draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-07.txt   draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08.txt 
BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed. BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed.
Internet-Draft Rtbrick Internet-Draft VMware
Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri
Expires: November 18, 2019 Individual Contributor Expires: May 4, 2020 Individual Contributor
V. Govindan V. Govindan
M. Mudigonda M. Mudigonda
Cisco Cisco
G. Mirsky G. Mirsky
ZTE Corp. ZTE Corp.
May 17, 2019 November 1, 2019
BFD for VXLAN BFD for VXLAN
draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-07 draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local
Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network. Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Use of the Specific VNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Use of the Specific VNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Echo BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Echo BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [RFC7348] provides an "Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [RFC7348] provides an
encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by
decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that
of the network. of the network.
One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines
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Ethernet VPN [RFC8365]. Ethernet VPN [RFC8365].
This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized
hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in
hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non- hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non-
virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches. virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches.
In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with
another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are
unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP. unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP.
VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames
exchanged among VMs. exchanged among VMs.
Ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive Ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive
continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is
important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [RFC5880], important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [RFC5880], is
can be used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel. used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel.
In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in
Section 3.3 of [RFC8293]) resides behind an NVE, the mechanisms Section 3.3 of [RFC8293]) resides behind a Network Virtualization
described in this document apply and can, therefore, be used to test Endpoint (NVE), the mechanisms described in this document apply and
the connectivity from the source NVE to the MSN. can, therefore, be used to test the connectivity from the source NVE
to the MSN.
This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between (BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between
VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or
availability of a replicator multicast service node. availability of a replicator multicast service node.
2. Conventions used in this document 2. Conventions used in this document
2.1. Terminology 2.1. Terminology
BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
CC Continuity Check CC Continuity Check
p2p Point-to-point p2p Point-to-point
MSN Multicast Service Node MSN Multicast Service Node
NVE Network Virtualization Endpoint
VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance
VM Virtual Machine VM Virtual Machine
VNI VXLAN Network Identifier (or VXLAN Segment ID)
VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point
VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
2.2. Requirements Language 2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Deployment 3. Deployment
Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them
hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN
tunnels with VNI number 100 and 200 respectively. Separate BFD tunnels with VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) number 100 and 200
sessions can be established between the VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for respectively. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the
monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100 and 200). An VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100
implementation that supports this specification MUST be able to and 200). An implementation that supports this specification MUST be
control the number of BFD sessions that can be created between the able to control the number of BFD sessions that can be created
same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended for a Hypervisor VTEP MUST between the same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended for a VTEP MUST
NOT be forwarded to a VM as a VM may drop BFD packets leading to a NOT be forwarded to a VM as a VM may drop BFD packets leading to a
false negative. This method is applicable whether the VTEP is a false negative. This method is applicable whether the VTEP is a
virtual or physical device. virtual or physical device.
+------------+-------------+ +------------+-------------+
| Server 1 | | Server 1 |
| |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ | | +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | | | |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | |
| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | | | |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ | | +---------+ +---------+ |
| Hypervisor VTEP (IP1) | | VTEP (IP1) |
+--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
| |
|
|
| +-------------+ | +-------------+
| | Layer 3 | | | Layer 3 |
|---| Network | +---| Network |
| |
+-------------+ +-------------+
| |
|
+-----------+ +-----------+
| |
|
+------------+-------------+ +------------+-------------+
| Hypervisor VTEP (IP2) | | VTEP (IP2) |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ | | +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | | | |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | |
| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | | | |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ | | +---------+ +---------+ |
| Server 2 | | Server 2 |
+--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain
At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used between the
tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault management.
In such case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are
indistinguishable from data packets.
As per Section 4, the inner destination IP address SHOULD be set to
one of the loopback addresses (127/8 range for IPv4 and
0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00:0/104 range for IPv6). There could be a firewall
configured on VTEP to block loopback addresses if set as the
destination IP in the inner IP header. It is RECOMMENDED to allow
addresses from the loopback range through a firewall only if it is
used as the destination IP address in the inner IP header, and the
destination UDP port is set to 3784 [RFC5881].
4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel 4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel
BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as
explained in Section 4.1. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the BFD explained in this section. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the
packets follow the same lookup path as VXLAN data packets within the BFD packets follow the same lookup path as VXLAN data packets within
sender system. the sender system.
4.1. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN
BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN
packet format is defined in Section 5 of [RFC7348]. The Outer IP/UDP packet format is defined in Section 5 of [RFC7348]. The Outer IP/UDP
and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in
[RFC7348]. [RFC7348].
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
~ Inner IPvX Header ~ ~ Inner IPvX Header ~
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
~ Inner UDP Header ~ ~ Inner UDP Header ~
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
~ BFD Control Message ~ ~ BFD Control Packet ~
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| FCS | | FCS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Message Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Packet
The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner MAC frame of the The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner Ethernet frame of the
VXLAN packet. The inner MAC frame carrying the BFD payload has the VXLAN packet. The choice of Destination MAC and Destination IP
following format: addresses for the inner Ethernet frame MUST ensure that the BFD
Control packet is not forwarded to a tenant but is processed locally
at the remote VTEP. The inner Ethernet frame carrying the BFD
Control packet- has the following format:
Ethernet Header: Ethernet Header:
Destination MAC: This MUST be the dedicated MAC TBA (Section 8) Destination MAC: This MUST NOT be of one of tenant's MAC
or the MAC address of the destination VTEP. The details of how addresses. The destination MAC address MAY be the address
the MAC address of the destination VTEP is obtained are outside associated with the destination VTEP. The MAC address MAY be
the scope of this document. configured, or it MAY be learned via a control plane protocol.
The details of how the MAC address is obtained are outside the
scope of this document.
Source MAC: MAC address of the originating VTEP Source MAC: MAC address associated with the originating VTEP
IP header: IP header:
Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP. Destination IP: IP address MUST NOT be of one of tenant's IP
addresses. The IP address SHOULD be selected from the range
127/8 for IPv4, for IPv6 - from the range
0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00:0/104. Alternatively, the destination IP
address MAY be set to VTEP's IP address.
Destination IP: IP address of the terminating VTEP. Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.
TTL: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD packet is not TTL or Hop Limit: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD
routed within the L3 underlay network. packet is not routed within the Layer 3 underlay network. This
addresses the scenario when the inner IP destination address is
of VXLAN gateway and there is a router in underlay which
removes the VXLAN header, then it is possible to route the
packet as VXLAN gateway address is routable address.
The fields of the UDP header and the BFD control packet are The fields of the UDP header and the BFD Control packet are
encoded as specified in [RFC5881]. encoded as specified in [RFC5881].
5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel 5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel
Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the
Destination MAC of the inner MAC frame matches the dedicated MAC or Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame matches one of the MAC
the MAC address of the VTEP the packet MUST be processed further. addresses associated with the VTEP the packet MUST be processed
further. If the Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame doesn't
match any of VTEP's MAC addresses, then the processing of the
received VXLAN packet MUST follow the procedures described in
Section 4.1 [RFC7348]. If the BFD session is using the Management
VNI (Section 6), BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address MUST
NOT be forwarded to VMs.
The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be
validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by
BFD. BFD packet with inner MAC set to VTEP or dedicated MAC address BFD.
MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.
5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet 5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet
Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in Section 3 of Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in Section 3 of
[RFC5881]. Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two [RFC5881]. Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two
VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD
packets to the proper session. The procedure for demultiplexing packets to the proper session. For demultiplexing packets with Your
packets with Your Discriminator equal to 0 is different from Discriminator equal to 0, a BFD session MUST be identified using the
[RFC5880]. For such packets, the BFD session MUST be identified logical link over which the BFD Control packet is received. In the
using the inner headers, i.e., the source IP, the destination IP, and case of VXLAN, the VNI number identifies that logical link. If BFD
the source UDP port number present in the IP header carried by the packet is received with non-zero Your Discriminator, then BFD session
payload of the VXLAN encapsulated packet. The VNI of the packet MUST be demultiplexed only with Your Discriminator as the key.
SHOULD be used to derive interface-related information for
demultiplexing the packet. If BFD packet is received with non-zero
Your Discriminator, then BFD session MUST be demultiplexed only with
Your Discriminator as the key.
6. Use of the Specific VNI 6. Use of the Specific VNI
In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP
to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the
number of VNIs in common. When the single BFD session is used to number of VNIs. When the single BFD session is used to monitor the
monitor the reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD choose any
choose any of the VNIs but MAY choose VNI = 0. of the VNIs. An implementation MAY support the use of the Management
VNI as control and management channel between VTEPs. The selection
of the VNI number of the Management VNI MUST be controlled through
management plane. An implementation MAY use VNI number 1 as the
default value for the Management VNI. All VXLAN packets received on
the Management VNI MUST be processed locally and MUST NOT be
forwarded to a tenant.
7. Echo BFD 7. Echo BFD
Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document. Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned TBA as a dedicated MAC address from the IANA 48-bit This specification has no IANA action requested. This section may be
unicast MAC address registry to be used as the Destination MAC deleted before the publication.
address of the inner Ethernet of VXLAN when carrying BFD control
packets.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be
used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have
throttling in place to control the rate of BFD control packets sent throttling in place to control the rate of BFD Control packets sent
to the control plane. Throttling MAY be relaxed for BFD packets to the control plane. On the other hand, over-aggressive throttling
based on port number. of BFD Control packets may become the cause of the inability to form
and maintain BFD session at scale. Hence, throttling of BFD Control
packets SHOULD be adjusted to permit BFD to work according to its
procedures.
The implementation SHOULD have a reasonable upper bound on the number If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions
of BFD sessions that can be created between the same pair of VTEPs. between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to
control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the
same time.
Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions
between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any
additional security issues beyond those of the specifications additional security issues beyond those of the specifications
referred to in the list of normative references. referred to in the list of normative references.
10. Contributors 10. Contributors
Reshad Rahman Reshad Rahman
rrahman@cisco.com rrahman@cisco.com
skipping to change at page 10, line 14 skipping to change at page 10, line 33
[RFC8365] Sajassi, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Bitar, N., Shekhar, R., [RFC8365] Sajassi, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Bitar, N., Shekhar, R.,
Uttaro, J., and W. Henderickx, "A Network Virtualization Uttaro, J., and W. Henderickx, "A Network Virtualization
Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", RFC 8365, Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", RFC 8365,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8365, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8365, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8365>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8365>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Santosh Pallagatti (editor) Santosh Pallagatti (editor)
Rtbrick VMware
Email: santosh.pallagatti@gmail.com Email: santosh.pallagatti@gmail.com
Sudarsan Paragiri Sudarsan Paragiri
Individual Contributor Individual Contributor
Email: sudarsan.225@gmail.com Email: sudarsan.225@gmail.com
Vengada Prasad Govindan Vengada Prasad Govindan
Cisco Cisco
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