draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-23.txt   draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-24.txt 
ANIMA WG M. Pritikin ANIMA WG M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft Cisco Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson
Expires: January 22, 2020 Sandelman Expires: January 22, 2020 Sandelman
M. Behringer M. Behringer
S. Bjarnason
Arbor Networks
K. Watsen K. Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
July 22, 2019 July 21, 2019
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-23 draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-24
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
Control Plane. To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI) Control Plane. To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI)
is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificates, in
combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online
and offline. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable and offline. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
or on limited/disconnected networks. Support for lower security or on limited/disconnected networks. Support for lower security
models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
legacy reasons but not encouraged. Bootstrapping is complete when legacy reasons but not encouraged. Bootstrapping is complete when
the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
successfully deployed to the device but the established secure successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
device as well. device as well.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3.2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.4. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) . . . . . . . . 29 4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) . . . . . . . . 29
4.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1. Proxy GRASP announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.1.1. Proxy GRASP announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2. CoAP connection to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2. CoAP connection to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3. Proxy discovery and communication of Registrar . . . . . 33 4.3. Proxy discovery and communication of Registrar . . . . . 33
5. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA) . . . . . . . . 34 5. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA) . . . . . . . . 34
5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar . . . . . . . 36 5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar . . . . . . . 37
5.3. Registrar Authorization of 5.3. Registrar Authorization of
Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.5. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.5. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.5.1. MASA renewal of expired vouchers . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.5.1. MASA renewal of expired vouchers . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.5.2. MASA verification of voucher-request signature 5.5.2. MASA verification of voucher-request signature
consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.5.3. MASA authentication of registrar (certificate) . . . 41 5.5.3. MASA authentication of registrar (certificate) . . . 41
5.5.4. MASA revocation checking of registrar (certificate) . 41 5.5.4. MASA revocation checking of registrar (certificate) . 42
5.5.5. MASA verification of pledge prior-signed-voucher- 5.5.5. MASA verification of pledge prior-signed-voucher-
request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.5.6. MASA pinning of registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.5.6. MASA pinning of registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.5.7. MASA nonce handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.5.7. MASA nonce handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.6. MASA and Registrar Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.6. MASA and Registrar Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.6.1. Pledge voucher verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.6.1. Pledge voucher verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.6.2. Pledge authentication of provisional TLS connection . 45 5.6.2. Pledge authentication of provisional TLS connection . 46
5.7. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5.7. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.8. Registrar audit log request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.8. Registrar audit log request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.8.1. MASA audit log response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.8.1. MASA audit log response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.8.2. Registrar audit log verification . . . . . . . . . . 49 5.8.2. Registrar audit log verification . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.9. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.9. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.9.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 51 5.9.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 52
5.9.2. EST CSR Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.9.2. EST CSR Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.9.3. EST Client Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.9.3. EST Client Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.9.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.9.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.9.5. Multiple certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.9.5. Multiple certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.9.6. EST over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.9.6. EST over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6. Clarification of transfer-encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6. Clarification of transfer-encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7. Reduced security operational modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 7. Reduced security operational modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.1. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 7.1. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.2. Pledge security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 7.2. Pledge security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.3. Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 7.3. Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.4. MASA security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 7.4. MASA security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.1. Well-known EST registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.1. Well-known EST registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.2. PKIX Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.2. PKIX Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.3. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.3. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.4. DNS Service Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.4. DNS Service Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
9. Applicability to the Autonomic 9. Applicability to the Autonomic
Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.1. MASA audit log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.1. MASA audit log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.2. What BRSKI-MASA reveals to the manufacturer . . . . . . 61 10.2. What BRSKI-MASA reveals to the manufacturer . . . . . . 62
10.3. Manufacturers and Used or Stolen Equipment . . . . . . . 62 10.3. Manufacturers and Used or Stolen Equipment . . . . . . . 63
10.4. Manufacturers and Grey market equipment . . . . . . . . 63 10.4. Manufacturers and Grey market equipment . . . . . . . . 64
10.5. Some mitigations for meddling by manufacturers . . . . . 64 10.5. Some mitigations for meddling by manufacturers . . . . . 65
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.1. DoS against MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 11.1. DoS against MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.2. Freshness in Voucher-Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 11.2. Freshness in Voucher-Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3. Trusting manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.3. Trusting manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.4. Manufacturer Maintainance of trust anchors . . . . . . . 69 11.4. Manufacturer Maintenance of trust anchors . . . . . . . 70
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix A. IPv4 and non-ANI operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Appendix A. IPv4 and non-ANI operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.1. IPv4 Link Local addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 A.1. IPv4 Link Local addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.2. Use of DHCPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 A.2. Use of DHCPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Appendix B. mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options . . . . . . . . 77 Appendix B. mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options . . . . . . . . 78
Appendix C. MUD Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Appendix C. MUD Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix D. Example Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix D. Example Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
D.1. Keys involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 D.1. Keys involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
D.1.1. MASA key pair for voucher signatures . . . . . . . . 80 D.1.1. MASA key pair for voucher signatures . . . . . . . . 81
D.1.2. Manufacturer key pair for IDevID signatures . . . . . 80 D.1.2. Manufacturer key pair for IDevID signatures . . . . . 81
D.1.3. Registrar key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 D.1.3. Registrar key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
D.1.4. Pledge key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 D.1.4. Pledge key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
D.2. Example process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 D.2. Example process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
D.2.1. Pledge to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 D.2.1. Pledge to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
D.2.2. Registrar to MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 D.2.2. Registrar to MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
D.2.3. MASA to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 D.2.3. MASA to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BRSKI provides a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap BRSKI provides a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap
of new (unconfigured) devices that are called pledges in this of new (unconfigured) devices that are called pledges in this
document. document.
This document primarily provides for the needs of the ISP and This document primarily provides for the needs of the ISP and
Enterprise focused ANIMA Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) Enterprise focused ANIMA Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]. Other users of the BRSKI [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]. Other users of the BRSKI
protocol will need to provide separate applicability statements that protocol will need to provide separate applicability statements that
include privacy and security considerations appropriate to that include privacy and security considerations appropriate to that
deployment. Section Section 9 explains the details applicability for deployment. Section 9 explains the details applicability for this
this the ACP usage. the ACP usage.
This document describes how pledges discover (or be discovered by) an This document describes how pledges discover (or are discovered by)
element of the network domain to which the pledge belongs to perform an element of the network domain to which the pledge belongs to
the bootstrap. This element (device) is called the registrar. perform the bootstrap. This element (device) is called the
Before any other operation, pledge and registrar need to establish registrar. Before any other operation, pledge and registrar need to
mutual trust: establish mutual trust:
1. Registrar authenticating the pledge: "Who is this device? What 1. Registrar authenticating the pledge: "Who is this device? What
is its identity?" is its identity?"
2. Registrar authorizing the pledge: "Is it mine? Do I want it? 2. Registrar authorizing the pledge: "Is it mine? Do I want it?
What are the chances it has been compromised?" What are the chances it has been compromised?"
3. Pledge authenticating the registrar: "What is this registrar's 3. Pledge authenticating the registrar: "What is this registrar's
identity?" identity?"
4. Pledge authorizing the registrar: "Should I join it?" 4. Pledge authorizing the registrar: "Should I join it?"
This document details protocols and messages to answer the above This document details protocols and messages to answer the above
questions. It uses a TLS connection and an PKIX (X.509v3) questions. It uses a TLS connection and an PKIX (X.509v3)
certificate (an IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID] LDevID) of the pledge to answer certificate (an IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID] LDevID) of the pledge to answer
points 1 and 2. It uses a new artifact called a "voucher" that the points 1 and 2. It uses a new artifact called a "voucher" that the
registrar receives from a "Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority" registrar receives from a "Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority"
and passes to the pledge to answer points 3 and 4. (MASA) and passes to the pledge to answer points 3 and 4.
A proxy provides very limited connectivity between the pledge and the A proxy provides very limited connectivity between the pledge and the
registrar. registrar.
The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in
[RFC8366]. This document details automated protocol mechanisms to [RFC8366]. This document details automated protocol mechanisms to
obtain vouchers, including the definition of a 'voucher-request' obtain vouchers, including the definition of a 'voucher-request'
message that is a minor extension to the voucher format (see message that is a minor extension to the voucher format (see
Section 3) defined by [RFC8366]. Section 3) defined by [RFC8366].
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o and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not o and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not
an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key
material is not autonomic). material is not autonomic).
These "touch" methods do not meet the requirements for zero-touch. These "touch" methods do not meet the requirements for zero-touch.
There are "call home" technologies where the pledge first establishes There are "call home" technologies where the pledge first establishes
a connection to a well known manufacturer service using a common a connection to a well known manufacturer service using a common
client-server authentication model. After mutual authentication, client-server authentication model. After mutual authentication,
appropriate credentials to authenticate the target domain are appropriate credentials to authenticate the target domain are
transfered to the pledge. This creates serveral problems and transferred to the pledge. This creates several problems and
limitations: limitations:
o the pledge requires realtime connectivity to the manufacturer o the pledge requires realtime connectivity to the manufacturer
service, service,
o the domain identity is exposed to the manufacturer service (this o the domain identity is exposed to the manufacturer service (this
is a privacy concern), is a privacy concern),
o the manufacturer is responsible for making the authorization o the manufacturer is responsible for making the authorization
decisions (this is a liability concern), decisions (this is a liability concern),
BRSKI addresses these issues by defining extensions to the EST BRSKI addresses these issues by defining extensions to the EST
protocol for the automated distribution of vouchers. protocol for the automated distribution of vouchers.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
[RFC2119]. 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are defined for clarity: The following terms are defined for clarity:
domainID: The domain IDentity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT domainID: The domain IDentity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT
STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the pinned-domain-cert leaf, STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the pinned-domain-cert leaf,
i.e. the Registrars' certificate. This is consistent with the i.e. the Registrars' certificate. This is consistent with the
subject key identifier (Section 4.2.1.2 [RFC5280]). subject key identifier (Section 4.2.1.2 [RFC5280]).
drop ship: The physical distribution of equipment containing the drop-ship: The physical distribution of equipment containing the
"factory default" configuration to a final destination. In zero- "factory default" configuration to a final destination. In zero-
touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during
drop-ship. drop-ship.
imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key
material to identify and trust future interactions with a network. material to identify and trust future interactions with a network.
This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new
ducklings: during a critical period, the duckling would assume ducklings: during a critical period, the duckling would assume
that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their
mother. An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint mother. An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint
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the private key that defines the domain. Optionally, it certifies the private key that defines the domain. Optionally, it certifies
all elements. all elements.
Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain
that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new
device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the
domain interfaces with a "join registrar (and coordinator)" to domain interfaces with a "join registrar (and coordinator)" to
control this process. Typically a join registrar is "inside" its control this process. Typically a join registrar is "inside" its
domain. For simplicity this document often refers to this as just domain. For simplicity this document often refers to this as just
"registrar". Within [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] this is "registrar". Within [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] this is
refered to as the "join registrar autonomic service agent". Other referred to as the "join registrar autonomic service agent".
communities use the abbreviation "JRC". Other communities use the abbreviation "JRC".
(Public) Key Infrastructure: The collection of systems and processes (Public) Key Infrastructure: The collection of systems and processes
that sustain the activities of a public key system. The registrar that sustain the activities of a public key system. The registrar
acts as an [RFC5280] and [RFC5272] (see section 7) "Registration acts as an [RFC5280] and [RFC5272] (see section 7) "Registration
Authority". Authority".
Join Proxy: A domain entity that helps the pledge join the domain. Join Proxy: A domain entity that helps the pledge join the domain.
A join proxy facilitates communication for devices that find A join proxy facilitates communication for devices that find
themselves in an environment where they are not provided themselves in an environment where they are not provided
connectivity until after they are validated as members of the connectivity until after they are validated as members of the
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IPIP Proxy: A stateless proxy alternative. IPIP Proxy: A stateless proxy alternative.
MASA Service: A third-party Manufacturer Authorized Signing MASA Service: A third-party Manufacturer Authorized Signing
Authority (MASA) service on the global Internet. The MASA signs Authority (MASA) service on the global Internet. The MASA signs
vouchers. It also provides a repository for audit log information vouchers. It also provides a repository for audit log information
of privacy protected bootstrapping events. It does not track of privacy protected bootstrapping events. It does not track
ownership. ownership.
Ownership Tracker: An Ownership Tracker service on the global Ownership Tracker: An Ownership Tracker service on the global
internet. The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to Internet. The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to
accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains
that have purchased them. Although optional, this component that have purchased them. Although optional, this component
allows vendors to provide additional value in cases where their allows vendors to provide additional value in cases where their
sales and distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of sales and distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of
such ownership. Ownership tracking information is indicated in such ownership. Ownership tracking information is indicated in
vouchers as described in [RFC8366] vouchers as described in [RFC8366]
IDevID: An Initial Device Identity X.509 certificate installed by IDevID: An Initial Device Identity X.509 certificate installed by
the vendor on new equipment. the vendor on new equipment.
skipping to change at page 10, line 32 skipping to change at page 10, line 32
That stock ("SKU") could be provided to a number of potential domain That stock ("SKU") could be provided to a number of potential domain
owners, and the eventual domain owner will not know a-priori which owners, and the eventual domain owner will not know a-priori which
device will go to which location. device will go to which location.
The bootstrapping process can take minutes to complete depending on The bootstrapping process can take minutes to complete depending on
the network infrastructure and device processing speed. The network the network infrastructure and device processing speed. The network
communication itself is not optimized for speed; for privacy reasons, communication itself is not optimized for speed; for privacy reasons,
the discovery process allows for the pledge to avoid announcing its the discovery process allows for the pledge to avoid announcing its
presence through broadcasting. presence through broadcasting.
Nomadic or mobile devices often need to aquire credentials to access Nomadic or mobile devices often need to acquire credentials to access
the network at the new location. An example of this is mobile phone the network at the new location. An example of this is mobile phone
roaming among network operators, or even between cell towers. This roaming among network operators, or even between cell towers. This
is usually called handoff. BRSKI does not provide a low-latency is usually called handoff. BRSKI does not provide a low-latency
handoff which is usually a requirement in such situations. For these handoff which is usually a requirement in such situations. For these
solutions BRSKI can be used to create a relationship (an LDevID) with solutions BRSKI can be used to create a relationship (an LDevID) with
the "home" domain owner. The resulting credentials are then used to the "home" domain owner. The resulting credentials are then used to
provide credentials more appropriate for a low-latency handoff. provide credentials more appropriate for a low-latency handoff.
1.3.2. Constrained environments 1.3.2. Constrained environments
Questions have been posed as to whether this solution is suitable in Questions have been posed as to whether this solution is suitable in
general for Internet of Things (IoT) networks. This depends on the general for Internet of Things (IoT) networks. This depends on the
capabilities of the devices in question. The terminology of capabilities of the devices in question. The terminology of
[RFC7228] is best used to describe the boundaries. [RFC7228] is best used to describe the boundaries.
The solution described in this document is aimed in general at non- The solution described in this document is aimed in general at non-
constrained (i.e., class 2+) devices operating on a non-Challenged constrained (i.e., class 2+ [RFC7228]) devices operating on a non-
network. The entire solution as described here is not intended to be Challenged network. The entire solution as described here is not
useable as-is by constrained devices operating on challenged networks intended to be useable as-is by constrained devices operating on
(such as 802.15.4 LLNs). challenged networks (such as 802.15.4 LLNs).
Specifically, there are protocol aspects described here that might Specifically, there are protocol aspects described here that might
result in congestion collapse or energy-exhaustion of intermediate result in congestion collapse or energy-exhaustion of intermediate
battery powered routers in an LLN. Those types of networks SHOULD battery powered routers in an LLN. Those types of networks SHOULD
NOT use this solution. These limitations are predominately related NOT use this solution. These limitations are predominately related
to the large credential and key sizes required for device to the large credential and key sizes required for device
authentication. Defining symmetric key techniques that meet the authentication. Defining symmetric key techniques that meet the
operational requirements is out-of-scope but the underlying protocol operational requirements is out-of-scope but the underlying protocol
operations (TLS handshake and signing structures) have sufficient operations (TLS handshake and signing structures) have sufficient
algorithm agility to support such techniques when defined. algorithm agility to support such techniques when defined.
skipping to change at page 11, line 30 skipping to change at page 11, line 30
The certificate contents, and the process by which the four questions The certificate contents, and the process by which the four questions
above are resolved do apply to constrained devices. It is simply the above are resolved do apply to constrained devices. It is simply the
actual on-the-wire imprint protocol that could be inappropriate. actual on-the-wire imprint protocol that could be inappropriate.
1.3.3. Network Access Controls 1.3.3. Network Access Controls
This document presumes that network access control has either already This document presumes that network access control has either already
occurred, is not required, or is integrated by the proxy and occurred, is not required, or is integrated by the proxy and
registrar in such a way that the device itself does not need to be registrar in such a way that the device itself does not need to be
aware of the details. Although the use of an X.509 Initial Device aware of the details. Although the use of an X.509 Initial Device
Identity is consistant with IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID], and allows for Identity is consistent with IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID], and allows for
alignment with 802.1X network access control methods, its use here is alignment with 802.1X network access control methods, its use here is
for pledge authentication rather than network access control. for pledge authentication rather than network access control.
Integrating this protocol with network access control, perhaps as an Integrating this protocol with network access control, perhaps as an
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method (see [RFC3748]), is Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method (see [RFC3748]), is
out-of-scope. out-of-scope.
1.3.4. Bootstrapping is not Booting 1.3.4. Bootstrapping is not Booting
This document describes "bootstrapping" as the protocol used to This document describes "bootstrapping" as the protocol used to
obtain a local trust anchor. It is expected that this trust anchor, obtain a local trust anchor. It is expected that this trust anchor,
along with any additional configuration information subsequently along with any additional configuration information subsequently
installed, is persisted on the device across system restarts installed, is persisted on the device across system restarts
("booting"). Bootstrapping occurs only infrequently such as when a ("booting"). Bootstrapping occurs only infrequently such as when a
device is transfered to a new owner or has been reset to factory device is transferred to a new owner or has been reset to factory
default settings. default settings.
1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps 1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps
As a result of the protocol described herein, the bootstrapped As a result of the protocol described herein, the bootstrapped
devices have the Domain CA trust anchor in common. An end entity devices have the Domain CA trust anchor in common. An end entity
certificate has optionally been issued from the Domain CA. This certificate has optionally been issued from the Domain CA. This
makes it possible to securely deploy functionalities across the makes it possible to securely deploy functionalities across the
domain, e.g: domain, e.g:
skipping to change at page 12, line 20 skipping to change at page 12, line 20
o Service discovery. o Service discovery.
The major beneficiary is that it possible to use the credentials The major beneficiary is that it possible to use the credentials
deployed by this protocol to secure the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) deployed by this protocol to secure the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)
([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]). ([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]).
1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices 1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices
The BRSKI protocol can be used in a number of environments. Some of The BRSKI protocol can be used in a number of environments. Some of
the options in this document is the result of requirements that are the options in this document are the result of requirements that are
out of the ANI scope. This section defines the base requirements for out of the ANI scope. This section defines the base requirements for
ANI devices. ANI devices.
For devices that intend to become part of an Autonomic Network For devices that intend to become part of an Autonomic Network
Infrastructure (ANI) ([I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]) that includes Infrastructure (ANI) ([I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]) that includes
an Autonomic Control Plane an Autonomic Control Plane
([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]), the BRSKI protocol MUST ([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]), the BRSKI protocol MUST
be implemented. be implemented.
The pledge must perform discovery of the proxy as described in The pledge must perform discovery of the proxy as described in
Section 4.1 using GRASP M_FLOOD announcements. Section 4.1 using GRASP [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] M_FLOOD announcements.
Upon successfully validating a voucher artiface, a status telemetry Upon successfully validating a voucher artifact, a status telemetry
MUST be returned. See Section 5.7. MUST be returned. See Section 5.7.
An ANIMA ANI pledge MUST implement the EST automation extensions An ANIMA ANI pledge MUST implement the EST automation extensions
described in Section 5.9. They supplement the [RFC7030] EST to described in Section 5.9. They supplement the [RFC7030] EST to
better support automated devices that do not have an end user. better support automated devices that do not have an end user.
The ANI Join Registrar ASA MUST support all the BRSKI and above The ANI Join Registrar ASA MUST support all the BRSKI and above
listed EST operations. listed EST operations.
All ANI devices SHOULD support the BRSKI proxy function, using All ANI devices SHOULD support the BRSKI proxy function, using
skipping to change at page 14, line 37 skipping to change at page 14, line 37
| | Join | | | Join |
| +------+-------+ | +------+-------+
| | | |
| +------v-------+ | +------v-------+
| | (4) Imprint | | | (4) Imprint |
^------------+ | ^------------+ |
| Bad MASA +------+-------+ | Bad MASA +------+-------+
| response | send Voucher Status Telemetry | response | send Voucher Status Telemetry
| +------v-------+ | +------v-------+
| | (5) Enroll |<---+ (non-error HTTP codes ) | | (5) Enroll |<---+ (non-error HTTP codes )
^------------+ |\___/ (e.g. 201 'Retry-After') ^------------+ |\___/ (e.g. 202 'Retry-After')
| Enroll +------+-------+ | Enroll +------+-------+
| Failure | | Failure |
| -----v------ | -----v------
| / Enrolled \ | / Enrolled \
^------------+ | ^------------+ |
Factory \------------/ Factory \------------/
reset reset
Figure 2: pledge state diagram Figure 2: pledge state diagram
skipping to change at page 17, line 44 skipping to change at page 17, line 44
requests are always passed up to the MASA. requests are always passed up to the MASA.
As explained in Section 5.5 the Registrar MUST extract the serial- As explained in Section 5.5 the Registrar MUST extract the serial-
number again itself from the pledge's TLS certificate. It can number again itself from the pledge's TLS certificate. It can
consult the serial-number in the pledge-request if there are any consult the serial-number in the pledge-request if there are any
possible confusion about the source of the serial-number (hwSerialNum possible confusion about the source of the serial-number (hwSerialNum
vs serialNumber). vs serialNumber).
2.3.2. MASA URI extension 2.3.2. MASA URI extension
This docucment defines a new PKIX non-critical certificate extension This document defines a new PKIX non-critical certificate extension
to carry the MASA URI. This extension is intended to be used in the to carry the MASA URI. This extension is intended to be used in the
IDevID certificate. The URI is represented as described in IDevID certificate. The URI is represented as described in
Section 7.4 of [RFC5280]. Section 7.4 of [RFC5280].
Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
in the certificate extension. The IRI provides the authority in the certificate extension. The IRI provides the authority
information. The BRSKI "/.well-known" tree ([RFC5785]) is described information. The BRSKI "/.well-known" tree ([RFC5785]) is described
in Section 5. in Section 5.
As explained in [RFC5280] section 7.4, a complete IRI SHOULD be in As explained in [RFC5280] section 7.4, a complete IRI SHOULD be in
this extension, including the scheme, iauthority, and ipath. As a this extension, including the scheme, iauthority, and ipath. As a
consideration to constrained systems, this MAY be reduced to only the consideration to constrained systems, this MAY be reduced to only the
iauthority, in which case a scheme of "https://" and ipath of iauthority, in which case a scheme of "https://" ([RFC7230] section
"/.well-known/est" is to be assumed, as explained in section 2.7.3) and ipath of "/.well-known/est" is to be assumed, as explained
Section 5. in Section 5.
The registrary can assume that only the iauthority is present in the The registrar can assume that only the iauthority is present in the
extension, if there are no slash ("/") characters in the extension. extension, if there are no slash ("/") characters in the extension.
Section 7.4 of [RFC5280] calls out various schemes that MUST be Section 7.4 of [RFC5280] calls out various schemes that MUST be
supported, including ldap, http and ftp. However, the registrar MUST supported, including LDAP, HTTP and FTP. However, the registrar MUST
use https for the BRSKI-MASA connection. use HTTPS for the BRSKI-MASA connection.
The new extension is identified as follows: The new extension is identified as follows:
<CODE BEGINS> <CODE BEGINS>
MASAURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) MASAURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) } id-mod(0) id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
skipping to change at page 21, line 38 skipping to change at page 21, line 38
The registrar uses an Implicit Trust Anchor database for The registrar uses an Implicit Trust Anchor database for
authenticating the BRSKI-MASA TLS connection MASA certificate. The authenticating the BRSKI-MASA TLS connection MASA certificate. The
registrar uses a different Implicit Trust Anchor database for registrar uses a different Implicit Trust Anchor database for
authenticating the BRSKI-EST TLS connection pledge client authenticating the BRSKI-EST TLS connection pledge client
certificate. Configuration or distribution of these trust anchor certificate. Configuration or distribution of these trust anchor
databases is out-of-scope of this specification. databases is out-of-scope of this specification.
2.5.4. Manufacturer Service 2.5.4. Manufacturer Service
The Manufacturer Service provides two logically seperate functions: The Manufacturer Service provides two logically separate functions:
the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) described in the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) described in
Section 5.5 and Section 5.6, and an ownership tracking/auditing Section 5.5 and Section 5.6, and an ownership tracking/auditing
function described in Section 5.7 and Section 5.8. function described in Section 5.7 and Section 5.8.
2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) administers certificates for the The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) administers certificates for the
domain of concerns, providing the trust anchor(s) for it and allowing domain of concerns, providing the trust anchor(s) for it and allowing
enrollment of pledges with domain certificates. enrollment of pledges with domain certificates.
skipping to change at page 22, line 24 skipping to change at page 22, line 24
2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock 2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock
Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current
time. Mechanisms such as Network Time Protocols cannot be secured time. Mechanisms such as Network Time Protocols cannot be secured
until bootstrapping is complete. Therefore bootstrapping is defined until bootstrapping is complete. Therefore bootstrapping is defined
in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time. A in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time. A
pledge MAY ignore all time stamps in the voucher and in the pledge MAY ignore all time stamps in the voucher and in the
certificate validity periods if it does not know the current time. certificate validity periods if it does not know the current time.
The pledge is exposed to dates in the following five places: The pledge is exposed to dates in the following five places:
registrar certificate notBefore, registrar certificiate notAfter, registrar certificate notBefore, registrar certificate notAfter,
voucher created-on, and voucher expires-on. Additionally, CMS voucher created-on, and voucher expires-on. Additionally, CMS
signatures contain a signingTime. signatures contain a signingTime.
If the voucher contains a nonce then the pledge MUST confirm the If the voucher contains a nonce then the pledge MUST confirm the
nonce matches the original pledge voucher-request. This ensures the nonce matches the original pledge voucher-request. This ensures the
voucher is fresh. See Section 5.2. voucher is fresh. See Section 5.2.
2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID 2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID
[RFC5280] explains that long lived pledge certificates "SHOULD be [RFC5280] explains that long lived pledge certificates "SHOULD be
skipping to change at page 22, line 46 skipping to change at page 22, line 46
MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring pledge MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring pledge
lifetimes if they did not follow the RFC5280 recommendations. lifetimes if they did not follow the RFC5280 recommendations.
For example, IDevID may have incorrect lifetime of N <= 3 years, For example, IDevID may have incorrect lifetime of N <= 3 years,
rendering replacement pledges from storage useless after N years rendering replacement pledges from storage useless after N years
unless registrars support ignoring such a lifetime. unless registrars support ignoring such a lifetime.
2.7. Cloud Registrar 2.7. Cloud Registrar
There exist operationally open network wherein devices gain There exist operationally open network wherein devices gain
unauthenticated access to the internet at large. In these use cases unauthenticated access to the Internet at large. In these use cases
the management domain for the device needs to be discovered within the management domain for the device needs to be discovered within
the larger internet. These are less likely within the anima scope the larger Internet. These are less likely within the anima scope
but may be more important in the future. but may be more important in the future.
There are additionally some greenfield situations involving an There are additionally some greenfield situations involving an
entirely new installation where a device may have some kind of entirely new installation where a device may have some kind of
management uplink that it can use (such as via 3G network for management uplink that it can use (such as via 3G network for
instance). In such a future situation, the device might use this instance). In such a future situation, the device might use this
management interface to learn that it should configure itself to management interface to learn that it should configure itself to
become the local registrar. become the local registrar.
In order to support these scenarios, the pledge MAY contact a well In order to support these scenarios, the pledge MAY contact a well
skipping to change at page 25, line 8 skipping to change at page 25, line 8
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a
voucher-request document. The voucher-request builds upon the voucher-request document. The voucher-request builds upon the
voucher artifact described in [RFC8366]. The tree diagram is voucher artifact described in [RFC8366]. The tree diagram is
described in [RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described described in [RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described
by the YANG module in Section 3.4. Please review the YANG module for by the YANG module in Section 3.4. Please review the YANG module for
a detailed description of the voucher-request format. a detailed description of the voucher-request format.
module: ietf-voucher-request module: ietf-voucher-request
grouping voucher-request-grouping grouping voucher-request-grouping
+---- voucher +-- voucher
+---- created-on? yang:date-and-time +-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- expires-on? yang:date-and-time +-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- assertion? enumeration +-- assertion? enumeration
+---- serial-number string +-- serial-number string
+---- idevid-issuer? binary +-- idevid-issuer? binary
+---- pinned-domain-cert? binary +-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+---- nonce? binary +-- nonce? binary
+---- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time +-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+---- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary +-- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary
+---- proximity-registrar-cert? binary +-- proximity-registrar-cert? binary
3.3. Examples 3.3. Examples
This section provides voucher-request examples for illustration This section provides voucher-request examples for illustration
purposes. For detailed examples, see Appendix D.2. These examples purposes. The contents of the certificate have been elided to save
space. For detailed examples, see Appendix D.2. These examples
conform to the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951]. conform to the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951].
Example (1) The following example illustrates a pledge voucher- Example (1) The following example illustrates a pledge voucher-
request. The assertion leaf is indicated as 'proximity' request. The assertion leaf is indicated as 'proximity'
and the registrar's TLS server certificate is included and the registrar's TLS server certificate is included
in the 'proximity-registrar-cert' leaf. See in the 'proximity-registrar-cert' leaf. See
Section 5.2. Section 5.2.
{ {
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": { "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5", "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"serial-number" : "JADA123456789",
"created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
"proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==" "proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
} }
} }
Example (2) The following example illustrates a registrar voucher- Example (2) The following example illustrates a registrar voucher-
request. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is request. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is
populated with the pledge's voucher-request (such as the populated with the pledge's voucher-request (such as the
prior example). The pledge's voucher-request is a prior example). The pledge's voucher-request is a
binary object. In the JSON encoding used here it must binary object. In the JSON encoding used here it must
skipping to change at page 27, line 10 skipping to change at page 27, line 10
description "This import statement is only present to access description "This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040."; the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol"; reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
} }
import ietf-voucher { import ietf-voucher {
prefix v; prefix v;
description "This module defines the format for a voucher, description "This module defines the format for a voucher,
which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or
delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to
an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure
conn ection to the owner's network infrastructure"; connection to the owner's network infrastructure";
reference "RFC YYYY: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols"; reference "RFC 8366: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
} }
organization organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group"; "IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/> "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net> <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>
Author: Michael H. Behringer
<mailto:Michael.H.Behringer@gmail.com>
Author: Steinthor Bjarnason
<mailto:sbjarnason@arbor.net>
Author: Max Pritikin Author: Max Pritikin
<mailto:pritikin@cisco.com> <mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>
Author: Michael Richardson Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>";
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>";
description description
"This module defines the format for a voucher request. "This module defines the format for a voucher request.
It is a superset of the voucher itself. It is a superset of the voucher itself.
It provides content to the MASA for consideration It provides content to the MASA for consideration
during a voucher request. during a voucher request.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved. authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC
itself for full legal notices."; itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2018-02-14" { revision "2018-02-14" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols"; "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
} }
skipping to change at page 28, line 34 skipping to change at page 28, line 36
mandatory false; mandatory false;
} }
refine "voucher/pinned-domain-cert" { refine "voucher/pinned-domain-cert" {
mandatory false; mandatory false;
} }
refine "voucher/domain-cert-revocation-checks" { refine "voucher/domain-cert-revocation-checks" {
description "The domain-cert-revocation-checks field description "The domain-cert-revocation-checks field
is not valid in a voucher request, and is not valid in a voucher request, and
any occurance MUST be ignored"; any occurence MUST be ignored";
} }
refine "voucher/assertion" { refine "voucher/assertion" {
mandatory false; mandatory false;
description "Any assertion included in voucher description "Any assertion included in voucher
requests SHOULD be ignored by the MASA."; requests SHOULD be ignored by the MASA.";
} }
augment "voucher" { augment "voucher" {
description description
skipping to change at page 29, line 50 skipping to change at page 30, line 5
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) 4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar)
The role of the proxy is to facilitate communications. The proxy The role of the proxy is to facilitate communications. The proxy
forwards packets between the pledge and a registrar that has been forwards packets between the pledge and a registrar that has been
provisioned to the proxy via GRASP discovery. provisioned to the proxy via GRASP discovery.
This section defines a stateful proxy mechanism which is refered to This section defines a stateful proxy mechanism which is referred to
as a "circuit" proxy. as a "circuit" proxy.
The proxy does not terminate the TLS handshake: it passes streams of The proxy does not terminate the TLS handshake: it passes streams of
bytes onward without examination. A proxy MUST NOT assume any bytes onward without examination. A proxy MUST NOT assume any
specific TLS version. specific TLS version.
A Registrar can directly provide the proxy announcements described A Registrar can directly provide the proxy announcements described
below, in which case the announced port can point directly to the below, in which case the announced port can point directly to the
Registrar itself. In this scenario the pledge is unaware that there Registrar itself. In this scenario the pledge is unaware that there
is no proxing occuring. This is useful for Registrars servicing is no proxing occurring. This is useful for Registrars servicing
pledges on directly connected networks. pledges on directly connected networks.
As a result of the proxy Discovery process in Section 4.1.1, the port As a result of the proxy Discovery process in Section 4.1.1, the port
number exposed by the proxy does not need to be well known, or number exposed by the proxy does not need to be well known, or
require an IANA allocation. require an IANA allocation.
During the discovery of the Registrar by the Join Proxy, the Join During the discovery of the Registrar by the Join Proxy, the Join
Proxy will also learn which kinds of proxy mechanisms are available. Proxy will also learn which kinds of proxy mechanisms are available.
This will allow the Join Proxy to use the lowest impact mechanism This will allow the Join Proxy to use the lowest impact mechanism
which the Join Proxy and Registrar have in common. which the Join Proxy and Registrar have in common.
In order to permit the proxy functionality to be implemented on the In order to permit the proxy functionality to be implemented on the
maximum variety of devices the chosen mechanism SHOULD use the maximum variety of devices the chosen mechanism should use the
minimum amount of state on the proxy device. While many devices in minimum amount of state on the proxy device. While many devices in
the ANIMA target space will be rather large routers, the proxy the ANIMA target space will be rather large routers, the proxy
function is likely to be implemented in the control plane CPU of such function is likely to be implemented in the control plane CPU of such
a device, with available capabilities for the proxy function similar a device, with available capabilities for the proxy function similar
to many class 2 IoT devices. to many class 2 IoT devices.
The document [I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] provides a The document [I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] provides a
more extensive analysis and background of the alternative proxy more extensive analysis and background of the alternative proxy
methods. methods.
skipping to change at page 31, line 20 skipping to change at page 31, line 22
Once a proxy is discovered the pledge communicates with a registrar Once a proxy is discovered the pledge communicates with a registrar
through the proxy using the bootstrapping protocol defined in through the proxy using the bootstrapping protocol defined in
Section 5. Section 5.
While the GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism is passive for the pledge, the While the GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism is passive for the pledge, the
optional other methods (mDNS, and IPv4 methods) are active. The optional other methods (mDNS, and IPv4 methods) are active. The
pledge SHOULD run those methods in parallel with listening to for the pledge SHOULD run those methods in parallel with listening to for the
M_FLOOD. The active methods SHOULD exponentially back-off to a M_FLOOD. The active methods SHOULD exponentially back-off to a
maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network with discovery maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network with discovery
attempts. Detection of change of physical link status (ethernet attempts. Detection of change of physical link status (Ethernet
carrier for instance) SHOULD reset the exponential back off. carrier for instance) SHOULD reset the exponential back off.
The pledge could discover more than one proxy on a given physical The pledge could discover more than one proxy on a given physical
interface. The pledge can have a multitude of physical interfaces as interface. The pledge can have a multitude of physical interfaces as
well: a layer-2/3 ethernet switch may have hundreds of physical well: a layer-2/3 Ethernet switch may have hundreds of physical
ports. ports.
Each possible proxy offer SHOULD be attempted up to the point where a Each possible proxy offer SHOULD be attempted up to the point where a
voucher is received: while there are many ways in which the attempt voucher is received: while there are many ways in which the attempt
may fail, it does not succeed until the voucher has been validated. may fail, it does not succeed until the voucher has been validated.
The connection attempts via a single proxy SHOULD exponentially back- The connection attempts via a single proxy SHOULD exponentially back-
off to a maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network off to a maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network
infrastructure. The back-off timer for each MUST be independent of infrastructure. The back-off timer for each MUST be independent of
other connection attempts. other connection attempts.
Connection attempts SHOULD be run in parallel to avoid head of queue Connection attempts SHOULD be run in parallel to avoid head of queue
problems wherein an attacker running a fake proxy or registrar could problems wherein an attacker running a fake proxy or registrar could
perform protocol actions intentionally slowly. The pledge SHOULD perform protocol actions intentionally slowly. Connection attempts
continue to listen to for additional GRASP M_FLOOD messages during to different proxies SHOULD be sent with an interval of 3 to 5s. The
the connection attempts. pledge SHOULD continue to listen to for additional GRASP M_FLOOD
messages during the connection attempts.
Once a connection to a registrar is established (e.g. establishment Once a connection to a registrar is established (e.g. establishment
of a TLS session key) there are expectations of more timely of a TLS session key) there are expectations of more timely
responses, see Section 5.2. responses, see Section 5.2.
Once all discovered services are attempted (assuming that none Once all discovered services are attempted (assuming that none
succeeded) the device MUST return to listening for GRASP M_FLOOD. It succeeded) the device MUST return to listening for GRASP M_FLOOD. It
SHOULD periodically retry the manufacturer specific mechanisms. The SHOULD periodically retry the manufacturer specific mechanisms. The
pledge MAY prioritize selection order as appropriate for the pledge MAY prioritize selection order as appropriate for the
anticipated environment. anticipated environment.
skipping to change at page 33, line 17 skipping to change at page 33, line 21
The use of CoAP to connect from pledge to registrar is out of scope The use of CoAP to connect from pledge to registrar is out of scope
for this document, and is described in future work. See for this document, and is described in future work. See
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]. [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].
4.3. Proxy discovery and communication of Registrar 4.3. Proxy discovery and communication of Registrar
The registrar SHOULD announce itself so that proxies can find it and The registrar SHOULD announce itself so that proxies can find it and
determine what kind of connections can be terminated. determine what kind of connections can be terminated.
The registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using The registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using
M_FLOOD messages. ANI proxies MUST support GRASP discovery of M_FLOOD messages. A registrar may announce any convenient port
registrars. number, including using a stock port 443. ANI proxies MUST support
GRASP discovery of registrars.
The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows: The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows:
[M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', 180000, [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', 180000,
["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "EST-TLS"], ["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "EST-TLS"],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR, [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 80]] h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 8443]]
Figure 7a: Registrar Discovery Figure 7a: Registrar Discovery
The formal CDDL definition is: The formal CDDL definition is:
flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl, flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl,
+[objective, (locator-option / [])]] +[objective, (locator-option / [])]]
objective = ["AN_join_registrar", objective-flags, loop-count, objective = ["AN_join_registrar", objective-flags, loop-count,
objective-value] objective-value]
initiator = ACP address to contact Registrar initiator = ACP address to contact Registrar
objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec
sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization
loop-count = 255 ; mandatory maximum loop-count = 255 ; mandatory maximum
objective-value = text ; name of the (list of) of supported objective-value = text ; name of the (list of) of supported
; protocols: "EST-TLS" for RFC7030. ; protocols: "EST-TLS" for RFC7030.
Figure 7: AN_join_registrar CDDL Figure 7: AN_join_registrar CDDL
The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The default SHOULD be
The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The period is subject 60 seconds, the value SHOULD be operator configurable but SHOULD be
to network administrator policy (EST server configuration). It must not smaller than 60 seconds. The frequency of sending MUST be such
be sufficiently low that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs from all flooding
from all EST servers causes negligible traffic across the ACP. sources cause only negligible traffic across the ACP.
Here are some examples of locators for illustrative purposes. Only Here are some examples of locators for illustrative purposes. Only
the first one ($transport-protocol = 6, TCP) is defined in this the first one ($transport-protocol = 6, TCP) is defined in this
document and is mandatory to implement. document and is mandatory to implement.
locator1 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 6, 443] locator1 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 6, 443]
locator2 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 17, 5683] locator2 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 17, 5683]
locator3 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fe80::1234, 41, nil] locator3 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fe80::1234, 41, nil]
A protocol of 6 indicates that TCP proxying on the indicated port is A protocol of 6 indicates that TCP proxying on the indicated port is
skipping to change at page 34, line 46 skipping to change at page 35, line 4
BRSKI is described as extensions to EST [RFC7030]. The goal of these BRSKI is described as extensions to EST [RFC7030]. The goal of these
extensions is to reduce the number of TLS connections and crypto extensions is to reduce the number of TLS connections and crypto
operations required on the pledge. The registrar implements the operations required on the pledge. The registrar implements the
BRSKI REST interface within the same "/.well-known" URI tree as the BRSKI REST interface within the same "/.well-known" URI tree as the
existing EST URIs as described in EST [RFC7030] section 3.2.2. The existing EST URIs as described in EST [RFC7030] section 3.2.2. The
communication channel between the pledge and the registrar is communication channel between the pledge and the registrar is
referred to as "BRSKI-EST" (see Figure 1). referred to as "BRSKI-EST" (see Figure 1).
The communication channel between the registrar and MASA is similarly The communication channel between the registrar and MASA is similarly
described as extensions to EST within the same "/.well-known" tree. described as extensions to EST within the same "/.well-known" tree.
For clarity this channel is referred to as "BRSKI-MASA". (See For clarity this channel is referred to as "BRSKI-MASA". (See
Figure 1). Figure 1).
MASA URI is "https://" iauthority "/.well-known/est". MASA URI is "https://" iauthority "/.well-known/est".
BRSKI uses existing CMS message formats for existing EST operations. BRSKI uses existing CMS message formats for existing EST operations.
BRSKI uses JSON [RFC7159] for all new operations defined here, and BRSKI uses JSON [RFC8259] for all new operations defined here, and
voucher formats. voucher formats.
While EST section 3.2 does not insist upon use of HTTP 1.1 persistent While EST section 3.2 does not insist upon use of HTTP 1.1 persistent
connections, BRSKI-EST connections SHOULD use persistent connections. connections, ([RFC7230] section 6.3) BRSKI-EST connections SHOULD use
The intention of this guidance is to ensure the provisional TLS state persistent connections. The intention of this guidance is to ensure
occurs only once, and that the subsequent resolution of the provision the provisional TLS state occurs only once, and that the subsequent
state is not subject to a MITM attack during a critical phase. resolution of the provision state is not subject to a MITM attack
during a critical phase.
Summarized automation extensions for the BRSKI-EST flow are: Summarized automation extensions for the BRSKI-EST flow are:
o The pledge either attempts concurrent connections via each o The pledge either attempts concurrent connections via each
discovered proxy, or it times out quickly and tries connections in discovered proxy, or it times out quickly and tries connections in
series, as explained at the end of Section 5.1. series, as explained at the end of Section 5.1.
o The pledge provisionally accepts the registrar certificate during o The pledge provisionally accepts the registrar certificate during
the TLS handshake as detailed in Section 5.1. the TLS handshake as detailed in Section 5.1.
o The pledge requests and validates a voucher using the new REST o The pledge requests and validates a voucher using the new REST
calls described below. calls described below.
o The pledge completes authentication of the server certificate as o The pledge completes authentication of the server certificate as
detailed in Section 5.6.1. This moves the BRSKI-EST TLS detailed in Section 5.6.1. This moves the BRSKI-EST TLS
connection out of the provisional state. connection out of the provisional state.
o Mandatory boostrap steps conclude with voucher status telemetry o Mandatory bootstrap steps conclude with voucher status telemetry
(see Section 5.7). (see Section 5.7).
The BRSKI-EST TLS connection can now be used for EST enrollment. The BRSKI-EST TLS connection can now be used for EST enrollment.
The extensions for a registrar (equivalent to EST server) are: The extensions for a registrar (equivalent to EST server) are:
o Client authentication is automated using Initial Device Identity o Client authentication is automated using Initial Device Identity
(IDevID) as per the EST certificate based client authentication. (IDevID) as per the EST certificate based client authentication.
The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber" The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber"
attribute with the device's unique serial number. attribute with the device's unique serial number.
o In the language of [RFC6125] this provides for a SERIALNUM-ID o This extends the informal set of "identifer type" values defined
category of identifier that can be included in a certificate and in [RFC6125] to include a SERIALNUM-ID category of identifier that
therefore that can also be used for matching purposes. The can be included in a certificate and therefore that can also be
SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is collated according to manufacturer trust used for matching purposes. As noted in that document this is not
anchor since serial numbers are not globally unique. a formal definition as the underlying types have been previously
defined elsewhere. The SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is collated
according to manufacturer trust anchor since serial numbers are
not globally unique.
o The registrar requests and validates the voucher from the MASA. o The registrar requests and validates the voucher from the MASA.
o The registrar forwards the voucher to the pledge when requested. o The registrar forwards the voucher to the pledge when requested.
o The registrar performs log verifications in addition to local o The registrar performs log verifications in addition to local
authorization checks before accepting optional pledge device authorization checks before accepting optional pledge device
enrollment requests. enrollment requests.
5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details 5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details
skipping to change at page 36, line 24 skipping to change at page 36, line 32
registrar is the TLS server. All security associations established registrar is the TLS server. All security associations established
are between the pledge and the registrar regardless of proxy are between the pledge and the registrar regardless of proxy
operations. operations.
Establishment of the BRSKI-EST TLS connection is as specified in EST Establishment of the BRSKI-EST TLS connection is as specified in EST
[RFC7030] section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates" [RFC7030] section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates"
[RFC7030] wherein the client is authenticated with the IDevID [RFC7030] wherein the client is authenticated with the IDevID
certificate, and the EST server (the registrar) is provisionally certificate, and the EST server (the registrar) is provisionally
authenticated with an unverified server certificate. authenticated with an unverified server certificate.
The pledge maintains a security paranoia concerning the provisional The pledge performs input validation of all data received until a
state, and all data received, until a voucher is received and voucher is verified as specified in Section 5.6.1 and the TLS
verified as specified in Section 5.6.1 connection leaves the provisional state. Until these operations are
complete the pledge could be communicating with an attacker.
A Pledge that can connect to multiple registries concurrently, SHOULD A pledge that can connect to multiple registries concurrently SHOULD
do so. Some devices may be unable to do so for lack of threading, or do so. Some devices may be unable to do so for lack of threading, or
resource issues. Concurrent connections defeat atttempts by a resource issues. Concurrent connections defeat attempts by a
malicious proxy from causing a TCP Slowloris-like attack (see malicious proxy from causing a TCP Slowloris-like attack (see
[slowloris]). [slowloris]).
A pledge that can not maintain as many connections as there are A pledge that can not maintain as many connections as there are
eligible proxies. If no connection is making process after 5 seconds eligible proxies will need to rotate among the various choices,
then the pledge SHOULD drop the oldest connection and go on to a terminating connections that do not appear to be making progress. If
different proxy: the proxy that has been communicated with least no connection is making progess after 5 seconds then the pledge
recently. If there were no other proxies discovered, the pledge MAY SHOULD drop the oldest connection and go on to a different proxy: the
continue to wait, as long as it is concurrently listening for new proxy that has been communicated with least recently. If there were
proxy announcements. no other proxies discovered, the pledge MAY continue to wait, as long
as it is concurrently listening for new proxy announcements.
5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar 5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar
When the pledge bootstraps it makes a request for a voucher from a When the pledge bootstraps it makes a request for a voucher from a
registrar. registrar.
This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of
"/.well-known/est/requestvoucher". "/.well-known/est/requestvoucher".
The pledge voucher-request Content-Type is: The pledge voucher-request Content-Type is:
application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON
document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described
in Section 3 using the JSON encoding described in [RFC7951]. This in Section 3 using the JSON encoding described in [RFC7951]. This
voucher media type is defined in [RFC8366] and is also used for voucher media type is defined in [RFC8366] and is also used for
the pledge voucher-request. The pledge SHOULD sign the request the pledge voucher-request. The pledge SHOULD sign the request
using the Section 2.3 credential. using the Section 2.3 credential.
Registrar impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of Registrar implementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of
course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known. course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.
The pledge SHOULD include an [RFC7231] section 5.3.2 "Accept" header The pledge SHOULD include an [RFC7231] section 5.3.2 "Accept" header
indicating the acceptable media type for the voucher response. The field indicating the acceptable media type for the voucher response.
"application/voucher-cms+json" media type is defined in [RFC8366] but The "application/voucher-cms+json" media type is defined in [RFC8366]
constrained voucher formats are expected in the future. Registrar's but constrained voucher formats are expected in the future.
and MASA's are expected to be flexible in what they accept. Registrar's and MASA's are expected to be flexible in what they
accept.
The pledge populates the voucher-request fields as follows: The pledge populates the voucher-request fields as follows:
created-on: Pledges that have a realtime clock are RECOMMENDED to created-on: Pledges that have a realtime clock are RECOMMENDED to
populate this field. This provides additional information to the populate this field with the current date and time in yang:date-
MASA. and-time format. This provides additional information to the
MASA. Pledges that have no real-time clocks MAY omit this field.
nonce: The pledge voucher-request MUST contain a cryptographically nonce: The pledge voucher-request MUST contain a cryptographically
strong random or pseudo-random number nonce. (see [RFC4086]) Doing strong random or pseudo-random number nonce. (see [RFC4086]) Doing
so ensures Section 2.6.1 functionality. The nonce MUST NOT be so ensures Section 2.6.1 functionality. The nonce MUST NOT be
reused for multiple bootstrapping attempts. (The registrar reused for multiple bootstrapping attempts. (The registrar
voucher-request MAY omit the nonce as per Section 3.1) voucher-request MAY omit the nonce as per Section 3.1)
proximity-registrar-cert: In a pledge voucher-request this is the proximity-registrar-cert: In a pledge voucher-request this is the
first certificate in the TLS server 'certificate_list' sequence first certificate in the TLS server 'certificate_list' sequence
(see [RFC5246]) presented by the registrar to the pledge. This (see [RFC5246]) presented by the registrar to the pledge. This
skipping to change at page 38, line 20 skipping to change at page 38, line 32
IDevID), IDevID),
o allow any device from a specific vendor (as determined by the o allow any device from a specific vendor (as determined by the
X.509 IDevID), X.509 IDevID),
o allow a specific device from a vendor (as determined by the X.509 o allow a specific device from a vendor (as determined by the X.509
IDevID) against a domain white list. (The mechanism for checking IDevID) against a domain white list. (The mechanism for checking
a shared white list potentially used by multiple Registrars is out a shared white list potentially used by multiple Registrars is out
of scope). of scope).
If these validations fail the registrar SHOULD respond with an If these validations fail the registrar SHOULD respond with the HTTP
appropriate HTTP error code. 404 error code. If the voucher-request is in an unknown format, then
an HTTP 406 error code is more appropriate. A situation that could
be resolved with administrative action (such as adding a vendor to a
whitelist) MAY be responded with an 403 HTTP error code.
If authorization is successful the registrar obtains a voucher from If authorization is successful the registrar obtains a voucher from
the MASA service (see Section 5.5) and returns that MASA signed the MASA service (see Section 5.5) and returns that MASA signed
voucher to the pledge as described in Section 5.6. voucher to the pledge as described in Section 5.6.
5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details 5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details
The BRSKI-MASA TLS connection is a 'normal' TLS connection The BRSKI-MASA TLS connection is a 'normal' TLS connection
appropriate for HTTPS REST interfaces. The registrar initiates the appropriate for HTTPS REST interfaces. The registrar initiates the
connection and uses the MASA URL obtained as described in Section 2.8 connection and uses the MASA URL obtained as described in
for [RFC6125] authentication of the MASA. Section 2.8. The mechanisms in [RFC6125] SHOULD be used
authentication of the MASA. Some vendors will establish explicit (or
private) trust anchors for validating their MASA; this will typically
done as part of a sales channel integration. Registars SHOULD permit
trust anchors to be pre-configured on a per-vendor basis.
The primary method of registrar "authentication" by the MASA is The primary method of registrar "authentication" by the MASA is
detailed in Section 5.5. As detailed in Section 11 the MASA might detailed in Section 5.5. As detailed in Section 11 the MASA might
find it necessary to request additional registrar authentication. find it necessary to request additional registrar authentication.
The MASA and the registrars SHOULD be prepared to support TLS client The MASA and the registrars SHOULD be prepared to support TLS client
certificate authentication and/or HTTP Basic or Digest authentication certificate authentication and/or HTTP Basic or Digest authentication
as described in [RFC7030] for EST clients. This connection MAY also as described in [RFC7030] for EST clients. This connection MAY also
have no client authentication at all (Section 7.4) have no client authentication at all (Section 7.4)
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[RFC8366] and is also used for the registrar voucher-request. It is [RFC8366] and is also used for the registrar voucher-request. It is
a JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure. The a JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure. The
registrar MUST sign the registrar voucher-request. The entire registrar MUST sign the registrar voucher-request. The entire
registrar certificate chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST registrar certificate chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST
be included in the CMS structure. be included in the CMS structure.
MASA impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of MASA impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of
course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known. course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.
The Registrar SHOULD include an [RFC7231] section 5.3.2 "Accept" The Registrar SHOULD include an [RFC7231] section 5.3.2 "Accept"
header indicating the response media types that are acceptable. This header field indicating the response media types that are acceptable.
list SHOULD be the entire list presented to the Registrar in the This list SHOULD be the entire list presented to the Registrar in the
Pledge's original request (see Section 5.2) but MAY be a subset. Pledge's original request (see Section 5.2) but MAY be a subset.
MASA's are expected to be flexible in what they accept. MASA's are expected to be flexible in what they accept.
The registrar populates the voucher-request fields as follows: The registrar populates the voucher-request fields as follows:
created-on: Registrars are RECOMMENDED to populate this field. This created-on: The Registrars SHOULD populate this field with the
provides additional information to the MASA. current date and time when the Registrar formed this voucher
request. This field provides additional information to the MASA.
nonce: This is the value from the pledge voucher-request. The nonce: This is the value from the pledge voucher-request. The
registrar voucher-request MAY omit the nonce as per Section 3.1) registrar voucher-request MAY omit the nonce as per Section 3.1)
serial-number: The serial number of the pledge the registrar would serial-number: The serial number of the pledge the registrar would
like a voucher for. The registrar determines this value by like a voucher for. The registrar determines this value by
parsing the authenticated pledge IDevID certificate. See parsing the authenticated pledge IDevID certificate. See
Section 2.3. The registrar MUST verify that the serial number Section 2.3. The registrar MUST verify that the serial number
field it parsed matches the serial number field the pledge field it parsed matches the serial number field the pledge
provided in its voucher-request. This provides a sanity check provided in its voucher-request. This provides a sanity check
useful for detecting error conditions and logging. The registrar useful for detecting error conditions and logging. The registrar
MUST NOT simply copy the serial number field from a pledge voucher MUST NOT simply copy the serial number field from a pledge voucher
request as that field is claimed but not certified. request as that field is claimed but not certified.
idevid-issuer: The idevid-issuer value from the pledge certificate idevid-issuer: The idevid-issuer value from the pledge certificate
is included to ensure a statistically unique identity. is included to ensure a unique identity.
prior-signed-voucher-request: The signed pledge voucher-request prior-signed-voucher-request: The signed pledge voucher-request
SHOULD be included in the registrar voucher-request. (NOTE: what SHOULD be included in the registrar voucher-request. (NOTE: what
is included is the complete pledge voucher-request, inclusive of is included is the complete pledge voucher-request, inclusive of
the 'assertion', 'proximity-registrar-cert', etc wrapped by the the 'assertion', 'proximity-registrar-cert', etc wrapped by the
pledge's original signature). If a signed voucher-request was not pledge's original signature). If a signed voucher-request was not
recieved from the pledge then this leaf is omitted from the received from the pledge then this leaf is omitted from the
registrar voucher request. registrar voucher request.
A nonceless registrar voucher-request MAY be submitted to the MASA. A nonceless registrar voucher-request MAY be submitted to the MASA.
Doing so allows the registrar to request a voucher when the pledge is Doing so allows the registrar to request a voucher when the pledge is
offline, or when the registrar anticipates not being able to connect offline, or when the registrar anticipates not being able to connect
to the MASA while the pledge is being deployed. Some use cases to the MASA while the pledge is being deployed. Some use cases
require the registrar to learn the appropriate IDevID SerialNumber require the registrar to learn the appropriate IDevID SerialNumber
field and appropriate 'Accept header' field values from the physical field and appropriate 'Accept header field' values from the physical
device labeling or from the sales channel (out-of-scope for this device labeling or from the sales channel (out-of-scope for this
document). document).
All other fields MAY be omitted in the registrar voucher-request. All other fields MAY be omitted in the registrar voucher-request.
Example JSON payloads of registrar voucher-requests are in Example JSON payloads of registrar voucher-requests are in
Section 3.3 Examples 2 through 4. Section 3.3 Examples 2 through 4.
The MASA verifies that the registrar voucher-request is internally The MASA verifies that the registrar voucher-request is internally
consistent but does not necessarily authenticate the registrar consistent but does not necessarily authenticate the registrar
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The registrar's certificate chain is extracted from the signature The registrar's certificate chain is extracted from the signature
method. The chain includes the domain CA certificate as specified in method. The chain includes the domain CA certificate as specified in
Section 5.5. This certificate is used to populate the "pinned- Section 5.5. This certificate is used to populate the "pinned-
domain-cert" of the voucher being issued. The domainID (e.g., hash domain-cert" of the voucher being issued. The domainID (e.g., hash
of the root public key) is determined from the pinned-domain-cert and of the root public key) is determined from the pinned-domain-cert and
is used to update the audit log. is used to update the audit log.
5.5.7. MASA nonce handling 5.5.7. MASA nonce handling
The MASA does not verify the nonce itself. If the registrar voucher- The MASA does not verify the nonce itself. If the registrar voucher-
request contains a nonce, and the prior-signed-voucher-request is request contains a nonce, and the prior-signed-voucher-request
exist, then the MASA MUST verify that the nonce is consistent. exists, then the MASA MUST verify that the nonce is consistent.
(Recall from above that the voucher-request might not contain a (Recall from above that the voucher-request might not contain a
nonce, see Section 5.5 and Section 5.5.3). nonce, see Section 5.5 and Section 5.5.3).
The MASA MUST use the nonce from the registrar voucher-request for The MASA MUST use the nonce from the registrar voucher-request for
the resulting voucher and audit log. The prior-signed-voucher- the resulting voucher and audit log. The prior-signed-voucher-
request nonce is ignored during this operation. request nonce is ignored during this operation.
5.6. MASA and Registrar Voucher Response 5.6. MASA and Registrar Voucher Response
The MASA voucher response to the registrar is forwarded without The MASA voucher response to the registrar is forwarded without
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MASA responses or dynamically requests a new voucher based on local MASA responses or dynamically requests a new voucher based on local
policy (it does not generate or sign a voucher). Registrar policy (it does not generate or sign a voucher). Registrar
evaluation of the voucher itself is purely for transparency and audit evaluation of the voucher itself is purely for transparency and audit
purposes to further inform log verification (see Section 5.8.2) and purposes to further inform log verification (see Section 5.8.2) and
therefore a registrar could accept future voucher formats that are therefore a registrar could accept future voucher formats that are
opaque to the registrar. opaque to the registrar.
If the voucher-request is successful, the server (MASA responding to If the voucher-request is successful, the server (MASA responding to
registrar or registrar responding to pledge) response MUST contain an registrar or registrar responding to pledge) response MUST contain an
HTTP 200 response code. The server MUST answer with a suitable 4xx HTTP 200 response code. The server MUST answer with a suitable 4xx
or 5xx HTTP [RFC2616] error code when a problem occurs. In this or 5xx HTTP [RFC7230] error code when a problem occurs. In this
case, the response data from the MASA MUST be a plaintext human- case, the response data from the MASA MUST be a plaintext human-
readable (ASCII, English) error message containing explanatory readable (ASCII, English) error message containing explanatory
information describing why the request was rejected. information describing why the request was rejected.
The registrar MAY respond with an HTTP 202 ("the request has been The registrar MAY respond with an HTTP 202 ("the request has been
accepted for processing, but the processing has not been completed") accepted for processing, but the processing has not been completed")
as described in EST [RFC7030] section 4.2.3 wherein the client "MUST as described in EST [RFC7030] section 4.2.3 wherein the client "MUST
wait at least the specified 'Retry-After' time before repeating the wait at least the specified 'Retry-After' time before repeating the
same request". (see [RFC7231] section 6.6.4) The pledge is same request". (see [RFC7231] section 6.6.4) The pledge is
RECOMMENDED to provide local feedback (blinked LED etc) during this RECOMMENDED to provide local feedback (blinked LED etc) during this
wait cycle if mechanisms for this are available. To prevent an wait cycle if mechanisms for this are available. To prevent an
attacker registrar from significantly delaying bootstrapping the attacker registrar from significantly delaying bootstrapping the
pledge MUST limit the 'Retry-After' time to 60 seconds. Ideally the pledge MUST limit the 'Retry-After' time to 60 seconds. Ideally the
pledge would keep track of the appropriate Retry-After header values pledge would keep track of the appropriate Retry-After header field
for any number of outstanding registrars but this would involve a values for any number of outstanding registrars but this would
state table on the pledge. Instead the pledge MAY ignore the exact involve a state table on the pledge. Instead the pledge MAY ignore
Retry-After value in favor of a single hard coded value (a registrar the exact Retry-After value in favor of a single hard coded value (a
that is unable to complete the transaction after the first 60 seconds registrar that is unable to complete the transaction after the first
has another chance a minute later). A pledge SHOULD only maintain a 60 seconds has another chance a minute later). A pledge SHOULD only
202 retry-state for up to 4 days, which is longer than a long maintain a 202 retry-state for up to 4 days, which is longer than a
weekend, after which time the enrollment attempt fails and the pledge long weekend, after which time the enrollment attempt fails and the
returns to discovery state. pledge returns to discovery state.
In order to avoid infinite redirect loops, which a malicious In order to avoid infinite redirect loops, which a malicious
registrar might do in order to keep the pledge from discovering the registrar might do in order to keep the pledge from discovering the
correct registrar, the pledge MUST NOT follow more than one correct registrar, the pledge MUST NOT follow more than one
redirection (3xx code) to another web origins. EST supports redirection (3xx code) to another web origins. EST supports
redirection but requires user input; this change allows the pledge to redirection but requires user input; this change allows the pledge to
follow a single redirection without a user interaction. follow a single redirection without a user interaction.
A 403 (Forbidden) response is appropriate if the voucher-request is A 403 (Forbidden) response is appropriate if the voucher-request is
not signed correctly, stale, or if the pledge has another outstanding not signed correctly, stale, or if the pledge has another outstanding
voucher that cannot be overridden. voucher that cannot be overridden.
A 404 (Not Found) response is appropriate when the request is for a A 404 (Not Found) response is appropriate when the request is for a
device that is not known to the MASA. device that is not known to the MASA.
A 406 (Not Acceptable) response is appropriate if a voucher of the A 406 (Not Acceptable) response is appropriate if a voucher of the
desired type or using the desired algorithms (as indicated by the desired type or using the desired algorithms (as indicated by the
Accept: headers, and algorithms used in the signature) cannot be Accept: header fields, and algorithms used in the signature) cannot
issued such as because the MASA knows the pledge cannot process that be issued such as because the MASA knows the pledge cannot process
type. The registrar SHOULD use this response if it determines the that type. The registrar SHOULD use this response if it determines
pledge is unacceptable due to inventory control, MASA audit logs, or the pledge is unacceptable due to inventory control, MASA audit logs,
any other reason. or any other reason.
A 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response is approriate for a request A 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response is appropriate for a request
that has a voucher-request or accept encoding that is not understood. that has a voucher-request or accept encoding that is not understood.
The voucher response format is as indicated in the submitted accept The voucher response format is as indicated in the submitted Accept
header or based on the MASA's prior understanding of proper format header fields or based on the MASA's prior understanding of proper
for this Pledge. Only the [RFC8366] "application/voucher-cms+json" format for this Pledge. Only the [RFC8366] "application/voucher-
media type is defined at this time. The syntactic details of cms+json" media type is defined at this time. The syntactic details
vouchers are described in detail in [RFC8366]. For example, the of vouchers are described in detail in [RFC8366]. Figure 8 shows a
voucher consists of: sample of the contents of a voucher.
{ {
"ietf-voucher:voucher": { "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5", "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"assertion": "logging" "assertion": "logging",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==" "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789" "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
} }
} }
Figure 8: An example voucher
Figure 1: An example voucher
The MASA populates the voucher fields as follows: The MASA populates the voucher fields as follows:
nonce: The nonce from the pledge if available. See Section 5.5.7. nonce: The nonce from the pledge if available. See Section 5.5.7.
assertion: The method used to verify assertion. See Section 5.5.5. assertion: The method used to verify assertion. See Section 5.5.5.
pinned-domain-cert: The domain CA cert. See Section 5.5.6. This pinned-domain-cert: The domain CA cert. See Section 5.5.6. This
figure is illustrative, for an example, see Appendix D.2 figure is illustrative, for an example, see Appendix D.2
serial-number: The serial-number as provided in the voucher-request. serial-number: The serial-number as provided in the voucher-request.
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the voucher lifetime is consistent with any revocation or pinned- the voucher lifetime is consistent with any revocation or pinned-
domain-cert consistency checks the pledge might perform. See domain-cert consistency checks the pledge might perform. See
section Section 2.6.1. There are three times to consider: (a) a section Section 2.6.1. There are three times to consider: (a) a
configured voucher lifetime in the MASA, (b) the expiry time for configured voucher lifetime in the MASA, (b) the expiry time for
the registrar's certificate, (c) any certificate revocation the registrar's certificate, (c) any certificate revocation
information (CRL) lifetime. The expires-on field SHOULD be before information (CRL) lifetime. The expires-on field SHOULD be before
the earliest of these three values. Typically (b) will be some the earliest of these three values. Typically (b) will be some
significant time in the future, but (c) will typically be short significant time in the future, but (c) will typically be short
(on the order of a week or less). The RECOMMENDED period for (a) (on the order of a week or less). The RECOMMENDED period for (a)
is on the order of 20 minutes, so it will typically determine the is on the order of 20 minutes, so it will typically determine the
lifespan of the resulting voucher. 20 minutes is sufficent time lifespan of the resulting voucher. 20 minutes is sufficient time
to reach the post-provisional state in the pledge, at which point to reach the post-provisional state in the pledge, at which point
there is an established trust relationship between pledge and there is an established trust relationship between pledge and
registrar. The subsequent operations can take as long as required registrar. The subsequent operations can take as long as required
from that point onwards. The lifetime of the voucher has no from that point onwards. The lifetime of the voucher has no
impact on the lifespan of the ownership relationship. impact on the lifespan of the ownership relationship.
Whenever a voucher is issued the MASA MUST update the audit log Whenever a voucher is issued the MASA MUST update the audit log
appropriately. The internal state requirements to maintain the audit appropriately. The internal state requirements to maintain the audit
log are out-of-scope. See Section 5.8.1 for a discussion of log are out-of-scope. See Section 5.8.1 for a discussion of
reporting the log to a registrar. reporting the log to a registrar.
5.6.1. Pledge voucher verification 5.6.1. Pledge voucher verification
The pledge MUST verify the voucher signature using the manufacturer The pledge MUST verify the voucher signature using the manufacturer
installed trust anchor(s) associated with the manufacturer's MASA installed trust anchor(s) associated with the manufacturer's MASA
(this is likely included in the pledge's firmware). Management of (this is likely included in the pledge's firmware). Management of
the manufacter installed trust anchor(s) is out-of-scope of this the manufacturer installed trust anchor(s) is out-of-scope of this
document; this protocol does not update these trust anchor(s). document; this protocol does not update these trust anchor(s).
The pledge MUST verify the serial-number field of the signed voucher The pledge MUST verify the serial-number field of the signed voucher
matches the pledge's own serial-number. matches the pledge's own serial-number.
The pledge MUST verify that the voucher nonce field is accurate and The pledge MUST verify that the voucher nonce field is accurate and
matches the nonce the pledge submitted to this registrar, or that the matches the nonce the pledge submitted to this registrar, or that the
voucher is nonceless (see Section 7.2). voucher is nonceless (see Section 7.2).
The pledge MUST be prepared to parse and fail gracefully from a The pledge MUST be prepared to parse and fail gracefully from a
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Certificate Response is obtained it is more authoritative for the Certificate Response is obtained it is more authoritative for the
domain than the limited 'pinned-domain-cert' response. domain than the limited 'pinned-domain-cert' response.
5.7. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry 5.7. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry
The domain is expected to provide indications to the system The domain is expected to provide indications to the system
administrators concerning device lifecycle status. To facilitate administrators concerning device lifecycle status. To facilitate
this it needs telemetry information concerning the device's status. this it needs telemetry information concerning the device's status.
To indicate pledge status regarding the voucher, the pledge MUST post To indicate pledge status regarding the voucher, the pledge MUST post
a status message. a status message to the Registrar.
The posted data media type: application/json The posted data media type: application/json
The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the EST well The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the EST well
known URI "/voucher_status". The Status field indicates if the known URI "/voucher_status".
voucher was acceptable. If it was not acceptable the Reason string
indicates why. In the failure case this message may be sent to an
unauthenticated, potentially malicious registrar and therefore the
Reason string SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an
attacker. The operational benefit of this telemetry information is
balanced against the operational costs of not recording that an
voucher was ignored by a client the registrar expected to continue
joining the domain.
{ The format and semantics described below are for version 1. A
"version":"1", version field is included to permit significant changes to this
"Status":FALSE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail" feedback in the future. A Registrar that receives a status message
"Reason":"Informative human readable message" with a version larger than it knows about SHOULD log the contents and
"reason-context": { additional JSON } alert a human.
}
The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with The Status field indicates if the voucher was acceptable. Boolean
an HTTP 404 error. The client ignores any response. Within the values are acceptable.
server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.
If the voucher was not acceptable the Reason string indicates why.
In the failure case this message may be sent to an unauthenticated,
potentially malicious registrar and therefore the Reason string
SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an attacker. The
operational benefit of this telemetry information is balanced against
the operational costs of not recording that an voucher was ignored by
a client the registrar expected to continue joining the domain.
The reason-context attribute is an arbitrary JSON object (literal The reason-context attribute is an arbitrary JSON object (literal
value or hash of values) which provides additional information value or hash of values) which provides additional information
specific to this pledge. The contents of this field are not subject specific to this pledge. The contents of this field are not subject
to standardization. to standardization.
The version, and status fields MUST be present. The Reason field
SHOULD be present whenever the status field is negative. The Reason-
Context field is optional.
The keys to this JSON hash are case-insensitive. Figure 2 shows an
example JSON.
{
"version":"1",
"status":false,
"reason":"Informative human readable message",
"reason-context": { "additional" : "JSON" }
}
Figure 2: Example Status Telemetry
The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
an HTTP 404 error. The client ignores any response. Within the
server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.
Additional standard JSON fields in this POST MAY be added, see Additional standard JSON fields in this POST MAY be added, see
Section 8.3. Section 8.3. A server that sees unknown fields should log them, but
otherwise ignore them.
5.8. Registrar audit log request 5.8. Registrar audit log request
After receiving the pledge status telemetry Section 5.7, the After receiving the pledge status telemetry Section 5.7, the
registrar SHOULD request the MASA audit log from the MASA service. registrar SHOULD request the MASA audit log from the MASA service.
This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of
"/.well-known/est/requestauditlog". "/.well-known/est/requestauditlog".
The registrar SHOULD HTTP POST the same registrar voucher-request as The registrar SHOULD HTTP POST the same registrar voucher-request as
it did when requesting a voucher (using the same Content-Type). It it did when requesting a voucher (using the same Content-Type). It
is posted to the /requestauditlog URI instead. The "idevid-issuer" is posted to the /requestauditlog URI instead. The "idevid-issuer"
and "serial-number" informs the MASA which log is requested so the and "serial-number" informs the MASA which log is requested so the
appropriate log can be prepared for the response. Using the same appropriate log can be prepared for the response. Using the same
media type and message minimizes cryptographic and message operations media type and message minimizes cryptographic and message operations
although it results in additional network traffic. The relying MASA although it results in additional network traffic. The relying MASA
implementation MAY leverage internal state to associate this request implementation MAY leverage internal state to associate this request
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A registrar MAY request logs at future times. If the registrar A registrar MAY request logs at future times. If the registrar
generates a new request then the MASA is forced to perform the generates a new request then the MASA is forced to perform the
additional cryptographic operations to verify the new request. additional cryptographic operations to verify the new request.
A MASA that receives a request for a device that does not exist, or A MASA that receives a request for a device that does not exist, or
for which the requesting owner was never an owner returns an HTTP 404 for which the requesting owner was never an owner returns an HTTP 404
("Not found") code. ("Not found") code.
Rather than returning the audit log as a response to the POST (with a Rather than returning the audit log as a response to the POST (with a
return code 200), the MASA MAY instead return a 201 ("Created") return code 200), the MASA MAY instead return a 201 ("Created")
RESTful response ([RFC7231] section 7.1) containing a URL to the RESTful response ([RFC7231] sections 6.3.2 and 7.1) containing a URL
prepared (and easily cachable) audit response. to the prepared (and easily cachable) audit response.
In order to avoid enumeration of device audit logs, MASA that return In order to avoid enumeration of device audit logs, MASA that return
URLs SHOULD take care to make the returned URL unguessable. For URLs SHOULD take care to make the returned URL unguessable. For
instance, rather than returning URLs containing a database number instance, rather than returning URLs containing a database number
such as https://example.com/auditlog/1234 or the EUI of the device such as https://example.com/auditlog/1234 or the EUI of the device
such https://example.com/auditlog/10-00-00-11-22-33, the MASA SHOULD such https://example.com/auditlog/10-00-00-11-22-33, the MASA SHOULD
return a randomly generated value (a "slug" in web parlance). The return a randomly generated value (a "slug" in web parlance). The
value is used to find the relevant database entry. value is used to find the relevant database entry.
A MASA that returns a code 200 MAY also include a Location: header A MASA that returns a code 200 MAY also include a Location: header
for future reference by the registrar. for future reference by the registrar.
5.8.1. MASA audit log response 5.8.1. MASA audit log response
A log data file is returned consisting of all log entries associated A log data file is returned consisting of all log entries associated
with the the device selected by the IDevID presented in the request. with the device selected by the IDevID presented in the request. The
The audit log may be truncated of old or repeated values as explained audit log may be abridged by removal of old or repeated values as
below. The returned data is in JSON format ([RFC7951]), and the explained below. The returned data is in JSON format ([RFC7951]),
Content-Type SHOULD be "application/json". For example: and the Content-Type SHOULD be "application/json". For example:
{ {
"version":"1", "version":"1",
"events":[ "events":[
{ {
"date":"<date/time of the entry>", "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>", "domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>" "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>",
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>" "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>",
"truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>" "truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>"
}, },
{ {
"date":"<date/time of the entry>", "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>", "domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>" "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>",
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>" "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
} }
], ],
"truncation": { "truncation": {
"nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>", "nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>", "nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>" "arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>"
} }
} }
Figure 3: Example of audit-log response
Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can
be optimized as follows: Nonced or Nonceless entries for the same be optimized as follows: Nonced or Nonceless entries for the same
domainID MAY be truncated from the log leaving only the single most domainID MAY be abridged from the log leaving only the single most
recent nonced or nonceless entry for that domainID. In the case of recent nonced or nonceless entry for that domainID. In the case of
truncation the 'event' truncation value SHOULD contain a count of the truncation the 'event' truncation value SHOULD contain a count of the
number of events for this domainID that were truncated. The log number of events for this domainID that were omitted. The log SHOULD
SHOULD NOT be further reduced but there could exist operational NOT be further reduced but there could exist operational situation
situation where maintaining the full log is not possible. In such where maintaining the full log is not possible. In such situations
situations the log MAY be arbitrarily truncated for length, with the the log MAY be arbitrarily abridged for length, with the number of
number of removed entries indicated as 'arbitrary'. removed entries indicated as 'arbitrary'.
If the truncation count exceeds 1024 then the MASA MAY use this value If the truncation count exceeds 1024 then the MASA MAY use this value
without further incrementing it. without further incrementing it.
A log where duplicate entries for the same domain have been truncated A log where duplicate entries for the same domain have been omitted
("nonced duplicates" and/or "nonceless duplicates) could still be ("nonced duplicates" and/or "nonceless duplicates) could still be
acceptable for informed decisions. A log that has had "arbitrary" acceptable for informed decisions. A log that has had "arbitrary"
truncations is less acceptable but manufacturer transparency is truncations is less acceptable but manufacturer transparency is
better than hidden truncations. better than hidden truncations.
This document specifies a simple log format as provided by the MASA This document specifies a simple log format as provided by the MASA
service to the registrar. This format could be improved by service to the registrar. This format could be improved by
distributed consensus technologies that integrate vouchers with distributed consensus technologies that integrate vouchers with
technologies such as block-chain or hash trees or optimized logging technologies such as block-chain or hash trees or optimized logging
approaches. Doing so is out of the scope of this document but is an approaches. Doing so is out of the scope of this document but is an
anticipated improvement for future work. As such, the registrar anticipated improvement for future work. As such, the registrar
client SHOULD anticipate new kinds of responses, and SHOULD provide client SHOULD anticipate new kinds of responses, and SHOULD provide
operator controls to indicate how to process unknown responses. operator controls to indicate how to process unknown responses.
5.8.2. Registrar audit log verification 5.8.2. Registrar audit log verification
Each time the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) issues Each time the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) issues
a voucher, it places it into the audit log for that device. The a voucher, it appends details of the assignment to an internal audit
details are described in Section 5.8. The contents of the audit log log for that device. The internal audit log is processed when
can express a variety of trust levels, and this section explains what responding to requests for details as described in Section 5.8. The
kind of trust a registrar can derive from the entries. contents of the audit log can express a variety of trust levels, and
this section explains what kind of trust a registrar can derive from
the entries.
While the audit log provides a list of vouchers that were issued by While the audit log provides a list of vouchers that were issued by
the MASA, the vouchers are issued in response to voucher-requests, the MASA, the vouchers are issued in response to voucher-requests,
and it is the contents of the voucher-requests which determines how and it is the contents of the voucher-requests which determines how
meaningful the audit log entries are. meaningful the audit log entries are.
A registrar SHOULD use the log information to make an informed A registrar SHOULD use the log information to make an informed
decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the pledge. The decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the pledge. The
exact policy is out of scope of this document as it depends on the exact policy is out of scope of this document as it depends on the
security requirements within the registrar domain. Equipment that is security requirements within the registrar domain. Equipment that is
purchased pre-owned can be expected to have an extensive history. purchased pre-owned can be expected to have an extensive history.
The following dicussion is provided to help explain the value of each The following discussion is provided to help explain the value of
log element: each log element:
date: The date field provides the registrar an opportunity to divide date: The date field provides the registrar an opportunity to divide
the log around known events such as the purchase date. Depending the log around known events such as the purchase date. Depending
on context known to the registrar or administrator evens before/ on context known to the registrar or administrator events before/
after certain dates can have different levels of importance. For after certain dates can have different levels of importance. For
example for equipment that is expected to be new, and thus have no example for equipment that is expected to be new, and thus have no
history, it would be a surprise to find prior entries. history, it would be a surprise to find prior entries.
domainID: If the log includes an unexpected domainID then the pledge domainID: If the log includes an unexpected domainID then the pledge
could have imprinted on an unexpected domain. The registrar can could have imprinted on an unexpected domain. The registrar can
be expected to use a variety of techniques to define "unexpected" be expected to use a variety of techniques to define "unexpected"
ranging from white lists of prior domains to anomoly detection ranging from white lists of prior domains to anomaly detection
(e.g. "this device was previously bound to a different domain than (e.g. "this device was previously bound to a different domain than
any other device deployed"). Log entries can also be compared any other device deployed"). Log entries can also be compared
against local history logs in search of discrepancies (e.g. "this against local history logs in search of discrepancies (e.g. "this
device was re-deployed some number of times internally but the device was re-deployed some number of times internally but the
external audit log shows additional re-deployments our internal external audit log shows additional re-deployments our internal
logs are unaware of"). logs are unaware of").
nonce: Nonceless entries mean the logged domainID could nonce: Nonceless entries mean the logged domainID could
theoretically trigger a reset of the pledge and then take over theoretically trigger a reset of the pledge and then take over
management by using the existing nonceless voucher. management by using the existing nonceless voucher.
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created by a CA that is likely operated by a group that has no created by a CA that is likely operated by a group that has no
insight into different network services/protocols used. For example, insight into different network services/protocols used. For example,
the CA could even be outsourced. the CA could even be outsourced.
To alleviate these operational difficulties, the pledge MUST request To alleviate these operational difficulties, the pledge MUST request
the EST "CSR Attributes" from the EST server and the EST server needs the EST "CSR Attributes" from the EST server and the EST server needs
to be able to reply with the attributes necessary for use of the to be able to reply with the attributes necessary for use of the
certificate in its intended protocols/services. This approach allows certificate in its intended protocols/services. This approach allows
for minimal CA integrations and instead the local infrastructure (EST for minimal CA integrations and instead the local infrastructure (EST
server) informs the pledge of the proper fields to include in the server) informs the pledge of the proper fields to include in the
generated CSR. This approach is beneficial to automated boostrapping generated CSR. This approach is beneficial to automated
in the widest number of environments. bootstrapping in the widest number of environments.
If the hardwareModuleName in the X.509 IDevID is populated then it If the hardwareModuleName in the X.509 IDevID is populated then it
SHOULD by default be propagated to the LDevID along with the SHOULD by default be propagated to the LDevID along with the
hwSerialNum. The EST server SHOULD support local policy concerning hwSerialNum. The EST server SHOULD support local policy concerning
this functionality. this functionality.
In networks using the BRSKI enrolled certificate to authenticate the In networks using the BRSKI enrolled certificate to authenticate the
ACP (Autonomic Control Plane), the EST attributes MUST include the ACP (Autonomic Control Plane), the EST attributes MUST include the
"ACP information" field. See "ACP information" field. See
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] for more details. [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] for more details.
skipping to change at page 52, line 33 skipping to change at page 53, line 33
mechanisms MAY be used even if the client ignores CSR Attribute mechanisms MAY be used even if the client ignores CSR Attribute
guidance. guidance.
5.9.3. EST Client Certificate Request 5.9.3. EST Client Certificate Request
The pledge MUST request a new client certificate. See RFC7030, The pledge MUST request a new client certificate. See RFC7030,
section 4.2. section 4.2.
5.9.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry 5.9.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry
For automated bootstrapping of devices, the adminstrative elements For automated bootstrapping of devices, the administrative elements
providing bootstrapping also provide indications to the system providing bootstrapping also provide indications to the system
administrators concerning device lifecycle status. This might administrators concerning device lifecycle status. This might
include information concerning attempted bootstrapping messages seen include information concerning attempted bootstrapping messages seen
by the client, MASA provides logs and status of credential by the client, MASA provides logs and status of credential
enrollment. [RFC7030] assumes an end user and therefore does not enrollment. [RFC7030] assumes an end user and therefore does not
include a final success indication back to the server. This is include a final success indication back to the server. This is
insufficient for automated use cases. insufficient for automated use cases.
To indicate successful enrollment the client SHOULD re-negotiate the To indicate successful enrollment the client SHOULD re-negotiate the
EST TLS session using the newly obtained credentials. This occurs by EST TLS session using the newly obtained credentials. This occurs by
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SubjectKeyIdentifier is included so that the server can record the SubjectKeyIdentifier is included so that the server can record the
successful certificate distribution. successful certificate distribution.
Status media type: application/json Status media type: application/json
The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the new EST well The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the new EST well
known URI /enrollstatus. known URI /enrollstatus.
{ {
"version":"1", "version":"1",
"Status":TRUE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail" "Status":true,
"Reason":"Informative human readable message" "Reason":"Informative human readable message",
"reason-context": "Additional information" "reason-context": "Additional information"
} }
Figure 4: Example of enrollment status POST
The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
an HTTP 404 error. an HTTP 404 error.
Within the server logs the server MUST capture if this message was Within the server logs the server MUST capture if this message was
received over an TLS session with a matching client certificate. received over an TLS session with a matching client certificate.
This allows for clients that wish to minimize their crypto operations This allows for clients that wish to minimize their crypto operations
to simply POST this response without renegotiating the TLS session - to simply POST this response without renegotiating the TLS session -
at the cost of the server not being able to accurately verify that at the cost of the server not being able to accurately verify that
enrollment was truly successful. enrollment was truly successful.
5.9.5. Multiple certificates 5.9.5. Multiple certificates
Pledges that require multiple certificates could establish direct EST Pledges that require multiple certificates could establish direct EST
connections to the registrar. connections to the registrar.
5.9.6. EST over CoAP 5.9.6. EST over CoAP
This document describes extensions to EST for the purposes of This document describes extensions to EST for the purposes of
bootstrapping of remote key infrastructures. Bootstrapping is bootstrapping of remote key infrastructures. Bootstrapping is
relevant for CoAP enrollment discussions as well. The defintion of relevant for CoAP enrollment discussions as well. The definition of
EST and BRSKI over CoAP is not discussed within this document beyond EST and BRSKI over CoAP is not discussed within this document beyond
ensuring proxy support for CoAP operations. Instead it is ensuring proxy support for CoAP operations. Instead it is
anticipated that a definition of CoAP mappings will occur in anticipated that a definition of CoAP mappings will occur in
subsequent documents such as [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and that CoAP subsequent documents such as [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and that CoAP
mappings for BRSKI will be discussed either there or in future work. mappings for BRSKI will be discussed either there or in future work.
6. Clarification of transfer-encoding 6. Clarification of transfer-encoding
[RFC7030] defines it's endpoints to include a "Content-Transfer- [RFC7030] defines it's endpoints to include a "Content-Transfer-
Encoding" heading, and the payloads to be [RFC4648] Base64 encoded Encoding" heading, and the payloads to be [RFC4648] Base64 encoded
DER. DER.
When used within BRSKI, the original RFC7030 EST endpoints remain When used within BRSKI, the original RFC7030 EST endpoints remain
Base64 encoded, but the new BRSKI end points which send and receive Base64 encoded, but the new BRSKI end points which send and receive
binary artifacts (specifically, ../voucherrequest) are binary. That binary artifacts (specifically, /requestvoucher) are binary. That
is, no encoding is used. is, no encoding is used.
In the BRSKI context, the EST "Content-Transfer-Encoding" header if In the BRSKI context, the EST "Content-Transfer-Encoding" header
present, SHOULD be ignored. This header does not need to included. field if present, SHOULD be ignored. This header field does not need
to included.
7. Reduced security operational modes 7. Reduced security operational modes
A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure
operational modes for support specific use cases. The following operational modes for support specific use cases. The following
sections detail specific ways that the pledge, registrar and MASA can sections detail specific ways that the pledge, registrar and MASA can
be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated reasons. be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated reasons.
This section is considered non-normative: use suggested methods MUST This section is considered non-normative in the generality of the
be detailed in specific profiles of BRSKI. This is the subject for protocol. Use of the suggested mechanism here MUST be detailed in
future work. specific profiles of BRSKI, such as in Section 9.
7.1. Trust Model 7.1. Trust Model
This section explains the trust relationships detailed in This section explains the trust relationships detailed in
Section 2.4: Section 2.4:
+--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+ +--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+
| Pledge | | Join | | Domain | |Manufacturer| | Pledge | | Join | | Domain | |Manufacturer|
| | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Service | | | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Service |
| | | | | | | (Internet) | | | | | | | | (Internet) |
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3. The pledge MAY have an operational mode where it skips voucher 3. The pledge MAY have an operational mode where it skips voucher
validation one time. For example if a physical button is validation one time. For example if a physical button is
depressed during the bootstrapping operation. This can be useful depressed during the bootstrapping operation. This can be useful
if the manufacturer service is unavailable. This behavior SHOULD if the manufacturer service is unavailable. This behavior SHOULD
be available via local configuration or physical presence methods be available via local configuration or physical presence methods
(such as use of a serial/craft console) to ensure new entities (such as use of a serial/craft console) to ensure new entities
can always be deployed even when autonomic methods fail. This can always be deployed even when autonomic methods fail. This
allows for unsecured imprint. allows for unsecured imprint.
4. A craft/serial console COULD include a command such as "est-
enroll [2001:db8:0:1]:443" that begins the EST process from the
point after the voucher is validated. This process SHOULD
include server certificate verification using an on-screen
fingerprint.
It is RECOMMENDED that "trust on first use" or any method of skipping It is RECOMMENDED that "trust on first use" or any method of skipping
voucher validation (including use of craft serial console) only be voucher validation (including use of craft serial console) only be
available if hardware assisted Network Endpoint Assessment [RFC5209] available if hardware assisted Network Endpoint Assessment [RFC5209]
is supported. This recommendation ensures that domain network is supported. This recommendation ensures that domain network
monitoring can detect innappropriate use of offline or emergency monitoring can detect inappropriate use of offline or emergency
deployment procedures when voucher-based bootstrapping is not used. deployment procedures when voucher-based bootstrapping is not used.
7.3. Registrar security reductions 7.3. Registrar security reductions
A registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods. A registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods.
These methods are acceptable when low security models are needed, as These methods are acceptable when low security models are needed, as
the security decisions are being made by the local administrator, but the security decisions are being made by the local administrator, but
they MUST NOT be the default behavior: they MUST NOT be the default behavior:
1. A registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of a 1. A registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of a
skipping to change at page 58, line 9 skipping to change at page 59, line 13
reduces the need for ownership verification. reduces the need for ownership verification.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document requires the following IANA actions: This document requires the following IANA actions:
8.1. Well-known EST registration 8.1. Well-known EST registration
This document extends the definitions of "est" (so far defined via This document extends the definitions of "est" (so far defined via
RFC7030) in the "https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/ RFC7030) in the "https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/
well-known-uris.xhtml" registry as follows: well-known-uris.xhtml" registry. IANA is asked to change the
registration of "est" to include RFC7030 and this document.
o add /.well-known/est/requestvoucher (see Section 5.5 )
o add /.well-known/est/requestauditlog (see Section 5.7)
8.2. PKIX Registry 8.2. PKIX Registry
IANA is requested to register the following: IANA is requested to register the following:
This document requests a number for id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) from This document requests a number for id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) from
the pkix(7) id-mod(0) Registry. the pkix(7) id-mod(0) Registry.
This document has received an early allocation from the id-pe This document has received an early allocation from the id-pe
registry (SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension) for id-pe- registry (SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension) for id-pe-
skipping to change at page 59, line 5 skipping to change at page 60, line 5
o Status o Status
o Reason o Reason
o reason-context o reason-context
8.4. DNS Service Names 8.4. DNS Service Names
IANA is requested to register the following Service Names: IANA is requested to register the following Service Names:
Service Name: _brski-proxy Service Name: brski-proxy
Transport Protocol(s): tcp Transport Protocol(s): tcp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>. Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>.
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Description: The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Description: The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures Proxy Infrastructures Proxy
Reference: [This document] Reference: [This document]
Service Name: _brski-registrar Service Name: brski-registrar
Transport Protocol(s): tcp Transport Protocol(s): tcp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>. Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>.
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Description: The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Description: The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures Registrar Infrastructures Registrar
Reference: [This document] Reference: [This document]
8.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA 8.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA
The IANA is requested to list the name "masa" in the MUD extensions The IANA is requested to list the name "masa" in the MUD extensions
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The protocol described in this document has appeal in a number of The protocol described in this document has appeal in a number of
other non-ANIMA use cases. Such uses of the protocol will be other non-ANIMA use cases. Such uses of the protocol will be
deploying into other environments with different tradeoffs of deploying into other environments with different tradeoffs of
privacy, security, reliability and autonomy from manufacturers. As privacy, security, reliability and autonomy from manufacturers. As
such those use cases will need to provide their own applicability such those use cases will need to provide their own applicability
statements, and will need to address unique privacy and security statements, and will need to address unique privacy and security
considerations for the environments in which they are used. considerations for the environments in which they are used.
The autonomic control plane that this document provides bootstrap for The autonomic control plane that this document provides bootstrap for
is typically a medium to large Internet Service Provider is typically a medium to large Internet Service Provider
organization, or an equivalent Enterprise that has signficant layer-3 organization, or an equivalent Enterprise that has significant
router connectivity. (A network consistenting of primarily layer-2 layer-3 router connectivity. (A network consisting of primarily
is not excluded, but the adjacencies that the ACP will create and layer-2 is not excluded, but the adjacencies that the ACP will create
maintain will not reflect the topology until all devices participate and maintain will not reflect the topology until all devices
in the ACP). participate in the ACP).
As specified in the ANIMA charter, this work "..focuses on As specified in the ANIMA charter, this work "..focuses on
professionally-managed networks." Such a network has an operator and professionally-managed networks." Such a network has an operator and
can do things like like install, configure and operate the Registrar can do things like install, configure and operate the Registrar
function. The operator makes purchasing decisions and is aware of function. The operator makes purchasing decisions and is aware of
what manufacturers it expects to see on it's network. what manufacturers it expects to see on it's network.
Such an operator also is capable of performing the traditional (craft Such an operator is also capable of performing bootstrapping of a
serial-console) based bootstrap of devices. The zero-touch mechanism device using a serial-console (craft console). The zero-touch
presented in this and the ACP document represents a signficiant mechanism presented in this and the ACP document represents a
efficiency: in particular it reduces the need to put senior experts significiant efficiency: in particular it reduces the need to put
on airplanes to configure devices in person. There is a recognition senior experts on airplanes to configure devices in person.
as the technology evolves that not every situation may work out, and
occasionally a human still still have to visit. There is a recognition as the technology evolves that not every
situation may work out, and occasionally a human may still have to
visit. In recognition of this, some mechanisms are presented in
Section 7.2. The manufacturer MUST provide at least one of the one-
touch mechanisms described that permit enrollment to be proceed
without availability of any manufacturer server (such as the MASA).
The BRSKI protocol is going into environments where there have The BRSKI protocol is going into environments where there have
already been quite a number of vendor proprietary management systems. already been quite a number of vendor proprietary management systems.
Those are not expected to go away quickly, but rather to leverage the Those are not expected to go away quickly, but rather to leverage the
secure credentials that are provisioned by BRSKI. The connectivity secure credentials that are provisioned by BRSKI. The connectivity
requirements of said management systems are provided by the ACP. requirements of said management systems are provided by the ACP.
10. Privacy Considerations 10. Privacy Considerations
10.1. MASA audit log 10.1. MASA audit log
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significant level of privacy while maintaining the security significant level of privacy while maintaining the security
characteristics provided by Registrar based audit log inspection. characteristics provided by Registrar based audit log inspection.
10.2. What BRSKI-MASA reveals to the manufacturer 10.2. What BRSKI-MASA reveals to the manufacturer
The so-called "call-home" mechanism that occurs as part of the BRSKI- The so-called "call-home" mechanism that occurs as part of the BRSKI-
MASA connection standardizes what has been deemed by some as a MASA connection standardizes what has been deemed by some as a
sinister mechanism for corporate oversight of individuals. sinister mechanism for corporate oversight of individuals.
([livingwithIoT] and [IoTstrangeThings] for a small sample). ([livingwithIoT] and [IoTstrangeThings] for a small sample).
As the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) usage of BRSKI is not targetted As the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) usage of BRSKI is not targeted
at individual usage of IoT devices, but rather at the Enterprise and at individual usage of IoT devices, but rather at the Enterprise and
ISP creation of networks in a zero-touch fashion, the "call-home" ISP creation of networks in a zero-touch fashion, the "call-home"
represents a different kind of concern. represents a different kind of concern.
It needs to be re-iterated that the BRSKI-MASA mechanism only occurs It needs to be re-iterated that the BRSKI-MASA mechanism only occurs
once during the comissioning of the device. It is well defined, and once during the commissioning of the device. It is well defined, and
although encrypted with TLS, it could in theory be made auditable as although encrypted with TLS, it could in theory be made auditable as
the contents are well defined. This connection does not occur when the contents are well defined. This connection does not occur when
the device powers on or is restarted for normal routines. It is the device powers on or is restarted for normal routines. It is
conceivable that a device could be forced to go through a full conceivable that a device could be forced to go through a full
factory reset during an exceptional firmware update situation, after factory reset during an exceptional firmware update situation, after
which enrollment would have be repeated. which enrollment would have be repeated.
The BRSKI call-home mechanism is mediated via the owner's Registrar, The BRSKI call-home mechanism is mediated via the owner's Registrar,
and the information that is transmitted is directly auditable by the and the information that is transmitted is directly auditable by the
device owner. This is in stark constrast to many "call-home" device owner. This is in stark contrast to many "call-home"
protocols where the device autonomously calls home and uses an protocols where the device autonomously calls home and uses an
undocumented protocol. undocumented protocol.
While the contents of the signed part of the pledge voucher request While the contents of the signed part of the pledge voucher request
can not be changed, they are not encrypted at the registrar. The can not be changed, they are not encrypted at the registrar. The
ability to audit the messages by the owner of the network prevents ability to audit the messages by the owner of the network prevents
exfiltration of data by a nefarious pledge. The contents of an exfiltration of data by a nefarious pledge. The contents of an
unsigned voucher request are, however, completely changeable by the unsigned voucher request are, however, completely changeable by the
Registrar. Both are, to re-iterate, encrypted by TLS while in Registrar. Both are, to re-iterate, encrypted by TLS while in
transit. transit.
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general traffic their site by hosting the MASA behind the same (set) general traffic their site by hosting the MASA behind the same (set)
of load balancers that the companies normal marketing site is hosted of load balancers that the companies normal marketing site is hosted
behind. This makes lots of sense from a straight capacity planning behind. This makes lots of sense from a straight capacity planning
point of view as the same set of services (and the same set of point of view as the same set of services (and the same set of
Distributed Denial of Service mitigations) may be used. Distributed Denial of Service mitigations) may be used.
Unfortunately, as the BRSKI-MASA connections include TLS Unfortunately, as the BRSKI-MASA connections include TLS
ClientCertificate exchanges, this may easily be observed in TLS 1.2, ClientCertificate exchanges, this may easily be observed in TLS 1.2,
and a traffic analysis may reveal it even in TLS 1.3. This does not and a traffic analysis may reveal it even in TLS 1.3. This does not
make such a plan irrelevant. There may be other organizational make such a plan irrelevant. There may be other organizational
reasons to keep the marketing site (which is often subject to reasons to keep the marketing site (which is often subject to
frequent redesigs, outsourcing, etc.) seperate from the MASA, which frequent re-designs, outsourcing, etc.) separate from the MASA, which
may need to operate reliably for decades. may need to operate reliably for decades.
10.3. Manufacturers and Used or Stolen Equipment 10.3. Manufacturers and Used or Stolen Equipment
As explained above, the manufacturer receives information each time As explained above, the manufacturer receives information each time
that a device which is in factory-default mode does a zero-touch that a device which is in factory-default mode does a zero-touch
bootstrap, and attempts to enroll into a domain owner's registrar. bootstrap, and attempts to enroll into a domain owner's registrar.
The manufacturer is therefore in a position to decline to issue a The manufacturer is therefore in a position to decline to issue a
voucher if it detects that the new owner is not the same as the voucher if it detects that the new owner is not the same as the
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resales unless told otherwise. In which case, the transfer of resales unless told otherwise. In which case, the transfer of
ownership simply occurs. ownership simply occurs.
3. A manufacturer could however decide not to issue a new voucher in 3. A manufacturer could however decide not to issue a new voucher in
response to a transfer of ownership. This is essentially the response to a transfer of ownership. This is essentially the
same as the stolen case, with the manufacturer having decided same as the stolen case, with the manufacturer having decided
that the sale was not legitimate. that the sale was not legitimate.
4. There is a fourth case, if the manufacturer is providing 4. There is a fourth case, if the manufacturer is providing
protection against stolen devices. The manufacturer then has a protection against stolen devices. The manufacturer then has a
responsability to protect the legitimate owner against fraudulent responsibility to protect the legitimate owner against fraudulent
claims that the the equipment was stolen. Such a claim would claims that the equipment was stolen. Such a claim would cause
cause the manufacturer to refuse to issue a new voucher. Should the manufacturer to refuse to issue a new voucher. Should the
the device go through a deep factory reset (for instance, device go through a deep factory reset (for instance, replacement
replacement of a damaged main board component, the device would of a damaged main board component, the device would not
not bootstrap. bootstrap.
5. Finally, there is a fifth case: the manufacturer has decided to 5. Finally, there is a fifth case: the manufacturer has decided to
end-of-line the device, or the owner has not paid a yearly end-of-line the device, or the owner has not paid a yearly
support amount, and the manufacturer refuses to issue new support amount, and the manufacturer refuses to issue new
vouchers at that point. This last case is not new to the vouchers at that point. This last case is not new to the
industry: many license systems are already deployed that have industry: many license systems are already deployed that have
significantly worse effect. significantly worse effect.
This section has outlined five situations in which a manufacturer This section has outlined five situations in which a manufacturer
could use the voucher system to enforce what are clearly license could use the voucher system to enforce what are clearly license
terms. A manufacturer that attempted to enforce license terms via terms. A manufacturer that attempted to enforce license terms via
vouchers would find it rather ineffective as the terms would only be vouchers would find it rather ineffective as the terms would only be
enforced when the device is enrolled, and this is not (to repeat), a enforced when the device is enrolled, and this is not (to repeat), a
daily or even monthly occurrance. daily or even monthly occurrence.
10.4. Manufacturers and Grey market equipment 10.4. Manufacturers and Grey market equipment
Manufacturers of devices often sell different products into different Manufacturers of devices often sell different products into different
regional markets. Which product is available in which market can be regional markets. Which product is available in which market can be
driven by price differentials, support issues (some markets may driven by price differentials, support issues (some markets may
require manuals and tech-support to be done in the local language), require manuals and tech-support to be done in the local language),
government export regulation (such as whether strong crypto is government export regulation (such as whether strong crypto is
permitted to be exported, or permitted to be used in a particular permitted to be exported, or permitted to be used in a particular
market). When an domain owner obtains a device from a different market). When an domain owner obtains a device from a different
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could be determined: from the geolocation of the registrar, from could be determined: from the geolocation of the registrar, from
sales channel knowledge about the customer, and what products are sales channel knowledge about the customer, and what products are
(un-)available in that market. If the device has a GPS the (un-)available in that market. If the device has a GPS the
coordinates of the device could even be placed into an extension of coordinates of the device could even be placed into an extension of
the voucher. the voucher.
The above actions are not illegal, and not new. Many manufacturers The above actions are not illegal, and not new. Many manufacturers
have shipped crypto-weak (exportable) versions of firmware as the have shipped crypto-weak (exportable) versions of firmware as the
default on equipment for decades. The first task of an enterprise/ default on equipment for decades. The first task of an enterprise/
ISP has always been to login to a manufacturer system, show one's ISP has always been to login to a manufacturer system, show one's
"entitlement" (country informatin, proof that support payments have "entitlement" (country information, proof that support payments have
been made), and receive either a new updated firmware, or a license been made), and receive either a new updated firmware, or a license
key that will activate the correct firmware. key that will activate the correct firmware.
BRSKI permits the above process to automated (in an autonomic BRSKI permits the above process to automated (in an autonomic
fashion), and therefore perhaps encourages this kind of fashion), and therefore perhaps encourages this kind of
differentiation by reducing the cost of doing it. differentiation by reducing the cost of doing it.
An issue that manufacturers will need to deal with in the above An issue that manufacturers will need to deal with in the above
automated process is when a device is shipped to one country with one automated process is when a device is shipped to one country with one
set of rules (or laws or entitlements), but the domain registry is in set of rules (or laws or entitlements), but the domain registry is in
another one. Which rules apply is something will have to be worked another one. Which rules apply is something will have to be worked
out: the manufacturer could come to believe they are dealing with out: the manufacturer could come to believe they are dealing with
Grey market equipment, when it is simply dealing with a global Grey market equipment, when it is simply dealing with a global
enterprise. enterprise.
10.5. Some mitigations for meddling by manufacturers 10.5. Some mitigations for meddling by manufacturers
The most obvious mitigation is not to buy the product. Pick The most obvious mitigation is not to buy the product. Pick
manufacturers that are up-front about their policies, who do not manufacturers that are up-front about their policies, who do not
change them gratutiously. change them gratuitiously.
A manufacturer could provide a mechanism to manage the trust anchors A manufacturer could provide a mechanism to manage the trust anchors
and built-in certificates (IDevID) as an extension. This is a and built-in certificates (IDevID) as an extension. This is a
substantial amount of work, and may be an area for future substantial amount of work, and may be an area for future
standardization work. standardization work.
Replacement of the voucher validation anchors (usually pointing to Replacement of the voucher validation anchors (usually pointing to
the original manufacturer's MASA) with those of the new owner permits the original manufacturer's MASA) with those of the new owner permits
the new owner to issue vouchers to subsequent owners. This would be the new owner to issue vouchers to subsequent owners. This would be
done by having the selling (old) owner to run a MASA. done by having the selling (old) owner to run a MASA.
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A new owner could override this in their Registrar, or the A new owner could override this in their Registrar, or the
manufacturer could provide a mechanism to update or replace the manufacturer could provide a mechanism to update or replace the
IDevID prior to sale. IDevID prior to sale.
Once the voucher trust anchor and the IDevID is replaced, then the Once the voucher trust anchor and the IDevID is replaced, then the
device will no longer trust the manufacturer in any way. When a new device will no longer trust the manufacturer in any way. When a new
owner performs a bootstrap, the device will point to a MASA that has owner performs a bootstrap, the device will point to a MASA that has
been chosen, and will validate vouchers from this new entity. been chosen, and will validate vouchers from this new entity.
The BRSKI protocol depends upon a trust anchor on the device and an The BRSKI protocol depends upon a trust anchor on the device and an
identity on the device. Management of these these entities identity on the device. Management of these entities facilitates a
facilitiates a few new operatonal modes without making any changes to few new operational modes without making any changes to the BRSKI
the BRSKI protocol. Those modes include: offline modes where the protocol. Those modes include: offline modes where the domain owner
domain owner operates an internal MASA for all devices, resell modes operates an internal MASA for all devices, resell modes where the
where the first domain owner becomes the MASA for the next (resold- first domain owner becomes the MASA for the next (resold-to) domain
to) domain owner, and services where an aggregator acquires a large owner, and services where an aggregator acquires a large variety of
variety of devices, and then acts as a pseudonymized MASA for a devices, and then acts as a pseudonymized MASA for a variety of
variety of devices from a variety of manufacturers. devices from a variety of manufacturers.
Some manufacturers may wish to consider replacement of the IDevID as Some manufacturers may wish to consider replacement of the IDevID as
an indication that the device's warantee is terminated. For others, an indication that the device's warrantee is terminated. For others,
the privacy requiments of some deployments might consider this a the privacy requirements of some deployments might consider this a
standard operating practice. standard operating practice.
As discussed at the end of Section 5.8.1, new work could be done to As discussed at the end of Section 5.8.1, new work could be done to
use a distributed consensus technology for the audit log. This would use a distributed consensus technology for the audit log. This would
permit the audit log to continue to be useful, even when there is a permit the audit log to continue to be useful, even when there is a
chain of MASA due to changes of ownership. chain of MASA due to changes of ownership.
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
This document details a protocol for bootstrapping that balances This document details a protocol for bootstrapping that balances
skipping to change at page 66, line 9 skipping to change at page 67, line 9
To facilitate logging and administrative oversight, in addition to To facilitate logging and administrative oversight, in addition to
triggering Registration verification of MASA logs, the pledge reports triggering Registration verification of MASA logs, the pledge reports
on voucher parsing status to the registrar. In the case of a on voucher parsing status to the registrar. In the case of a
failure, this information is informative to a potentially malicious failure, this information is informative to a potentially malicious
registrar. This is mandated anyway because of the operational registrar. This is mandated anyway because of the operational
benefits of an informed administrator in cases where the failure is benefits of an informed administrator in cases where the failure is
indicative of a problem. The registrar is RECOMMENDED to verify MASA indicative of a problem. The registrar is RECOMMENDED to verify MASA
logs if voucher status telemetry is not received. logs if voucher status telemetry is not received.
To facilitate truely limited clients EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2 To facilitate truly limited clients EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2
requirements that the client MUST support a client authentication requirements that the client MUST support a client authentication
model have been reduced in Section 7 to a statement that the model have been reduced in Section 7 to a statement that the
registrar "MAY" choose to accept devices that fail cryptographic registrar "MAY" choose to accept devices that fail cryptographic
authentication. This reflects current (poor) practices in shipping authentication. This reflects current (poor) practices in shipping
devices without a cryptographic identity that are NOT RECOMMENDED. devices without a cryptographic identity that are NOT RECOMMENDED.
During the provisional period of the connection the pledge MUST treat During the provisional period of the connection the pledge MUST treat
all HTTP header and content data as untrusted data. HTTP libraries all HTTP header and content data as untrusted data. HTTP libraries
are regularly exposed to non-secured HTTP traffic: mature libraries are regularly exposed to non-secured HTTP traffic: mature libraries
should not have any problems. should not have any problems.
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Rm would have to attack the pledge and return it to a bootstrapping Rm would have to attack the pledge and return it to a bootstrapping
enabled state. This would require wiping the pledge of current enabled state. This would require wiping the pledge of current
configuration and triggering a re-bootstrapping of the pledge. This configuration and triggering a re-bootstrapping of the pledge. This
is no more likely than simply taking control of the pledge directly is no more likely than simply taking control of the pledge directly
but if this is a consideration the target network is RECOMMENDED to but if this is a consideration the target network is RECOMMENDED to
take the following steps: take the following steps:
o Ongoing network monitoring for unexpected bootstrapping attempts o Ongoing network monitoring for unexpected bootstrapping attempts
by pledges. by pledges.
o Retreival and examination of MASA log information upon the o Retrieval and examination of MASA log information upon the
occurance of any such unexpected events. Rm will be listed in the occurence of any such unexpected events. Rm will be listed in the
logs along with nonce information for analysis. logs along with nonce information for analysis.
11.3. Trusting manufacturers 11.3. Trusting manufacturers
The BRSKI extensions to EST permit a new pledge to be completely The BRSKI extensions to EST permit a new pledge to be completely
configured with domain specific trust anchors. The link from built- configured with domain specific trust anchors. The link from built-
in manufacturer-provided trust anchors to domain-specific trust in manufacturer-provided trust anchors to domain-specific trust
anchors is mediated by the signed voucher artifact. anchors is mediated by the signed voucher artifact.
If the manufacturer's IDevID signing key is not properly validated, If the manufacturer's IDevID signing key is not properly validated,
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device category (e.g, a light bulb, or a cable-modem) are signed device category (e.g, a light bulb, or a cable-modem) are signed
by an certificate authority specifically for this. This is done by an certificate authority specifically for this. This is done
by CableLabs today. It is used for authentication and by CableLabs today. It is used for authentication and
authorization as part of TR-79: [docsisroot] and [TR069]. authorization as part of TR-79: [docsisroot] and [TR069].
The existing WebPKI provides a reasonable anchor between manufacturer The existing WebPKI provides a reasonable anchor between manufacturer
name and public key. It authenticates the key. It does not provide name and public key. It authenticates the key. It does not provide
a reasonable authorization for the manufacturer, so it is not a reasonable authorization for the manufacturer, so it is not
directly useable on it's own. directly useable on it's own.
11.4. Manufacturer Maintainance of trust anchors 11.4. Manufacturer Maintenance of trust anchors
BRSKI depends upon the manufacturer building in trust anchors to the BRSKI depends upon the manufacturer building in trust anchors to the
pledge device. The voucher artifact which is signed by the MASA will pledge device. The voucher artifact which is signed by the MASA will
be validated by the pledge using that anchor. This implies that the be validated by the pledge using that anchor. This implies that the
manufacturer needs to maintain access to a signing key that the manufacturer needs to maintain access to a signing key that the
pledge can validate. pledge can validate.
The manufacturer will need to maintain the ability to make signatures The manufacturer will need to maintain the ability to make signatures
that can be validated for the lifetime that the device could be that can be validated for the lifetime that the device could be
onboarded. Whether this onboarding lifetime is less than the device onboarded. Whether this onboarding lifetime is less than the device
lifetime depends upon how the device is used. An inventory of lifetime depends upon how the device is used. An inventory of
devices kept in a warehouse as spares might not be onboarded for many devices kept in a warehouse as spares might not be onboarded for many
decades. decades.
There are good cryptographic hygiene reasons why a manufacturer would There are good cryptographic hygiene reasons why a manufacturer would
not want to maintain access to a private key for many decades. A not want to maintain access to a private key for many decades. A
manufacturer in that situation can leverage a long-term certificate manufacturer in that situation can leverage a long-term certificate
authority anchor, built-in to the pledge, and then a certificate authority anchor, built-in to the pledge, and then a certificate
chain may be incorporated using the normal CMS certificate set. This chain may be incorporated using the normal CMS certificate set. This
may increase the size of the voucher artifacts, but that is not a may increase the size of the voucher artifacts, but that is not a
significant issues in non-constrained environements. significant issues in non-constrained environments.
There are a few other operational variations that manufacturers could There are a few other operational variations that manufacturers could
consider. For instance, there is no reason that every device need consider. For instance, there is no reason that every device need
have the same set of trust anchors pre-installed. Devices built in have the same set of trust anchors pre-installed. Devices built in
different factories, or on different days, or any other consideration different factories, or on different days, or any other consideration
could have different trust anchors built in, and the record of which could have different trust anchors built in, and the record of which
batch the device is in would be recorded in the asset database. The batch the device is in would be recorded in the asset database. The
manufacturer would then know which anchor to sign an artifact manufacturer would then know which anchor to sign an artifact
against. against.
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12. Acknowledgements 12. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in
particular William Atwood, Brian Carpenter, Toerless Eckert, Fuyu particular William Atwood, Brian Carpenter, Toerless Eckert, Fuyu
Eleven, Eliot Lear, Sergey Kasatkin, Anoop Kumar, Markus Stenberg, Eleven, Eliot Lear, Sergey Kasatkin, Anoop Kumar, Markus Stenberg,
Peter van der Stok, and Thomas Werner Peter van der Stok, and Thomas Werner
Significant reviews were done by Jari Arko, Christian Huitema and Significant reviews were done by Jari Arko, Christian Huitema and
Russ Housley. Russ Housley.
13. References This document started it's life as a two-page idea from Steinthor
Bjarnason.
13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control- Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane-19 (work in progress), March 2019. plane-19 (work in progress), March 2019.
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima- Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
skipping to change at page 73, line 5 skipping to change at page 74, line 14
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service [RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013, Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG", [RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016, RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert, [RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols", "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018, RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
[RFC8368] Eckert, T., Ed. and M. Behringer, "Using an Autonomic [RFC8368] Eckert, T., Ed. and M. Behringer, "Using an Autonomic
Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network
Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)", Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)",
RFC 8368, DOI 10.17487/RFC8368, May 2018, RFC 8368, DOI 10.17487/RFC8368, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368>.
skipping to change at page 73, line 48 skipping to change at page 75, line 18
digital-certificate-issuance-service/>. digital-certificate-issuance-service/>.
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S. Raza, Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S. Raza,
"EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", draft-ietf-ace-coap- "EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", draft-ietf-ace-coap-
est-12 (work in progress), June 2019. est-12 (work in progress), June 2019.
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained
Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft- Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-
ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-04 (work in progress), July ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-05 (work in progress), July
2019. 2019.
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L., Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic
Networking", draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-10 (work in Networking", draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-10 (work in
progress), November 2018. progress), November 2018.
[I-D.ietf-anima-stable-connectivity] [I-D.ietf-anima-stable-connectivity]
Eckert, T. and M. Behringer, "Using Autonomic Control Eckert, T. and M. Behringer, "Using Autonomic Control
skipping to change at page 82, line 12 skipping to change at page 83, line 12
c3o= c3o=
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
The registrar public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509 The registrar public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509
utility. Note that the registrar certificate is marked with the utility. Note that the registrar certificate is marked with the
cmcRA extension. cmcRA extension.
Certificate: Certificate:
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 3 (0x3) Serial Number: 3 (0x3)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
Issuer: DC=ca, DC=sandelman, CN=Unstrung Fountain CA Issuer: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = Unstrung Fount
ain CA
Validity Validity
Not Before: Sep 5 01:12:45 2017 GMT Not Before: Sep 5 01:12:45 2017 GMT
Not After : Sep 5 01:12:45 2019 GMT Not After : Sep 5 01:12:45 2019 GMT
Subject: DC=ca, DC=sandelman, CN=localhost Subject: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = localhost
Subject Public Key Info: Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit) Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub: pub:
04:35:64:0e:cd:c3:4c:52:33:f4:36:bb:5f:7 04:35:64:0e:cd:c3:4c:52:33:f4:36:bb:5f:7
8:17: 8:17:
34:0c:92:d6:7d:e3:06:80:21:5d:22:fe:85:5 34:0c:92:d6:7d:e3:06:80:21:5d:22:fe:85:5
3:3e: 3:3e:
03:89:f3:35:ba:33:01:79:cf:e0:e9:6f:cf:e 03:89:f3:35:ba:33:01:79:cf:e0:e9:6f:cf:e
9:ba: 9:ba:
13:9b:24:c6:74:53:a1:ff:c1:f0:29:47:ab:2 13:9b:24:c6:74:53:a1:ff:c1:f0:29:47:ab:2
f:96: f:96:
e9:9d:e2:bc:b2 e9:9d:e2:bc:b2
ASN1 OID: prime256v1 ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE CA:FALSE
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
30:66:02:31:00:b7:fe:24:d0:27:77:af:61:87:20:6d:78: 30:66:02:31:00:b7:fe:24:d0:27:77:af:61:87:20:6d:78:
5b: 5b:
9b:3a:e9:eb:8b:77:40:2e:aa:8c:87:98:da:39:03:c7:4e: 9b:3a:e9:eb:8b:77:40:2e:aa:8c:87:98:da:39:03:c7:4e:
b6: b6:
9e:e3:62:7d:52:ad:c9:a6:ab:6b:71:77:d0:02:24:29:21: 9e:e3:62:7d:52:ad:c9:a6:ab:6b:71:77:d0:02:24:29:21:
02: 02:
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16:c0:3f:54:55:a0:54:e5:0d:0b:8e:f6:79:8b:cd:be:64:53: 16:c0:3f:54:55:a0:54:e5:0d:0b:8e:f6:79:8b:cd:be:64:53:
e7:14:a8:2b:4f:44:56:41:51:73:f7:92 e7:14:a8:2b:4f:44:56:41:51:73:f7:92
D.2. Example process D.2. Example process
The JSON examples below are wrapped at 60 columns. This results in The JSON examples below are wrapped at 60 columns. This results in
strings that have newlines in them, which makes them invalid JSON as strings that have newlines in them, which makes them invalid JSON as
is. The strings would otherwise be too long, so they need to be is. The strings would otherwise be too long, so they need to be
unwrapped before processing. unwrapped before processing.
RFC-EDITOR: these examples will need to be replaced with CMS versions
once IANA has assigned the eContentType in [RFC8366].
D.2.1. Pledge to Registrar D.2.1. Pledge to Registrar
As described in Section 5.2, the pledge will sign a pledge voucher- As described in Section 5.2, the pledge will sign a pledge voucher-
request containing the registrar's public key in the proximity- request containing the registrar's public key in the proximity-
registrar-cert field. The base64 has been wrapped at 60 characters registrar-cert field. The base64 has been wrapped at 60 characters
for presentation reasons. for presentation reasons.
-----BEGIN CMS----- -----BEGIN CMS-----
MIIGtQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGpjCCBqICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggNRBgkq MIIGtQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGpjCCBqICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggNRBgkq
hkiG9w0BBwGgggNCBIIDPnsiaWV0Zi12b3VjaGVyLXJlcXVlc3Q6dm91Y2hlciI6 hkiG9w0BBwGgggNCBIIDPnsiaWV0Zi12b3VjaGVyLXJlcXVlc3Q6dm91Y2hlciI6
skipping to change at page 97, line 24 skipping to change at page 98, line 24
Michael C. Richardson Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/ URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Michael H. Behringer Michael H. Behringer
Email: Michael.H.Behringer@gmail.com Email: Michael.H.Behringer@gmail.com
Steinthor Bjarnason
Arbor Networks
Email: sbjarnason@arbor.net
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
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