Network Working Group S. Govindan (Editor) Internet-Draft Panasonic Expires:
August 5,October 16, 2005 ZH. Yao Huawei WH. Zhou China Mobile L. Yang Intel H. Cheng Panasonic MarchApril 14, 2005 Objectives for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) draft-ietf-capwap-objectives-01.txtdraft-ietf-capwap-objectives-02.txt Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5,October 16, 2005. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Abstract This document presents objectives for an interoperable protocol for the Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP). The document aims to establish a set of focused requirements for the development and evaluation of a CAPWAP protocol. The objectives address Architecture, Operation, Security and Network Operator Requirements that are necessary to enable interoperability among wireless local area network (WLAN) devices of alternative designs. Table of Contents 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4. Objectives Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.1 Mandatory and Accepted Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.1.1 Logical Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.1.2 Support for Traffic Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5.1.3 Wireless Terminal Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 5.1.4 Configuration Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 5.1.5 Firmware Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 5.1.6 Monitoring and Exchange of System-wide Resource State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 5.1.7 Resource Control Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 5.1.8 CAPWAP Protocol Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1415 5.1.9 System-wide Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1516 5.1.10 IEEE 802.11i Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 1617 5.1.11 Interoperability Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1718 5.1.12 Protocol Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.1.13 Vendor Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.1.14 Vendor Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2 Desirable Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1921 5.2.1 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . 1922 5.2.2 Support for Future Wireless Technologies . . . . . . . 2022 5.2.3 Support for New IEEE Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 2123 5.2.4 Interconnection Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2224 5.2.5 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2225 5.3 Rejected Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2426 5.3.1 Support for Non-CAPWAP WTPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2426 5.3.2 Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.4 Operator Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2427 5.4.1 AP Fast Handoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2527 6. Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2628 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2729 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2830 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2830 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2830 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 3032 1. Requirements notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. Terminology This document follows the terminologies of [I-D.ietf-capwap-arch]. Additionally, the following terms are defined; Switching Segment: Those aspects of a centralized WLAN that primarily deal with switching or routing of control and data information between Wireless Termination Points (WTPs) and the WLAN controller. Wireless Medium Segment: Those aspects of a centralized WLAN that primarily deal with the wireless interface between WTPs and wireless terminals. The Wireless Medium Segment is specific to layer 2 wireless technology, such as IEEE 802.11. CAPWAP Framework: A term that covers the local-MAC and split-MAC designs of the Centralized WLAN Architecture. Standardization efforts are focussed on these designs. CAPWAP Protocol: The protocol between WLAN controller and WTPs in the CAPWAP framework. It facilitates control, management and provisioning of WTPs in an interoperable manner. 3. Introduction The growth in large-scale wireless local area network (WLAN) deployments has brought to focus a number of technical challenges. Among them is the complexity of managing large numbers of wireless termination points (WTPs), which is further exacerbated by variations in their design. Another challenge is the maintenance of consistent configurations among the numerous WTPs of a system. The dynamic nature of the wireless medium is also a concern together with WLAN security. The challenges affecting large-scale WLAN deployments have been highlighted in [I-D.ietf-capwap-problem-statement]. Many vendors have addressed these challenges by developing new architectures and solutions. A survey of the various developments was conducted to better understand the context of these challenges. This survey is a first step towards designing interoperability among the solutions. The Architecture Taxonomy [I-D.ietf-capwap-arch] is a result of this survey in which major WLAN architecture families are classified. Broadly, these are the autonomous, centralized WLAN and distributed mesh architectures. The Architecture Taxonomy identified that the current majority of large-scale deployments follow the centralized WLAN architecture in which portions of the wireless medium access control (MAC) operations are centralized in a WLAN controller. This centralized WLAN architecture is further classified into remote-MAC, split-MAC and local-MAC designs. Each differs in the degree of separation of wireless MAC layer capabilities between WTPs and WLAN controller. This document puts forward critical objectives for achieving interoperability in the CAPWAP framework. It presents requirements that address the challenges of controling and provisioning large-scalelarge- scale WLAN deployments. The realization of these objectives in a CAPWAP protocol will ensure that WLAN equipment of major design types may be integrally deployed and managed. 4. Objectives Overview The objectives for CAPWAP have been broadly classified to address architecture, operation and security requirements of managing large-scalelarge- scale WLAN deployments. Architecture objectives deal with system level aspects of the CAPWAP protocol. They address issues of protocol extensibility, diversity in network deployments and architecture designs and differences in transport technologies. Operational objectives address the control and management features of the CAPWAP protocol. They deal with operations relating to WLAN monitoring, resource management, QoS and access control. Security objectives address potential threats to WLANs and their containment. In the CAPWAP context, security requirements cover both the protocol between WLAN controller and WTPs and also the WLAN system as a whole. Additionally, a general classification is used for objectives relating to the overall impact of the CAPWAP protocol specifications. 5. Objectives The objectives described in this document have been prioritized based on their immediate significance in the development and evaluation of a control and provisioning protocol for large-scale WLAN deployments. Additionally, one category is provided for requirements gathered from network service operators. These are specific need that arise from operators' experiencese in deploying and managing large-scale WLANs. The priorities are; i. Mandatory and Accepted Objectives ii. Desirable Objectives iii. Rejected Objectives iv. Operator Requirements The priorities have been assigned to individual objectives in accordance with working group discussions. 5.1 Mandatory and Accepted Objectives Objectives prioritized as Mandatory and Accepted have been deemed crucial for the control and provisioning of WTPs. They directly address the challenges of large-scale WLAN deployments and must be realized by a CAPWAP protocol. 5.1.1 Logical Groups [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.3i]Classification: Architecture Description: Large WLAN deployments are complex and expensive. Furthermore, enterprises deploying such networks are under pressure to improve the efficiency of their expenditures. Shared WLAN deployments, where a single physical WLAN infrastructure supports a number of logical networks, are increasingly used to address these two issues of large-scale WLANs. These are popular as they allow deployment and management costs to be spread across businesses. In traditional WLANs, each physical WTP represents one complete subset of a larger WLAN system. Shared WLANs differ in that each physical WTP represents a number of logical subsets of possibly a number of larger WLAN systems. Each logical division of a physical WTP is referred to as a logical group. For example, each BSSID of a physical WTP can be construed to be a logical group. So WLANs are managed in terms of logical groups instead of physical WTPs. Virtual APs are examples of logical groups. Protocol Requirement: WLAN deployment trends require the CAPWAP protocol to be capable of controlling and managing physical WTPs in terms of logical groups. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: Commercial realities necessitate that WLANs be manageable in terms of its logical groups. This allows separation of logical services and underlying infrastructure management. A protocol that realizes this need ensures simlper and cost effective WLANs, which directly address the requirements of network service operators. Relation to Problem Statement: This objective addresses the problem of management complexity in terms of costs. Cost complexity is reduced by sharing WLAN deployments. Consequently, deployment and management cost-efficienciescost- efficiencies are realized. 5.1.2 Support for Traffic Separation [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.7 and 5.2.3ii]Classification: Operations Description: The centralized WLAN architecture simplifies complexity associated with large-scale deployments by consolidating portions of wireless MAC functionality at a central WLAN controller and distributing the remaining across WTPs. As a result, WTPs and WLAN controller exchange control and data information between them. This objective states that control and data aspects of the exchanges be mutually separated for further simplicity. This will allow solutions for each type of exchange to be independently optimized. Furthermore, in the context of shared WLAN deployments, the mutual separation of control and data also addresses security concerns. In particular, given the likelihood of different logical groups being managed by different administrators, separation of control and data is a first step towards individually containing and securing the logical groups. It is also important to ensure that traffic from each logical group be mutually separated to maintain the integrity and independence of the logical groups. Protocol Requirement: In order to maintain the separation of control and data traffic, the CAPWAP protocol is required to define control messages such that they do not involve piggybacking or other combination with data traffic. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The aim of separating data and control aspects of the protocol is to simplify the protocol. It also allows for the flexibility of addressing each type of traffic in the most appropriate manner. Furthermore, such separation provides for the separation of data and control paths. This will help remotely located WTPs to handle data traffic in alternative ways without the need for forwarding them across a wide network to the WLAN controller. Separation of WTP control and data also aids in the secure realization of shared WLAN deployments. Relation to Problem Statement: Broadly, this objective relates to the challenge of managing complexity in large-scale WLANs. The requirement for traffic separation simplifies control as this is separated from the task of data transport. 5.1.3 Wireless Terminal Transparency [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.4iii]Classification: Operations Description: The CAPWAP protocol is applicable between a centralized WLAN controller and a number of WTPs, i.e. it affects only the switching segment of the centralized WLAN architecture. Its operations should therefore be independent of the wireless terminal. Wireless terminals should not be required to be aware of the existence of the CAPWAP protocol. Protocol Requirement: Wireless terminals should not be required to recognize or be aware of the CAPWAP protocol. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: IEEE 802.11 based wireless terminals are mature and widely available. It would be beneficial for CAPWAP not to impose new requirements on these wireless terminals. In effect, this requirement ensures that the setup cost of the protocol is reduced as the numerous existing wireless terminals need not be altered. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement highlights the challenges faced by large WLANs consisting of many WTPs. It does not refer to the operations of wireless terminals and this objective emphasizes the independence. 5.1.4 Configuration Consistency [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.5i]Classification: Operations Description: WLANs in the CAPWAP framework contain numerous WTPs, each of which need to be configured and managed in a consistent manner. This is possible by providing the centralized WLAN controller with regular updates on the state of their operations. The centralized WLAN controller can in turn apply information from the regular updates to consistently configure the WTPs. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must allow for regular exchanges of state information between WTPs and WLAN controller. Examples of state information include WTP processing load and memory utilization. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: A protocol that has access to regular state information can in turn use this to enhance WLAN performance. The CAPWAP protocol will be better equipped to address configuration related problems with the state information. So with greater state information, control and management operations can be improved. Relation to Problem Statement: One of the major challenges described in the Problem Statement is that of maintaining consistent configuration across the numerous WTPs of a WLAN. This objective fundamentally addresses this challenge by providing relevant state information based on which configurations can be appropriately maintained. 5.1.5 Firmware Trigger [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.5i] [Ed. Note: Was titled "Firmware Distribution]Classification: Operations Description: One specific aspect of configuration consistency is the firmware used by various WTPs. The scale of large WLANs introduces possibilities for variations in the firmware used among WTPs. This objective highlights the need for the CAPWAP protocol to trigger the delivery of appropriate versions of firmware to WTPs. The actual delivery of firmware need not be inclusive to the prtoocol. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must support a trigger for delivery of firmware updates. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The CAPWAP protocol interfaces many WTPs to a centralized WLAN controller. Firmware distribution allows these interfaces to be appropriately equivalent. This in turn results in consistent configuration and simplified management. So the protocol benefits by including triggers for the distribution of firmware updates. Relation to Problem Statement: Inconsistencies in the configuration of WTPs has been identified as a major challenge for large-scale WTPs. This objectives helps overcome the challenge by providing for a way for the protocol to initiate delivery of equivalent versions of firmware to all WTPs. 5.1.6 Monitoring and Exchange of System-wide Resource State [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.5ii] [Ed. Note: Was titled "System-wide Resource State"]Classification: Operations Description: The centralized WLAN architecture is made up of a switching segment and wireless medium segment. In the switching segment, network congestion, WTP status and firmware information have to be monitored. In the wireless medium segment, the dynamic nature of the medium itself has to be monitored. Overall, there are also various statistics need to be considered for efficient WLAN operation. The CAPWAP protocol should be capable of monitoring the various information sources and deliver the resulting information to the relevant WLAN devices - either WTPs or WLAN controller. Moreover, given the relationship among information sources, the CAPWAP protocol should combine state information from them. For example, statistics information and status signals from WTPs may be merged before being exchanged. Examples of statistics information that the CAPWAP protocol should monitor and exchange include; congestion state, interference levels, loss rates and various delay factors. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must allow for the exchange of statistics, congestion and other WLAN state information. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The effectivness of a protocol is based on the relevance of information on which it operates. This requirement for resource monitoring and exchange can provide the appropriate information to the CAPWAP protocol. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement highlights the challenge of dealing with large numbers of WTPs and the dynamic nature of the wireless medium. Information on the state of WTPs and the medium is important to deal with them effectively. So this objective relates to the problem of managing consistency in large WLANs. 5.1.7 Resource Control Objective [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.6]Classification: Operations Description: Integral to the success of any wireless network system is the performance and quality it can offer its subscribers. Since CAPWAP based WLANs combine a switching segment and a wireless medium segment, performance and quality need to be coordinated across both of these segments. So QoS performance must be enforced system-wide. This objective highlights QoS over the entire WLAN system which includes the switching segment and the wireless medium segment. Given the fundamental differences between the two, it is likely that there are alternate QoS mechanisms between WTPs and wireless service subscribers and between WTPs and WLAN controllers. For instance, the former will be based on IEEE 802.11e while the latter will be an alternative. So resources need to be adjusted in a coordinated fashion over both segments. The CAPWAP protocol should ensure that these adjustments are appropriately exchanged between WLAN controllers and WTPs. In addition to IEEE 802.11e, there are a number of other IEEE Task Groups that may affect network resources. These include IEEE TGk, TGu and TGv, which are currently under progress. CAPWAP should therefore not be restricted to IEEE 802.11e based mapping. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must maintain IEEE 802.11e QoS mappings across the switching and wireless medium segments. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: A protocol that addresses QoS aspects of WLAN systems will deliver high performance thereby being beneficial for subscribers and for resource utilization efficiency. Since CAPWAP deals with WTPs directly and with the wireless medium indirectly, both of these must be considered for performance. For the wireless medium segment, QoS aspects in the protocol enable high quality communications within the domain of a WLAN controller. Since each domain generally covers an enterprise or a group of service providers, such protocol performance has wide-ranging effects. Within the switching segment of CAPWAP, a QoS-enabled protocol minimizes the adverse effects of dynamic traffic characteristics so as to ensure system-wide performance. Relation to Problem Statement: QoS control is critical to large WLANs and relates to a number of aspects. In particular, this objective can help address the problem of managing dynamic conditions of the wireless medium. Furthermore, traffic characteristics in large scale WLANs are constantly varying. So network utilization becomes inefficient and user experience is unpredictable. The interaction and coordination between the two aspects of system-widesystem- wide QoS is therefore critical for performance. 5.1.8 CAPWAP Protocol Security [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.10]Classification: Security Description: This objective addresses the security of the CAPWAP protocol. The CAPWAP protocol must first provide for the participating entities - WLAN controller and WTPs - to be mutually authenticated. This is to ensure that rogue WTPs do not breach legitimate WLAN systems. For example, WTPs may need to regularly renew their authentication state with the WLAN controller. Once WTPs and WLAN controller have been mutually authenticated, information exchanges between them must be secured against various security threats. This should cover illegitimate modifications to protocol exchanges, eavesdropping and DoS attacks, among other potential compromises. So the protocol must be provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for those exchanges. As a result of realizing this objective it should not be possible for individual WTP breaches to affect the security of the WLAN as a whole. So WTP mis-use will be protected against. Additionally, the key establishment protocol for authentication and securing CAPWAP exchanges must be designed to minimize the possibility of future compromises after the keys are established. While mutual authentication is necessary for CAPWAP, the protocol should not prevent the use of asymmetric, non-mutual authentication. The security considerations of such asymmetric authentication are described in the Security Considerations section. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must support mutual authentication of WTPs and the centralized controller. It must also ensure that information exchanges between them are secured. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: WLANs are increasingly deployed in critical aspects of enterprise and consumer networks. In these contexts, protocol security is crucial to assure the privacy and integrity expected from network administrators and end-users. So securing the CAPWAP protocol has direct benefits in addressing these concerns. Relation to Problem Statement: Security problems in large-scale WLANs are detailed in the Problem Statement. These include complications arising from rogue WTPs and compromised interfaces between WTPs and WLAN controller. The requirement for protocol security addresses these problems and highlights the importance of protecting against them. 5.1.9 System-wide Security [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.11]Classification: Security Description: The emphasis of this objective is on the security threats external to the centralized CAPWAP segment of a WLAN system. The focus is therefore on rogue wireless clients and other illegitimate wireless interferences. There are a number of specific external threats that need to be addressed within the CAPWAP framework. i. PMK Sharing One aspect of this objective relates to recent discussions on PMK sharing in the CAPWAP framework. This objective highlights the need to prevent exploitation of this ambiguity by rogue wireless clients. It is to ensure that any ambiguities arising from the CAPWAP framework are not cause for security breaches. Protocol Requirement: The design of the CAPWAP protocol should not allow for any compromises to the WLAN system by external entities. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The external threats to the centralized WLAN architecture become increasingly crucial given the low cost of wireless clients. Since it is relatively inexpensive for rogue individuals to mount attacks, it is important that WLAN systems are protected against them. Adequate mechanisms to thwart such external threats will be of tremendous benefit to the WLAN systems controlled and managed with the CAPWAP protocol. Relation to Problem Statement: This objective is based on the security needs highlighted in the Problem Statement. Specifically, the Problem Statement discusses the effects of the shared wireless medium. This represents the external aspects of the CAPWAP framework from which certain threats can arise. The system-wide security objective addresses such threats in relation to the Problem Statement. 5.1.10 IEEE 802.11i Considerations [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.15]Classification: Operations Description: The CAPWAP protocol must support authentication in the centralized WLAN architecture in which the authenticator and encryption points can be located on distinct entities, i.e. WLAN controller or WTP. The Architecture Taxonomy illustrates a number of variants, in both local-MAC and split-MAC designs, in which the authenticator is located at the WLAN controller and the encryption points are at the WTPs. The CAPWAP protocol must be applicable to these variants and allow authentication mechanisms and their consistituent processes to be operable in these cases. An important issue to consider in this case is the exchange of key information when authenticator and encryption points are located on distinct entities. For example, consider the case where IEEE 802.11i is used in a WLAN in which the WLAN controller realizes the authenticator, some WTPs realize encryption (possibly local-MAC WTPs) and other WTPs rely on the WLAN controller for encryption (possibly split-MAC WTPs). Here, CAPWAP will first need to identify the location of the authenticator and encryption points between each WLAN controller-WTP pair. This will likely be part of the initial WTP configuration. Subsequently, the WTPs which realize encryption will need CAPWAP to exchange key information with the authenticator at the WLAN controller. For the WTPs which do not realize encryption, CAPWAP need to adapt its control to bypass the key exchange phase. Clearly, the centralized WLAN architecture presents a different platform for authentication mechanisms compared to legacy WLANs in which a WTP realized both authenticator and encryption roles. So this objective highlights the need for CAPWAP to support authentication and key management in the centralized WLAN architecture. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must determine the exact structure of the centralized WLAN architecture in which authentication needs to be supported, i.e. the location of major authentication components. This may be achieved during WTP initialization where major capabilities are distinguished. The protocol must allow for the exchange of key information when authenticator and encryption roles are located in distinct entities. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The immediate focus of CAPWAP is on supporting IEEE 802.11 based WLANs. As such, it is necessary for the protocol to recognize the major distinction in WLAN design with respect to IEEE 802.11i authenticator and encryption points. This represents a significant variation that has been highlighted in the Architecture Taxonomy. The CAPWAP protocol benefits by accommodating such a major consideration fro IEEE 802.11i. These requirements will be common for all authentication mechanisms over the centralized WLAN architecture. So they are applicable to IEEE 802.11i, UMA and other mechanisms. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement highlights the availability of different WTP designs and the need to ensure interoperability among them. In this regard, operational changes occuring due to the separation of the IEEE 802.11i authenticator and encryption points need to be accommated within the CAPWAP protocol. 5.1.11 Interoperability Objective [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.1]Classification: Architecture Description: Two major designs of the centralized WLAN architecture are local-MAC and split-MAC. With the focusing of standardization efforts on these two designs, it is crucial to ensure mutual interoperation among them. This objective for the CAPWAP protocol is to ensure that WTPs of both local-MAC and split-MAC architecture designs are capable of interoperation within a single WLAN. Consequently, a single WLAN controller will be capable of controlling both types of WTPs using a single CAPWAP protocol. Integral support for these designs comprises a number of protocol aspects. i. Capability negotiations between WLAN controller and WTPs WTP designs differ in the degree of IEEE 802.11 MAC functionalities that each type of WTP realizes. The major distinctions, split-MAC and local-MAC differ in the processing of IEEE 802.11 MAC frames. In this regard, the CAPWAP protocol should include functionality that allows for negotiationg of significant capabilities between WTPs and WLAN controller. As a first step, such negotiations could cover the type of WTP - split-MAC or local-MAC - as this provides substantial information on their respective capabilities. ii. Establishment of alternative interfaces The capability differences among different WTPs essentially equates to alternative interfaces with a WLAN controller. So the CAPWAP protocol should be capable of adapting its operations to the major different interfaces. In a first case, this would include accommodating capability differences between local-MAC and split-MAC WTPs. The definition of these interfaces in terms of finer granularity of functionalities will be based on the outcome of the IEEE AP Functionality (APF) Ad-Hoc Committee. The APF Ad-Hoc Committee will provide appropriate insight in to specific functional blocks which may be used for finer capabilities negotiations within the CAPWAP protocol. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must include sufficient capabilities negotiations to distinguish between major types of WTPs. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The benefits of realizing this architecture objective are both technical and practical. First, there are substantial overlaps in the control operations of local-MAC and split-MAC architecture designs. The Architecture Taxonomy tabulates major common features of the two designs. As a result, it is technically practical to devise a single protocol that manages both types of devices. Next, the ability to operate a CAPWAP protocol for both types of architectural designs enhances its practical prospects as it will have wider appeal. Furthermore, the additional complexity resulting from such alternative interfaces is marginal. Consequently, the benefits of this objective will far outweigh any cost of realizing it. Relation to Problem Statement: The objective for supporting both local-MAC and split-MAC WTPs is fundamental to addressing the Problem Statement. It forms the basis for those problems to be uniformly addressed across the major WLAN architectures. This is the ultimate aim of standardization efforts. The realization of this objective will ensure the development of a comprehensive set of mechanisms that address the challenges of large-scalelarge- scale WLAN deployments. 5.2 Desirable Objectives These objectives have been determined to be desirable for a CAPWAP protocol but not mandatory. Realizing these objectives may help improve control of WLANs but need not necessarily be required for all networks or scenarios. 5.2.1 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.3iii]5.1.12 Protocol Specifications Classification: ArchitectureGeneral Description: SharedWLAN infrastructure raiseequipment vendors require sufficient details from protocol specifications so that implementing them will allow for compatibility with other equipment that run the issue of multiple authentication mechanisms. This is because each logical groupsame protocol. In this light, it is likelyimportant for the CAPWAP protocol specifications to be associated with different service providersreasonably complete for realization. Protocol Requirement: Any WTP or WLAN domains. As a result, the authentication needsAC vendor or any person can implement the CAPWAP protocol from the specification itself and by that it is required that all such implementations do interoperate. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: It is beneficial for WLAN equipment vendors to refer to a single set of specifications while implementing the CAPWAP protocol. This helps to ease and quicken the development process. Relation to Problem Statement: This requirement is based on WG discussions that have determined to be important for CAPWAP. 5.1.13 Vendor Independence Classification: General Description: Rapid developments in WLAN technologies results in equipment vendors constantly modifying their devices. In many cases, developments are independently made for ACs and WTPs. The CAPWAP protocol should not affect the the independence of device modificaitons. Protocol Requirement: A WTP vendor can make modifications to hardware without any AC vendor involvement. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: Independence in the type of hardware for WLAN equipment ensures that new developments do not hamper protocol operation. Relation to Problem Statement: This requirement is based on WG discussions that have determined to be important for CAPWAP. 5.1.14 Vendor Flexibility Classification: General Description: The CAPWAP protocol must not be specified for a particular MAC. It should be compatible with both local-MAC and split-MAC WTPs. Protocol Requirement: WTP vendors must not be bound to a specific MAC. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: This requirement is to ensure that WTP vendors have sufficient flexibility in selecting the type of MAC that they consider best for deployments. Relation to Problem Statement: This requirement is based on WG discussions that have determined to be important for CAPWAP. 5.2 Desirable Objectives These objectives have been determined to be desirable for a CAPWAP protocol but not mandatory. Realizing these objectives may help improve control of WLANs but need not necessarily be required for all networks or scenarios. 5.2.1 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms Classification: Architecture Description: Shared WLAN infrastructure raise the issue of multiple authentication mechanisms. This is because each logical group is likely to be associated with different service providers or WLAN domains. As a result, the authentication needs withing them will be different. While CAPWAP is required to support IEEE 802.11i, it is also necessary for it to support other authentication mechanisms. For example, one logical group may use IEEE 802.11i while another may use web authentication. CAPWAP must be able to operate in such shared WLANs. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must support different authentication mechanisms in addition to IEEE 802.11i. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The benefit of supporting various authentication mechanisms is that the protocol then becomes flexible for use in various deployments. The protocol will therefore not mandate the use of any particular mechanisms which may not be appropriate for a particular deployment. Relation to Problem Statement: This objective relates to the problem of management complexity. Shared WLAN deployments simplifies management of large networks. 5.2.2 Support for Future Wireless Technologies [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.4i]Classification: Architecture Description: The rapid pace of technology developments means that new advances need to be catered for in current analyses. Among these is the support for new wireless technologies within the CAPWAP protocol, such as IEEE 802.16. The protocol should therefore not rely on specifics of IEEE 802.11 technology. In all cases where the CAPWAP protocol messages contain specific layer 2 information elements, the definition of the protocol needs to provide for extensibility so that these elements can be defined for specific layer 2 wireless protocols. This may entail assigning a layer 2 wireless protocol type and version field to the message PDU. Examples of other wireless protocols that might be supported include but are not limited to 802.16e, 802.15.x, etc. Protocol Requirement: CAPWAP protocol messages must be designed to be extensible for specific layer 2 wireless technologies. It should not be limited to the transport of elements relating to IEEE 802.11. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: There are many benefits to an extensible protocol. It allows for application in different networks and provides greater scope. Furthermore, service providers require WLAN solutions that will be able to meet current and future market requirements. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement describes some of the advances taking place in other standards bodies like the IEEE. It is important for the CAPWAP protocol to reflect the advances and provide a framework in which they can be supported. 5.2.3 Support for New IEEE Requirements [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.4ii]Classification: Architecture Description: The IEEE is currently reviewing IEEE 802.11 functionality. It is expected that the review by the IEEE AP Functionality Ad-Hoc Committee may result in new definitions of functional blocks, interfaces or information flows. The CAPWAP protocol must be able to incorporate these revisions with minimal change. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must be openly designed to support new IEEE extensions. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: There are a number of advances being made within the IEEE regarding the functionality of IEEE 802.11 technology. Since this represents one of the major wireless technologies in use today, it will be beneficial for CAPWAP to incorporate the relevant new extensions. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement presents an overview of the task of the IEEE 802.11 working group. This group is focussed on defining the functional architecture of WTPs. It is necessary for the CAPWAP protocol to reflect these definitions. 5.2.4 Interconnection Objective [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.2]Classification: Architecture Description: Large scale WLAN deployments are likely to use a variety of interconnection technologies between different devices of the network. It should therefore be possible for the CAPWAP protocol to operate over various interconnection technologies. As a result of realizing this objective, the protocol will be capable of operation over both IPv4 and IPv6. It will also be designed such that it can operate within tightly administered networks, such as enterprise networks, or on open, public access networks. For example, VLAN tunnels can be used across different types of networks over which CAPWAP will operate. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must not be constrained to specific underlying transport mechanisms. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: The main aim of the CAPWAP protocol is to achieve interoperability among various WTPs and WLAN controllers. As such, the motivation for this requirement is for the protocol to be operable independent of underlying interconnection technologies. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement discusses the complexity of configuring large WLANs. The selection of available interconnection technologies for large-scale deployments further intensifies this complexity. This requirement avoids part of the complexity by advocating independence of the operational aspects of the protocol from from underlying transport. 5.2.5 Access Control [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.8] [Ed. Note: Was titled "STA Admission Control Objective"]Classification: Operations [Ed. Note: Priority of this objectives needs to be confirmed by WG.]Description: This objective focuses on the informational needs of WLAN access control and specifically the role of the CAPWAP protocol in transporting this information between WTPs and their WLAN controller. The following are some specific information aspects that need to be transported by the CAPWAP protocol; i. IEEE 802.11 association and authentication The association of wireless clients is distinct for initial and roaming cases. As a result, access control mechanisms requires specific contextual information regarding each case. Additionally, load balancing, QoS, security and congestion information in both wireless medium segments and switching segments need to be considered. ii. WTP Access Control In addition to controlling access for wireless clients, it is also necessary to control admission of new WTPs. Given the threat of rogue WTPs, it is important for CAPWAP to relay appropriate authentication information between new WTPs and the WLAN controller. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol must be capable of exchanging information required for access control of WTPs and wireless terminals. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: Due to the scale of deployments in which CAPWAP will be employed, comprehensive access control is crucial. The effectiveness of access control in turn is affected by the information on which such control is based. As a result, this objective has critical relevance to a CAPWAP protocol. Relation to Problem Statement: This objective addresses the issue of access control in large WLANs. Broadly, it relates the problem of managing the complexity scale of such networks. With collective information of both switching and wireless medium segments, realizing this objective will help control and manage complexity. 5.3 Rejected Objectives The following objectives have been rejected during the course of working group consultations. These objectives have been rejected in the context of CAPWAP and its considerations. They may however be applicable in alternative contexts. 5.3.1 Support for Non-CAPWAP WTPs [Ed. Note: Was 5.2.12] [Ed. Note: Was titled "Centralized WTP Management"]Classification: Architecture Description: The CAPWAP protocol should provide an engine-mechanism to spring WTP auto-configuration and/or software version updates and should support integration with existing network management system. WLAN controller as a management agent is optional. If entities other than WLAN controllers manage some aspects of WTPs, such as software downloads, the CAPWAP protocol may be used for WTPs to notify WLAN controllers of any changes made by the other entities. Protocol Requirement: The CAPWAP protocol should be capable of recognizing legacy WTPs and existing network management systems. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: It is expected that in many cases, the centralized WLAN architecture will be deployed incrementally with legacy systems. In this regard, it is necessary for the protocol to be used in scenarios with mixed WLAN devices. Relation to Problem Statement: The Problem Statement highlights management complexity as a major issue with large WLANs. One part of this comlpexity can be related to the incremental deployment of centralized WLAN devices for which this objective is applicable. 5.3.2 Technical Specifications Classification: General Description: The CAPWAP protocol must not require AC and WTP vendors to share technical specifications to establish compatibility. The protocol specifications alone must be sufficient for compatibility. Protocol Requirement: WTP vendors should not have to share technical specifications for hardware and software to AC vendors in order for interoperability to be achieved. Motivation and Protocol Benefits: It is beneficial for WLAN equipment vendors to refer to a single set of specifications while implementing the CAPWAP protocol. This helps to ease and quicken the development process. Relation to Problem Statement: This requirement is based on WG discussions that have determined to be important for CAPWAP. This objective has been prioritized as rejected as it is a duplicate of the Protocol Specifications objective (Section 5.1.12). 5.4 Operator Requirements The following objectives have been provided by network service operators. They represent the requirements from those ultimately deploying the CAPWAP protocol in their WLANs. 5.4.1 AP Fast Handoff [Ed. Note: Operator requirements from China Mobile]Classification: Operations Description: Network service operators consider handoffs crucially because of the mobile nature of their customers. In this regard, the CAPWAP protocol should not adversely affect AP fast handoff procedures. The protocol may support optimizations for fast handoff procedures so as to allow better support for real-time services during handoffs. Protocol Requirement: CAPWAP protocol operations must not impede or obstruct the efficacy of AP fast handoff procedures. 6. Summary and Conclusion The objectives presented in this document address three main aspects of the CAPWAP protocol, namely; i. Architecture ii. Operations iii. Security These requirements are aimed to focus standardization efforts on a simple, interoperable protocol for managing large-scale WLANs. The architecture requirements specify the structural features of the protocol such as those relating to WTP types (local-MAC and split-MAC)split- MAC) and WTP structures (logical groups). The operations requirements address the functional aspects dealing with WTP configuration and management. Finally, the security requirements cover authentication and integrity aspects of protocol exchanges. The objectives have additionally been prioritized to reflect their immediate significance to the development and evaluation of an interoperable CAPWAP protocol. The priorities are Mandatory and Accepted, Desirable and Rejected. They reflect working group consensus on the effectiveness of the requirements in the context of protocol design. Additionally, this document includes requirements from network service operators that have been derived based on their experience in operating large- scale WLANs. The resulting requirements from this document will be used in conjunction with the CAPWAP Problem Statement [I-D.ietf-capwap-problem-statement][I-D.ietf-capwap- problem-statement] and CAPWAP Architecture Taxonomy [I-D.ietf-capwap-arch][I-D.ietf-capwap- arch] to develop and evalute an interoperable protocol for the control and provisioning of WTPs in large-scale WLANs. 7. Security Considerations The CAPWAP framework highlights support for both local-MAC and split-MACsplit- MAC WTPs. In deployments where both types of WTPs are used, it is crucial to ensure that each be secured in consideration of their capabilities. The Architecture Taxonomy illustrates how different WTPs incorporate varying levels of functionalities. Development of the CAPWAP protocol should ensure that the deployment of both local-MAClocal- MAC and split-MAC WTPs within a single WLAN do not present loopholes for security compromises. In shared WLAN deployments made of a number of logical groups, traffic from each group needs to be mutually separated. So in addition to protocol related exchanges, data traffic from wireless terminals should also be segregated with respect to the logical groups to which they belong. It should not be possible for data or control traffic from one logical group to stray to or influence another logical group. The use of IEEE 802.11i over the centralized WLAN architecture allows for implementations in which the PMK is shared across WTPs. This raises the ambiguity between legitimate sharing and illegitimate copies. Wireless terminals may unknowingly fall prey to or exploit this ambiguity. The resolution of this issue is currently being evaluted by the IEEE 802 and IETF liaisons. The low-cost of launching attacks on WLANs makes the CAPWAP protocol a target. A first step in securing against any form of attacks is to continuously monitor the WLAN for conditions of potential threats from rogue WTPs or wireless terminals. For example, profiles for DoS and replay attacks need to be considered for the CAPWAP protocol to effectively monitor security conditions. The open environment of many WLAN deployments makes physical security breaches highly probable. Compromises resulting from theft and physical damage must be considered during protocol development. For instance, it should not be possible for a single compromised WTP to affect the WLAN as a whole. Considering asymmetric, non-mutual authentication between WTPs and WLAN controller, there is a risk of a rogue participant exploiting such an arrangement. It is preferrable to avoid non-mutual authentication. In some cases, the legitimacy of the protocol exchange participants may be verified externally, for example by means of physical containment within a close environment. Asymmetric authentication may be appropriate here without risk of security compromises. 8. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Working Group Chairs, Dorothy Gellert and Mahalingam Mani, for their support and patience with this document. We would also like to thank participants of the Working Group who have helped shape the objectives. In particular, the authors thank James Kempf, Pat Calhoun, Inderpreet SinghSingh, Dan Harkins and T. Sridhar for their invaluable inputs. The authors also acknowledge the contributions from Meimei Dang, Satoshi Iino, Mikihito Sugiura and Dong Wang. 9. References [I-D.ietf-capwap-arch] Yang, L., Zerfos, P.P., and E. Sadot, "Architecture Taxonomy for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points(CAPWAP)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-capwap-arch-06,draft-ietf-capwap-arch-06 (work in progress), November 2004. [I-D.ietf-capwap-problem-statement] Calhoun, P., "CAPWAP Problem Statement", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-capwap-problem-statement-02,draft-ietf-capwap-problem-statement-02 (work in progress), September 2004. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Authors' Addresses Saravanan Govindan Panasonic Singapore Laboratories Block 1022, Tai Seng Industrial Estate #06-3530, Tai Seng Avenue Singapore 534 415 Singapore Phone: +65 6550 5441 Email: email@example.com Zhonghui Yao Huawei Longgang Production Base Shenzhen 518 129 P. R. China Phone: +86 755 2878 0808 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Wenhui Zhou China Mobile 53A, Xibianmen Ave, Xuanwu District Beijing 100 053 P. R. China Phone: +86 10 6600 6688 ext.3061 Email: email@example.com L. Lily Yang Intel Corp. JF3-206, 2111 NE 25th Ave. Hilsboro, OR 97124 USA Phone: +1 503 264 8813 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Hong Cheng Panasonic Singapore Laboratories Block 1022, Tai Seng Industrial Estate #06-3530, Tai Seng Avenue Singapore 534 415 Singapore Phone: +65 6550 5447 Email: email@example.com Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at firstname.lastname@example.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.