ANIMA                                                     T. Eckert Eckert, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Informational                              M. Behringer
Expires: January 4, 28, 2018                                  July 3, 27, 2017

  Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM


   OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) Maintenance - as per BCP161,
   [RFC6291]) processes for data networks are often subject to the
   problem of circular dependencies when relying on network connectivity of
   provided by the network to be managed for the OAM operations itself. purposes.
   Provisioning during device/network bring up tends to be far less easy
   to automate than service provisioning later on, changes in core
   network functions impacting reachability
   can may not be easy to be
   automated either because of ongoing connectivity requirements for the OAM equipment itself,
   OAM, and widely used OAM protocols are not secure enough to be
   carried across the network without security concerns.

   This document describes how to integrate OAM processes with the autonomic
   control plane (ACP) in Autonomic Networks (AN). (AN) to provide stable and
   secure connectivity for those OAM processes. conducting OAM.  This connectivity is not
   subject to aforementioned circular dependencies.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Self dependent OAM connectivity Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Data Communication Networks (DCNs)  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Leveraging the ACP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   4
   2.  Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Stable connectivity Connectivity for centralized Centralized OAM operations . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Simple connectivity Connectivity for non-autonomic Non-ACP capable NMS hosts . Hosts . .   5
       2.1.2.  Challenges and limitation Limitation of simple connectivity Simple Connectivity  . .   6
       2.1.3.  Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity Data Plane Connectivity  . . . .   7
       2.1.4.  IPv4 only  IPv4-only NMS hosts Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
       2.1.5.  Path selection policies Selection Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.1.6.  Autonomic NOC device/applications Device/Applications . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
       2.1.7.  Encryption of data-plane connections  . . . . . . . .  12
       2.1.8.  Long term direction Term Direction of the solution Solution . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.2.  Stable connectivity Connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions  13 Distributed Network/OAM . . . . .  14
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  No IPv4 for ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]  . . . . . . . . . . .  16  17
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  19

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Self dependent OAM connectivity Connectivity

   OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes Maintenance - as per BCP161,
   [RFC6291]) for data networks are is often subject to the problem of
   circular dependencies when relying on network the connectivity of service
   provided by the network to be managed managed.  OAM can easily but
   unintentionally break the connectivity required for its own
   operations.  Avoiding these problems can lead to complexity in OAM.
   This document describes this problem and how to use the Autonomic
   Control Plane (ACP) to solve it without further OAM operations itself: complexity:

   The ability to perform OAM operations on a network device requires first the
   execution of OAM procedures necessary to create network connectivity to that
   device in all intervening devices.  This typically leads to
   sequential, 'expanding ring configuration' from a NOC (Network
   Operations Center).  It also leads to tight dependencies between
   provisioning tools and security enrollment of devices.  Any process
   that wants to enroll multiple devices along a newly deployed network
   topology needs to tightly interlock with the provisioning process
   that creates connectivity before the enrollment can move on to the
   next device.

   When performing change operations on a network, it likewise is
   necessary to understand at any step of that process that there is no
   interruption of connectivity that could lead to removal of
   connectivity to remote devices.  This includes especially change
   provisioning of routing, forwarding, security and addressing policies
   in the network that often occur through mergers and acquisitions, the
   introduction of IPv6 or other mayor re-hauls in the infrastructure
   design.  Examples include change of an IGP protocols or areas, PD PA (Provider Dependent)
   Aggregatabe) to PI (Provider Independent) addressing, or systematic
   topology changes. changes (such as L2 to L3 changes).

   All this these circular dependencies make OAM processes complex and potentially
   fragile.  When automation is being used, for example through
   provisioning systems or network controllers, systems, this complexity extends into that automation

1.2.  Data Communication Networks (DCNs)

   In the late 1990'th and early 2000, IP networks became the method of
   choice to build separate OAM networks for the communications
   infrastructure in service providers. within Network Providers.  This concept was
   standardized in ITU-T G.7712/Y.1703 [ITUT] and called "Data
   Communications Networks" (DCN).  These where (and still are)
   physically separate IP(/MPLS) networks that provide access to OAM
   interfaces of all equipment that had to be managed, from PSTN (Public
   Switched Telephone Network) switches over optical equipment to
   nowadays ethernet Ethernet and IP/MPLS production network equipment.

   Such DCN provide stable connectivity not subject to aforementioned
   problems because they are separate network entirely, so change
   configuration of the production IP network is done via the DCN but
   never affects the DCN configuration.  Of course, this approach comes
   at a cost of buying and operating a separate network and this cost is
   not feasible for many networks, providers, most notably smaller service providers, most
   enterprises and typical IoT networks. networks (Internet of Things).

1.3.  Leveraging the ACP

   One goal of the goals of the Autonomic Networks Autonomic Control plane Plane
   (ACP as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] ) in Autonomic
   Networks is to
   provide similar stable connectivity as a DCN, but without having to
   build a separate DCN.  It is clear that such 'in-
   band' 'in-band' approach can
   never achieve fully the same level of separation, but the goal is to
   get as close to it as possible.

   This solution approach has several aspects.  One aspect is designing
   the implementation of the ACP in network devices to make it actually
   perform without interruption by changes in what we will call in this
   document the "data-plane", aka: a.k.a: the operator or controller
   configured services planes of the network equipment.  This aspect is
   not currently covered in this document.

   Another aspect is how to leverage the stable IPv6 connectivity
   provided by the ACP to build actual for OAM solutions. purposes.  This is the current scope of
   this document.

2.  Solutions

2.1.  Stable connectivity Connectivity for centralized Centralized OAM operations

   The ANI is the "Autonomic Networking Infrastructure" consisting of
   secure zero touch Bootstrap (BRSKI -
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]), Generic GeneRic Autonomic Signaling
   Protocol (GRASP -
   [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]), and Autonomic Control
   Plane (ACP -
   [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] ).  See [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]).  Refer to
   [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]  for an overview of the ANI and how
   its components interact and [RFC7575] for concepts and terminology of
   ANI and autonomic networks.

   This section describes stable connectivity for centralized OAM
   operations via
   ACP/ANI starting by what we expect to be the easiest most easy to deploy
   short-term deployment option.  It then describes limitation/ limitation and challenges of
   that approach and their solutions/workarounds to finish with the
   preferred target option of autonomic NOC devices in Section 2.1.6.

   This order was choosen chosen because it helps to explain how simple initial
   use of ACP can be, how difficult workarounds can become (and
   therefore what to avoid), and finally because one very promising
   long-term solution alternative is exactly like the most easy short-
   term solution only virtualized and automated.

   In the most common case, OAM operations will be performed by one or more
   applications running on a variety of centralized NOC systems that
   communicate with network devices.  We describe differently advanced
   approaches to leverage the ACP for stable connectivity
   leveraging the ACP.  The descriptions will show that there connectivity.  There is a
   wide range of options, some of which are simple, some more complex.

   Most easily we think there are three

   Three stages of interest: can be considered:

   o  There are simple options described first in sections Section 2.1.1
      through Section 2.1.3 that we consider to be good starting points
      to operationalize the use of the ACP for stable connectivity. connectivity
      today.  These options require only network and OAN/NOC device

   o  The are more advanced intermediate options that try workarounds to establish
      backward compatibility with existing deployed approached such as
      leveraging connect the ACP to non-IPv6 capable NOC
      devices through the use of IPv4/IPv6 NAT (Network Address Translation).  Selection and
      deployment of these approaches needs
      Translation) as described in section Section 2.1.4.  These
      workarounds are not recommended but if such non-IPv6 capable NOC
      devices need to be carefully vetted to
      ensure that they provide positive RoI.  This very much depends on used longer term, then this is the operational processes of only option
      to connect them to the network operator. ACP.

   o  It seems clearly feasible  Near to build towards a long-term
      configuration that provides long term options can provide all the desired operational,
      zero touch and security benefits of an autonomic network, but a
      range of details for this still have to be worked out. out and
      development work on NOC/OAM equipment is necessary.  These options
      are discussed in sections Section 2.1.5 through Section 2.1.8.

2.1.1.  Simple connectivity Connectivity for non-autonomic Non-ACP capable NMS hosts Hosts

   In the most simple candidate deployment case, the ACP extends all the
   way into the NOC via an autonomic device set up as an ACP one or more "ACP edge device
   providing native access to the ACP for NMS hosts (as devices" as defined in
   section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane].  It  These
   devices "leak" the (otherwise encrypted) ACP natively to NMS hosts.
   They acts as the default-router default router to those NMS hosts and provides provide them
   with only IPv6 connectivity into the ACP - but no IPv4 connectivity. ACP.  NMS hosts with this setup need
   to support IPv6 (see e.g.  [RFC6434]) but require no other
   modifications to leverage the ACP.

   Note that even though the ACP only uses IPv6, it can and should of course
   support OAM for any type of network deployment as long as the network
   devices support the ACP: The Data Plane can be IPv4 only, dual-stack
   or IPv6 only.  It is always spearate from the ACP, therefore there is
   no dependency between the ACP and the IP version(s) used to provide stable connectivity for management of any network:
   IPv4 only, dual-stack or IPv6 only. in the Data

   This setup is sufficient for troubleshooting OAM operations such as SSH into network
   devices, NMS that perform performs SNMP read operations for status checking, for
   software downloads into autonomic devices, provisioning of devices
   via NETCONF and so on.  In conjunction with otherwise unmodified OAM operations
   via separate NMS hosts it can provide a good subset of the interesting stable
   connectivity goals from goals.  The limitations of this approach are discussed
   in the ACP. next section.

   Because the ACP provides 'only' for IPv6 connectivity, and because
   addressing provided by the ACP does not include any topological
   addressing structure that operations in a NOC often relies on to
   recognize where devices are on the network, it is likely highly
   desirable to set up DNS (Domain Name System - see [RFC1034]) so that
   the ACP IPv6 addresses of autonomic devices are known via domain
   names with
   logical names. that include the desired structure.  For example, if DNS in the
   network was set up with names for network devices as, and the well known structure of the Data
   Plane IPv4 addresses space was used by operators to infer the region
   where a device is located in, then the ACP address of that device
   could be mapped set up as devicename_<region>, and could be a CNAME to devicename-
   devicename_<region>  Note that many networks
   already use names for network equipment where topological information
   is included, even without an ACP.

2.1.2.  Challenges and limitation Limitation of simple connectivity Simple Connectivity

   This simple connectivity of non-autonomic NMS hosts suffers from a
   range of possible challenges (operators (that is, operators may not be able to do it this
   way) or limitations (operator can not (that is, operator cannot achieve desired goals
   with this setup).  The following list summarizes these challenges and the
   limitations.  The following sections describe additional mechanisms
   to overcome them.

   Note that these challenges and limitations exist because the ACP is
   primarily designed to support distributed ASA in the most
   leightweight fashion lightweight
   fashion, but not mandatorily require support for additional
   mechanisms to best support centralized NOC operations.  It is this
   document that describes additional (short term) workarounds and (long
   term) extensions.

   1.  Limitation:  (Limitation) NMS hosts can not cannot directly probe whether the desired
       so called 'data-plane' network connectivity works because they do
       not directly have access to it.  This problem is not dissimilar similar to
       probing connectivity for other services (such as VPN services)
       that they do not have direct access to, so the NOC may already
       employ appropriate mechanisms to deal with this issue (probing
       proxies).  See Section 2.1.3 for candidate solutions.

   2.  Challenge:  (Challenge) NMS hosts need to support IPv6 which often is still
       not possible in many enterprise networks.  See Section 2.1.4 for
       (highly undesirable) some

   3.  Limitation:  (Limitation) Performance of the ACP will be limited versus normal
       'data-plane' connectivity.  The setup of the ACP will often
       support only non-hardware accelerated forwarding.  Running a
       large amount of traffic through the ACP, especially for tasks
       where it is not necessary will reduce its performance/
       effectiveness for those operations where it is necessary or
       highly desirable.  See Section 2.1.5 for candidate solutions.

   4.  Limitation:  (Limitation) Security of the ACP is reduced by exposing the ACP
       natively (and unencrypted) into a LAN In in the NOC where the NOC
       devices are attached to it.  See Section 2.1.7 for candidate

   These four problems can be tackled independently of each other by
   solution improvements.  Combining some of these solutions
   improvements together ultimately leads can lead towards the target a candiate long term solution.

2.1.3.  Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity Data Plane Connectivity

   Simultaneous connectivity to both ACP and data-plane can be achieved
   in a variety of ways.  If the data-plane is only IPv4, IPv4-only, then any
   method for dual-stack attachment of the NOC device/application will
   suffice: IPv6 connectivity from the NOC provides access via the ACP,
   IPv4 will provide access via the data-plane.  If as explained above
   in the most simple case, an autonomic device supports native attachment to
   the ACP, and the existing NOC setup is IPv4 only, then it could be
   sufficient to simply attach the ACP device(s) as the IPv6
   default-router default router to
   the NOC LANs and keep the existing IPv4 default router setup

   If the data-plane of the network is also supporting IPv6, then the
   NOC devices that need access to the ACP should have a dual-homing
   IPv6 setup.  One option is to make the NOC devices multi-homed with
   one logical or physical IPv6 interface connecting to the data-plane,
   and another into the ACP.  The LAN that provides access to the ACP
   should then be given an IPv6 prefix that shares a common prefix with
   the IPv6 ULA (see [RFC4193]) of the ACP so that the standard IPv6
   interface selection rules on the NOC host would result in the desired
   automatic selection of the right interface: towards the ACP facing
   interface for connections to ACP addresses, and towards the data-
   plane interface for anything else.  If this can not cannot be achieved
   automatically, then it needs to be done via simple IPv6 static routes in the
   NOC host.

   Providing two virtual (eg: (e.g. dot1q subnet) connections into NOC hosts
   may be seen as an undesired complexity.  In that case the routing
   policy to provide access to both ACP and data-plane via IPv6 needs to
   happen in the NOC network itself: The NMS host gets a single
   attachment interface but still with the same two IPv6 addresses as in
   before - one for use towards the ACP, one towards the data-plane.
   The first-
   hop first-hop router connecting to the NMS host would then have
   separate interfaces: one towards the data-plane, one towards the ACP.
   Routing of traffic from NMS hosts would then have to be based on the
   source IPv6 address of the host: Traffic from the address designated
   for ACP use would get routed towards the ACP, traffic from the
   designated data-plane address towards the data-plane.

   In the most simple case, we get the following topology: Existing NMS hosts
   connect via an existing NOClan and existing first hop Rtr1 to the
   data-plane.  Rtr1 is not made autonomic, but instead the edge router
   of the Autonomic network ANrtr is attached via a separate interface
   to Rtr1 and ANrtr provides access to the ACP via ACPaccessLan.  Rtr1
   is configured with the above described IPv6 source routing policies
   and the NOC-app-devices are given the secondary IPv6 address for
   connectivity into the ACP.

                                     --... (data-plane)
 NOC-app-device(s) -- NOClan -- Rtr1
                                     --- ACPaccessLan -- ANrtr ... (ACP)

                                 Figure 1

   If Rtr1 was to be upgraded to also implement Autonomic Networking and
   the ACP, the picture would change as follows:

                                                ---- ... (data-plane)
       NOC-app-device(s) ---- NOClan --- ANrtr1
                                         .  .   ---- ... (ACP)
                                         (ACP to data-plane loopback)

                                 Figure 2

   In this case, ANrtr1 would have to implement some more advanced
   routing such as cross-VRF routing because the data-plane and ACP are
   most likely run via separate VRFs.  A workaround without additional
   software functionality could be a physical external loopback cable
   into two ports of ANrtr1 to connect the data-plane and ACP VRF as
   shown in the picture.  A (virtual) software loopback between the ACP
   and data plane VRF would of course be the better solution.

2.1.4.  IPv4 only  IPv4-only NMS hosts

   The Hosts

   ACP does not support IPv4 to ensure long term simplicity: IPv4: Single stack IPv6 management of the
   network via ACP and (as needed) data plane.  Independent of whether
   the data plane is dual-stack, has IPv4 as a service or is single
   stack IPv6.  Dual plane management, IPv6 for the ACP, IPv4 for the data
   plane is likewise an architecturally simple option.

   The downside of this architectural decision is the potential need for
   short-term workarounds when the operational practices in a network
   that can not cannot meet these target expectations.  This section motivates
   when and why these workarounds may be necessary and describes them.
   All the workarounds described in this section are HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE.
   The only long term recommended solution is to enable IPv6 on NMS hosts.

   Most network equipment today supports IPv6 but it is by far not
   ubiquitously supported in NOC backend solutions (HW/SW), especially
   not in the product space for enterprises.  Even when it is supported,
   there are often additional limitations or issues using it in a dual
   stack setup or the operator mandates for simplicity single stack for
   all operations.  For these reasons an IPv4 only management plane is
   still required and common practice in many enterprises.  Without the
   desire to leverage the ACP, this required and common practice is not
   a problem for those enterprises even when they run dual stack in the
   network.  Therefore we  We document these workarounds here because it is a short
   term deployment challence challenge specific to the operations of the ACP.

   To bridge an IPv4 only management plane with the ACP, IPv4 to IPv6
   NAT can be used.  This NAT setup could for example be done in Rt1r1
   in above picture to also support IPv4 only NMS hots connected to

   To support connections initiated from IPv4 only NMS hosts towards the
   ACP of network devices, it is necessary to create a static mapping of
   ACP IPv6 addresses into an unused IPv4 address space and dynamic or
   static mapping of the IPv4 NOC application device address (prefix)
   into IPv6 routed in the ACP.  The main issue in this setup is the
   mapping of all ACP IPv6 addresses to IPv4.  Without further network
   intelligence, this needs to be a 1:1 address mapping because the
   prefix used for ACP IPv6 addresses is too long to be mapped directly
   into IPv4 on a prefix basis.

   One could implement in router software dynamic mappings by leveraging
   DNS, but it seems highly undesirable to implement such complex
   technologies for something that ultimately is a temporary problem
   (IPv4 only NMS hosts).  With today's operational directions it is
   likely more preferable to automate the setup of 1:1 NAT mappings in
   that NAT router as part of the automation process of network device
   enrollment into the ACP.

   The ACP can also be used for connections initiated by the network
   device into the NMS hosts.  For example example, syslog from autonomic
   devices.  In this case, static mappings of the NMS hosts IPv4
   addresses are required.  This can easily be done with a static prefix
   mapping into IPv6.

   Overall, the use of NAT is especially subject to the RoI ROI (Return of On
   Investment) considerations, but the methods described here may not be
   too different from the same problems encountered totally independent
   of AN/ACP when some parts of the network are to introduce IPv6 but
   NMS hosts are not (yet) upgradeable.

2.1.5.  Path selection policies Selection Policies

   As mentioned above, the ACP is not expected to have high performance
   because its primary goal is connectivity and security, and for
   existing network device platforms this often means that it is a lot
   more effort to implement that additional connectivity with hardware
   acceleration than without - especially because of the desire to
   support full encryption across the ACP to achieve the desired

   Some of these issues may go away in the future with further adoption
   of the ACP and network device designs that better tender to the needs
   of a separate OAM plane, but it is wise to plan for even long-term
   designs of the solution that does NOT depend on high-performance of
   the ACP.  This is opposite to the expectation that future NMS hosts
   will have IPv6, so that any considerations for IPv4/NAT in this
   solution are temporary.

   To solve the expected performance limitations of the ACP, we do
   expect to have the above describe dual-connectivity via both ACP and
   data-plane between NOC application devices and AN devices with ACP.
   The ACP connectivity is expected to always be there (as soon as a
   device is enrolled), but the data-plane connectivity is only present
   under normal operations but will not be present during eg: e.g.  early
   stages of device bootstrap, failures, provisioning mistakes or during
   network configuration changes.

   The desired policy is therefore as follows: In the absence of further
   security considerations (see below), traffic between NMS hosts and AN
   devices should prefer data-plane connectivity and resort only to
   using the ACP when necessary, unless it is an operation known to be
   so much tied to the cases where the ACP is necessary that it makes no
   sense to try using the data plane.  An example here is of course the
   SSH connection from the NOC into a network device to troubleshoot
   network connectivity.  This could easily always rely on the ACP.
   Likewise, if an NMS host is known to transmit large amounts of data,
   and it uses the ACP, then its performance need to be controlled so
   that it will not overload the ACP performance.  Typical examples of
   this are software downloads.

   There is a wide range of methods to build up these policies.  We
   describe a few:

   Ideally, a NOC system would learn and keep track of all addresses of
   a device (ACP and the various data plane addresses).  Every action of
   the NOC system would indicate via a "path-policy" what type of
   connection it needs (eg: (e.g. only data-plane, ACP-only, default to data-
   plane, fallback to ACP,...).  A connection policy manager would then
   build connection to the target using the right address(es).  Shorter
   term, a common practice is to identify different paths to a device
   via different names (eg: (e.g. loopback vs. interface addresses).  This
   approach can be expanded to ACP uses, whether it uses NOC system
   local names or DNS.  We describe example schemes using DNS:

   DNS can be used to set up names for the same network devices but with
   different addresses assigned: One name ( with
   only the data-plane address(es) (IPv4 and/or IPv6) to be used for
   probing connectivity or performing routine software downloads that
   may stall/fail when there are connectivity issues.  One name (name- with only the ACP reachable address of the
   device for troubleshooting and probing/discovery that is desired to
   always only use the ACP.  One name with data plane and ACP addresses

   Traffic policing and/or shaping of at the ACP edge in the NOC can be
   used to throttle applications such as software download into the ACP.


   MPTCP (Multipath TCP -see [RFC6824]) is a very attractive candidate
   to automate the use of both data-plane and ACP and minimize or fully
   avoid the need for the above mentioned logical names to pre-set the
   desired connectivity (data-plane-only, ACP only, both).  For example,
   a set-up for non MP-TCP MPTCP aware applications would be as follows:

   DNS naming is set up to provide the ACP IPv6 address of network
   devices.  Unbeknownst to the application, MP-TCP MPTCP is used.  MP-TCP  MPTCP
   mutually discovers between the NOC and network device the data-plane
   address and caries all traffic across it when that MP-TCP sub-flow MPTCP subflow
   across the data-plane can be built.

   In the Autonomic network devices where data-plane and ACP are in
   separate VRFs, it is clear that this type of MP-TCP sub-flow MPTCP subflow creation
   across different VRFs is new/added functionality.  Likewise  Likewise, the
   policies of preferring a particular address (NOC-device) or VRF (AN
   device) for the traffic is potentially also a policy not provided as
   a standard.

2.1.6.  Autonomic NOC device/applications Device/Applications

   Setting up connectivity between the NOC and autonomic devices when
   the NOC device itself is non-autonomic is as mentioned in the
   beginning a security issue.  It also results as shown in the previous
   paragraphs in a range of connectivity considerations, some of which
   may be quite undesirable or complex to operationalize.

   Making NMS hosts autonomic and having them participate in the ACP is
   therefore not only a highly desirable solution to the security
   issues, but can also provide a likely easier operationalization of
   the ACP because it minimizes NOC-special edge considerations - the
   ACP is simply built all the way automatically, even inside the NOC
   and only authorized and authenticate NOC devices/applications will
   have access to it.

   Supporting the ACP all the way into an application device requires
   implementing the following aspects in it: AN bootstrap/enrollment
   mechanisms, the secure channel for the ACP and at least the host side
   of IPv6 routing setup for the ACP.  Minimally this could all be
   implemented as an application and be made available to the host OS
   via eg: e.g. a tap driver to make the ACP show up as another IPv6 enabled

   Having said this: If the structure of NMS hosts is transformed
   through virtualization anyhow, then it may be considered equally
   secure and appropriate to construct (physical) NMS host system by
   combining a virtual AN/ACP enabled router with non-AN/ACP enabled
   NOC-application VMs via a hypervisor, leveraging the configuration
   options described in the previous sections but just virtualizing

2.1.7.  Encryption of data-plane connections

   When combining ACP and data-plane connectivity for availability and
   performance reasons, this too has an impact on security: When using
   the ACP, the traffic will be mostly encryption protected, especially
   when considering the above described use of AN application devices.
   If instead the data-plane is used, then this is not the case anymore
   unless it is done by the application.

   The simplest solution for this problem exists when using AN capable
   NMS hosts, because in that case the communicating AN capable NMS host
   and the AN network device have certificates through the AN enrollment
   process that they can mutually trust (same AN domain).  In result,
   data-plane connectivity that does support this can simply leverage
   TLS/DTLS ([RFC5246]/[RFC6347]) with mutual AN-domain certificate
   authentication - and does not incur new key management.

   If this automatic security benefit is seen as most important, but a
   "full" ACP stack into the NMS host is unfeasible, then it would still
   be possible to design a stripped down version of AN functionality for
   such NOC hosts that only provides enrollment of the NOC host into the
   AN domain to the extend extent that the host receives an AN domain
   certificate, but without directly participating in the ACP
   afterwards.  Instead, the host would just leverage TLS/dTLS TLS/DTLS using its
   AN certificate via the data-plane with AN network devices as well as
   indirectly via the ACP with the above mentioned in-NOC network edge
   connectivity into the ACP.

   When using the ACP itself, TLS/dTLS TLS/DTLS for the transport layer between
   NMS hosts and network device is somewhat of a double price to pay
   (ACP also encrypts) and could potentially be optimized away, but
   given the assumed lower performance of the ACP, it seems that this is
   an unnecessary optimization.

2.1.8.  Long term direction Term Direction of the solution Solution

   If we consider what potentially could be the most lightweight and
   autonomic long term solution based on the technologies described
   above, we see the following direction:

   1.  NMS hosts should at least support IPv6.  IPv4/IPv6 NAT in the
       network to enable use of ACP is long term undesirable.  Having
       IPv4 only applications automatically leverage IPv6 connectivity
       via host-stack options is likely non-feasible (NOTE: this has
       still to translation may be vetted more). an option but the operational
       viability of this approach is not well enough understood.

   2.  Build the ACP as a lightweight application for NMS hosts so ACP
       extends all the way into the actual NMS hosts.

   3.  Leverage and as necessary enhance MP-TCP MPTCP with automatic dual-
       connectivity: If the MP-TCP an MPTCP unaware application is using ACP
       connectivity, the policies used should add sub-flow(s) subflow(s) via the
       data-plane and prefer them.

   4.  Consider how to best map NMS host desires to underlying transport
       mechanisms: With the above mentioned 3 points, not all options
       are covered.  Depending on the OAM operation, OAM, one may still want only ACP,
       only data-plane, or automatically prefer one over the other and/or and/
       or use the ACP with low performance or high-performance (for
       emergency OAM actions such as countering DDoS).  It is as of today not
       clear what the simplest set of tools is to enable explicitly the
       choice of desired behavior of each OAM operations. OAM.  The use of the above
       mentioned DNS and MP-TCP MPTCP mechanisms is a start, but this will
       require additional thoughts.  This is likely a specific case of
       the more generic scope of TAPS.

2.2.  Stable connectivity Connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions Distributed Network/OAM

   The ANI (ACP, Bootstrap, GRASP) can provide via the GRASP protocol
   common direct-neighbor discovery and capability negotiation (GRASP
   via ACP and/or data-plane) and stable and secure connectivity for
   functions running distributed in network devices (GRASP via ACP).  It
   can therefore eliminate the need to re-implement similar functions in
   each distributed function in the network.  Today, every distributed
   protocol does this with functional elements usually called "Hello"
   mechanisms and with often protocol specific security mechanisms.

   KARP (Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols, see [RFC6518])
   has tried to start provide common directions and therefore reduce the
   re-invention of at least some of the security aspects, but it only
   covers routing-protocols and it is unclear how well it applicable to
   a potentially wider range of network distributed agents such as those
   performing distributed OAM functions. OAM.  The ACP can help in these cases.

3.  Security Considerations

   In this section, we discuss only security considerations not covered
   in the appropriate sub-sections of the solutions described.

   Even though ACPs are meant to be isolated, explicit operator
   misconfiguration to connect to insecure OAM equipment and/or bugs in
   ACP devices may cause leakage into places where it is not expected.
   Mergers/Acquisitions and other complex network reconfigurations
   affecting the NOC are typical examples.

   ULA addressing as proposed in this document is preferred over
   globally reachable addresses because it is not routed in the global
   Internet and will therefore be subject to more filtering even in
   places where specific ULA addresses are being used.


   Random ULA addressing provides more than sufficient protection
   against address collision even though there is no central assignment
   authority.  This is helped by the expectation, that ACPs are never
   expected to connect all together, but only few ACPs may ever need to
   connect together, eg: e.g. when mergers and aquisitions occur.

   If packets with unexpected ULA addresses are seen and one expects
   them to be from another networks ACP from which they leaked, then
   some form of ULA prefix registrastion registration (not allocation) can be
   beneficial.  Some voluntary registries exist, for example, although none of them is
   preferable because of being operated by some recognized authority.
   If an operator would want to make its ULA prefix known, it might need
   to register it with multiple existing registries.

   ULA Centrally assigned ULA addresses (ULA-C) was an attempt to
   introduce centralized registration of randomly assigned addresses and
   potentially even carve out a different ULA prefix for such addresses.
   This proposal is currently not proceeding, and it is questionable
   whether the stable connectivity use case provides sufficient
   motivation to revive this effort.

   Using current registration options implies that there will not be
   reverse DNS mapping for ACP addresses.  For that one will have to
   rely on looking up the unknown/unexpected network prefix in the
   registry registry to determine the owner of these addresses.

   Reverse DNS resolution may be beneficial for specific already
   deployed insecure legacy protocols on NOC OAM systems that intend to
   communicate via the ACP (eg: (e.g.  TFTP) and leverages reverse-DNS for
   authentication.  Given how the ACP provides path security except
   potentially for the last-hop in the NOC, the ACP does make it easier
   to extend the lifespan of such protocols in a secure fashion as far
   to just the transport is concerned.  The ACP does not make reverse
   DNS lookup a secure authentication method though.  Any current and
   future protocols must rely on secure end-to-end communications (TLD,
   dTLS) (TLS/
   DTLS) and identification and authentication via the certificates
   assigned to both ends.  This is enabled by the certificate mechanisms
   of the ACP.

   If DNS and especially reverse DNS are set up, then it should be set
   up in an automated fashion, linked to the autonomic registrar backend
   so that the DNS and reverse DNS records are actually derived from the
   subject name elements of the ACP device certificates in the same way
   as the autonomic devices themselves will derive their ULA addresses
   from their certificates to ensure correct and consistent DNS entries.

   If an operator feels that reverse DNS records are beneficial to its
   own operations but that they should not be made available publically
   for "security" by concealment reasons, then the case of ACP DNS
   entries is probably one of the least problematic use cases for split-
   DNS: The ACP DNS names are only needed for the NMS hosts intending to
   use the ACP - but not network wide across the enterprise.

4.  No IPv4 for ACP

   The ACP is targeted to be IPv6 only, and the prior explanations in
   this document show that this can lead to some complexity when having
   to connect IPv4 only NOC solutions, and that it will be impossible to
   leverage the ACP when the OAM agents on an ACP network device do not
   support IPv6.  Therefore, the question was raised whether the ACP
   should optionally also support IPv4.

   The decision not to include IPv4 for ACP as something that is
   considered in the use cases in this document is because of the
   following reasons:

   In SP networks that have started to support IPv6, often the next
   planned step is to consider moving out IPv4 from a native transport
   as just a service on the edge.  There is no benefit/need for multiple
   parallel transport families within the network, and standardizing on
   one reduces OPEX and improves reliability.  This evolution in the
   data plane makes it highly unlikely that investing development cycles
   into IPv4 support for ACP will have a longer term benefit or enough
   critical short-term use-cases.  Support for only IPv4 IPv4-only for ACP is
   purely a strategic choice to focus on the known important long term

   In other type of networks as well, we think that efforts to support
   autonomic networking is better spent in ensuring that one address
   family will be support so all use cases will long-term work with it,
   instead of duplicating effort into IPv4.  Especially because auto-
   addressing for the ACP with IPv4 would be more ecomplex complex than in IPv6
   due to the IPv4 addressing space.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no action by IANA.

6.  Acknowledgements

   This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at cisco
   Systems, which started in early 2010 including customers involved in
   the design and early testing.  Many people contributed to the aspects
   described in this document, including in alphabetical order: BL
   Balaji, Steinthor Bjarnason, Yves Herthoghs, Sebastian Meissner, Ravi
   Kumar Vadapalli.  The author would also like to thank Michael
   Richardson, James Woodyatt and Brian Carpenter for their review and
   comments.  Special thanks to Sheng Jiang and Mohamed Boucadair for his
   their thorough review.

7.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]

      04: Integrated fixes from Mohamed Boucadairs review.

      03: Integrated fixed fixes from Shepherd review (Sheng Jiang).

      01: Refresh timeout.  Stable document, change in author

      01: Refresh timeout.  Stable document, no changes.

      00: Changed title/dates.

      individual-02: Updated references.

      individual-03: Modified ULA text to not suggest ULA-C as much
      better anymore, but still mention it.

      individual-02: Added explanation why no IPv4 for ACP.

      individual-01: Added security section discussing the role of
      address prefix selection and DNS for ACP.  Title change to
      emphasize focus on OAM.  Expanded abstract.

      individual-00: Initial version.

8.  References

              Behringer, M., Eckert, T., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
              Control Plane", Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
              plane-08 (work in progress), March July 2017.

              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-07 (work in progress), May July 2017.

              Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
              grasp-15 (work in progress), July 2017.

              Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
              Pierre, P., Liu, B., Nobre, J., and J. Strassner, "A
              Reference Model for Autonomic Networking", draft-ietf-
              anima-reference-model-04 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [ITUT]     International Telecommunication Union, "Architecture and
              specification of data communication network",
              ITU-T Recommendation G.7712/Y.1703, June 2008.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC6291]  Andersson, L., van Helvoort, H., Bonica, R., Romascanu,
              D., and S. Mansfield, "Guidelines for the Use of the "OAM"
              Acronym in the IETF", BCP 161, RFC 6291,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6291, June 2011,

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <>.

   [RFC6418]  Blanchet, M. and P. Seite, "Multiple Interfaces and
              Provisioning Domains Problem Statement", RFC 6418,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6418, November 2011,

   [RFC6434]  Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", RFC 6434, DOI 10.17487/RFC6434, December
              2011, <>.

   [RFC6518]  Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6518, February 2012,

   [RFC6824]  Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
              "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
              Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013,

   [RFC7575]  Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,

Authors' Addresses

   Toerless Eckert (editor)
   Futurewei Technologies Inc.
   2330 Central Expy
   Santa Clara  95050


   Michael H. Behringer