--- 1/draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06.txt 2019-06-20 12:13:13.860536392 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-babel-hmac-07.txt 2019-06-20 12:13:13.908537609 -0700 @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ Network Working Group C. Do Internet-Draft W. Kolodziejak Obsoletes: 7298 (if approved) J. Chroboczek Intended status: Standards Track IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot Expires: December 22, 2019 June 20, 2019 HMAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol - draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06 + draft-ietf-babel-hmac-07 Abstract This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for the Babel routing protocol that has provisions for replay avoidance. - This document updates RFC 6126bis and obsoletes RFC 7298. + This document obsoletes RFC 7298. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. @@ -73,20 +73,21 @@ 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Incremental deployment and key rotation . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. Changes from previous versions . . . . . . . . . . . 18 B.1. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 . . . . . . . . . 18 B.2. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-01 . . . . . . . . . 18 B.3. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-02 . . . . . . . . . 18 B.4. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-03 . . . . . . . . . 18 B.5. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-04 . . . . . . . . . 19 B.6. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-05 . . . . . . . . . 19 + B.7. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06 . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1. Introduction By default, the Babel routing protocol trusts the information contained in every UDP datagram that it receives on the Babel port. An attacker can redirect traffic to itself or to a different node in the network, causing a variety of potential issues. In particular, an attacker might: @@ -846,20 +847,24 @@ B.6. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-05 o Do not update RFC 6126bis. o Clarify that indices and nonces of length 0 are valid. o Clarify that multiple PC TLVs in a single packet are not allowed. o Allow discarding challenge requests when they carry an old PC. +B.7. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06 + + o Do not update RFC 6126bis, for real this time. + Authors' Addresses Clara Do IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot 75205 Paris Cedex 13 France Email: clarado_perso@yahoo.fr Weronika Kolodziejak