condition is ACP domain membership,
node to NOC/OAM end-to-end security and ASA to ASA end-to-end such as ACP node to NOC/OAM end-to-end security and ASA to ASA end-
security. Section 6.1.2 defines this "ACP domain membership check". to-end security. Section 6.1.3 defines this "ACP domain membership
The uses of this check that are standardized in this document are for check". The uses of this check that are standardized in this
the establishment of ACP secure channels (Section 6.6) and for ACP document are for the establishment of hop-by-hop ACP secure channels
GRASP (Section 6.8.2). (Section 6.6) and for ACP GRASP (Section 6.8.2) end-to-end via TLS
([RFC5246]).
6.1.1. Certificate ACP Domain Information Field The ACP domain membership check requires a minimum amount of elements
in a certificate as described in Section 6.1.3. All elements are
[RFC5280] compliant. The identity of a node in the ACP is carried
via the ACP Domain Information Field as defined in Section 6.1.2
which is encoded as an rfc822Name field.
Any other field of the ACP domain certificate is to be populated as
required by [RFC5280] or desired by the operator of the ACP domain
ACP registrars/CA and required by other purposes that the ACP domain
certificate is intended to be used for.
For diagnostic and other operational purposes, it is beneficial to
copy the device identifying fields of the node's IDevID into the ACP
domain certificate, such as the "serialNumber" (see
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 2.3.1). Inclusion of
this information makes it easier to potentially attack the node
though, for example by learning the device model, which may help to
select a fitting subset of attacks. Neighboring attackers can
retrieve the certificate through an otherwise unsuccessful initiation
of a secure channel association.
Note that there is no intention to constrain authorization within the
ACP or autonomic networks using the ACP to just the ACP domain
membership check as defined in this document. It can be extended or
modified with future requirements. Such future authorizations can
use and require additional elements in certificates or policies or
even additional certificates. For an example, see Appendix A.10.5.
6.1.2. ACP Certificate ACP Domain Information Field
Information about the domain MUST be encoded in the domain Information about the domain MUST be encoded in the domain
certificate in a subjectAltName / rfc822Name field according to the certificate in a subjectAltName / rfc822Name field according to the
following ABNF definition ([RFC5234]): following ABNF ([RFC5234]) definition:
[RFC Editor: Please substitute SELF in all occurrences of rfcSELF in [RFC Editor: Please substitute SELF in all occurrences of rfcSELF in
this document with the RFC number assigned to this document and this document with the RFC number assigned to this document and
remove this comment line] remove this comment line]
domain-information = local-part "@" acp-domain-name domain-information = local-part "@" acp-domain-name
local-part = key [ "." local-info ] local-part = key [ "." local-info ]
key = "rfcSELF" key = "rfcSELF"
local-info = [ acp-address ] [ "+" rsub extensions ] local-info = [ acp-address ] [ "+" rsub extensions ]
acp-address = 32hex-dig | 0 acp-address = 32HEXDIG | 0 ; HEXDIG as of RFC5234 section B.1
hex-dig = DIGIT / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
rsub = [ <subdomain> ] ; <subdomain> as of RFC1034, section 3.5 rsub = [ <subdomain> ] ; <subdomain> as of RFC1034, section 3.5
routing-subdomain = [ rsub "." ] acp-domain-name
acp-domain-name = ; <domain> ; as of RFC 1034, section 3.5 acp-domain-name = ; <domain> ; as of RFC 1034, section 3.5
extensions = *( "+" extension ) extensions = *( "+" extension )
extension = ; future standard definition. extension = ; future standard definition.
; Must fit RFC5322 simple dot-atom format. ; Must fit RFC5322 simple dot-atom format.
routing-subdomain = [ rsub " ." ] acp-domain-name
Example: Example:
given an ACP address of fd89:b714:f3db:0:200:0:6400:0000
and an ACP domain-name of acp.example.com
and an rsub extenstion of area51.research
then this results in:
domain-information = rfcSELF+fd89b714f3db00000200000064000000 domain-information = rfcSELF+fd89b714f3db00000200000064000000
+area51.research@acp.example.com +area51.research@acp.example.com
acp-domain-name = acp.example.com acp-domain-name = acp.example.com
routing-subdomain = area51.research.acp.example.com routing-subdomain = area51.research.acp.example.com
Figure 2: ACP Domain Information Field ABNF Figure 2: ACP Domain Information Field ABNF
domain-information is the encoded information that is put into the
ACP domain certificates subjectAltName / rfc822Name field. routing-
subdomain is a string that can be constructed from the domain-
information, and it is used in the hash-creation of the ULA (see
below). The requirements and sementics of the parts of this
information are explained in the following paragraphs:
Nodes complying with this specification MUST be able to receive their Nodes complying with this specification MUST be able to receive their
ACP address through the domain certificate, in which case their own ACP address through the domain certificate, in which case their own
ACP domain certificate MUST have the 32hex-dig "acp-address" field. ACP domain certificate MUST have the 32HEXDIG "acp-address" field.
Nodes complying with this specification MUST also be able to Nodes complying with this specification MUST also be able to
authenticate nodes as ACP domain members / ACP secure channel peers authenticate nodes as ACP domain members / ACP secure channel peers
when they have an empty or 0-value acp-address field. See when they have an empty or 0-value acp-address field. See
Section 6.1.2. Section 6.1.3.
"acp-domain-name" is used to indicate the ACP Domain across which all "acp-domain-name" is used to indicate the ACP Domain across which all
ACP nodes trust each other and are willing to build ACP channels to ACP nodes trust each other and are willing to build ACP channels to
each other. See Section 6.1.2. Acp-domain-name SHOULD be the FQDN each other. See Section 6.1.3. Acp-domain-name SHOULD be the FQDN
of a DNS domain owned by the operator assigning the certificate. of a DNS domain owned by the operator assigning the certificate.
This is a simple method to ensure that the domain is globally unique This is a simple method to ensure that the domain is globally unique
and collision of ACP addresses would therefore only happen due to ULA and collision of ACP addresses would therefore only happen due to ULA
hash collisions (see Section 6.10.2). If the operator does not own hash collisions (see Section 6.10.2). If the operator does not own
any FQDN, it should choose a string (in FQDN format) that it intends any FQDN, it should choose a string (in FQDN format) that it intends
to be equally unique. to be equally unique.
"routing-subdomain" is the autonomic subdomain composed of "rsub" and To keep the encoding simple, there is no consideration for
"acp-domain-name". "rsub" is optional. When not present, "routing- internationalized acp-domain-names. The ACP domain information is
subdomain" is the same as "acp-domain-name". "routing-subdomain" not intended for enduser consumption, and there is no protection
determines the /48 ULA prefix for ACP addresses. "rsub" therefore against someone not owning a domain name to simpy choose it.
allows to use multiple /48 ULA prefixes in an ACP domain. See Instead, it only serves as a hash seed for the ULA and for
Appendix A.7 for example use-cases. diagnostics to the operator. Therefore, any operator owning only an
internationalized domain name should be able to pick an equivalently
unique 7-bit ASCII acp-domain-name string representing the
internationalized domain name.
"routing-subdomain" is a heuristic that allows a Registrar to
consistently generate a unique 48-bit ULA prefix for ACP addresses.
The presence of the "rsub" component allows to a single ACP domain to
employ multiple /48 ULA prefixes. See Appendix A.7 for example use-
cases.
The optional "extensions" field is used for future standardized The optional "extensions" field is used for future standardized
extensions to this specification. It MUST be ignored if present and extensions to this specification. It MUST be ignored if present and
not understood. not understood.
Formatting notes: Formatting notes:
o "rsub" needs to be in the "local-part": If the format just had o "rsub" needs to be in the "local-part": If the format just had
routing-subdomain as the domain part of the domain-information, routing-subdomain as the domain part of the domain-information,
rsub and acp-domain-name could not be separated from each other. rsub and acp-domain-name could not be separated from each other.
It also makes acp-domain-name a valid e-mail target across all It also makes domain-information a valid e-mail target across all
routing-subdomains. routing-subdomains.
o "acp-address" cannot use standard IPv6 address formats because it o "acp-address" cannot use standard IPv6 address formats because it
must match the simple dot-atom format of [RFC5322]. The character must match the simple dot-atom format of [RFC5322]. The character
":" is not allowed in that format. ":" is not allowed in that format.
o If "acp-address" is empty, and "rsub" is empty too, the "local- o If "acp-address" is empty, and "rsub" is empty too, the "local-
part" will have the format "rfcSELF++extension(s)". The two plus part" will have the format "rfcSELF++extension(s)". The two plus
characters are necessary so the node can unambiguously parse that characters are necessary so the node can unambiguously parse that
both "acp-address" and "rsub" are empty. both "acp-address" and "rsub" are empty.
o The maximum size of "domain-information" is 254 characters and the o The maximum size of "domain-information" is 254 characters and the
maximum size of node-info is 64 characters according to [RFC5280] maximum size of local-part is 64 characters according to [RFC5280]
that is referring to [RFC2821] (superseded by [RFC5321]). that is referring to [RFC2821] (superseded by [RFC5321]).
The subjectAltName / rfc822Name encoding of the ACP domain name and The subjectAltName / rfc822Name encoding of the ACP domain name and
ACP address is used for the following reasons: ACP address is used for the following reasons:
o It should be possible to share the LDevID with other uses beside o It should be possible to use the ACP domain certificate as an
the ACP. Therefore, the information element required for the ACP LDevID on the system for other uses beside the ACP. Therefore,
should be encoded so that it minimizes the possibility of creating the information element required for the ACP should be encoded so
incompatibilities with such other uses. that it minimizes the possibility of creating incompatibilities
with such other uses.
o The information for the ACP should not cause incompatibilities o The information for the ACP should not cause incompatibilities
with any pre-existing ASN.1 software. This eliminates the with any pre-existing ASN.1 software. This eliminates the
introduction of a novel information element because that could introduction of a novel information element because that could
require extensions to such pre-existing ASN.1 parsers. require extensions to such pre-existing ASN.1 parsers.
o subjectAltName / rfc822Name is a pre-existing element that must be o subjectAltName / rfc822Name is a pre-existing element that must be
supported by all existing ASN.1 parsers for LDevID. supported by all existing ASN.1 parsers for LDevID.
o The element required for the ACP should not be misinterpreted by o The element required for the ACP should not be misinterpreted by
skipping to change at page 24, line 38 skipping to change at page 26, line 12
words, it is not necessary to set up a separate mailbox for every words, it is not necessary to set up a separate mailbox for every
ACP node, but only one for the whole domain. ACP node, but only one for the whole domain.
o In result, if any unexpected use of the ACP addressing information o In result, if any unexpected use of the ACP addressing information
in a certificate happens, it is benign and detectable: it would be in a certificate happens, it is benign and detectable: it would be
mail to that mailbox. mail to that mailbox.
See section 4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280] for details on the subjectAltName See section 4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280] for details on the subjectAltName
field. field.
6.1.2. ACP domain membership check 6.1.3. ACP domain membership check
The following points constitute the ACP domain membership check of a The following points constitute the ACP domain membership check of a
candidate peer certificate, independent of the protocol used: candidate peer via its certificate:
1: The peer certificate is valid (lifetime). 1: The peer certificate is valid (lifetime).
2: The peer has proved ownership of the private key associated with 2: The peer has proved ownership of the private key associated with
the certificate's public key. the certificate's public key. This check is performed by the
security association protocol used, for example [RFC7296], section
2.15.
3: The peer's certificate passes certificate path validation as 3: The peer's certificate passes certificate path validation as
defined in [RFC5280] against one of the Trust Anchors associated defined in [RFC5280], section 6 against one of the Trust Anchors
with the ACP nodes ACP domain certificate (see Section 6.1.3 associated with the ACP node's ACP domain certificate (see
below). Section 6.1.4 below).
4: If the node certificate indicates a Certificate Revocation List 4: If the node certificate indicates a Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Distribution Point (CDP) ([RFC5280], section 4.2.1.13) or (CRL) Distribution Point (CDP) ([RFC5280], section 4.2.1.13) or
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder ([RFC5280], Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder ([RFC5280],
section 4.2.2.1), then the peer's certificate must be valid section 4.2.2.1), then the peer's certificate must be valid
according to those criteria: An OCSP check for the peer's according to those criteria: An OCSP check for the peer's
certificate across the ACP must succeed or the peer certificate certificate across the ACP must succeed or the peer certificate
must not be listed in the CRL retrieved from the CDP. This rule must not be listed in the CRL retrieved from the CDP. This rule
has to be skipped for ACP secure channel peer authentication when has to be skipped for ACP secure channel peer authentication when
the node has no ACP or non-ACP connectivity to retrieve current the node has no ACP or non-ACP connectivity to retrieve current
CRL or access an OCSP responder (see below). CRL or access an OCSP responder (and the security association
protocol itself has also no way to communicate CRL or OCSP check).
5: The peer's certificate has a syntactically valid ACP domain 5: The peer's certificate has a syntactically valid ACP domain
information field (encoded as subjectAltName / rfc822Name) and the information field (encoded as subjectAltName / rfc822Name) and the
acp-domain-name in that peer's domain information field is the acp-domain-name in that peer's domain information field is the
same as in this ACP node's certificate (lowercase normalized). same as in this ACP node's certificate (lowercase normalized).
When an ACP node learns later via OCSP/CRL that an ACP peers Note: When an ACP node learns later via OCSP/CRL that an ACP peer's
certificate for which rule 4 had to be skipped during ACP secure certificate for which rule 4 had to be skipped during ACP secure
channel establishment is invalid, then the ACP secure channel to that channel establishment is invalid, then the ACP secure channel to that
peer SHOULD be closed even if this peer is the only connectivity to peer SHOULD be closed even if this peer is the only connectivity to
access CRL/OCSP. The ACP secure channel connection MUST be retried access CRL/OCSP. The ACP secure channel connection MUST be retried
periodically to support the case that the neighbor aquires a new, periodically to support the case that the neighbor aquires a new,
valid certificate. valid certificate.
Only when checking a candidate peer's certificate for the purpose of When checking a candidate peer's certificate for the purpose of
establishing an ACP secure channel, one additional check is establishing an ACP secure channel, one additional check is
performed: performed:
6: The candidate peer certificate's ACP domain information field 6: The candidate peer certificate's ACP domain information field
has a non-empty acp-address field (either 32hex-dig or 0, has a non-empty acp-address field (either 32HEXDIG or 0, according
according to Figure 2). to Figure 2).
Rule 6 for the establishment of ACP secure channels ensures that they Technically, ACP secure channels can only be built with nodes that
will only be built between nodes which indicate through the acp- have an acp-address. Rule 6 ensures that this is taken into account
address in their ACP domain certificate the ability and permission by during ACP domain membership check.
the Registrar to participate in ACP secure-channels.
Nodes with an empty acp-address field can only use their ACP domain Nodes with an empty acp-address field can only use their ACP domain
certificate for non-ACP-secure channel authentication purposes. certificate for non-ACP-secure channel authentication purposes. This
includes for example NMS type nodes permitted to communicate into the
ACP via ACP connect (Section 8.1)
The special value 0 in an ACP certificates acp-address field is used The special value 0 in an ACP certificates acp-address field is used
for nodes that can and should determine their ACP address through for nodes that can and should determine their ACP address through
other mechanisms than learning it through the acp-address field in other mechanisms than learning it through the acp-address field in
their ACP domain certificate. These ACP nodes are permitted to their ACP domain certificate. These ACP nodes are permitted to
establish ACP secure channels. Mechanisms for those nodes to establish ACP secure channels. Mechanisms for those nodes to
determine their ACP address are outside the scope of this determine their ACP address are outside the scope of this
specification. specification, but this option is defined here so that any ACP nodes
can build ACP secure channels to them according to Rule 6.
Formally, the ACP domain membership check includes both the In summary:
authentication of the peers certificate (steps 1...4) and a check
authorizing this node and the peer to establish an ACP connection
and/or any other secure connection across ACP or data-plane end to
end. Step 5 authorizes to build any non-ACP secure connection
between members of the same ACP domain, step 5 and 6 are required to
build an ACP secure channel. For brevity, the remainder of this
document refers to this process only as authentication instead of as
authentication and authorization.
6.1.3. Trust Points and Trust Anchors Steps 1...4 constitute standard certificate validity verification
and private key authentication as defined by [RFC5280] and
security association protocols (such as IKEv2 [RFC7296] when
leveraging certificates.
Steps 1...4 do not include verification of any pre-existing form
of non-public-key-only based identity elements of a certificate
such as a web servers domain name prefix often encoded in
certificate common name. Steps 5 and 6 are the equivalent steps.
Step 4 Constitutes standard CRL/OCSP checks refined for the case
of missing connectivity and limited functionality security
association protocols.
Step 5 Checks for the presence of an ACP identity for the peer.
Steps 1...5 authorize to build any secure connection between
members of the same ACP domain except for ACP secure channels.
Step 6 is the additional verification of the presence of an ACP
address.
Steps 1...6 authorize to build an ACP secure channel.
For brevity, the remainder of this document refers to this process
only as authentication instead of as authentication and
authorization.
6.1.4. Trust Points and Trust Anchors
ACP nodes need Trust Point (TP) certificates to perform certificate ACP nodes need Trust Point (TP) certificates to perform certificate
path validation as required by Section 6.1.2, rule 3. Trust Point(s) path validation as required by Section 6.1.3, rule 3. Trust Point(s)
must be provisioned to an ACP node (together with its ACP domain must be provisioned to an ACP node (together with its ACP domain
certificate) by an ACP Registrar during initial enrolment of a certificate) by an ACP Registrar during initial enrolment of a
candidate ACP node. ACP nodes MUST also support renewal of TPs via candidate ACP node. ACP nodes MUST also support renewal of TPs via
EST as described below in Section 6.1.4. EST as described below in Section 6.1.5.
Trust Point is the term used in this document for a certificate Trust Point is the term used in this document for a certificate
authority (CA) and its associated set of certificates. Multiple authority (CA) and its associated set of certificates. Multiple
certificates are required for a CA to deal with CA certificate certificates are required for a CA to deal with CA certificate
renewals as explained in Section 4.4 of CMP ([RFC4210]). renewals as explained in Section 4.4 of CMP ([RFC4210]).
A certificate path is a chain of certificates starting at a self- A certificate path is a chain of certificates starting at the ACP
signed certificate of a so called root-CA or Trust Anchor, followed certificate (leaf/end-entity) followed by zero or more intermediate
by zero or more intermediate Trust Point or sub-CA certificates and Trust Point or sub-CA certificates and ending with a self-signed
ending with an ACP certificate. Certificate path validation certificate of a so called root-CA or Trust Anchor. Certificate path
authenticates that the ACP certificate is signed by a Trust Anchor, validation authenticates that the ACP certificate is signed by a
directly or indirectly via one or more intermediate Trust Points. Trust Anchor, directly or indirectly via one or more intermediate
Trust Points.
Note that different ACP nodes may have different Trust Points and Note that different ACP nodes may have different Trust Points and
even different Trust Anchors in their certificate path, as long as even different Trust Anchors in their certificate path, as long as
the set of Trust Points for all ACP node includes the same set of the set of Trust Points for all ACP node includes the same set of
Trust Anchors (usually 1), and each ACP nodes set of Trust Anchors Trust Anchors (usually 1), and each ACP nodes set of Trust Anchors
includes the intermediate Trust Points for its own ACP domain includes the intermediate Trust Points for its own ACP domain
certificate. The protocols through which ACP domain membership check certificate. The protocols through which ACP domain membership check
rules 1-4 are performed therefore need to support the exchange not rules 1-4 are performed therefore need to support the exchange not
only of the ACP nodes certificates, but also their intermediate Trust only of the ACP nodes certificates, but also their intermediate Trust
Points. Points.
skipping to change at page 27, line 13 skipping to change at page 29, line 13
certificates with valid ACP domain information fields only for certificates with valid ACP domain information fields only for
trusted ACP registrars of that domain. This can be achieved by using trusted ACP registrars of that domain. This can be achieved by using
Trust Anchors private to the owner of the ACP domain or potentially Trust Anchors private to the owner of the ACP domain or potentially
through appropriate contractual agreements between the involved through appropriate contractual agreements between the involved
parties. Public CA without such obligations and guarantees can not parties. Public CA without such obligations and guarantees can not
be used. be used.
A single owner can operate multiple independent ACP domains from the A single owner can operate multiple independent ACP domains from the
same set of private trust anchors (CAs) when the ACP Registrars are same set of private trust anchors (CAs) when the ACP Registrars are
trusted not to permit certificates with incorrect ACP information trusted not to permit certificates with incorrect ACP information
fields to be signed. Such as ACP information with a wrong acp-domain fields to be signed, such as ACP information with a wrong acp-domain
field. In this case, CAs can be completely unaware of ACP specifics, field. In this case, CAs can be completely unaware of ACP specifics,
so that it should be possible to use any existing CA software. When so that it should be possible to use any existing CA software. When
ACP Registrars are not to be trusted, the correctness of the ACP ACP Registrars are not to be trusted, the correctness of the ACP
domain information field for the candidate ACP node has to be domain information field for the candidate ACP node has to be
verified by the CA signing the ACP domain certificate. verified by the CA signing the ACP domain certificate.
6.1.4. Certificate and Trust Point Maintenance 6.1.5. Certificate and Trust Point Maintenance
ACP nodes MUST support renewal of their Certificate and Trust Points ACP nodes MUST support renewal of their Certificate and Trust Points
(TP) via EST ("Enrollment over Secure Transport", see [RFC7030]) and (TP) via EST ("Enrollment over Secure Transport", see [RFC7030]) and
MAY support other mechanisms. An ACP network MUST have at least one MAY support other mechanisms. An ACP network MUST have at least one
ACP node supporting EST server functionality across the ACP so that ACP node supporting EST server functionality across the ACP so that
EST renewal is useable. EST renewal is useable.
ACP nodes SHOULD be able to remember the EST server from which they ACP nodes SHOULD be able to remember the EST server from which they
last renewed their ACP domain certificate and SHOULD provide the last renewed their ACP domain certificate and SHOULD provide the
ability for this remembered EST server to also be set by the ACP ability for this remembered EST server to also be set by the ACP
Registrar (see Section 6.10.7) that initially enrolled the ACP device Registrar (see Section 6.10.7) that initially enrolled the ACP device
with its ACP domain certificate. When BRSKI (see with its ACP domain certificate. When BRSKI (see
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) is used, the ACP address of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) is used, the ACP address of
the BRSKI registrar from the BRSKI TLS connection SHOULD be the BRSKI registrar from the BRSKI TLS connection SHOULD be
remembered and used for the next renewal via EST if that registrar remembered and used for the next renewal via EST if that registrar
also announces itself as an EST server via GRASP (see next section) also announces itself as an EST server via GRASP (see next section)
on its ACP address. on its ACP address.
6.1.4.1. GRASP objective for EST server The EST server MUST present a certificate that is passing ACP domain
membership check in its TLS connection setup (Section 6.1.3, rules
1..5, not rule 6 as this is not for an ACP secure channel setup).
The EST server certificate MUST also contain the id-kp-cmcRA
[RFC6402] extended key usage extension and the EST client must check
its presence.
The additional check against the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage
extension field ensures that clients do not fall prey to an illicit
EST server. While such illicit EST servers should not be able to
support certificate signing requests (as they are not able to elicit
a signing response from a valid CA), such an illicit EST server would
be able to provide faked CA certificates to EST clients that need to
renew their CA certificates when they expire.
Note that EST servers supporting multiple ACP domains will need to
have for each of these ACP domains a separate certificate and respond
on a different transport address (IPv6 address and/or TCP port), but
this is easily automated on the EST server as long as the CA does not
restrict registrars to request certificates with the id-kp-cmcRA
extended usage extension for themselves.
6.1.5.1. GRASP objective for EST server
ACP nodes that are EST servers MUST announce their service via GRASP ACP nodes that are EST servers MUST announce their service via GRASP
in the ACP through M_FLOOD messages. See [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp], in the ACP through M_FLOOD messages. See [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp],
section 2.8.11 for the definition of this message type: section 2.8.11 for the definition of this message type:
Example: Example:
[M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', 210000, [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', 210000,
["SRV.est", 4, 255 ], ["SRV.est", 4, 255 ],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR, [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', TCP, 80] h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', TCP, 443]
] ]
Figure 3: GRASP SRV.est example Figure 3: GRASP SRV.est example
The formal definition of the objective in Concise data definition The formal definition of the objective in Concise data definition
language (CDDL) (see [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]) is as follows: language (CDDL) (see [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]) is as follows:
flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl, flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl,
+[objective, (locator-option / [])]] +[objective, (locator-option / [])]]
; see example above and explanation
; below for initiator and ttl
objective = ["SRV.est", objective-flags, loop-count, objective = ["SRV.est", objective-flags, loop-count,
objective-value] objective-value]
objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec
sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization
loop-count = 255 ; recommended loop-count = 255 ; recommended as there is no mechanism
objective-value = any ; Not used (yet) ; to discover network diameter.
objective-value = any ; reserved for future extensions
Figure 4: GRASP SRV.est definition Figure 4: GRASP SRV.est definition
The objective name "SRV.est" indicates that the objective is an The objective name "SRV.est" indicates that the objective is an
[RFC7030] compliant EST server because "est" is an [RFC6335] [RFC7030] compliant EST server because "est" is an [RFC6335]
registered service name for [RFC7030]. Objective-value MUST be registered service name for [RFC7030]. Objective-value MUST be
ignored if present. Backward compatible extensions to [RFC7030] MAY ignored if present. Backward compatible extensions to [RFC7030] MAY
be indicated through objective-value. Non [RFC7030] compatible be indicated through objective-value. Non [RFC7030] compatible
certificate renewal options MUST use a different objective-name. certificate renewal options MUST use a different objective-name.
Non-recognized objective-values (or parts thereof if it is a
structure partially understood) MUST be ignored.
The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The default SHOULD be The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The default SHOULD be
60 seconds, the value SHOULD be operator configurable but SHOULD be 60 seconds, the value SHOULD be operator configurable but SHOULD be
not smaller than 60 seconds. The frequency of sending MUST be such not smaller than 60 seconds. The frequency of sending MUST be such
that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs from all flooding that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs from all flooding
sources cause only negligible traffic across the ACP. The time-to- sources cause only negligible traffic across the ACP. The time-to-
live (ttl) parameter SHOULD be 3.5 times the period so that up to live (ttl) parameter SHOULD be 3.5 times the period so that up to
three consecutive messages can be dropped before considering an three consecutive messages can be dropped before considering an
announcement expired. In the example above, the ttl is 210000 msec, announcement expired. In the example above, the ttl is 210000 msec,
3.5 times 60 seconds. When a service announcer using these 3.5 times 60 seconds. When a service announcer using these
parameters unexpectedly dies immediately after sending the M_FLOOD, parameters unexpectedly dies immediately after sending the M_FLOOD,
receivers would consider it expired 210 seconds later. When a receivers would consider it expired 210 seconds later. When a
receiver tries to connect to this dead service before this timeout, receiver tries to connect to this dead service before this timeout,
it will experience a failing connection and use that as an indication it will experience a failing connection and use that as an indication
that the service is dead and select another instance of the same that the service instance is dead and select another instance of the
service instead. same service instead (from another GRASP announcement).
6.1.4.2. Renewal 6.1.5.2. Renewal
When performing renewal, the node SHOULD attempt to connect to the When performing renewal, the node SHOULD attempt to connect to the
remembered EST server. If that fails, it SHOULD attempt to connect remembered EST server. If that fails, it SHOULD attempt to connect
to an EST server learned via GRASP. The server with which to an EST server learned via GRASP. The server with which
certificate renewal succeeds SHOULD be remembered for the next certificate renewal succeeds SHOULD be remembered for the next
renewal. renewal.
Remembering the last renewal server and preferring it provides Remembering the last renewal server and preferring it provides
stickiness which can help diagnostics. It also provides some stickiness which can help diagnostics. It also provides some
protection against off-path compromised ACP members announcing bogus protection against off-path compromised ACP members announcing bogus
information into GRASP. information into GRASP.
Renewal of certificates SHOULD start after less than 50% of the Renewal of certificates SHOULD start after less than 50% of the
domain certificate lifetime so that network operations has ample time domain certificate lifetime so that network operations has ample time
to investigate and resolve any problems that causes a node to not to investigate and resolve any problems that causes a node to not
renew its domain certificate in time - and to allow prolonged periods renew its domain certificate in time - and to allow prolonged periods
of running parts of a network disconnected from any CA. of running parts of a network disconnected from any CA.
6.1.4.3. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 6.1.5.3. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
The ACP node SHOULD support Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) via The ACP node SHOULD support Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) via
HTTPs from one or more CRL Distribution Points (CDPs). The CDP(s) HTTP from one or more CRL Distribution Points (CDPs). The CDP(s)
MUST be indicated in the Domain Certificate when used. If the CDP MUST be indicated in the Domain Certificate when used. If the CDP
URL uses an IPv6 address (ULA address when using the addressing rules URL uses an IPv6 address (ULA address when using the addressing rules
specified in this document), the ACP node will connect to the CDP via specified in this document), the ACP node will connect to the CDP via
the ACP. If the CDP uses a domain name, the ACP node will connect to the ACP. If the CDP uses a domain name, the ACP node will connect to
the CDP via the Data-Plane. the CDP via the Data-Plane.
It is common to use domain names for CDP(s), but there is no It is common to use domain names for CDP(s), but there is no
requirement for the ACP to support DNS. Any DNS lookup in the Data- requirement for the ACP to support DNS. Any DNS lookup in the Data-
Plane is not only a possible security issue, but it would also not Plane is not only a possible security issue, but it would also not
indicate whether the resolved address is meant to be reachable across indicate whether the resolved address is meant to be reachable across
the ACP. Therefore, the use of an IPv6 address versus the use of a the ACP. Therefore, the use of an IPv6 address versus the use of a
DNS name doubles as an indicator whether or not to reach the CDP via DNS name doubles as an indicator whether or not to reach the CDP via
the ACP. the ACP.
A CDP can be reachable across the ACP either by running it on a node A CDP can be reachable across the ACP either by running it on a node
with ACP or by connecting its node via an ACP connect interface (see with ACP or by connecting its node via an ACP connect interface (see
Section 8.1). The CDP SHOULD use an ACP domain certificate for its Section 8.1). The CDP SHOULD use an ACP domain certificate for its
HTTPs connections. The connecting ACP node SHOULD verify that the HTTPs connections. The connecting ACP node SHOULD verify that the
CDP certificate used during the HTTPs connection has the same ACP CDP certificate used during the HTTPs connection has the same ACP
address as indicated in the CDP URL of the nodes ACP domain address as indicated in the CDP URL of the node's ACP domain
certificate if the CDP URL uses an IPv6 address. certificate if the CDP URL uses an IPv6 address.
6.1.4.4. Lifetimes 6.1.5.4. Lifetimes
Certificate lifetime may be set to shorter lifetimes than customary Certificate lifetime may be set to shorter lifetimes than customary
(1 year) because certificate renewal is fully automated via ACP and (1 year) because certificate renewal is fully automated via ACP and
EST. The primary limiting factor for shorter certificate lifetimes EST. The primary limiting factor for shorter certificate lifetimes
is load on the EST server(s) and CA. It is therefore recommended is load on the EST server(s) and CA. It is therefore recommended
that ACP domain certificates are managed via a CA chain where the that ACP domain certificates are managed via a CA chain where the
assigning CA has enough performance to manage short lived assigning CA has enough performance to manage short lived
certificates. See also Section 10.2.4 for discussion about an certificates. See also Section 10.2.4 for discussion about an
example setup achieving this. See also [I-D.ietf-acme-star]. example setup achieving this. See also [I-D.ietf-acme-star].
When certificate lifetimes are sufficiently short, such as few hours, When certificate lifetimes are sufficiently short, such as few hours,
certificate revocation may not be necessary, allowing to simplify the certificate revocation may not be necessary, allowing to simplify the
overall certificate maintenance infrastructure. overall certificate maintenance infrastructure.
See Appendix A.2 for further optimizations of certificate maintenance See Appendix A.2 for further optimizations of certificate maintenance
when BRSKI can be used ("Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key when BRSKI can be used ("Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures", see [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]). Infrastructures", see [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]).
6.1.4.5. Re-enrollment 6.1.5.5. Re-enrollment
An ACP node may determine that its ACP domain certificate has An ACP node may determine that its ACP domain certificate has
expired, for example because the ACP node was powered down or expired, for example because the ACP node was powered down or
disconnected longer than its certificate lifetime. In this case, the disconnected longer than its certificate lifetime. In this case, the
ACP node SHOULD convert to a role of a re-enrolling candidate ACP ACP node SHOULD convert to a role of a re-enrolling candidate ACP
node. node.
In this role, the node does maintain the trust anchor and certificate In this role, the node does maintain the trust anchor and certificate
chain associated with its ACP domain certificate exclusively for the chain associated with its ACP domain certificate exclusively for the
purpose of re-enrollment, and attempts (or waits) to get re-enrolled purpose of re-enrollment, and attempts (or waits) to get re-enrolled
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intended to be used without BRSKI, the details about BRSKI and intended to be used without BRSKI, the details about BRSKI and
vouchers in the following text can be skipped. vouchers in the following text can be skipped.
When BRSKI is used (i.e.: on ACP nodes that are ANI nodes), the re- When BRSKI is used (i.e.: on ACP nodes that are ANI nodes), the re-
enrolling candidate ACP node would attempt to enroll like a candidate enrolling candidate ACP node would attempt to enroll like a candidate
ACP node (BRSKI pledge), but instead of using the ACP nodes IDevID, ACP node (BRSKI pledge), but instead of using the ACP nodes IDevID,
it SHOULD first attempt to use its ACP domain certificate in the it SHOULD first attempt to use its ACP domain certificate in the
BRSKI TLS authentication. The BRSKI registrar MAY honor this BRSKI TLS authentication. The BRSKI registrar MAY honor this
certificate beyond its expiration date purely for the purpose of re- certificate beyond its expiration date purely for the purpose of re-
enrollment. Using the ACP node's domain certificate allows the BRSKI enrollment. Using the ACP node's domain certificate allows the BRSKI
registrar to learn that nodes ACP domain information field, so that registrar to learn that node's ACP domain information field, so that
the BRSKI registrar can re-assign the same ACP address information to the BRSKI registrar can re-assign the same ACP address information to
the ACP node in the new ACP domain certificate. the ACP node in the new ACP domain certificate.
If the BRSKI registrar denies the use of the old ACP domain If the BRSKI registrar denies the use of the old ACP domain
certificate, the re-enrolling candidate ACP node MUST re-attempt re- certificate, the re-enrolling candidate ACP node MUST re-attempt re-
enrollment using its IDevID as defined in BRSKI during the TLS enrollment using its IDevID as defined in BRSKI during the TLS
connection setup. connection setup.
Both when the BRSKI connection is attempted with the old ACP domain Both when the BRSKI connection is attempted with the old ACP domain
certificate or the IDevID, the re-enrolling candidate ACP node SHOULD certificate or the IDevID, the re-enrolling candidate ACP node SHOULD
authenticate the BRSKI registrar during TLS connection setup based on authenticate the BRSKI registrar during TLS connection setup based on
its existing trust anchor/certificate chain information associated its existing trust anchor/certificate chain information associated
with its old ACP certificate. The re-enrolling candidate ACP node with its old ACP certificate. The re-enrolling candidate ACP node
SHOULD only request a voucher from the BRSKI registrar when this SHOULD only fall back to requesting a voucher from the BRSKI
authentication fails during TLS connection setup. registrar when this authentication fails during TLS connection setup.
When other mechanisms than BRSKI are used for ACP domain certificate When other mechanisms than BRSKI are used for ACP domain certificate
enrollment, the principles of the re-enrolling candidate ACP node are enrollment, the principles of the re-enrolling candidate ACP node are
the same. The re-enrolling candidate ACP node attempts to the same. The re-enrolling candidate ACP node attempts to
authenticate any ACP registrar peers during re-enrollment protocol/ authenticate any ACP registrar peers during re-enrollment protocol/
mechanisms via its existing certificate chain/trust anchor and mechanisms via its existing certificate chain/trust anchor and
provides its existing ACP domain certificate and other identification provides its existing ACP domain certificate and other identification
(such as the IDevID) as necessary to the registrar. (such as the IDevID) as necessary to the registrar.
Maintaining existing trust anchor information is especially important Maintaining existing trust anchor information is especially important
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therefore the injection of certificate failures could otherwise make therefore the injection of certificate failures could otherwise make
the ACP node easily attackable remotely. the ACP node easily attackable remotely.
When using BRSKI or other protocol/mechanisms supporting vouchers, When using BRSKI or other protocol/mechanisms supporting vouchers,
maintaining existing trust anchor information allows for re- maintaining existing trust anchor information allows for re-
enrollment of expired ACP certificates to be more lightweight, enrollment of expired ACP certificates to be more lightweight,
especially in environments where repeated acquisition of vouchers especially in environments where repeated acquisition of vouchers
during the lifetime of ACP nodes may be operationally expensive or during the lifetime of ACP nodes may be operationally expensive or
otherwise undesirable. otherwise undesirable.
6.1.4.6. Failing Certificates 6.1.5.6. Failing Certificates
An ACP domain certificate is called failing in this document, if/when An ACP domain certificate is called failing in this document, if/when
the ACP node can determine that it was revoked (or explicitly not the ACP node to which the certificate was issued can determine that
renewed), or in the absence of such explicit local diagnostics, when it was revoked (or explicitly not renewed), or in the absence of such
the ACP node fails to connect to other ACP nodes in the same ACP explicit local diagnostics, when the ACP node fails to connect to
domain using its ACP certificate. For connection failures to other ACP nodes in the same ACP domain using its ACP certificate.
determine the ACP domain certificate as the culprit, the peer should For connection failures to determine the ACP domain certificate as
pass the domain membership check (Section 6.1.2) and other reasons the culprit, the peer should pass the domain membership check
for the connection failure can be excluded because of the connection (Section 6.1.3) and other reasons for the connection failure can be
error diagnostics. excluded because of the connection error diagnostics.
This type of failure can happen during setup/refresh of a secure ACP This type of failure can happen during setup/refresh of a secure ACP
channel connections or any other use of the ACP domain certificate, channel connections or any other use of the ACP domain certificate,
such as for the TLS connection to an EST server for the renewal of such as for the TLS connection to an EST server for the renewal of
the ACP domain certificate. the ACP domain certificate.
Example reasons for failing certificates that the ACP node can only Example reasons for failing certificates that the ACP node can only
discover through connection failure are that the domain certificate discover through connection failure are that the domain certificate
or any of its signing certificates could have been revoked or may or any of its signing certificates could have been revoked or may
have expired, but the ACP node cannot self-diagnose this condition have expired, but the ACP node cannot self-diagnose this condition
directly. Revocation information or clock synchronization may only directly. Revocation information or clock synchronization may only
be available across the ACP, but the ACP node cannot build ACP secure be available across the ACP, but the ACP node cannot build ACP secure
channels because ACP peers reject the ACP node's domain certificate. channels because ACP peers reject the ACP node's domain certificate.
ACP nodes SHOULD support the option to determines whether its ACP ACP nodes SHOULD support the option to determines whether its ACP
certificate is failing, and when it does, put itself into the role of certificate is failing, and when it does, put itself into the role of
a re-enrolling candidate ACP node as explained above a re-enrolling candidate ACP node as explained above
(Section 6.1.4.5). (Section 6.1.5.5).
6.2. ACP Adjacency Table 6.2. ACP Adjacency Table
To know to which nodes to establish an ACP channel, every ACP node To know to which nodes to establish an ACP channel, every ACP node
maintains an adjacency table. The adjacency table contains maintains an adjacency table. The adjacency table contains
information about adjacent ACP nodes, at a minimum: Node-ID information about adjacent ACP nodes, at a minimum: Node-ID
(identifier of the node inside the ACP, see Section 6.10.3 and (identifier of the node inside the ACP, see Section 6.10.3 and
Section 6.10.5), interface on which neighbor was discovered (by GRASP Section 6.10.5), interface on which neighbor was discovered (by GRASP
as explained below), link-local IPv6 address of neighbor on that as explained below), link-local IPv6 address of neighbor on that
interface, certificate (including domain information field). An ACP interface, certificate (including domain information field). An ACP
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determine to which neighbor an ACP connection is established. determine to which neighbor an ACP connection is established.
Where the next ACP node is not directly adjacent (i.e., not on a link Where the next ACP node is not directly adjacent (i.e., not on a link
connected to this node), the information in the adjacency table can connected to this node), the information in the adjacency table can
be supplemented by configuration. For example, the Node-ID and IP be supplemented by configuration. For example, the Node-ID and IP
address could be configured. See Section 8.2. address could be configured. See Section 8.2.
The adjacency table MAY contain information about the validity and The adjacency table MAY contain information about the validity and
trust of the adjacent ACP node's certificate. However, subsequent trust of the adjacent ACP node's certificate. However, subsequent
steps MUST always start with the ACP domain membership check against steps MUST always start with the ACP domain membership check against
the peer (see Section 6.1.2). the peer (see Section 6.1.3).
The adjacency table contains information about adjacent ACP nodes in The adjacency table contains information about adjacent ACP nodes in
general, independently of their domain and trust status. The next general, independently of their domain and trust status. The next
step determines to which of those ACP nodes an ACP connection should step determines to which of those ACP nodes an ACP connection should
be established. be established.
6.3. Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP 6.3. Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP
[RFC Editor: GRASP draft is in RFC editor queue, waiting for [RFC Editor: GRASP draft is in RFC editor queue, waiting for
dependencies, including ACP. Please ensure that references to I- dependencies, including ACP. Please ensure that references to I-
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in the same M_FLOOD message, since GRASP allows multiple objectives in the same M_FLOOD message, since GRASP allows multiple objectives
in one message. This may be impractical though if ACP and BRSKI in one message. This may be impractical though if ACP and BRSKI
operations are implemented via separate software modules / ASAs. operations are implemented via separate software modules / ASAs.
The result of the discovery is the IPv6 link-local address of the The result of the discovery is the IPv6 link-local address of the
neighbor as well as its supported secure channel protocols (and non- neighbor as well as its supported secure channel protocols (and non-
standard port they are running on). It is stored in the ACP standard port they are running on). It is stored in the ACP
Adjacency Table (see Section 6.2), which then drives the further Adjacency Table (see Section 6.2), which then drives the further
building of the ACP to that neighbor. building of the ACP to that neighbor.
Note that the DULL GRASP objective described does intentionally not
include ACP nodes ACP domain certificate even though this would be
useful for diagnostics and to simplify the security exchange in ACP
secure channel security association protocols (see Section 6.7). The
reason is that DULL GRASP messages are periodically multicasted
across IPv6 subnets and full certificates could easily lead to
fragmented IPv6 DULL GRASP multicast packets due to the size of a
certificate. This would be highly undesirable.
6.4. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection 6.4. Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection
An ACP node must determine to which other ACP nodes in the adjacency An ACP node must determine to which other ACP nodes in the adjacency
table it should build an ACP connection. This is based on the table it should build an ACP connection. This is based on the
information in the ACP Adjacency table. information in the ACP Adjacency table.
The ACP is established exclusively between nodes in the same domain. The ACP is established exclusively between nodes in the same domain.
This includes all routing subdomains. Appendix A.7 explains how ACP This includes all routing subdomains. Appendix A.7 explains how ACP
connections across multiple routing subdomains are special. connections across multiple routing subdomains are special.
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6.5. Channel Selection 6.5. Channel Selection
To avoid attacks, initial discovery of candidate ACP peers cannot To avoid attacks, initial discovery of candidate ACP peers cannot
include any non-protected negotiation. To avoid re-inventing and include any non-protected negotiation. To avoid re-inventing and
validating security association mechanisms, the next step after validating security association mechanisms, the next step after
discovering the address of a candidate neighbor can only be to try discovering the address of a candidate neighbor can only be to try
first to establish a security association with that neighbor using a first to establish a security association with that neighbor using a
well-known security association method. well-known security association method.
At this time in the lifecycle of ACP nodes, it is unclear whether it
is feasible to even decide on a single MTI (mandatory to implement)
security association protocol across all ACP nodes.
From the use-cases it seems clear that not all type of ACP nodes can From the use-cases it seems clear that not all type of ACP nodes can
or need to connect directly to each other or are able to support or or need to connect directly to each other or are able to support or
prefer all possible mechanisms. For example, code space limited IoT prefer all possible mechanisms. For example, code space limited IoT
devices may only support DTLS because that code exists already on devices may only support DTLS because that code exists already on
them for end-to-end security, but low-end in-ceiling L2 switches may them for end-to-end security, but low-end in-ceiling L2 switches may
only want to support Media Access Control Security (MacSec, see only want to support Media Access Control Security (MacSec, see
802.1AE ([MACSEC]) because that is also supported in their chips. 802.1AE ([MACSEC]) because that is also supported in their chips.
Only a flexible gateway device may need to support both of these Only a flexible gateway device may need to support both of these
mechanisms and potentially more. Note that MacSec is not required by mechanisms and potentially more. Note that MacSec is not required by
any profiles of the ACP in this specification but just mentioned as a any profiles of the ACP in this specification but just mentioned as a
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rules apply: rules apply:
o An ACP node may choose to attempt to initiate the different o An ACP node may choose to attempt to initiate the different
feasible ACP secure channel protocols it supports according to its feasible ACP secure channel protocols it supports according to its
local policies sequentially or in parallel, but it MUST support local policies sequentially or in parallel, but it MUST support
acting as a responder to all of them in parallel. acting as a responder to all of them in parallel.
o Once the first secure channel protocol succeeds, the two peers o Once the first secure channel protocol succeeds, the two peers
know each other's certificates because they must be used by all know each other's certificates because they must be used by all
secure channel protocols for mutual authentication. The node with secure channel protocols for mutual authentication. The node with
the lower Node-ID in the ACP address becomes Bob, the one with the the lower Node-ID in the ACP address of its ACP domain certificate
higher Node-ID in the certificate Alice. becomes Bob, the one with the higher Node-ID in the certificate
Alice. A peer with an empty ACP address field in its ACP domain
certificate becomes Bob (this specification does not define such
peers, only the interoperability with them).
o Bob becomes passive, he does not attempt to further initiate ACP o Bob becomes passive, he does not attempt to further initiate ACP
secure channel protocols with Alice and does not consider it to be secure channel protocols with Alice and does not consider it to be
an error when Alice closes secure channels. Alice becomes the an error when Alice closes secure channels. Alice becomes the
active party, continues to attempt setting up secure channel active party, continues to attempt setting up secure channel
protocols with Bob until she arrives at the best one from her view protocols with Bob until she arrives at the best one from her view
that also works with Bob. that also works with Bob.
For example, originally Bob could have been the initiator of one ACP For example, originally Bob could have been the initiator of one ACP
secure channel protocol that Bob prefers and the security association secure channel protocol that Bob prefers and the security association
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on connection C1. Connection setup C1 is completed. on connection C1. Connection setup C1 is completed.
[9] Node 1 (Bob)) refrains from attempting any further secure [9] Node 1 (Bob)) refrains from attempting any further secure
channel connections to Node 2 (Alice) as learned from [2] channel connections to Node 2 (Alice) as learned from [2]
because it knows from [8:C1] that it is Bob relative because it knows from [8:C1] that it is Bob relative
to Node 1. to Node 1.
[10:C2] Node1 and Node2 have authenticated each others [10:C2] Node1 and Node2 have authenticated each others
certificate on connection C2 (like [7:C1]). certificate on connection C2 (like [7:C1]).
[11:C2] Node 2 certificate has lower ACP Node-ID than Node2, [11:C2] Node 1 certificate has lower ACP Node-ID than Node2,
therefore Node 1 considers itself Bob and Node 2 Alice therefore Node 1 considers itself Bob and Node 2 Alice
on connection C1, but they also identify that C2 is to the on connection C1, but they also identify that C2 is to the
same mutual peer as their C1, so this has no further impact. same mutual peer as their C1, so this has no further impact.
[12:C2] Node 1 (Alice) closes C1. Because of [8:C1], Node 2 (Bob) [12:C2] Node 1 (Alice) closes C1. Because of [8:C1], Node 2 (Bob)
expected this. expected this.
[13] Node 1 (Alice) and Node 2 (Bob) start data transfer across [13] Node 1 (Alice) and Node 2 (Bob) start data transfer across
C2, which makes it become a secure channel for the ACP. C2, which makes it become a secure channel for the ACP.
Figure 7: Secure Channel sequence of steps Figure 7: Secure Channel sequence of steps
All this negotiation is in the context of an "L2 interface". Alice All this negotiation is in the context of an "L2 interface". Alice
and Bob will build ACP connections to each other on every "L2 and Bob will build ACP connections to each other on every "L2
interface" that they both connect to. An autonomic node must not interface" that they both connect to. An autonomic node MUST NOT
assume that neighbors with the same L2 or link-local IPv6 addresses assume that neighbors with the same L2 or link-local IPv6 addresses
on different L2 interfaces are the same node. This can only be on different L2 interfaces are the same node. This can only be
determined after examining the certificate after a successful determined after examining the certificate after a successful
security association attempt. security association attempt.
6.6. Candidate ACP Neighbor verification 6.6. Candidate ACP Neighbor verification
Independent of the security association protocol chosen, candidate Independent of the security association protocol chosen, candidate
ACP neighbors need to be authenticated based on their domain ACP neighbors need to be authenticated based on their domain
certificate. This implies that any secure channel protocol MUST certificate. This implies that any secure channel protocol MUST
support certificate based authentication that can support the ACP support certificate based authentication that can support the ACP
domain membership check as defined in Section 6.1.2. If it fails, domain membership check as defined in Section 6.1.3. If it fails,
the connection attempt is aborted and an error logged. Attempts to the connection attempt is aborted and an error logged. Attempts to
reconnect MUST be throttled. The RECOMMENDED default is exponential reconnect MUST be throttled. The RECOMMENDED default is exponential
base 2 backoff with a minimum delay of 10 seconds and a maximum delay base 2 backoff with a minimum delay of 10 seconds and a maximum delay
of 640 seconds. of 640 seconds.
6.7. Security Association protocols 6.7. Security Association protocols
The following sections define the security association protocols that Due to Channel Selection (Section 6.5), ACP can support an evolving
we consider to be important and feasible to specify in this document: set of security association protocols. These protocols only need to
be used to establish secure channels with L2 adjacent ACP neighbors
and only optionally (where needed) across non-ACP capable L3 network
(see Section 8.2). Therefore, there is architecturally no need for
any network wide mandatory to implement (MTI) security association
protocols. Instead, ACP nodes only need to implement those protocols
required to be supported by their neighbors. See Section 6.7.3 for
an example of this.
The authentication of peers in any security association protocol MUST
use the ACP domain certificate according to Section 6.1.3. Because
auto-discovery of candidate ACP neighbors via GRASP (see Section 6.3)
as specified in this document does not communicate the neighbors ACP
domain certificate, and ACP nodes may not (yet) have any other
network connectivity to retrieve certificates, any security
association protocol MUST use a mechanism to communicate the
certificate directly instead of relying on a referential mechanism
such as communicating only a hash and/or URL for the certificate.
The degree of security required on every hop of an ACP network needs
to be consistent across the network so that there is no designated
"weakest link" because it is that "weakest link" that would otherwise
become the designated point of attack. When the secure channel
protection on one link is compromised, it can be used to send/receive
packets across the whole ACP network. This principle does not imply
that the requirements against ACP security association protocols have
to be the same across all subnets in an ACP network:
o Underlying L2 mechanisms such as strong encrypted radio
technologies or [MACSEC] may offer equivalent encryption and the
ACP security association protocol may only be required to
authenticate ACP domain membership of a peer. Mechanisms to auto-
discover and associate ACP peers leveraging such underlying L2
security are possible and desirable to avoid duplication of
encryption, but none are specified in this document.
o Strong physical security of a link may stand in where
cryptographic security is infeasible. As there is no secure
mechanism to automatically discover strong physical security
solely between two peers, it can only be used with explicit
configuration and that configuration too could become an attack
vector. This document therefore only specifies with ACP connect
(Figure 15) one explicitly configured mechanism without any secure
channel association protocol - for the case where both the link
and the nodes attached to it have strong physical security.
The following sub-sections define the security association protocols
that are considered to be important and feasible to specify in this
document.
6.7.1. ACP via IKEv2 6.7.1. ACP via IKEv2
An ACP node announces its ability to support IKEv2 as the ACP secure An ACP node announces its ability to support IKEv2 as the ACP secure
channel protocol in GRASP as "IKEv2". channel protocol in GRASP as "IKEv2".
6.7.1.1. Native IPsec 6.7.1.1. Native IPsec
To run ACP via IPsec natively, no further IANA assignments/ To run ACP via IPsec natively, no further IANA assignments/
definitions are required. An ACP node that is supporting native definitions are required.
IPsec MUST use IPsec security setup via IKEv2, tunnel mode, local and
peer link-local IPv6 addresses used for encapsulation. It MUST then
support ESP with AES-256-GCM ([RFC4106]) for encryption and SHA256
hash and MUST NOT permit weaker crypto options. Key establishment
MUST support ECDHE with P-256.
In terms of IKEv2, this means the initiator will offer to support An ACP node that is supporting native IPsec MUST use IPsec security
IPsec tunnel mode with next protocol equal to 41 (IPv6). setup via IKEv2 for tunnel mode and IPsec/IKE signaling accordingly
for IPv6 payload (e.g.: ESP next header of 41). It MUST use local
and peer link-local IPv6 addresses for encapsulation.
Authentication MUST use the ACP domain certificates. Certificate
Encoding MUST support "PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate" (0) (see
[IKEV2IANA] for this and other IANA IKEv2 parameter names used in
this text). If certificate chains are used, all intermediate
certificates up to, but not including the locally provisioned trust
anchor certificate must be signaled.
IPsec tunnel mode is required because the ACP will route/forward IPsec tunnel mode is required because the ACP will route/forward
packets received from any other ACP node across the ACP secure packets received from any other ACP node across the ACP secure
channels, and not only its own generated ACP packets. With IPsec channels, and not only its own generated ACP packets. With IPsec
transport mode, it would only be possible to send packets originated transport mode, it would only be possible to send packets originated
by the ACP node itself. by the ACP node itself.
ESP is used because ACP mandates the use of encryption for ACP secure IPsec MUST use ESP with ENCR_AES_GCM_16 ([RFC4106]) due to its higher
channels. performance over ENCR_AES_CBC. ACP MUST NOT use any NULL encryption
option due to the confidentiality of ACP payload that may not be
encrypted by itself (when carrying legacy management protocol
traffics as well as hop-by-hop GRASP).
These IPsec requirements are based on [RFC8221] but limited to the
minimum necessary options because ACP is not a general purpose use
case today with a wide range of interoperability requirements against
legacy devices originally developed against older profile
recommendations. Once there are updates to [RFC8221], these should
accordingly be reflected in updates to these ACP requirements (for
example if ENCR_AES_GCM_16 was to be superceeded in the future).
Additional requirements from [RFC8221] MAY be used for ACP channels
as long as they do not result in a reduction of security over the
above MTI requirements. For example, ESP compression MAY be used.
IKEv2 MUST follow [RFC8247] as necessary to support the above listed
IPsec requirements.
6.7.1.2. IPsec with GRE encapsulation 6.7.1.2. IPsec with GRE encapsulation
In network devices it is often more common to implement high In network devices it is often more common to implement high
performance virtual interfaces on top of GRE encapsulation than on performance virtual interfaces on top of GRE encapsulation than on
top of a "native" IPsec association (without any other encapsulation top of a "native" IPsec association (without any other encapsulation
than those defined by IPsec). On those devices it may be beneficial than those defined by IPsec). On those devices it may be beneficial
to run the ACP secure channel on top of GRE protected by the IPsec to run the ACP secure channel on top of GRE protected by the IPsec
association. association.
To run ACP via GRE/IPsec, no further IANA assignments/definitions are To run ACP via GRE/IPsec, no further IANA assignments/definitions are
required. An ACP node that is supporting ACP via GRE/IPsec MUST then required.
support IPsec security setup via IKEv2, IPsec transport mode, local
and peer link-local IPv6 addresses used for encapsulation, ESP with
AES256 encryption and SHA256 hash.
When GRE is used, transport mode is sufficient because the routed ACP
packets are not "tunneled" by IPsec but rather by GRE: IPsec only has
to deal with the GRE/IP packet which always uses the local and peer
link-local IPv6 addresses and is therefore applicable to transport
mode.
ESP is used because ACP mandates the use of encryption for ACP secure
channels.
In terms of IKEv2 negotiation, this means the initiator must offer to The requirements for ESP/IPsec/IKEv2 are the same as for native IPsec
support IPsec transport mode with next protocol equal to GRE (47) (see Section 6.7.1.1) except that IPsec transport mode and next
followed by the offer for native IPsec as described above (because protocol GRE (47) are to be negotiated. Tunnel mode is not required
that option is mandatory to support). because of GRE.
If IKEv2 initiator and responder support GRE, it will be selected. If IKEv2 initiator and responder support IPsec over GRE, it has to be
The version of GRE to be used must be determined according to preferred over native IPsec. The ACP IPv6 traffic has to be carried
[RFC7676]. across GRE according to [RFC7676].
6.7.2. ACP via DTLS 6.7.2. ACP via DTLS
We define the use of ACP via DTLS in the assumption that it is likely We define the use of ACP via DTLS in the assumption that it is likely
the first transport encryption code basis supported in some classes the first transport encryption supported in some classes of
of constrained devices. constrained devices.
To run ACP via UDP and DTLS v1.2 [RFC6347] a locally assigned UDP To run ACP via UDP and DTLS v1.2 [RFC6347] a locally assigned UDP
port is used that is announced as a parameter in the GRASP AN_ACP port is used that is announced as a parameter in the GRASP AN_ACP
objective to candidate neighbors. objective to candidate neighbors.
All ACP nodes supporting DTLS as a secure channel protocol MUST All ACP nodes supporting DTLS as a secure channel protocol MUST
adhere to the DTLS implementation recommendations and security adhere to the DTLS implementation recommendations and security
considerations of [RFC7525] except with respect to the DTLS version. considerations of BCP 195 [RFC7525] except with respect to the DTLS
ACP nodes supporting DTLS MUST implement only DTLS 1.2 or later. For version. ACP nodes supporting DTLS MUST implement only DTLS 1.2 or
example, implementing DTLS-1.3 ([I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]) is also an later. For example, implementing DTLS-1.3 ([I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]) is
option. also an option.
There is no additional session setup or other security association There is no additional session setup or other security association
besides this simple DTLS setup. As soon as the DTLS session is besides this simple DTLS setup. As soon as the DTLS session is
functional, the ACP peers will exchange ACP IPv6 packets as the functional, the ACP peers will exchange ACP IPv6 packets as the
payload of the DTLS transport connection. Any DTLS defined security payload of the DTLS transport connection. Any DTLS defined security
association mechanisms such as re-keying are used as they would be association mechanisms such as re-keying are used as they would be
for any transport application relying solely on DTLS. for any transport application relying solely on DTLS.
6.7.3. ACP Secure Channel Requirements 6.7.3. ACP Secure Channel Requirements
As explained in the beginning of Section 6.5, there is no single As explained in the beginning of Section 6.5, there is no single
secure channel mechanism mandated for all ACP nodes. Instead, this secure channel mechanism mandated for all ACP nodes. Instead, this
section defines two ACP profiles (baseline and constrained) for ACP section defines two ACP profiles (baseline and constrained) for ACP
nodes that do introduce such requirements. nodes that do introduce such requirements.
A baseline ACP node MUST support IPsec natively and MAY support IPsec A baseline ACP node MUST support IPsec natively and MAY support IPsec
via GRE. A constrained ACP node that cannot support IPsec MUST via GRE. A constrained ACP node that cannot support IPsec MUST
support DTLS. An ACP node connecting an area of constrained ACP support DTLS. An ACP node connecting an area of constrained ACP
nodes with an area of baseline ACP nodes MUST therefore support IPsec nodes with an area of baseline ACP nodes must therefore support IPsec
and DTLS and supports therefore the baseline and constrained profile. and DTLS and supports therefore the baseline and constrained profile.
Explanation: Not all type of ACP nodes can or need to connect Explanation: Not all type of ACP nodes can or need to connect
directly to each other or are able to support or prefer all possible directly to each other or are able to support or prefer all possible
secure channel mechanisms. For example, code space limited IoT secure channel mechanisms. For example, code space limited IoT
devices may only support DTLS because that code exists already on devices may only support DTLS because that code exists already on
them for end-to-end security, but high-end core routers may not want them for end-to-end security, but high-end core routers may not want
to support DTLS because they can perform IPsec in accelerated to support DTLS because they can perform IPsec in accelerated
hardware but would need to support DTLS in an underpowered CPU hardware but would need to support DTLS in an underpowered CPU
forwarding path shared with critical control plane operations. This forwarding path shared with critical control plane operations. This
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link-local link-local - encapsulation addresses link-local link-local - encapsulation addresses
subnet1 subnet2 - Data-Plane interfaces subnet1 subnet2 - Data-Plane interfaces
| | | |
ACP-Nbr1 ACP-Nbr2 ACP-Nbr1 ACP-Nbr2
Figure 8: ACP as security and transport substrate for GRASP Figure 8: ACP as security and transport substrate for GRASP
GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP always use the ACP address. GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP always use the ACP address.
Link-local addresses from the ACP VRF must not be used inside Link-local addresses from the ACP VRF must not be used inside
objectives. GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP are transported objectives. GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP are transported
via TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246]) connections with AES256 encryption and via TLS according to [RFC7525] execept that only TLS version 1.2
SHA256. Mutual authentication uses the ACP domain membership check ([RFC5246]) or higher MUST be used - because there is no need for
defined in (Section 6.1.2). backward compatibility in the new use-case of ACP. Mutual
authentication MUST use the ACP domain membership check defined in
(Section 6.1.3).
GRASP link-local multicast messages are targeted for a specific ACP GRASP link-local multicast messages are targeted for a specific ACP
virtual interface (as defined Section 6.12.5) but are sent by the ACP virtual interface (as defined Section 6.12.5) but are sent by the ACP
into an ACP GRASP virtual interface that is constructed from the TCP into an ACP GRASP virtual interface that is constructed from the TCP
connection(s) to the IPv6 link-local neighbor address(es) on the connection(s) to the IPv6 link-local neighbor address(es) on the
underlying ACP virtual interface. If the ACP GRASP virtual interface underlying ACP virtual interface. If the ACP GRASP virtual interface
has two or more neighbors, the GRASP link-local multicast messages has two or more neighbors, the GRASP link-local multicast messages
are replicated to all neighbor TCP connections. are replicated to all neighbor TCP connections.
TCP and TLS connections for GRASP in the ACP use the IANA assigned TCP and TLS connections for GRASP in the ACP use the IANA assigned
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result in more traffic and processing overhead in the ACP than the result in more traffic and processing overhead in the ACP than the
hop-by-hop reliable retransmission mechanism by TCP and duplicate hop-by-hop reliable retransmission mechanism by TCP and duplicate
elimination by GRASP. elimination by GRASP.
TLS is mandated for GRASP non-link-local unicast because the ACP TLS is mandated for GRASP non-link-local unicast because the ACP
secure channel mandatory authentication and encryption protects only secure channel mandatory authentication and encryption protects only
against attacks from the outside but not against attacks from the against attacks from the outside but not against attacks from the
inside: Compromised ACP members that have (not yet) been detected and inside: Compromised ACP members that have (not yet) been detected and
removed (e.g., via domain certificate revocation / expiry). removed (e.g., via domain certificate revocation / expiry).
If GRASP peer connections would just use TCP, compromised ACP members If GRASP peer connections were to use just TCP, compromised ACP
could simply eavesdrop passively on GRASP peer connections for whom members could simply eavesdrop passively on GRASP peer connections
they are on-path ("Man In The Middle" - MITM). Or intercept and for whom they are on-path ("Man In The Middle" - MITM) or intercept
modify them. With TLS, it is not possible to completely eliminate and modify them. With TLS, it is not possible to completely
problems with compromised ACP members, but attacks are a lot more eliminate problems with compromised ACP members, but attacks are a
complex: lot more complex:
Eavesdropping/spoofing by a compromised ACP node is still possible Eavesdropping/spoofing by a compromised ACP node is still possible
because in the model of the ACP and GRASP, the provider and consumer because in the model of the ACP and GRASP, the provider and consumer
of an objective have initially no unique information (such as an of an objective have initially no unique information (such as an
identity) about the other side which would allow them to distinguish identity) about the other side which would allow them to distinguish
a benevolent from a compromised peer. The compromised ACP node would a benevolent from a compromised peer. The compromised ACP node would
simply announce the objective as well, potentially filter the simply announce the objective as well, potentially filter the
original objective in GRASP when it is a MITM and act as an original objective in GRASP when it is a MITM and act as an
application level proxy. This of course requires that the application level proxy. This of course requires that the
compromised ACP node understand the semantics of the GRASP compromised ACP node understand the semantics of the GRASP
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the ACP context (as explained in in Section 6.9). This address may the ACP context (as explained in in Section 6.9). This address may
be used also in other virtual contexts. be used also in other virtual contexts.
With the algorithm introduced here, all ACP nodes in the same routing With the algorithm introduced here, all ACP nodes in the same routing
subdomain have the same /48 ULA prefix. Conversely, ULA global IDs subdomain have the same /48 ULA prefix. Conversely, ULA global IDs
from different domains are unlikely to clash, such that two ACP from different domains are unlikely to clash, such that two ACP
networks can be merged, as long as the policy allows that merge. See networks can be merged, as long as the policy allows that merge. See
also Section 9.1 for a discussion on merging domains. also Section 9.1 for a discussion on merging domains.
Links inside the ACP only use link-local IPv6 addressing, such that Links inside the ACP only use link-local IPv6 addressing, such that
each nodes ACP only requires one routable virtual address. each node's ACP only requires one routable virtual address.
6.10.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing 6.10.1. Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing
o Usage: Autonomic addresses are exclusively used for self- o Usage: Autonomic addresses are exclusively used for self-
management functions inside a trusted domain. They are not used management functions inside a trusted domain. They are not used
for user traffic. Communications with entities outside the for user traffic. Communications with entities outside the
trusted domain use another address space, for example normally trusted domain use another address space, for example normally
managed routable address space (called "Data-Plane" in this managed routable address space (called "Data-Plane" in this
document). document).
skipping to change at page 49, line 9 skipping to change at page 53, line 14
The first 48-bits follow the ULA scheme, as defined in [RFC4193], to The first 48-bits follow the ULA scheme, as defined in [RFC4193], to
which a type field is added: which a type field is added:
o "fd" identifies a locally defined ULA address. o "fd" identifies a locally defined ULA address.
o The 40-bits ULA "global ID" (term from [RFC4193]) for ACP o The 40-bits ULA "global ID" (term from [RFC4193]) for ACP
addresses carried in the domain information field of domain addresses carried in the domain information field of domain
certificates are the first 40-bits of the SHA256 hash of the certificates are the first 40-bits of the SHA256 hash of the
routing subdomain from the same domain information field. In the routing subdomain from the same domain information field. In the
example of Section 6.1.1, the routing subdomain is example of Section 6.1.2, the routing subdomain is
"area51.research.acp.example.com" and the 40-bits ULA "global ID" "area51.research.acp.example.com" and the 40-bits ULA "global ID"
89b714f3db. 89b714f3db.
o When creating a new routing-subdomain for an existing autonomic o When creating a new routing-subdomain for an existing autonomic
network, it MUST be ensured, that rsub is selected so the network, it MUST be ensured, that rsub is selected so the
resulting hash of the routing-subdomain does not collide with the resulting hash of the routing-subdomain does not collide with the
hash of any pre-existing routing-subdomains of the autonomic hash of any pre-existing routing-subdomains of the autonomic
network. This ensures that ACP addresses created by registrars network. This ensures that ACP addresses created by registrars
for different routing subdomains do not collide with each others. for different routing subdomains do not collide with each others.
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node during normal operations. The hash function is only executed node during normal operations. The hash function is only executed
during the creation of the certificate. If BRSKI is used then the during the creation of the certificate. If BRSKI is used then the
BRSKI registrar will create the domain information field in BRSKI registrar will create the domain information field in
response to the EST Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attribute response to the EST Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attribute
Request message by the pledge. Request message by the pledge.
o Establishing connectivity between different ACP (different acp- o Establishing connectivity between different ACP (different acp-
domain-name) is outside the scope of this specification. If it is domain-name) is outside the scope of this specification. If it is
being done through future extensions, then the rsub of all being done through future extensions, then the rsub of all
routing-subdomains across those autonomic networks need to be routing-subdomains across those autonomic networks need to be
selected so their hashes do not collide. For example a large selected so the resulting routing-subdomain hashes do not collide.
cooperation with its own private Trust Anchor may want to create For example a large cooperation with its own private Trust Anchor
different autonomic networks that initially should not be able to may want to create different autonomic networks that initially
connect but where the option to do so should be kept open. When should not be able to connect but where the option to do so should
taking this future possibility into account, it is easy to always be kept open. When taking this future possibility into account,
select rsub so that no collisions happen. it is easy to always select rsub so that no collisions happen.
o Type: This field allows different address sub-schemes. This o Type: This field allows different address sub-schemes. This
addresses the "upgradability" requirement. Assignment of types addresses the "upgradability" requirement. Assignment of types
for this field will be maintained by IANA. for this field will be maintained by IANA.
The sub-scheme may imply a range or set of addresses assigned to the The sub-scheme may imply a range or set of addresses assigned to the
node, this is called the ACP address range/set and explained in each node, this is called the ACP address range/set and explained in each
sub-scheme. sub-scheme.
Please refer to Section 6.10.7 and Appendix A.1 for further Please refer to Section 6.10.7 and Appendix A.1 for further
explanations why the following Sub-Addressing schemes are used and explanations why the following Sub-Addressing schemes are used and
why multiple are necessary. why multiple are necessary.
The following summarizes the addressing schemes:
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
| type | Z | name | F-bit | V-bit size |
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
| 0x00 | 0 | ACP Zone | N/A | 1 bit |
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
| 0x00 | 1 | ACP Manual | N/A | 1 bit |
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
| 0x01 | N/A | VLong-ASA | 0 | 8-bits |
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
| 0x01 | N/A | VLong-ACP-edge | 1 | 16-bits |
+------+-----+----------------+-------+------------+
Figure 10: Addressing schemes
6.10.3. ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme 6.10.3. ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme
The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 00b (zero) The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 00b (zero)
in the base scheme and 0 in the Z bit. in the base scheme and 0 in the Z bit.
64 64 64 64
+-----------------+---+---------++-----------------------------+---+ +-----------------+---+---------++-----------------------------+---+
| (base scheme) | Z | Zone-ID || Node-ID | | (base scheme) | Z | Zone-ID || Node-ID |
| | | || Registrar-ID | Node-Number| V | | | | || Registrar-ID | Node-Number| V |
+-----------------+---+---------++--------------+--------------+---+ +-----------------+---+---------++--------------+--------------+---+
50 1 13 48 15 1 50 1 13 48 15 1
Figure 10: ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme Figure 11: ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme
The fields are defined as follows: The fields are defined as follows:
o Zone-ID: If set to all zero bits: The Node-ID bits are used as an o Zone-ID: If set to all zero bits: The Node-ID bits are used as an
identifier (as opposed to a locator). This results in a non- identifier (as opposed to a locator). This results in a non-
hierarchical, flat addressing scheme. Any other value indicates a hierarchical, flat addressing scheme. Any other value indicates a
zone. See Section 6.10.3.1 on how this field is used in detail. zone. See Section 6.10.3.1 on how this field is used in detail.
o Z: MUST be 0. o Z: MUST be 0.
skipping to change at page 52, line 32 skipping to change at page 57, line 11
The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 00b (zero) The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 00b (zero)
in the base scheme and 1 in the Z bit. in the base scheme and 1 in the Z bit.
64 64 64 64
+---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+ +---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+
| (base scheme) | Z | Subnet-ID|| Interface Identifier | | (base scheme) | Z | Subnet-ID|| Interface Identifier |
+---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+ +---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+
50 1 13 50 1 13
Figure 11: ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme Figure 12: ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme
The fields are defined as follows: The fields are defined as follows:
o Subnet-ID: Configured subnet identifier. o Subnet-ID: Configured subnet identifier.
o Z: MUST be 1. o Z: MUST be 1.
o Interface Identifier. o Interface Identifier.
This sub-scheme is meant for "manual" allocation to subnets where the This sub-scheme is meant for "manual" allocation to subnets where the
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for details. for details.
6.10.5. ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme 6.10.5. ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme
The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 01b (one) in The sub-scheme defined here is defined by the Type value 01b (one) in
the base scheme. the base scheme.
50 78 50 78
+---------------------++-----------------------------+----------+ +---------------------++-----------------------------+----------+
| (base scheme) || Node-ID | | (base scheme) || Node-ID |
| || Registrar-ID | Node-Number| V | | || Registrar-ID |F| Node-Number| V |
+---------------------++--------------+--------------+----------+ +---------------------++--------------+--------------+----------+
50 46 24/16 8/16 50 46 1 23/15 8/16
Figure 12: ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme Figure 13: ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme
This addressing scheme foregoes the Zone-ID field to allow for This addressing scheme foregoes the Zone-ID field to allow for
larger, flatter routed networks (e.g., as in IoT) with 8421376 Node- larger, flatter routed networks (e.g., as in IoT) with 8421376 Node-
Numbers (2^23+2^15). It also allows for up to 2^16 (i.e. 65536) Numbers (2^23+2^15). It also allows for up to 2^16 (i.e. 65536)
different virtualized addresses within a node, which could be used to different virtualized addresses within a node, which could be used to
address individual software components in an ACP node. address individual software components in an ACP node.
The fields are the same as in the Zone-ID sub-scheme with the The fields are the same as in the Zone-ID sub-scheme with the
following refinements: following refinements:
o V: Virtualization field: 8 or 16 bit. Values 0 and 1 are assigned o F: format bit. This bit determines the format of the subsequent
in the same way as in the Zone-ID sub-scheme, the other values are bits.
for further use by the node.
o V: Virtualization bit: this is a field that is either 8 or 16
bits. For F=0, it is 8 bits, for F=1 it is 16 bits. The V bits
are assigned by the ACP node. In the ACP certificate's ACP
address Section 6.1.2, the V-bits are always set to 0.
o Registrar-ID: To maximize Node-Number and V, the Registrar-ID is o Registrar-ID: To maximize Node-Number and V, the Registrar-ID is
reduced to 46-bits. This still permits the use of the MAC address reduced to 46-bits. This still permits the use of the MAC address
of an ACP registrar by removing the V and U bits from the 48-bits of an ACP registrar by removing the V and U bits from the 48-bits
of a MAC address (those two bits are never unique, so they cannot of a MAC address (those two bits are never unique, so they cannot
be used to distinguish MAC addresses). be used to distinguish MAC addresses).
o If the first bit of the "Node-Number" is "1", then the Node-Number o The Node-Number is unique to each ACP node. There are two formats
is 16-bit long and the V field is 16-bit long. Otherwise the for the Node-Number. When F=0, the node-number is 23 bits, for
Node-Number is 24-bit long and the V field is 8-bit long. F=1 it is 15 bits. Each format of node-number is considered to be
in a unique number space.
"0" bit Node-Numbers are intended to be used for "general purpose" The F=0 bit format addresses are intended to be used for "general
ACP nodes that would potentially have a limited number (< 256) of purpose" ACP nodes that would potentially have a limited number (<
clients (ASA/Autonomic Functions or legacy services) of the ACP that 256) of clients (ASA/Autonomic Functions or legacy services) of the
require separate V(irtual) addresses. "1" bit Node-Numbers are ACP that require separate V(irtual) addresses.
intended for ACP nodes that are ACP edge nodes (see Section 8.1.1) or
that have a large number of clients requiring separate V(irtual) The F=1 bit Node-Numbers are intended for ACP nodes that are ACP edge
addresses. For example large SDN controllers with container modular nodes (see Section 8.1.1) or that have a large number of clients
software architecture (see Section 8.1.2). requiring separate V(irtual) addresses. For example large SDN
controllers with container modular software architecture (see
Section 8.1.2).
In the Vlong addressing sub-scheme, the ACP address in the In the Vlong addressing sub-scheme, the ACP address in the
certificate has all V field bits as zero. The ACP address set for certificate has all V field bits as zero. The ACP address set for
the node includes any V value. the node includes any V value.
6.10.6. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes 6.10.6. Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes
Before further addressing sub-schemes are defined, experience with Before further addressing sub-schemes are defined, experience with
the schemes defined here should be collected. The schemes defined in the schemes defined here should be collected. The schemes defined in
this document have been devised to allow hopefully sufficiently this document have been devised to allow hopefully sufficiently
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required to be BRSKI for ANI registrars). Only nodes that are required to be BRSKI for ANI registrars). Only nodes that are
trusted to be compliant with the requirements against registrar trusted to be compliant with the requirements against registrar
described in this section must be given the necessary credentials to described in this section must be given the necessary credentials to
perform this RA function, such as credentials for the BRSKI perform this RA function, such as credentials for the BRSKI
connection to the CA for ANI registrars. connection to the CA for ANI registrars.
6.10.7.1. Use of BRSKI or other Mechanism/Protocols 6.10.7.1. Use of BRSKI or other Mechanism/Protocols
Any protocols or mechanisms may be used as ACP registrars, as long as Any protocols or mechanisms may be used as ACP registrars, as long as
the resulting ACP certificate and trust anchors allow to perform the the resulting ACP certificate and trust anchors allow to perform the
ACP domain membership described in Section 6.1.2 with other ACP ACP domain membership described in Section 6.1.3 with other ACP
domain members, and meet the ACP addressing requirements for its ACP domain members, and meet the ACP addressing requirements for its ACP
domain information field as described further below in this section. domain information field as described further below in this section.
An ACP registrar could be a person deciding whether to enroll a An ACP registrar could be a person deciding whether to enroll a
candidate ACP node and then orchestrating the enrollment of the ACP candidate ACP node and then orchestrating the enrollment of the ACP
certificate and associated trust anchor, using command line or web certificate and associated trust anchor, using command line or web
based commands on the candidate ACP node and trust anchor to generate based commands on the candidate ACP node and trust anchor to generate
and sign the ACP domain certificate and configure certificate and and sign the ACP domain certificate and configure certificate and
trust anchors onto the node. trust anchors onto the node.
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unique 46 bit identifiers, so ACP registrars with known unique EUI-48 unique 46 bit identifiers, so ACP registrars with known unique EUI-48
MAC addresses can use these as Registrar-IDs. Registrar-IDs do not MAC addresses can use these as Registrar-IDs. Registrar-IDs do not
need to be globally unique but only unique across the set of ACP need to be globally unique but only unique across the set of ACP
registrars for an ACP domain, so other means to assign unique registrars for an ACP domain, so other means to assign unique
Registrar-IDs to ACP registrars can be used, such as configuration on Registrar-IDs to ACP registrars can be used, such as configuration on
the ACP registrars. the ACP registrars.
When the candidate ACP device (called Pledge in BRSKI) is to be When the candidate ACP device (called Pledge in BRSKI) is to be
enrolled into an ACP domain, the ACP registrar needs to allocate a enrolled into an ACP domain, the ACP registrar needs to allocate a
unique ACP address to the node and ensure that the ACP certificate unique ACP address to the node and ensure that the ACP certificate
gets a domain information field (Section 6.1.1) with the appropriate gets a domain information field (Section 6.1.2) with the appropriate
information - ACP domain-name, ACP-address, and so on. If the ACP information - ACP domain-name, ACP-address, and so on. If the ACP
registrar uses BRSKI, it signals the ACP domain information field to registrar uses BRSKI, it signals the ACP domain information field to
the Pledge via the EST /csraddrs command (see the Pledge via the EST /csrattrs command (see
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], section 5.8.2 - "EST CSR [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], section 5.9.2 - "EST CSR
Attributes"). Attributes").
[RFC Editor: please update reference to section 5.8.2 accordingly [RFC Editor: please update reference to section 5.9.2 accordingly
with latest BRSKI draft at time of publishing, or RFC] with latest BRSKI draft at time of publishing, or RFC]
6.10.7.3. Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies 6.10.7.3. Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies
The ACP registrar selects for the candidate ACP node a unique address The ACP registrar selects for the candidate ACP node a unique address
prefix from an appropriate ACP addressing sub-scheme, either a zone prefix from an appropriate ACP addressing sub-scheme, either a zone
addressing sub-scheme prefix (see Section 6.10.3), or a Vlong addressing sub-scheme prefix (see Section 6.10.3), or a Vlong
addressing sub-scheme prefix (see Section 6.10.5). The assigned ACP addressing sub-scheme prefix (see Section 6.10.5). The assigned ACP
address prefix encoded in the domain information field of the ACP address prefix encoded in the domain information field of the ACP
domain certificate indicates to the ACP node its ACP address domain certificate indicates to the ACP node its ACP address
information. The sub-addressing scheme indicates the prefix length: information. The sub-addressing scheme indicates the prefix length:
/127 for zone address sub-scheme, /120 or /112 for Vlong address sub- /127 for zone address sub-scheme, /120 or /112 for Vlong address sub-
scheme. The first address of the prefix is the ACP address, all scheme. The first address of the prefix is the ACP address. All
other addresses in the prefix are for other uses by the ACP node as other addresses in the prefix are for other uses by the ACP node as
described in the zone and Vlong addressing sub scheme sections. The described in the zone and Vlong addressing sub scheme sections. The
ACP address prefix itself is then signaled by the ACP node into the ACP address prefix itself is then signaled by the ACP node into the
ACP routing protocol (see Section 6.11) to establish IPv6 ACP routing protocol (see Section 6.11) to establish IPv6
reachability across the ACP. reachability across the ACP.
The choice of addressing sub-scheme and prefix-length in the Vlong The choice of addressing sub-scheme and prefix-length in the Vlong
address sub-scheme is subject to ACP registrar policy. It could be address sub-scheme is subject to ACP registrar policy. It could be
an ACP domain wide policy, or a per ACP node or per ACP node type an ACP domain wide policy, or a per ACP node or per ACP node type
policy. For example, in BRSKI, the ACP registrar is aware of the policy. For example, in BRSKI, the ACP registrar is aware of the
IDevID of the candidate ACP node, which contains a serialNnumber that IDevID of the candidate ACP node, which contains a "serialNnumber"
is typically indicating the nodes vendor and device type and can be that is typically indicating the node's vendor and device type and
used to drive a policy selecting an appropriate addressing sub-scheme can be used to drive a policy selecting an appropriate addressing
for the (class of) node(s). sub-scheme for the (class of) node(s).
ACP registrars SHOULD default to allocate ACP zone sub-address scheme ACP registrars SHOULD default to allocate ACP zone sub-address scheme
addresses with Subnet-ID 0. Allocation and use of zone sub-addresses addresses with Zone-ID 0. Allocation and use of zone sub-addresses
with Subnet-ID != 0 is outside the scope of this specification with Zone-ID != 0 is outside the scope of this specification because
because it would need to go along with rules for extending ACP it would need to go along with rules for extending ACP routing to
routing to multiple zones, which is outside the scope of this multiple zones, which is outside the scope of this specification.
specification.
ACP registrars that can use the IDevID of a candidate ACP device ACP registrars that can use the IDevID of a candidate ACP device
SHOULD be able to choose the zone vs. Vlong sub-address scheme for SHOULD be able to choose the zone vs. Vlong sub-address scheme for
ACP nodes based on the serialNumber of the IDevID, for example by the ACP nodes based on the "serialNumber" of the IDevID, for example by
PID (Product Identifier) part which identifies the product type, or the PID (Product Identifier) part which identifies the product type,
the complete serialNumber. or the complete "serialNumber".
In a simple allocation scheme, an ACP registrar remembers In a simple allocation scheme, an ACP registrar remembers
persistently across reboots its currently used Registrar-ID and for persistently across reboots its currently used Registrar-ID and for
each addressing scheme (zone with Subnet-ID 0, Vlong with /112, Vlong each addressing scheme (zone with Zone-ID 0, Vlong with /112, Vlong
with /120), the next Node-Number available for allocation and with /120), the next Node-Number available for allocation and
increases it during successful enrollment to an ACP node. In this increases it during successful enrollment to an ACP node. In this
simple allocation scheme, the ACP registrar would not recycle ACP simple allocation scheme, the ACP registrar would not recycle ACP
address prefixes from no longer used ACP nodes. address prefixes from no longer used ACP nodes.
6.10.7.4. Address/Prefix Persistence 6.10.7.4. Address/Prefix Persistence
When an ACP domain certificate is renewed or rekeyed via EST or other When an ACP domain certificate is renewed or rekeyed via EST or other
mechanisms, the ACP address/prefix in the ACP domain information mechanisms, the ACP address/prefix in the ACP domain information
field MUST be maintained unless security issues or violations of the field MUST be maintained unless security issues or violations of the
unique address assignment requirements exist or are suspected by the unique address assignment requirements exist or are suspected by the
ACP registrar. ACP registrar.
ACP address information SHOULD be maintained even when the renewing/ ACP address information SHOULD be maintained even when the renewing/
rekeying ACP registrar is not the same as the one that enrolled the rekeying ACP registrar is not the same as the one that enrolled the
prior ACP certificate. See Section 10.2.4 for an example. prior ACP certificate. See Section 10.2.4 for an example.
ACP address information SHOULD also be maintained even after an ACP ACP address information SHOULD also be maintained even after an ACP
certificate did expire or failed. See Section 6.1.4.5 and certificate did expire or failed. See Section 6.1.5.5 and
Section 6.1.4.6. Section 6.1.5.6.
6.10.7.5. Further Details 6.10.7.5. Further Details
Section 10.2 discusses further informative details of ACP registrars: Section 10.2 discusses further informative details of ACP registrars:
What interactions registrars need, what parameters they require, What interactions registrars need, what parameters they require,
certificate renewal and limitations, use of sub-CAs on registrars and certificate renewal and limitations, use of sub-CAs on registrars and
centralized policy control. centralized policy control.
6.11. Routing in the ACP 6.11. Routing in the ACP
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There are a variety of mechanisms possible in RPL to further avoid There are a variety of mechanisms possible in RPL to further avoid
temporary loops: DODAG Information Objects (DIOs) SHOULD be sent temporary loops: DODAG Information Objects (DIOs) SHOULD be sent
2...3 times to inform children when losing the last parent. The 2...3 times to inform children when losing the last parent. The
technique in [RFC6550] section 8.2.2.6. (Detaching) SHOULD be technique in [RFC6550] section 8.2.2.6. (Detaching) SHOULD be
favored over that in section 8.2.2.5., (Poisoning) because it allows favored over that in section 8.2.2.5., (Poisoning) because it allows
local connectivity. Nodes SHOULD select more than one parent, at local connectivity. Nodes SHOULD select more than one parent, at
least 3 if possible, and send Destination Advertisement Objects least 3 if possible, and send Destination Advertisement Objects
(DAO)s to all of them in parallel. (DAO)s to all of them in parallel.
Additionally, failed ACP tunnels can be quickly discovered the secure Additionally, failed ACP tunnels can be quickly discovered trough the
channel protocol mechanisms such as IKEv2 Dead Peer Detection. This secure channel protocol mechanisms such as IKEv2 Dead Peer Detection.
can function as a replacement for a Low-power and Lossy Networks' This can function as a replacement for a Low-power and Lossy
(LLN's) Expected Transmission Count (ETX) feature that is not used in Networks' (LLN's) Expected Transmission Count (ETX) feature that is
this profile. A failure of an ACP tunnel should imediately signal not used in this profile. A failure of an ACP tunnel should
the RPL control plane to pick a different parent. imediately signal the RPL control plane to pick a different parent.
6.11.1.2. RPL Instances 6.11.1.2. RPL Instances
Single RPL instance. Default RPLInstanceID = 0. Single RPL instance. Default RPLInstanceID = 0.
6.11.1.3. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode 6.11.1.3. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode
RPL Mode of Operations (MOP): MUST support mode 2 - "Storing Mode of RPL Mode of Operations (MOP): MUST support mode 2 - "Storing Mode of
Operations with no multicast support". Implementations MAY support Operations with no multicast support". Implementations MAY support
mode 3 ("... with multicast support" as that is a superset of mode mode 3 ("... with multicast support" as that is a superset of mode
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6.11.1.14. Unknown Destinations 6.11.1.14. Unknown Destinations
Because RPL minimizes the size of the routing and forwarding table, Because RPL minimizes the size of the routing and forwarding table,
prefixes reachable through the same interface as the RPL root are not prefixes reachable through the same interface as the RPL root are not
known on every ACP node. Therefore traffic to unknown destination known on every ACP node. Therefore traffic to unknown destination
addresses can only be discovered at the RPL root. The RPL root addresses can only be discovered at the RPL root. The RPL root
SHOULD have attach safe mechanisms to operationally discover and log SHOULD have attach safe mechanisms to operationally discover and log
such packets. such packets.
As this requirement raises additional data plane requirements, it
does not apply to nodes where the administrative parameter to become
root (Section 6.11.1.12) can always only be 0b001, e.g.: the node
does not support explicit configuration to be root, or to be ACP
registrar or to have ACP-connect functionality. If an ACP network is
degraded to the point where there are no nodes that could be
configured roots, ACP registrars or ACP-connect nodes, traffic to
unknown destinations could not be diagnosed, but in the absence of
any intelligent nodes supporting other than 0b001 administrative
preference, there is likely also no diagnostic function possible.
6.12. General ACP Considerations 6.12. General ACP Considerations
Since channels are by default established between adjacent neighbors, Since channels are by default established between adjacent neighbors,
the resulting overlay network does hop-by-hop encryption. Each node the resulting overlay network does hop-by-hop encryption. Each node
decrypts incoming traffic from the ACP, and encrypts outgoing traffic decrypts incoming traffic from the ACP, and encrypts outgoing traffic
to its neighbors in the ACP. Routing is discussed in Section 6.11. to its neighbors in the ACP. Routing is discussed in Section 6.11.
6.12.1. Performance 6.12.1. Performance
There are no performance requirements against ACP implementations There are no performance requirements against ACP implementations
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when using many radio technologies. When such NBMA subnets are used, when using many radio technologies. When such NBMA subnets are used,
they MUST NOT be represented as ACP multi-access virtual interfaces they MUST NOT be represented as ACP multi-access virtual interfaces
because the replication of IPv6 link-local multicast messages will because the replication of IPv6 link-local multicast messages will
not reach all NBMA subnet neighbors. In result, GRASP message not reach all NBMA subnet neighbors. In result, GRASP message
flooding would fail. Instead, each ACP secure channel across such an flooding would fail. Instead, each ACP secure channel across such an
interface MUST be represented as a ACP point-to-point virtual interface MUST be represented as a ACP point-to-point virtual
interface. See also Appendix A.10.4. interface. See also Appendix A.10.4.
Care must also be taken when creating multi-access ACP virtual Care must also be taken when creating multi-access ACP virtual
interfaces across ACP secure channels between ACP nodes in different interfaces across ACP secure channels between ACP nodes in different
domains or routing subdomains. The policies to be negotiated may be domains or routing subdomains. If for example future inter-domain
described as peer-to-peer policies in which case it is easier to ACP policies are defined as "peer-to-peer" policies, it is easier to
create ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces for these secure create ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces for these inter-domain
channels. secure channels.
7. ACP support on L2 switches/ports (Normative) 7. ACP support on L2 switches/ports (Normative)
7.1. Why (Benefits of ACP on L2 switches) 7.1. Why (Benefits of ACP on L2 switches)
ANrtr1 ------ ANswitch1 --- ANswitch2 ------- ANrtr2 ANrtr1 ------ ANswitch1 --- ANswitch2 ------- ANrtr2
.../ \ \ ... .../ \ \ ...
ANrtrM ------ \ ------- ANrtrN ANrtrM ------ \ ------- ANrtrN
ANswitchM ... ANswitchM ...
Figure 13: Topology with L2 ACP switches Figure 14: Topology with L2 ACP switches
Consider a large L2 LAN with ANrtr1...ANrtrN connected via some Consider a large L2 LAN with ANrtr1...ANrtrN connected via some
topology of L2 switches. Examples include large enterprise campus topology of L2 switches. Examples include large enterprise campus
networks with an L2 core, IoT networks or broadband aggregation networks with an L2 core, IoT networks or broadband aggregation
networks which often have even a multi-level L2 switched topology. networks which often have even a multi-level L2 switched topology.
If the discovery protocol used for the ACP is operating at the subnet If the discovery protocol used for the ACP is operating at the subnet
level, every ACP router will see all other ACP routers on the LAN as level, every ACP router will see all other ACP routers on the LAN as
neighbors and a full mesh of ACP channels will be built. If some or neighbors and a full mesh of ACP channels will be built. If some or
all of the AN switches are autonomic with the same discovery all of the AN switches are autonomic with the same discovery
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| | . | [ ] | . ^ | || | | . | [ ] | . ^ | ||
+--------+ . +----------------+ . . +-------------+| +--------+ . +----------------+ . . +-------------+|
. . . +-------------+ . . . +-------------+
. . . . . .
Data-Plane "native" . ACP "native" (unencrypted) Data-Plane "native" . ACP "native" (unencrypted)
+ ACP auto-negotiated . "ACP connect subnet" + ACP auto-negotiated . "ACP connect subnet"
and encrypted . and encrypted .
ACP connect interface ACP connect interface
e.g., "VRF ACP native" (config) e.g., "VRF ACP native" (config)
Figure 14: ACP connect Figure 15: ACP connect
ACP connect has security consequences: All systems and processes ACP connect has security consequences: All systems and processes
connected via ACP connect have access to all ACP nodes on the entire connected via ACP connect have access to all ACP nodes on the entire
ACP, without further authentication. Thus, the ACP connect interface ACP, without further authentication. Thus, the ACP connect interface
and (NOC) systems connected to it must be physically controlled/ and (NOC) systems connected to it must be physically controlled/
secured. For this reason the mechanisms described here do explicitly secured. For this reason the mechanisms described here do explicitly
not include options to allow for a non-ACP router to be connected not include options to allow for a non-ACP router to be connected
across an ACP connect interface and addresses behind such a router across an ACP connect interface and addresses behind such a router
routed inside the ACP. routed inside the ACP.
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can rely on [RFC6724] to determine longest match prefix routes can rely on [RFC6724] to determine longest match prefix routes
towards its different interfaces, ACP and data-plane. With RFC6724, towards its different interfaces, ACP and data-plane. With RFC6724,
The NMS host will select the ACP connect interface for all addresses The NMS host will select the ACP connect interface for all addresses
in the ACP because any ACP destination address is longest matched by in the ACP because any ACP destination address is longest matched by
the address on the ACP connect interface. If the NMS hosts ACP the address on the ACP connect interface. If the NMS hosts ACP
connect interface uses another prefix or if the ACP uses multiple ULA connect interface uses another prefix or if the ACP uses multiple ULA
prefixes, then the NMS hosts require (static) routes towards the ACP prefixes, then the NMS hosts require (static) routes towards the ACP
interface for these prefixes. interface for these prefixes.
When an ACP Edge node receives a packet from an ACP connect When an ACP Edge node receives a packet from an ACP connect
interface, it MUST only forward it intot he ACP if it has an IPv6 interface, the ACP Edge node MUST only forward the packet into the
source address from that interface. This is sometimes called "RPF ACP if the packet has an IPv6 source address from that interface.
filtering". This MAY be changed through administrative measures. This is sometimes called "RPF filtering". This MAY be changed
through administrative measures.
To limit the security impact of ACP connect, nodes supporting it To limit the security impact of ACP connect, nodes supporting it
SHOULD implement a security mechanism to allow configuration/use of SHOULD implement a security mechanism to allow configuration/use of
ACP connect interfaces only on nodes explicitly targeted to be ACP connect interfaces only on nodes explicitly targeted to be
deployed with it (those in physically secure locations such as a deployed with it (those in physically secure locations such as a
NOC). For example, the registrar could disable the ability to enable NOC). For example, the registrar could disable the ability to enable
ACP connect on devices during enrollment and that property could only ACP connect on devices during enrollment and that property could only
be changed through re-enrollment. See also Appendix A.10.5. be changed through re-enrollment. See also Appendix A.10.5.
8.1.2. Software Components 8.1.2. Software Components
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| | | [ACP ]. | . | |+ | | | [ACP ]. | . | |+
| | | .[VRF ] .[VRF ] | v | "ACP address"|| | | | .[VRF ] .[VRF ] | v | "ACP address"||
| +-------+. .[Select].+--------+ "Date Plane || | +-------+. .[Select].+--------+ "Date Plane ||
| | ^ | .[Data ]. | | Address(es)"|| | | ^ | .[Data ]. | | Address(es)"||
| | . | [Plane] | | || | | . | [Plane] | | ||
| | . | [ ] | +--------------+| | | . | [ ] | +--------------+|
+--------+ . +--------------------+ +--------------+ +--------+ . +--------------------+ +--------------+
. .
Data-Plane "native" and + ACP auto-negotiated/encrypted Data-Plane "native" and + ACP auto-negotiated/encrypted
Figure 15: VRF select Figure 16: VRF select
Using two physical and/or virtual subnets (and therefore interfaces) Using two physical and/or virtual subnets (and therefore interfaces)
into NMS Hosts (as per Section 8.1.1) or Software (as per into NMS Hosts (as per Section 8.1.1) or Software (as per
Section 8.1.2) may be seen as additional complexity, for example with Section 8.1.2) may be seen as additional complexity, for example with
legacy NMS Hosts that support only one IP interface. legacy NMS Hosts that support only one IP interface.
To provide a single subnet into both ACP and Data-Plane, the ACP Edge To provide a single subnet into both ACP and Data-Plane, the ACP Edge
node needs to de-multiplex packets from NMS hosts into ACP VRF and node needs to de-multiplex packets from NMS hosts into ACP VRF and
Data-Plane. This is sometimes called "VRF select". If the ACP VRF Data-Plane. This is sometimes called "VRF select". If the ACP VRF
has no overlapping IPv6 addresses with the Data-Plane (it should have has no overlapping IPv6 addresses with the Data-Plane (it should have
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implement [RFC6724] Rule 5.5, so it is preferred for hosts to support implement [RFC6724] Rule 5.5, so it is preferred for hosts to support
[RFC8028]. [RFC8028].
ACP edge nodes MAY support the Combined ACP and Data-Plane interface. ACP edge nodes MAY support the Combined ACP and Data-Plane interface.
8.1.5. Use of GRASP 8.1.5. Use of GRASP
GRASP can and should be possible to use across ACP connect GRASP can and should be possible to use across ACP connect
interfaces, especially in the architectural correct solution when it interfaces, especially in the architectural correct solution when it
is used as a mechanism to connect Software (e.g., ASA or legacy NMS is used as a mechanism to connect Software (e.g., ASA or legacy NMS
applications) to the ACP. Given how the ACP is the security and applications) to the ACP.
transport substrate for GRASP, the trustworthiness of nodes/software
allowed to participate in the ACP GRASP domain is one of the main
reasons why the ACP section describes no solution with non-ACP
routers participating in the ACP routing table.
ACP connect interfaces can be dealt with in the GRASP ACP domain the Given how the ACP is the security and transport substrate for GRASP,
same as any other ACP interface assuming that any physical ACP the requirements for devices connected via ACP connect is that those
connect interface is physically protected from attacks and that the are equivalently (if not better) secured against attacks and run only
connected Software or NMS Hosts are equally trusted as that on other software that is equally (if not better) protected, known (or
ACP nodes. ACP edge nodes SHOULD have options to filter GRASP trusted) not to be malicious and accordingly designed to isolate
messages in and out of ACP connect interfaces (permit/deny) and MAY access to the ACP against external equipment.
have more fine-grained filtering (e.g., based on IPv6 address of
originator or objective). The difference in security is that cryptographic security of the ACP
secure channel is replaced by required physical security of the
network connection between an ACP edge node and the NMS or other host
reachable via the ACP connect interface. Node integrity too is
expected to be easier because the ACP connect node, the ACP connect
link and the nodes connecting to it must be in a contiguous secure
location, hence assuming there can be no physical attack against the
devices.
When using "Combined ACP and Data-Plane Interfaces", care must be When using "Combined ACP and Data-Plane Interfaces", care must be
taken that only GRASP messages intended for the ACP GRASP domain taken that only GRASP messages intended for the ACP GRASP domain
received from Software or NMS Hosts are forwarded by ACP edge nodes. received from Software or NMS Hosts are forwarded by ACP edge nodes.
Currently there is no definition for a GRASP security and transport Currently there is no definition for a GRASP security and transport
substrate beside the ACP, so there is no definition how such substrate beside the ACP, so there is no definition how such
Software/NMS Host could participate in two separate GRASP Domains Software/NMS Host could participate in two separate GRASP Domains
across the same subnet (ACP and Data-Plane domains). At current it across the same subnet (ACP and Data-Plane domains). At current it
is assumed that all GRASP packets on a Combined ACP and Data-Plane is assumed that all GRASP packets on a Combined ACP and Data-Plane
interface belong to the GRASP ACP Domain. They must all use the ACP interface belong to the GRASP ACP Domain. They must all use the ACP
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ABNF. ABNF.
connection = [ method , local-addr, remote-addr, ?pmtu ] connection = [ method , local-addr, remote-addr, ?pmtu ]
method = [ "IKEv2" , ?port ] method = [ "IKEv2" , ?port ]
method //= [ "DTLS", port ] method //= [ "DTLS", port ]
local-addr = [ address , ?vrf ] local-addr = [ address , ?vrf ]
remote-addr = [ address ] remote-addr = [ address ]
address = ("any" | ipv4-address | ipv6-address ) address = ("any" | ipv4-address | ipv6-address )
vrf = tstr ; Name of a VRF on this node with local-address vrf = tstr ; Name of a VRF on this node with local-address
Figure 16: Parameters for remote ACP neighbors Figure 17: Parameters for remote ACP neighbors
Explicit configuration of a remote-peer according to this ABNF Explicit configuration of a remote-peer according to this ABNF
provides all the information to build a secure channel without provides all the information to build a secure channel without
requiring a tunnel to that peer and running DULL GRASP inside of it. requiring a tunnel to that peer and running DULL GRASP inside of it.
The configuration includes the parameters otherwise signaled via DULL The configuration includes the parameters otherwise signaled via DULL
GRASP: local address, remote (peer) locator and method. The GRASP: local address, remote (peer) locator and method. The
differences over DULL GRASP local neighbor discovery and secure differences over DULL GRASP local neighbor discovery and secure
channel creation are as follows: channel creation are as follows:
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in the ACP will automatically adapt to the changes and will in the ACP will automatically adapt to the changes and will
continue to provide reachability to all nodes. continue to provide reachability to all nodes.
o The ACP tracks the validity of peer certificates and tears down o The ACP tracks the validity of peer certificates and tears down
ACP secure channels when a peer certificate has expired. When ACP secure channels when a peer certificate has expired. When
short-lived certificates with lifetimes in the order of OCSP/CRL short-lived certificates with lifetimes in the order of OCSP/CRL
refresh times are used, then this allows for removal of invalid refresh times are used, then this allows for removal of invalid
peers (whose certificate was not renewed) at similar speeds as peers (whose certificate was not renewed) at similar speeds as
when using OCSP/CRL. The same benefit can be achieved when using when using OCSP/CRL. The same benefit can be achieved when using
CRL/OCSP, periodically refreshing the revocation information and CRL/OCSP, periodically refreshing the revocation information and
also tearing down ACP secure channels when the peers (long-lived) also tearing down ACP secure channels when the peer's (long-lived)
certificate is revoked. There is no requirement against ACP certificate is revoked. There is no requirement against ACP
implementations to require this enhancement though to keep the implementations to require this enhancement though to keep the
mandatory implementations simpler. mandatory implementations simpler.
The ACP can also sustain network partitions and mergers. Practically The ACP can also sustain network partitions and mergers. Practically
all ACP operations are link local, where a network partition has no all ACP operations are link local, where a network partition has no
impact. Nodes authenticate each other using the domain certificates impact. Nodes authenticate each other using the domain certificates
to establish the ACP locally. Addressing inside the ACP remains to establish the ACP locally. Addressing inside the ACP remains
unchanged, and the routing protocol inside both parts of the ACP will unchanged, and the routing protocol inside both parts of the ACP will
lead to two working (although partitioned) ACPs. lead to two working (although partitioned) ACPs.
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available can address this issue. Also, an ACP registrar or available can address this issue. Also, an ACP registrar or
Certificate Authority might not be available during a partition. Certificate Authority might not be available during a partition.
This may delay renewal of certificates that are to expire in the This may delay renewal of certificates that are to expire in the
future, and it may prevent the enrollment of new nodes during the future, and it may prevent the enrollment of new nodes during the
partition. partition.
Highly resilient ACP designs can be built by using ACP registrars Highly resilient ACP designs can be built by using ACP registrars
with embedded sub-CA, as outlined in Section 10.2.4. As long as a with embedded sub-CA, as outlined in Section 10.2.4. As long as a
partition is left with one or more of such ACP registrars, it can partition is left with one or more of such ACP registrars, it can
continue to enroll new candidate ACP nodes as long as the ACP continue to enroll new candidate ACP nodes as long as the ACP
registrars sub-CA certificate does not expire. Because the ACP registrar's sub-CA certificate does not expire. Because the ACP
addressing relies on unique Registrar-IDs, a later re-merge of addressing relies on unique Registrar-IDs, a later re-merge of
partitions will also not cause problems with ACP addresses assigned partitions will also not cause problems with ACP addresses assigned
during partitioning. during partitioning.
After a network partition, a re-merge will just establish the After a network partition, a re-merge will just establish the
previous status, certificates can be renewed, the CRL is available, previous status, certificates can be renewed, the CRL is available,
and new nodes can be enrolled everywhere. Since all nodes use the and new nodes can be enrolled everywhere. Since all nodes use the
same trust anchor(s), a re-merge will be smooth. same trust anchor(s), a re-merge will be smooth.
Merging two networks with different trust anchors requires the ACP Merging two networks with different trust anchors requires the ACP
nodes to trust the union of Trust Anchors. As long as the routing- nodes to trust the union of Trust Anchors. As long as the routing-
subdomain hashes are different, the addressing will not overlap, subdomain hashes are different, the addressing will not overlap,
except for the low probability of a 40-bit hash collision in SHA256 which only happens in the unlikely event of a 40-bit hash collision
(see Section 6.10). Note that the complete mechanisms to merge in SHA256 (see Section 6.10). Note that the complete mechanisms to
networks is out of scope of this specification. merge networks is out of scope of this specification.
It is also highly desirable for implementation of the ACP to be able It is also highly desirable for implementation of the ACP to be able
to run it over interfaces that are administratively down. If this is to run it over interfaces that are administratively down. If this is
not feasible, then it might instead be possible to request explicit not feasible, then it might instead be possible to request explicit
operator override upon administrative actions that would operator override upon administrative actions that would
administratively bring down an interface across which the ACP is administratively bring down an interface across which the ACP is
running. Especially if bringing down the ACP is known to disconnect running. Especially if bringing down the ACP is known to disconnect
the operator from the node. For example any such down administrative the operator from the node. For example any such down administrative
action could perform a dependency check to see if the transport action could perform a dependency check to see if the transport
connection across which this action is performed is affected by the connection across which this action is performed is affected by the
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group of nodes that receive an ACP domain certificate for the same group of nodes that receive an ACP domain certificate for the same
domain. Attacks from the inside by a compromised group member are domain. Attacks from the inside by a compromised group member are
therefore the biggest challenge. therefore the biggest challenge.
Group members must be protected against attackers so that there is no Group members must be protected against attackers so that there is no
easy way to compromise them, or use them as a proxy for attacking easy way to compromise them, or use them as a proxy for attacking
other devices across the ACP. For example, management plane other devices across the ACP. For example, management plane
functions (transport ports) should only be reachable from the ACP but functions (transport ports) should only be reachable from the ACP but
not the Data-Plane. Especially for those management plane functions not the Data-Plane. Especially for those management plane functions
that have no good protection by themselves because they do not have that have no good protection by themselves because they do not have
secure end-to-end transport and to whom ACP does not only provides secure end-to-end transport and to whom ACP not only provides
automatic reliable connectivity but also protection against attacks. automatic reliable connectivity but also protection against attacks.
Protection across all potential attack vectors is typically easier to Protection across all potential attack vectors is typically easier to
do in devices whose software is designed from the ground up with do in devices whose software is designed from the ground up with
security in mind than with legacy software based systems where the security in mind than with legacy software based systems where the
ACP is added on as another feature. ACP is added on as another feature.
As explained above, traffic across the ACP SHOULD still be end-to-end As explained above, traffic across the ACP SHOULD still be end-to-end
encrypted whenever possible. This includes traffic such as GRASP, encrypted whenever possible. This includes traffic such as GRASP,
EST and BRSKI inside the ACP. This minimizes man in the middle EST and BRSKI inside the ACP. This minimizes man in the middle
attacks by compromised ACP group members. Such attackers cannot attacks by compromised ACP group members. Such attackers cannot
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is unavoidable by any means). is unavoidable by any means).
See Appendix A.10.8 for further considerations how to avoid and deal See Appendix A.10.8 for further considerations how to avoid and deal
with compromised nodes. with compromised nodes.
9.3. The Administrator View 9.3. The Administrator View
An ACP is self-forming, self-managing and self-protecting, therefore An ACP is self-forming, self-managing and self-protecting, therefore
has minimal dependencies on the administrator of the network. has minimal dependencies on the administrator of the network.
Specifically, since it is (intended to be) independent of Specifically, since it is (intended to be) independent of
configuration, there is no scope for configuration errors on the ACP configuration, there is only limited scope for configuration errors
itself. The administrator may have the option to enable or disable on the ACP itself. The administrator may have the option to enable
the entire approach, but detailed configuration is not possible. or disable the entire approach, but detailed configuration is not
This means that the ACP must not be reflected in the running possible. This means that the ACP must not be reflected in the
configuration of nodes, except a possible on/off switch (and even running configuration of nodes, except a possible on/off switch (and
that is undesirable). even that is undesirable).
While configuration is not possible, an administrator must have full While configuration (except for Section 8 and Section 10.2) is not
visibility of the ACP and all its parameters, to be able to do possible, an administrator must have full visibility of the ACP and
trouble-shooting. Therefore, an ACP must support all show and debug all its parameters, to be able to do trouble-shooting. Therefore, an
options, as for any other network function. Specifically, a network ACP must support all show and debug options, as for any other network
management system or controller must be able to discover the ACP, and function. Specifically, a network management system or controller
monitor its health. This visibility of ACP operations must clearly must be able to discover the ACP, and monitor its health. This
be separated from visibility of Data-Plane so automated systems will visibility of ACP operations must clearly be separated from
never have to deal with ACP aspect unless they explicitly desire to visibility of Data-Plane so automated systems will never have to deal
do so. with ACP aspects unless they explicitly desire to do so.
Since an ACP is self-protecting, a node not supporting the ACP, or Since an ACP is self-protecting, a node not supporting the ACP, or
without a valid domain certificate cannot connect to it. This means without a valid domain certificate cannot connect to it. This means
that by default a traditional controller or network management system that by default a traditional controller or network management system
cannot connect to an ACP. See Section 8.1.1 for more details on how cannot connect to an ACP. See Section 8.1.1 for more details on how
to connect an NMS host into the ACP. to connect an NMS host into the ACP.
10. ACP Operations (Informative) 10. ACP Operations (Informative)
The following sections document important operational aspects of the The following sections document important operational aspects of the
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depend on reasonable notion of time). depend on reasonable notion of time).
o Does the node have keying material - domain certificate, trust o Does the node have keying material - domain certificate, trust
anchors. anchors.
o If no keying material and ANI is supported/enabled, check the o If no keying material and ANI is supported/enabled, check the
state of BRSKI (not detailed in this example). state of BRSKI (not detailed in this example).
o Check the validity of the domain certificate: o Check the validity of the domain certificate:
* Does the certificate authenticate against the trust anchor? * Does the certificate validate against the trust anchor?
* Has it been revoked? * Has it been revoked?
* Was the last scheduled attempt to retrieve a CRL successful * Was the last scheduled attempt to retrieve a CRL successful
(e.g., do we know that our CRL information is up to date). (e.g., do we know that our CRL information is up to date).
* Is the certificate valid: validity start time in the past, * Is the certificate valid: validity start time in the past,
expiration time in the future? expiration time in the future?
* Does the certificate have a correctly formatted ACP domain * Does the certificate have a correctly formatted ACP domain
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* If the neighbor closed the connection on us, provide any error * If the neighbor closed the connection on us, provide any error
diagnostics from the secure channel protocol. diagnostics from the secure channel protocol.
* If we failed the attempt, display our local reason: * If we failed the attempt, display our local reason:
+ There was no common secure channel protocol supported by the + There was no common secure channel protocol supported by the
two neighbors (this could not happen on nodes supporting two neighbors (this could not happen on nodes supporting
this specification because it mandates common support for this specification because it mandates common support for
IPsec). IPsec).
+ The ACP domain certificate membership check (Section 6.1.2) + The ACP domain certificate membership check (Section 6.1.3)
fails: fails:
- The neighbors certificate does not have the required - The neighbor's certificate does not have the required
trust anchor. Provide diagnostics which trust anchor it trust anchor. Provide diagnostics which trust anchor it
has (can identify whom the device belongs to). has (can identify whom the device belongs to).
- The neighbors certificate does not have the same domain - The neighbor's certificate does not have the same domain
(or no domain at all). Diagnose domain-name and (or no domain at all). Diagnose domain-name and
potentially other cert info. potentially other cert info.
- The neighbors certificate has been revoked or could not - The neighbor's certificate has been revoked or could not
be authenticated by OCSP. be authenticated by OCSP.
- The neighbors certificate has expired - or is not yet - The neighbor's certificate has expired - or is not yet
valid. valid.
* Any other connection issues in e.g., IKEv2 / IPsec, DTLS?. * Any other connection issues in e.g., IKEv2 / IPsec, DTLS?.
Question: Is the ACP operating correctly across its secure channels? Question: Is the ACP operating correctly across its secure channels?
o Are there one or more active ACP neighbors with secure channels? o Are there one or more active ACP neighbors with secure channels?
o Is the RPL routing protocol for the ACP running? o Is the RPL routing protocol for the ACP running?
o Is there a default route to the root in the ACP routing table? o Is there a default route to the root in the ACP routing table?
o Is there for each direct ACP neighbor not reachable over the ACP o Is there for each direct ACP neighbor not reachable over the ACP
virtual interface to the root a route in the ACP routing table? virtual interface to the root a route in the ACP routing table?
o Is ACP GRASP running? o Is ACP GRASP running?
o Is at least one SRV.est objective cached (to support certificate o Is at least one SRV.est objective cached (to support certificate
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the ACP registrar. the ACP registrar.
For recovery, the next-useable Node-IDs for zone (Zone-ID=0) sub- For recovery, the next-useable Node-IDs for zone (Zone-ID=0) sub-
addressing scheme, for Vlong /112 and for Vlong /1120 sub- addressing scheme, for Vlong /112 and for Vlong /1120 sub-
addressing scheme. These IDs would only need to be provisioned addressing scheme. These IDs would only need to be provisioned
after recovering from a crash. Some other mechanism would be after recovering from a crash. Some other mechanism would be
required to remember these IDs in a backup location or to recover required to remember these IDs in a backup location or to recover
them from the set of currently known ACP nodes. them from the set of currently known ACP nodes.
Policies if candidate ACP nodes should receive a domain Policies if candidate ACP nodes should receive a domain
certificate or not, for example based on the devices LDevID as in certificate or not, for example based on the devices IDevID as in
BRSKI. The ACP registrar may have a whitelist or blacklist of BRSKI. The ACP registrar may have a whitelist or blacklist of
devices serialNumbers from their LDevID. devices "serialNumbers" from their IDevID.
Policies what type of address prefix to assign to a candidate ACP Policies what type of address prefix to assign to a candidate ACP
devices, based on likely the same information. devices, based on likely the same information.
For BRSKI or other mechanisms using vouchers: Parameters to For BRSKI or other mechanisms using vouchers: Parameters to
determine how to retrieve vouchers for specific type of secure determine how to retrieve vouchers for specific type of secure
bootstrap candidate ACP nodes (such as MASA URLs), unless this bootstrap candidate ACP nodes (such as MASA URLs), unless this
information is automatically learned such as from the IDevID of information is automatically learned such as from the IDevID of
candidate ACP nodes (as defined in BRSKI). candidate ACP nodes (as defined in BRSKI).
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longer lived and subject to CRL. longer lived and subject to CRL.
10.2.5. Centralized Policy Control 10.2.5. Centralized Policy Control
When using multiple, uncoordinated ACP registrars, several advanced When using multiple, uncoordinated ACP registrars, several advanced
operations are potentially more complex than with a single, resilient operations are potentially more complex than with a single, resilient
policy control backend, for example including but not limited to: policy control backend, for example including but not limited to:
Which candidate ACP node is permitted or not permitted into an ACP Which candidate ACP node is permitted or not permitted into an ACP
domain. This may not be a decision to be taken upfront, so that a domain. This may not be a decision to be taken upfront, so that a
per-serialNumber policy can be loaded into ever ACP registrar. per-"serialNumber" policy can be loaded into every ACP registrar.
Instead, it may better be decided in real-time including Instead, it may better be decided in real-time including
potentially a human decision in a NOC. potentially a human decision in a NOC.
Tracking of all enrolled ACP nodes and their certificate Tracking of all enrolled ACP nodes and their certificate
information. For example in support of revoking individual ACP information. For example in support of revoking individual ACP
nodes certificates. nodes certificates.
More flexible policies what type of address prefix or even what More flexible policies what type of address prefix or even what
specific address prefix to assign to a candidate ACP node. specific address prefix to assign to a candidate ACP node.
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another high-cost touch), then the default should be not to enable another high-cost touch), then the default should be not to enable
ANI/ACP, and if it is potentially expensive or slow to fix (e.g., ANI/ACP, and if it is potentially expensive or slow to fix (e.g.,
parameters on SIM card shipped to remote location), then the default parameters on SIM card shipped to remote location), then the default
should be to enable ACP/ANI. should be to enable ACP/ANI.
10.3.5. Node Level ACP/ANI enable 10.3.5. Node Level ACP/ANI enable
A node level command "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" enables ACP or ANI A node level command "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" enables ACP or ANI
on the node (ANI = ACP + BRSKI). Without this command set, any on the node (ANI = ACP + BRSKI). Without this command set, any
interface level "ACP/ANI enable" is ignored. Once set, ACP/ANI will interface level "ACP/ANI enable" is ignored. Once set, ACP/ANI will
operate interface where "ACP/ANI enable" is set. Setting of operate an interface where "ACP/ANI enable" is set. Setting of
interface level "ACP/ANI enable" is either automatic (default) or interface level "ACP/ANI enable" is either automatic (default) or
explicit through operator action as described in the previous explicit through operator action as described in the previous
section. section.
If the option "up-if-only" is selected, the behavior of "down" If the option "up-if-only" is selected, the behavior of "down"
interfaces is unchanged, and ACP/ANI will only operate on interfaces interfaces is unchanged, and ACP/ANI will only operate on interfaces
where "ACP/ANI enable" is set and that are "up". When it is not set, where "ACP/ANI enable" is set and that are "up". When it is not set,
then "down" state of interfaces with "ACP/ANI enable" is modified to then "down" state of interfaces with "ACP/ANI enable" is modified to
behave as "admin down". behave as "admin down".
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The need to explicitly enable ACP/ANI is especially important in The need to explicitly enable ACP/ANI is especially important in
brownfield nodes because otherwise software updates may introduce brownfield nodes because otherwise software updates may introduce
support for ACP/ANI: Automatic enablement of ACP/ANI in networks support for ACP/ANI: Automatic enablement of ACP/ANI in networks
where the operator does not only not want ACP/ANI but where the where the operator does not only not want ACP/ANI but where the
operator likely never even heard of it could be quite irritating to operator likely never even heard of it could be quite irritating to
the operator. Especially when "down" behavior is changed to "admin the operator. Especially when "down" behavior is changed to "admin
down". down".
Automatically setting "ANI enable" on brownfield nodes where the Automatically setting "ANI enable" on brownfield nodes where the
operator is unaware of it could also be a critical security issue operator is unaware of BRSKI and MASA operations could also be an
depending on the vouchers used by BRKSI on these nodes. An attacker unlikely but then critical security issue. If an attacker could
could claim to be the owner of these devices and create an ACP that impersonate the operator and register as the operator at the MASA or
the attacker has access/control over. In networks where the operator otherwise get hold of vouchers and can get enough physical access to
explicitly wants to enable the ANI this could not happen, because he the network so pledges would register to an attacking registrar, then
would create a BRSKI registrar that would discover attack attempts. the attacker could gain access to the network through the ACP that
Nodes requiring "ownership vouchers" would not be subject to that the attacker then has access to.
attack. See [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] for more
details. Note that a global "ACP enable" alone is not subject to In networks where the operator explicitly wants to enable the ANI
these type of attacks, because it always depends on some other this could not happen, because the operator would create a BRSKI
mechanism first to provision domain certificates into the device. registrar that would discover attack attempts, and the operator would
be setting up his registrar with the MASA. Nodes requiring
"ownership vouchers" would not be subject to that attack. See
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] for more details. Note that
a global "ACP enable" alone is not subject to these type of attacks,
because it always depends on some other mechanism first to provision
domain certificates into the device.
10.3.5.2. Greenfield nodes 10.3.5.2. Greenfield nodes
A "greenfield" node is one that did not have any prior configuration. A "greenfield" node is one that did not have any prior configuration.
For greenfield nodes, only "ANI enable" is relevant. If another For greenfield nodes, only "ANI enable" is relevant. If another
mechanism than BRSKI is used to (zero-touch) bootstrap a node, then mechanism than BRSKI is used to (zero-touch) bootstrap a node, then
it is up to that mechanism to provision domain certificates and to it is up to that mechanism to provision domain certificates and to
set global "ACP enable" as desired. set global "ACP enable" as desired.
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operation terminates, this will automatically unset "ANI enable" and operation terminates, this will automatically unset "ANI enable" and
should terminate any temporarily needed state on the device to should terminate any temporarily needed state on the device to
perform BRSKI - DULL GRASP, BRSKI pledge and any IPv6 configuration perform BRSKI - DULL GRASP, BRSKI pledge and any IPv6 configuration
on interfaces. on interfaces.
10.3.6. Undoing ANI/ACP enable 10.3.6. Undoing ANI/ACP enable
Disabling ANI/ACP by undoing "ACP/ANI enable" is a risk for the Disabling ANI/ACP by undoing "ACP/ANI enable" is a risk for the
reliable operations of the ACP if it can be executed by mistake or reliable operations of the ACP if it can be executed by mistake or
unauthorized. This behavior could be influenced through some unauthorized. This behavior could be influenced through some
additional property in the certificate (e.g., in the domain additional (future) property in the certificate (e.g., in the domain
information extension field) subject to future work: In an ANI information extension field): In an ANI deployment intended for
deployment intended for convenience, disabling it could be allowed convenience, disabling it could be allowed without further
without further constraints. In an ANI deployment considered to be constraints. In an ANI deployment considered to be critical more
critical more checks would be required. One very controlled option checks would be required. One very controlled option would be to not
would be to not permit these commands unless the domain certificate permit these commands unless the domain certificate has been revoked
has been revoked or is denied renewal. Configuring this option would or is denied renewal. Configuring this option would be a parameter
be a parameter on the BRSKI registrar(s). As long as the node did on the BRSKI registrar(s). As long as the node did not receive a
not receive a domain certificate, undoing "ANI/ACP enable" should not domain certificate, undoing "ANI/ACP enable" should not have any
have any additional constraints. additional constraints.
10.3.7. Summary 10.3.7. Summary
Node-wide "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" commands enable the operation Node-wide "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" commands enable the operation
of ACP/ANI. This is only auto-enabled on ANI greenfield devices, of ACP/ANI. This is only auto-enabled on ANI greenfield devices,
otherwise it must be configured explicitly. otherwise it must be configured explicitly.
If the option "up-if-only" is not selected, interfaces enabled for If the option "up-if-only" is not selected, interfaces enabled for
ACP/ANI interpret "down" state as "admin down" and not "physical ACP/ANI interpret "down" state as "admin down" and not "physical
down". In "admin-down" all non-ACP/ANI packets are filtered, but the down". In "admin-down" all non-ACP/ANI packets are filtered, but the
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additional checks to minimize undesired breakage of ACP. The degree additional checks to minimize undesired breakage of ACP. The degree
of control could be a domain wide parameter in the domain of control could be a domain wide parameter in the domain
certificates. certificates.
10.4. Configuration and the ACP (summary) 10.4. Configuration and the ACP (summary)
There is no desirable configuration for the ACP. Instead, all There is no desirable configuration for the ACP. Instead, all
parameters that need to be configured in support of the ACP are parameters that need to be configured in support of the ACP are
limitations of the solution, but they are only needed in cases where limitations of the solution, but they are only needed in cases where
not all components are made autonomic. Whereever this is necessary, not all components are made autonomic. Whereever this is necessary,
it will rely on pre-existing mechanisms for configuration such as CLI it relies on pre-existing mechanisms for configuration such as CLI or
or YANG ([RFC7950]) data models. YANG ([RFC7950]) data models.
The most important examples of such configuration include: The most important examples of such configuration include:
o When ACP nodes do not support an autonomic way to receive an ACP o When ACP nodes do not support an autonomic way to receive an ACP
domain certificate, for example BRSKI, then such certificate needs domain certificate, for example BRSKI, then such certificate needs
to be configured via some pre-existing mechanisms outside the to be configured via some pre-existing mechanisms outside the
scope of this specification. Today, router have typically a scope of this specification. Today, router have typically a
variety of mechanisms to do this. variety of mechanisms to do this.
o Certificate maintenance requires PKI functions. Discovery of o Certificate maintenance requires PKI functions. Discovery of
these functions across the ACP is automated (see Section 6.1.4), these functions across the ACP is automated (see Section 6.1.5),
but their configuration is is not. but their configuration is not.
o When non-ACP capable nodes need to be connected to the ACP, the o When non-ACP capable nodes such as pre-existing NMS need to be
connecting ACP node needs to be configuration to support this physically connected to the ACP, the ACP node to which they attach
according to Section 8.1. needs to be configured with ACP-connect according to Section 8.1.
It is also possible to use that single physical connection to
connect both to ACP and the data-plane of the network as explained
in Section 8.1.4.
o When devices are not autonomically bootstrapped, explicit o When devices are not autonomically bootstrapped, explicit
configuration to enable the ACP needs to be applied. See configuration to enable the ACP needs to be applied. See
Section 10.3. Section 10.3.
o When the ACP needs to be extended across interfacess other than o When the ACP needs to be extended across interfacess other than
L2, the ACP as defined in this document can not autodiscover L2, the ACP as defined in this document can not autodiscover
candidate neighbors automatically. Remove neighbors need to be candidate neighbors automatically. Remote neighbors need to be
configured, see Section 8.2. configured, see Section 8.2.
Once the ACP is operating, any further configuration for the data- Once the ACP is operating, any further configuration for the data-
lane can be configured more reliably across the ACP itself because plane can be configured more reliably across the ACP itself because
the ACP provides addressing and connectivity (routing) independent of the ACP provides addressing and connectivity (routing) independent of
the data-plane itself. For this, the configuration methods simply the data-plane itself. For this, the configuration methods simply
need to also allow to operate across the ACP VRF - netconf, ssh or need to also allow to operate across the ACP VRF - netconf, ssh or
any other method. any other method.
The ACP also provides additional security through its hop-by-hop The ACP also provides additional security through its hop-by-hop
encryption for any such configuration operations: Some legacy encryption for any such configuration operations: Some legacy
configuration methods (SNMP, TFTP, HTTP) may not use end-to-end configuration methods (SNMP, TFTP, HTTP) may not use end-to-end
encryption, and most of the end-to-end secured configuration methods encryption, and most of the end-to-end secured configuration methods
still allow for easy passive observation along the path about still allow for easy passive observation along the path about
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However, the security of the ACP depends on a number of other However, the security of the ACP depends on a number of other
factors: factors:
o The usage of domain certificates depends on a valid supporting PKI o The usage of domain certificates depends on a valid supporting PKI
infrastructure. If the chain of trust of this PKI infrastructure infrastructure. If the chain of trust of this PKI infrastructure
is compromised, the security of the ACP is also compromised. This is compromised, the security of the ACP is also compromised. This
is typically under the control of the network administrator. is typically under the control of the network administrator.
o Every ACP registrar is criticial infrastructure that needs to be o Every ACP registrar is criticial infrastructure that needs to be
hardened against attacks similar to a CA. A malicious registrar hardened against attacks, similar to a CA. A malicious registrar
can enroll enemy plegdes to an ACP network or break ACP routing by can enroll enemy plegdes to an ACP network or break ACP routing by
duplicate ACP address assignment to pledges via their ACP domain duplicate ACP address assignment to pledges via their ACP domain
certificates. certificates.
o Security can be compromised by implementation errors (bugs), as in o Security can be compromised by implementation errors (bugs), as in
all products. all products.
There is no prevention of source-address spoofing inside the ACP. There is no prevention of source-address spoofing inside the ACP.
This implies that if an attacker gains access to the ACP, it can This implies that if an attacker gains access to the ACP, it can
spoof all addresses inside the ACP and fake messages from any other spoof all addresses inside the ACP and fake messages from any other
node. node.
The ACP It is designed to enable automation of current network The ACP is designed to enable automation of current network
management and future autonomic peer-to-peer/distributed network management and future autonomic peer-to-peer/distributed network
automation. Any ACP member can send ACP IPv6 packet to other ACP automation. Any ACP member can send ACP IPv6 packet to other ACP
members and announce via ACP GRASP services to all ACP members members and announce via ACP GRASP services to all ACP members
without depenency against centralized components. without depenency against centralized components.
The ACP relies on peer-to-peer authentication and authorization using The ACP relies on peer-to-peer authentication and authorization using
ACP certificates. This security model is necessary to enable the ACP certificates. This security model is necessary to enable the
autonomic ad-hoc any-to-any connectivity between ACP nodes. It autonomic ad-hoc any-to-any connectivity between ACP nodes. It
provides infrastructure protection through hop by hop authentication provides infrastructure protection through hop by hop authentication
and encryption - without relying on third parties. For any services and encryption - without relying on third parties. For any services
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encrypted traffic from other ACP nodes. encrypted traffic from other ACP nodes.
Attacks from impacted ACP nodes against the ACP are more difficult Attacks from impacted ACP nodes against the ACP are more difficult
than against the data-plane because of the autoconfiguration of the than against the data-plane because of the autoconfiguration of the
ACP and the absence of configuration options that could be abused ACP and the absence of configuration options that could be abused
that allow to change/break ACP behavior. This is excluding that allow to change/break ACP behavior. This is excluding
configuration for workaround in support of non-autonomic components. configuration for workaround in support of non-autonomic components.
Mitigation against compromised ACP members is possible through Mitigation against compromised ACP members is possible through
standard automated certificate management mechanisms including standard automated certificate management mechanisms including
revocation and non-renewal of short-lived cdrtificates. In this revocation and non-renewal of short-lived certificates. In this
version of the specification, there are no further optimization of version of the specification, there are no further optimization of
these mechanisms defined for the ACP (but see Appendix A.10.8). these mechanisms defined for the ACP (but see Appendix A.10.8).
Higher layer service built using ACP domain certificates should not Higher layer service built using ACP domain certificates should not
solely rely on undifferentiated group security when another model is solely rely on undifferentiated group security when another model is
more appropriate/more secure. For example central network more appropriate/more secure. For example central network
configuration relies on a security model where only few especially configuration relies on a security model where only few especially
trusted nodes are allowed to configure the data-plane of network trusted nodes are allowed to configure the data-plane of network
nodes (CLIL, Netconf). This can be done through ACP domain nodes (CLIL, Netconf). This can be done through ACP domain
certificates by differentiating them and introduce roles. See certificates by differentiating them and introduce roles. See
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operations automation mistakes, implementation and architecture. operations automation mistakes, implementation and architecture.
Autonomic approaches such as the ACP largely eliminate operator Autonomic approaches such as the ACP largely eliminate operator
mistakes and make it easier to recover from network operations mistakes and make it easier to recover from network operations
mistakes. Implementation and architectural mistakes are still mistakes. Implementation and architectural mistakes are still
possible, as in all networking technologies. possible, as in all networking technologies.
Many details of ACP are designed with security in mind and discussed Many details of ACP are designed with security in mind and discussed
elsewhere in the document: elsewhere in the document:
IPv6 addresses used by nodes in the ACP are covered as part of the IPv6 addresses used by nodes in the ACP are covered as part of the
node's domain certificate as described in Section 6.1.1. This allows node's domain certificate as described in Section 6.1.2. This allows
even verification of ownership of a peers IPv6 address when using a even verification of ownership of a peer's IPv6 address when using a
connection authenticated with the domain certificate. connection authenticated with the domain certificate.
The ACP acts as a security (and transport) substrate for GRASP inside The ACP acts as a security (and transport) substrate for GRASP inside
the ACP such that GRASP is not only protected by attacks from the the ACP such that GRASP is not only protected by attacks from the
outside, but also by attacks from compromised inside attackers - by outside, but also by attacks from compromised inside attackers - by
relying not only on hop-by-hop security of ACP secure channels, but relying not only on hop-by-hop security of ACP secure channels, but
adding end-to-end security for those GRASP messages. See adding end-to-end security for those GRASP messages. See
Section 6.8.2. Section 6.8.2.
ACP provides for secure, resilient zero-touch discovery of EST ACP provides for secure, resilient zero-touch discovery of EST
servers for certificate renewal. See Section 6.1.4. servers for certificate renewal. See Section 6.1.5.
ACP provides extensible, auto-configuring hop-by-hop protection of ACP provides extensible, auto-configuring hop-by-hop protection of
the ACP infrastructure via the negotiation of hop-by-hop secure the ACP infrastructure via the negotiation of hop-by-hop secure
channel protocols. See Section 6.5 and Appendix A.6. channel protocols. See Section 6.5.
The ACP is designed to minimize attacks from the outside by The ACP is designed to minimize attacks from the outside by
minimizing its dependency against any non-ACP (Data-Plane) minimizing its dependency against any non-ACP (Data-Plane)
operations/configuration on a node. See also Section 6.12.2. operations/configuration on a node. See also Section 6.12.2.
In combination with BRSKI, ACP enables a resilient, fully zero-touch In combination with BRSKI, ACP enables a resilient, fully zero-touch
network solution for short-lived certificates that can be renewed or network solution for short-lived certificates that can be renewed or
re-enrolled even after unintentional expiry (e.g., because of re-enrolled even after unintentional expiry (e.g., because of
interrupted connectivity). See Appendix A.2. interrupted connectivity). See Appendix A.2.
skipping to change at page 103, line 12 skipping to change at page 108, line 24
This document defines the "Autonomic Control Plane". This document defines the "Autonomic Control Plane".
The IANA is requested to register the value "AN_ACP" (without quotes) The IANA is requested to register the value "AN_ACP" (without quotes)
to the GRASP Objectives Names Table in the GRASP Parameter Registry. to the GRASP Objectives Names Table in the GRASP Parameter Registry.
The specification for this value is this document, Section 6.3. The specification for this value is this document, Section 6.3.
The IANA is requested to register the value "SRV.est" (without The IANA is requested to register the value "SRV.est" (without
quotes) to the GRASP Objectives Names Table in the GRASP Parameter quotes) to the GRASP Objectives Names Table in the GRASP Parameter
Registry. The specification for this value is this document, Registry. The specification for this value is this document,
Section 6.1.4. Section 6.1.5.
Explanation: This document chooses the initially strange looking Explanation: This document chooses the initially strange looking
format "SRV.<service-name>" because these objective names would be in format "SRV.<service-name>" because these objective names would be in
line with potential future simplification of the GRASP objective line with potential future simplification of the GRASP objective
registry. Today, every name in the GRASP objective registry needs to registry. Today, every name in the GRASP objective registry needs to
be explicitly allocated with IANA. In the future, this type of be explicitly allocated with IANA. In the future, this type of
objective names could considered to be automatically registered in objective names could considered to be automatically registered in
that registry for the same service for which <service-name> is that registry for the same service for which <service-name> is
registered according to [RFC6335]. This explanation is solely registered according to [RFC6335]. This explanation is solely
informational and has no impact on the requested registration. informational and has no impact on the requested registration.
The IANA is requested to create an ACP Parameter Registry with The IANA is requested to create an ACP Parameter Registry with
currently one registry table - the "ACP Address Type" table. currently one registry table - the "ACP Address Type" table.
"ACP Address Type" Table. The value in this table are numeric values "ACP Address Type" Table. The value in this table are numeric values
0...3 paired with a name (string). Future values MUST be assigned 0...3 paired with a name (string). Future values MUST be assigned
using the Standards Action policy defined by [RFC8126]. The using the Standards Action policy defined by [RFC8126]. The
following initial values are assigned by this document: following initial values are assigned by this document:
0: ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Figure 10) / ACP Manual 0: ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Figure 11) / ACP Manual
Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Section 6.10.4) Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Section 6.10.4)
1: ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Section 6.10.5) 1: ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC Section 6.10.5)
13. Acknowledgements 13. Acknowledgements
This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at Cisco This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at Cisco
Systems, which started in early 2010. Many people contributed to Systems, which started in early 2010. Many people contributed to
this project and the idea of the Autonomic Control Plane, amongst this project and the idea of the Autonomic Control Plane, amongst
which (in alphabetical order): Ignas Bagdonas, Parag Bhide, Balaji which (in alphabetical order): Ignas Bagdonas, Parag Bhide, Balaji
BL, Alex Clemm, Yves Hertoghs, Bruno Klauser, Max Pritikin, Michael BL, Alex Clemm, Yves Hertoghs, Bruno Klauser, Max Pritikin, Michael
skipping to change at page 109, line 11 skipping to change at page 114, line 20
describe in the ACP draft the whole format of the M_FLOOD message describe in the ACP draft the whole format of the M_FLOOD message
(and not only the actual objective). This should make it a lot (and not only the actual objective). This should make it a lot
easier to read (without having to go back and forth to the GRASP easier to read (without having to go back and forth to the GRASP
RFC/draft). It was also necessary because the locator in the RFC/draft). It was also necessary because the locator in the
M_FLOOD messages has an important role and its not coded inside M_FLOOD messages has an important role and its not coded inside
the objective. The specification of how to format the M_FLOOD the objective. The specification of how to format the M_FLOOD
message shuold now be complete, the text may be some duplicate message shuold now be complete, the text may be some duplicate
with the DULL specificateion in GRASP, but no contradiction. with the DULL specificateion in GRASP, but no contradiction.
o One of the main outcomes of reworking the GRASP section was the o One of the main outcomes of reworking the GRASP section was the
notion that GRASP announces both the candidate peers IPv6 link notion that GRASP announces both the candidate peer's IPv6 link
local address but also the support ACP security protocol including local address but also the support ACP security protocol including
the port it is running on. In the past we shied away from using the port it is running on. In the past we shied away from using
this information because it is not secured, but i think the this information because it is not secured, but i think the
additional attack vectors possible by using this information are additional attack vectors possible by using this information are
negligible: If an attacker on an L2 subnet can fake another negligible: If an attacker on an L2 subnet can fake another
devices GRASP message then it can already provide a similar amount devices GRASP message then it can already provide a similar amount
of attack by purely faking the link-local address. of attack by purely faking the link-local address.
o Removed the section on discovery and BRSKI. This can be revived o Removed the section on discovery and BRSKI. This can be revived
in the BRSKI document, but it seems mood given how we did remove in the BRSKI document, but it seems mood given how we did remove
skipping to change at page 128, line 18 skipping to change at page 133, line 37
A.10.8 - added section discussing how to minimize risk of compromised A.10.8 - added section discussing how to minimize risk of compromised
nodes, recovering them or kicking them out. nodes, recovering them or kicking them out.
14.26. Open Issues in -19 14.26. Open Issues in -19
Need to find good reference for TLS profile for ACP GRASP TLS Need to find good reference for TLS profile for ACP GRASP TLS
connections. connections.
TBD: Add DTLS choice to GRASP secure channel. TBD: Add DTLS choice to GRASP secure channel.
14.27. draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-20
(1)In reply to review of -16 by Ben Kaduk:
Diff:
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/
rfcdiff.pyht?url1=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-
19.txt&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/autonomic-
control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane/draft-
ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane.19.1.txt
6.1.1 - Changed ABNF to use HEXDIG (to simpllify ABNF) and changed
example to resulting uppercase hex characters. There was no specific
reason to pick lower vs. upper-case left, and predefined HEXDIG is
uppercase.
- Added explanation why internationalized domain-names are not
supported/required.
6.1.4.1 - better hint/formal text to explain grasp objective encoding
parameters.
6.7.1.1 - rewrote IPsec/IKEv2 requirements after discovering the
appropriate references RFC8221/8247 and ben asking to use IANA
registry code-point words correctly. Fully relying on RFC
recommendatin parameters, just stripping down required options to
minimum for IPsec to simplify any HW dependencies. Not stripped down
IKEv2 (SW) requirements though - unclear if that would be useful.
6.7.1.2 - stripped down IPsec/GRE requirements by referring to the
new text in 6.7.1.1 (reducing duplication that existed up to -19.
Referring to RFC7525 also as BCP as requested by Benj. Q: Do BCPs
keep numbers even if RFCs for them change ?? Otherwise i am not sure
what difference it makes to mention the BCP (maybe just to emphasize
on the operartional character..).
6.8.2 - Also referring now to RFC7525 for TLS requirements. Authors
had overlooked that it was not only covering DTLS, but also TLS.
6.11.1.14 - added paragraph about "simple" nodes not having to become
RPL roots (and therefore have less forwarding plane requirements.
Logic is that when there are only "simple" nodes, the requested
forwarding plane feature (diagnostcs) wouldn't be useful immediately
anyhow because no operator could connect to the network (all access
to ACP assumed to be via more intelligent nodes.
10.3.7 - Refined/amended explanation of ACP-connect configuration
case and how it can also be simple.
various - fixed places where LDevID was used instead of IDevID. Some
other smaller textual fixes
(2)In reply to review of -16 by Eric Rescorla (by Ben Kaduk):
Diff:
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/
rfcdiff.pyht?url1=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane.19.1.txt&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane.19.2.txt
6.1.1. - new subsection to cover generic ACP certificate
requirements. Must be rfc5280 complaint. Asks for what is
understood to be hopefully best current practices: Certificate with
ECDH public key, preferrably signed by ECDH key, describes how ACP
domain information field is effectively non cryptographic identity/
name of entity owning certificate.
6.1.3 (was 6.1.2) - ACP domain membership text refinement:
emphasises how this includes action of a security association
protocol (example IKEv2 proof of ownership of cert), reines relevant
parts of rfc5280, refines that CRL/OCSP are skipped only in absence
of doing them via secure association protocol)..
created new summary at the end restating the purpose of the different
steps.
6.1.5 (was 6.1.4) - added requirement for EST server certificate to
have extended key use id-kp-cmcRA so clients can trust them when
requesting refreshed CA certificates. Also explains how to set up
EST server for multiple ACP domains.
6.3 - DULL GRASP, explains why certs are not signalled in DULL grasp.
6.7 - explains generic requirements against security association
protocols: be able to authenticate with ACP certificates, have
appropriate security level (weakest link). Be able to directly
signal ACP certificates due to absence of other option to learn peer
cert. Discusses cases (L2 security, physical security) where
security association protocol security can be relaxed/removed).
8.1.5 - GRASP via ACP connect: removed suggestion for policy
filtering of GRASP messages. Better restatement of security model of
ACP connect to argue that GRASP is to be run equally run across it as
across the rest of ACP.
few smaller textual improvements.
In reply to 2nd review email (new ballot position) by Ben Kaduk:
Diff:
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/
rfcdiff.pyht?url1=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane.19.2.txt&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane.19.3.txt
large number of textual nits (thanks a lot!).
6.1.1 - Attempted to further complete whats required in certificate:
take from rfc5280 and if feasible by operator policy copy attributes
from IDevID for easier diagnostics. Added note that authorization
mechanisms for ACP can extend over time leveraging other fields of
certificate.
6.1.2 - Added paragraph stating ABNF domain-information field is what
becomes the rfc822address and other ABNF terminal nodes are used just
in the text (and hash creation).
6.1.5.1 - added note about unknown GRASP objective values MUST be
ignored.
6.1.5.3 - CDP distribution uses HTTP, not HTTP (to avoid circular
authentication reuirements and because payload is self signed/
authenticated).
6.5 (Channel selection) - Alice/Bob uses ACP address as tiebreakers,
empty ACP address just means "lowest tie-breaker" (become Bob).
10.3.5.1 - Better justification why ANI MUST be explicitly configured
on brownfield nodes - customer not bothering about registering
company with MASA etc.
A.6 - added RFC editor note to remove this section before publication
(as i think we agreed on earlier in WG).
A.7 - added note about possible security wise undesirability to make
IDevID information of nodes available even easier through unprotected
protocols.
In reply to Michael Richardson:
Diff:
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/
rfcdiff.pyht?url1=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane.19.3.txt&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/
autonomic-control-plane/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane.19.4.txt
Missing changes lost in github from March 2019, no functional all
textual/representation improvements:
Terminology text improvements, sUDI, routing-subdomain.
6.10.2 - new table showing the different address formats as a
summary.
6.10.5 - Vlong address format, cleaned up representation by
introducing F-bit to distinguish 23/15 Vlong address prefixes.
Adjusted explanatory text accordingly.
6.1.5.1 - Changed TCP port for SRV.est from 80 to 443 (EST is using
TLS).
Other:
Change author association: Toerless Eckert, Huawei -> Futurewei USA.
15. References 15. References
15.1. Normative References 15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima- Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
grasp-15 (work in progress), July 2017. grasp-15 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor- express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
cddl-07 (work in progress), February 2019. cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.
[IKEV2IANA]
IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-
parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.
skipping to change at page 130, line 48 skipping to change at page 140, line 14
[RFC7676] Pignataro, C., Bonica, R., and S. Krishnan, "IPv6 Support [RFC7676] Pignataro, C., Bonica, R., and S. Krishnan, "IPv6 Support
for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 7676, for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 7676,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7676, October 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7676, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7676>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7676>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
[RFC8247] Nir, Y., Kivinen, T., Wouters, P., and D. Migault,
"Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance
for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 8247, DOI 10.17487/RFC8247, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8247>.
15.2. Informative References 15.2. Informative References
[AR8021] Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and [AR8021] Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig] [I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig]
Eckert, T., "Autoconfiguration of NOC services in ACP Eckert, T., "Autoconfiguration of NOC services in ACP
networks via GRASP", draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00 networks via GRASP", draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00
(work in progress), July 2018. (work in progress), July 2018.
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] [I-D.ietf-acme-star]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T. Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed
(STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management (STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-star-05 (work in Environment (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-star-06 (work in
progress), March 2019. progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason, Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and K.
S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping- (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-24 (work
keyinfra-18 (work in progress), January 2019. in progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-anima-prefix-management] [I-D.ietf-anima-prefix-management]
Jiang, S., Du, Z., Carpenter, B., and Q. Sun, "Autonomic Jiang, S., Du, Z., Carpenter, B., and Q. Sun, "Autonomic
IPv6 Edge Prefix Management in Large-scale Networks", IPv6 Edge Prefix Management in Large-scale Networks",
draft-ietf-anima-prefix-management-07 (work in progress), draft-ietf-anima-prefix-management-07 (work in progress),
December 2017. December 2017.
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L., Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic
skipping to change at page 132, line 9 skipping to change at page 141, line 31
[I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template] [I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template]
Richardson, M., "ROLL Applicability Statement Template", Richardson, M., "ROLL Applicability Statement Template",
draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09 (work in draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09 (work in
progress), May 2016. progress), May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo] [I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo]
Robles, I., Richardson, M., and P. Thubert, "Using RPL Robles, I., Richardson, M., and P. Thubert, "Using RPL
Option Type, Routing Header for Source Routes and IPv6-in- Option Type, Routing Header for Source Routes and IPv6-in-
IPv6 encapsulation in the RPL Data Plane", draft-ietf- IPv6 encapsulation in the RPL Data Plane", draft-ietf-
roll-useofrplinfo-24 (work in progress), January 2019. roll-useofrplinfo-31 (work in progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30 (work in progress), 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-32 (work in progress), July
November 2018. 2019.
[IEEE-1588-2008] [IEEE-1588-2008]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization IEEE, "IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization
Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems", Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems",
December 2008, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2008, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/1588-2008.html>. standard/1588-2008.html>.
[IEEE-802.1X] [IEEE-802.1X]
Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and
Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access
skipping to change at page 134, line 13 skipping to change at page 143, line 39
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private [RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.
[RFC4429] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4429] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
for IPv6", RFC 4429, DOI 10.17487/RFC4429, April 2006, for IPv6", RFC 4429, DOI 10.17487/RFC4429, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky, [RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky,
"Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol "Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping (IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping
Switches", RFC 4541, DOI 10.17487/RFC4541, May 2006, Switches", RFC 4541, DOI 10.17487/RFC4541, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541>.
[RFC4604] Holbrook, H., Cain, B., and B. Haberman, "Using Internet [RFC4604] Holbrook, H., Cain, B., and B. Haberman, "Using Internet
Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast
Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source- Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-
Specific Multicast", RFC 4604, DOI 10.17487/RFC4604, Specific Multicast", RFC 4604, DOI 10.17487/RFC4604,
skipping to change at page 135, line 22 skipping to change at page 145, line 12
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011, RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>.
skipping to change at page 143, line 7 skipping to change at page 153, line 7
GRASPs flooding more efficient both for M_FLOOD and M_DISCOVERY) See GRASPs flooding more efficient both for M_FLOOD and M_DISCOVERY) See
Section 6.12.5 how this will be specifically beneficial when using Section 6.12.5 how this will be specifically beneficial when using
NBMA interfaces. This is not currently specified in this document NBMA interfaces. This is not currently specified in this document
because it is not quite clear yet what exactly the implications are because it is not quite clear yet what exactly the implications are
to make GRASP flooding depend on RPL DODAG convergence and how to make GRASP flooding depend on RPL DODAG convergence and how
difficult it would be to let GRASP flooding access the DODAG difficult it would be to let GRASP flooding access the DODAG
information. information.
A.6. Extending ACP channel negotiation (via GRASP) A.6. Extending ACP channel negotiation (via GRASP)
[RFC Editor: This section to be removed before RFC.
[This section kept for informational purposes up until the last draft
version as that would be the version that readers interested in the
changelog would also go to to revisit it.]
The mechanism described in the normative part of this document to The mechanism described in the normative part of this document to
support multiple different ACP secure channel protocols without a support multiple different ACP secure channel protocols without a
single network wide MTI protocol is important to allow extending single network wide MTI protocol is important to allow extending
secure ACP channel protocols beyond what is specified in this secure ACP channel protocols beyond what is specified in this
document, but it will run into problem if it would be used for document, but it will run into problem if it would be used for
multiple protocols: multiple protocols:
The need to potentially have multiple of these security associations The need to potentially have multiple of these security associations
even temporarily run in parallel to determine which of them works even temporarily run in parallel to determine which of them works
best does not support the most lightweight implementation options. best does not support the most lightweight implementation options.
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implementations. implementations.
A more modular alternative to extending IKEv2 could be to layer a A more modular alternative to extending IKEv2 could be to layer a
modular negotiation mechanism on top of the multitude of existing or modular negotiation mechanism on top of the multitude of existing or
possible future secure channel protocols. For this, GRASP over TLS possible future secure channel protocols. For this, GRASP over TLS
could be considered as a first ACP secure channel negotiation could be considered as a first ACP secure channel negotiation
protocol. The following are initial considerations for such an protocol. The following are initial considerations for such an
approach. A full specification is subject to a separate document: approach. A full specification is subject to a separate document:
To explicitly allow negotiation of the ACP channel protocol, GRASP To explicitly allow negotiation of the ACP channel protocol, GRASP
over a TLS connection using the GRASP_LISTEN_PORT and the nodes and over a TLS connection using the GRASP_LISTEN_PORT and the node's and
peers link-local IPv6 address is used. When Alice and Bob support peer's link-local IPv6 address is used. When Alice and Bob support
GRASP negotiation, they do prefer it over any other non-explicitly GRASP negotiation, they do prefer it over any other non-explicitly
negotiated security association protocol and should wait trying any negotiated security association protocol and should wait trying any
non-negotiated ACP channel protocol until after it is clear that non-negotiated ACP channel protocol until after it is clear that
GRASP/TLS will not work to the peer. GRASP/TLS will not work to the peer.
When Alice and Bob successfully establish the GRASP/TSL session, they When Alice and Bob successfully establish the GRASP/TSL session, they
will negotiate the channel mechanism to use using objectives such as will negotiate the channel mechanism to use using objectives such as
performance and perceived quality of the security. After agreeing on performance and perceived quality of the security. After agreeing on
a channel mechanism, Alice and Bob start the selected Channel a channel mechanism, Alice and Bob start the selected Channel
protocol. Once the secure channel protocol is successfully running, protocol. Once the secure channel protocol is successfully running,
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unique to that TLS connection. unique to that TLS connection.
A.7. CAs, domains and routing subdomains A.7. CAs, domains and routing subdomains
There is a wide range of setting up different ACP solution by There is a wide range of setting up different ACP solution by
appropriately using CAs and the domain and rsub elements in the appropriately using CAs and the domain and rsub elements in the
domain information field of the domain certificate. We summarize domain information field of the domain certificate. We summarize
these options here as they have been explained in different parts of these options here as they have been explained in different parts of
the document in before and discuss possible and desirable extensions: the document in before and discuss possible and desirable extensions:
An ACP domain is the set of all ACP nodes using certificates from the An ACP domain is the set of all ACP nodes using certificates from one
same CA using the same domain field. GRASP inside the ACP is run or more Trust Anchors (TA) (typically one CA) using the same domain
across all transitively connected ACP nodes in a domain. field. GRASP inside the ACP is run across all transitively connected
ACP nodes in a domain.
The rsub element in the domain information field permits the use of The rsub element in the domain information field permits the use of
addresses from different ULA prefixes. One use case is to create addresses from different ULA prefixes. One use case is to create
multiple physical networks that initially may be separated with one multiple physical networks that initially may be separated with one
ACP domain but different routing subdomains, so that all nodes can ACP domain but different routing subdomains, so that all nodes can
mutual trust their ACP domain certificates (not depending on rsub) mutual trust their ACP domain certificates (not depending on rsub)
and so that they could connect later together into a contiguous ACP and so that they could connect later together into a contiguous ACP
network. network.
One instance of such a use case is an ACP for regions interconnected One instance of such a use case is an ACP for regions interconnected
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that are potentially also used by others. Nevertheless it is highly that are potentially also used by others. Nevertheless it is highly
recommended to use domain names that one can have high probability to recommended to use domain names that one can have high probability to
be unique. It is recommended to use domain names that start with a be unique. It is recommended to use domain names that start with a
DNS domain names owned by the assigning organization and unique DNS domain names owned by the assigning organization and unique
within it. For example "acp.example.com" if you own "example.com". within it. For example "acp.example.com" if you own "example.com".
A.8. Intent for the ACP A.8. Intent for the ACP
Intent is the architecture component of autonomic networks according Intent is the architecture component of autonomic networks according
to [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] that allows operators to issue to [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] that allows operators to issue
policies to the network. In a simple instance, Intent could simply policies to the network. Its applicability for use is quite flexible
be policies flooded across ACP GRASP and interpreted on every ACP and freeform, with potential applications including policies flooded
node. across ACP GRASP and interpreted on every ACP node.
One concern for future definitions of Intent solutions is the problem One concern for future definitions of Intent solutions is the problem
of circular dependencies when expressing Intent policies about the of circular dependencies when expressing Intent policies about the
ACP itself. ACP itself.
For example, Intent could indicate the desire to build an ACP across For example, Intent could indicate the desire to build an ACP across
all domains that have a common parent domain (without relying on the all domains that have a common parent domain (without relying on the
rsub/routing-subdomain solution defined in this document). For rsub/routing-subdomain solution defined in this document). For
example ACP nodes with domain "example.com", "access.example.com", example ACP nodes with domain "example.com", "access.example.com",
"core.example.com" and "city.core.example.com" should all establish "core.example.com" and "city.core.example.com" should all establish
one single ACP. one single ACP.
If each domain has its own source of Intent, then the Intent would If each domain has its own source of Intent, then the Intent would
simply have to allow adding the peer domains trust anchors (CA) and simply have to allow adding the peer domains trust anchors (CA) and
domain names to the ACP domain membership check (Section 6.1.2) so domain names to the ACP domain membership check (Section 6.1.3) so
that nodes from those other domains are accepted as ACP peers. that nodes from those other domains are accepted as ACP peers.
If this Intent was to be originated only from one domain, it could If this Intent was to be originated only from one domain, it could
likely not be made to work because the other domains will not build likely not be made to work because the other domains will not build
any ACP connection amongst each other, whether they use the same or any ACP connection amongst each other, whether they use the same or
different CA due to the ACP domain membership check. different CA due to the ACP domain membership check.
If the domains use the same CA one could change the ACP setup to If the domains use the same CA one could change the ACP setup to
permit for the ACP to be established between two ACP nodes with permit for the ACP to be established between two ACP nodes with
different acp-domain-names, but only for the purpose of disseminating different acp-domain-names, but only for the purpose of disseminating
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additional connectivity requirements. additional connectivity requirements.
Last but not least, secure channel protocols including their Last but not least, secure channel protocols including their
encapsulations are easily added to ACP solutions. ACP hop-by-hop encapsulations are easily added to ACP solutions. ACP hop-by-hop
network layer secure channels could also be replaced by end-to-end network layer secure channels could also be replaced by end-to-end
security plus other means for infrastructure protection. Any future security plus other means for infrastructure protection. Any future
network OAM should always use end-to-end security anyhow and can network OAM should always use end-to-end security anyhow and can
leverage the domain certificates and is therefore not dependent on leverage the domain certificates and is therefore not dependent on
security to be provided for by ACP secure channels. security to be provided for by ACP secure channels.
A.10. Further options / futures A.10. Further (future) options
A.10.1. Auto-aggregation of routes A.10.1. Auto-aggregation of routes
Routing in the ACP according to this specification only leverages the Routing in the ACP according to this specification only leverages the
standard RPL mechanism of route optimization, e.g. keeping only standard RPL mechanism of route optimization, e.g. keeping only
routes that are not towards the RPL root. This is known to scale to routes that are not towards the RPL root. This is known to scale to
networks with 20,000 or more nodes. There is no auto-aggregation of networks with 20,000 or more nodes. There is no auto-aggregation of
routes for /48 ULA prefixes (when using rsub in the domain routes for /48 ULA prefixes (when using rsub in the domain
information field) and/or Zone-ID based prefixes. information field) and/or Zone-ID based prefixes.
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ACP1 --------------------------- ACP2 . ACP1 --------------------------- ACP2 .
| | . WAN | | . WAN
| metric 10 metric 20 | . Core | metric 10 metric 20 | . Core
| | . | | .
ACP3 --------------------------- ACP4 . ACP3 --------------------------- ACP4 .
| metric 100 | | metric 100 |
| | . | | .
| | . Sites | | . Sites
ACP10 ACP11 . ACP10 ACP11 .
Figure 17: Dual NOC Figure 18: Dual NOC
The profile for RPL specified in this document builds only one The profile for RPL specified in this document builds only one
spanning-tree path set to a root (NOC). In the presence of multiple spanning-tree path set to a root (NOC). In the presence of multiple
NOCs, routing toward the non-root NOCs may be suboptimal. Figure 17 NOCs, routing toward the non-root NOCs may be suboptimal. Figure 18
shows an extreme example. Assuming that node ACP1 becomes the RPL shows an extreme example. Assuming that node ACP1 becomes the RPL
root, traffic between ACP11 and NOC2 will pass through root, traffic between ACP11 and NOC2 will pass through
ACP4-ACP3-ACP1-ACP2 instead of ACP4-ACP2 because the RPL calculated ACP4-ACP3-ACP1-ACP2 instead of ACP4-ACP2 because the RPL calculated
DODAG/routes are shortest paths towards the RPL root. DODAG/routes are shortest paths towards the RPL root.
To overcome these limitations, extensions/modifications to the RPL To overcome these limitations, extensions/modifications to the RPL
profile can provide optimality for multiple NOCs. This requires profile can provide optimality for multiple NOCs. This requires
utilizing Data-Plane artifact including IPinIP encap/decap on ACP utilizing Data-Plane artifact including IPinIP encap/decap on ACP
routers and processing of IPv6 RPI headers. Alternatively, (Src,Dst) routers and processing of IPv6 RPI headers. Alternatively, (Src,Dst)
routing table entries could be used. routing table entries could be used.
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Section 10.1 describes diagnostics options that can be done without Section 10.1 describes diagnostics options that can be done without
changing the external, interoperability affecting characteristics of changing the external, interoperability affecting characteristics of
ACP implementations. ACP implementations.
Even better diagnostics of ACP operations is possible with additional Even better diagnostics of ACP operations is possible with additional
signaling extensions, such as: signaling extensions, such as:
1. Consider if LLDP should be a recommended functionality for ANI 1. Consider if LLDP should be a recommended functionality for ANI
devices to improve diagnostics, and if so, which information devices to improve diagnostics, and if so, which information
elements it should signal (insecure). Includes potentially new elements it should signal (noting that such information is
conveyed in an insecure manner). Includes potentially new
information elements. information elements.
2. In alternative to LLDP, A DULL GRASP diagnostics objective could 2. In alternative to LLDP, A DULL GRASP diagnostics objective could
be defined to carry these information elements. be defined to carry these information elements.
3. The IDevID of BRSKI pledges should be included in the selected 3. The IDevID of BRSKI pledges should be included in the selected
insecure diagnostics option. insecure diagnostics option. This may be undesirable when
exposure of device information is seen as too much of a security
issue (ability to deduce possible attack vectors from device
model for example).
4. A richer set of diagnostics information should be made available 4. A richer set of diagnostics information should be made available
via the secured ACP channels, using either single-hop GRASP or via the secured ACP channels, using either single-hop GRASP or
network wide "topology discovery" mechanisms. network wide "topology discovery" mechanisms.
A.10.8. Avoiding and dealing with compromised ACP nodes A.10.8. Avoiding and dealing with compromised ACP nodes
Compromised ACP nodes pose the biggest risk to the operations of the Compromised ACP nodes pose the biggest risk to the operations of the
network. The most common type of compromise is leakage of network. The most common type of compromise is leakage of
credentials to manage/configure the device and the application of credentials to manage/configure the device and the application of
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limits unexpected propagation of credentials. limits unexpected propagation of credentials.
If password based credentials to configure devices still need to be If password based credentials to configure devices still need to be
supported, they must not be locally configurable, but only be supported, they must not be locally configurable, but only be
remotely provisioned or verified (through protocols like Radius or remotely provisioned or verified (through protocols like Radius or
Diameter), and there must be no local configuration permitting to Diameter), and there must be no local configuration permitting to
change these authentication mechanisms, but ideally they should be change these authentication mechanisms, but ideally they should be
autoconfiguring across the ACP. See autoconfiguring across the ACP. See
[I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig]. [I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig].
Without physcial access to the compromised device, attackers with Without physical access to the compromised device, attackers with
access to configuration should not be able to break the ACP access to configuration should not be able to break the ACP
connectivity, even when they can break or otherwise manipulate connectivity, even when they can break or otherwise manipulate
(spoof) the data-plane connectivity through configuration. To (spoof) the data-plane connectivity through configuration. To
achieve this, it is necessary to avoid providing configuration achieve this, it is necessary to avoid providing configuration
options for the ACP, such as enabling/disabling it on interfaces. options for the ACP, such as enabling/disabling it on interfaces.
For example there could be an ACP configuration that locks down the For example there could be an ACP configuration that locks down the
current ACP config unless factory reseet is done. current ACP config unless factory reseet is done.
With such means, the valid administration has the best chances to With such means, the valid administration has the best chances to
maintain access to ACP nodes, discover malicious configuration though maintain access to ACP nodes, discover malicious configuration though
ongoing configuration tracking from central locations for example, ongoing configuration tracking from central locations for example,
and to react accordingly. and to react accordingly.
The primary reaction is withdrawal/change of credentials, terminate The primary reaction is withdrawal/change of credentials, terminate
malicious existing management sessions and fixing the configuration. malicious existing management sessions and fixing the configuration.
Ensuring that manaement sessions using invalidated credentials are Ensuring that management sessions using invalidated credentials are
terminated automatically without recourse will likely require new terminated automatically without recourse will likely require new
work. work.
Only when these steps are not feasible would it be necessary to Only when these steps are not feasible would it be necessary to
revoke or expire the ACP domain certificate credentials and consider revoke or expire the ACP domain certificate credentials and consider
the node kicked off the network - until the situation can be further the node kicked off the network - until the situation can be further
rectified, likely requiring direct physical access to the node. rectified, likely requiring direct physical access to the node.
Without extensions, compromised ACP nodes can only be removed from Without extensions, compromised ACP nodes can only be removed from
the ACP at the speed of CRL/OCSP information refresh or expiry (and the ACP at the speed of CRL/OCSP information refresh or expiry (and
non-removal) of short lived certificates. Future extensions to the non-removal) of short lived certificates. Future extensions to the
ACP could for example use GRASP flooding distribution of triggered ACP could for example use GRASP flooding distribution of triggered
updates of CRL/OCSP or explicit removal indication of the compromised updates of CRL/OCSP or explicit removal indication of the compromised
nodes domain certificate. nodes domain certificate.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Toerless Eckert (editor) Toerless Eckert (editor)
Huawei USA - Futurewei Technologies Inc. Futurewei Technologies Inc. USA
2330 Central Expy 2330 Central Expy
Santa Clara 95050 Santa Clara 95050
USA USA
Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de
Michael H. Behringer (editor) Michael H. Behringer (editor)
Email: michael.h.behringer@gmail.com Email: michael.h.behringer@gmail.com
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