draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04.txt   draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-05.txt 
Network Working Group M. Jethanandani Network Working Group M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track A. Mishra Intended status: Standards Track A. Mishra
Expires: May 25, 2018 O3b Networks Expires: November 26, 2018 SES Networks
A. Saxena A. Saxena
Ciena Corporation Ciena Corporation
M. Bhatia M. Bhatia
Ionos Networks Nokia
November 21, 2017 May 25, 2018
Optimizing BFD Authentication Optimizing BFD Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04 draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-05
Abstract Abstract
This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as
described in Section 6.7 of BFD [RFC5880]. described in Section 6.7 of BFD RFC5880.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 25, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or
with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process, Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process,
making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet - making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet -
particularly at faster rates. Also, the recent escalating series of particularly at faster rates. Also, the recent escalating series of
attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise
concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated
skipping to change at page 5, line 35 skipping to change at page 6, line 18
authentication a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement authentication a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement
that every frame be authenticated. By authenticating frames that that every frame be authenticated. By authenticating frames that
affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD session is affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD session is
maintained. As such this document does not change the security maintained. As such this document does not change the security
considerations for BFD. considerations for BFD.
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[FIPS-180-2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS PUB
180-2, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC)", August 2002.
[FIPS-198]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS PUB
198, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)",
March 2002.
[I-D.ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth]
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Zhang, D., and M. Jethanandani,
"BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication", draft-ietf-
bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06 (work in progress), April 2014.
[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers] [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., Saxena, A., and Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., Saxena, A., and
A. DeKok, "Secure BFD Sequence Numbers", draft-ietf-bfd- A. DeKok, "Secure BFD Sequence Numbers", draft-ietf-bfd-
secure-sequence-numbers-00 (work in progress), May 2017. secure-sequence-numbers-01 (work in progress), November
2017.
[I-D.ietf-bfd-stability]
Mishra, A., Jethanandani, M., Saxena, A., Networks, J.,
Chen, M., and P. Fan, "BFD Stability", draft-ietf-bfd-
stability-00 (work in progress), May 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
Protocols", RFC 6039, DOI 10.17487/RFC6039, October 2010, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039>.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[Dobb96a] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", May 1996.
[Dobb96b] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
CryptoBytes", 1996.
[I-D.ietf-karp-design-guide]
Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", draft-ietf-
karp-design-guide-10 (work in progress), December 2011.
[MD5-attack]
Wang, X., Feng, D., Lai, X., and H. Yu, "Collisions for
Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", August
2004.
[NIST-HMAC-SHA]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Available
online at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html,
"NIST's Policy on Hash Functions", 2006.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, [RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992, DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4822] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 4822, DOI 10.17487/RFC4822, February
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822>.
[RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310>.
[RFC5709] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5709, DOI 10.17487/RFC5709, October
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
[SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack1]
Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", 2005. Full SHA-1", 2005.
[SHA-1-attack2] [SHA-1-attack2]
Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for
SHA-1", 2005. SHA-1", 2005.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mahesh Jethanandani Mahesh Jethanandani
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Phone: +1 (408) 526-8763
Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
Ashesh Mishra Ashesh Mishra
O3b Networks SES Networks
Email: mishra.ashesh@gmail.com Email: mishra.ashesh@gmail.com
Ankur Saxena Ankur Saxena
Ciena Corporation Ciena Corporation
3939 N 1st Street 3939 N 1st Street
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com
Manav Bhatia Manav Bhatia
Ionos Networks Nokia
Bangalore Bangalore
India India
Email: manavbhatia@gmail.com Email: manav.bhatia@nokia.com
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