COSE Working Group                                             J. Schaad
Internet-Draft                                            August Cellars
Intended status: Informational                               B. Campbell                          October 17, 2015
Expires: March 24, April 19, 2016                                    Ping Identity
                                                      September 21, 2015

                      CBOR Encoded Message Syntax
                         draft-ietf-cose-msg-05
                         draft-ietf-cose-msg-06

Abstract

   Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is data format designed
   for small code size and small message size.  There is a need for the
   ability to have the basic security services defined for this data
   format.  This document specifies how to do signatures, message
   authentication codes and encryption using this data format.

Contributing to this document

   The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub.  Suggested
   changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/
   cose-wg/cose-spec>.  Instructions are on that page as well.
   Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial
   issues need to be discussed on the COSE mailing list.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 24, April 19, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Design changes from JOSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  CBOR Grammar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.5.  Document Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  The COSE_MSG structure  Basic COSE Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Header Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9   8
     3.1.  Common COSE Headers Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  10
   4.  Signing Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  13
     4.1.  Externally Supplied Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  15
     4.2.  Signing and Verification Process  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  15
     4.3.  Computing Counter Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  17
   5.  Encryption objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  18
     5.1.  Enveloped COSE structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  18
       5.1.1.  Recipient Algorithm Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20  19
     5.2.  Encrypted COSE structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  20
     5.3.  Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms  . . . . . . . .  21  20
     5.4.  Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms  . . . . . . . . .  22  21
   6.  MAC objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  22
     6.1.  How to compute a MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24  23
   7.  Key Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  24
     7.1.  COSE Key Common Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  24
   8.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  27
     8.1.  ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29  28
       8.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     8.2.  RSASSA-PSS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       8.2.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31  29
   9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . .  32  30
     9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)  . . . . .  32  30
       9.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33  31
     9.2.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-CBC-MAC) . . . . . .  34  32
       9.2.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34  32
   10. Content Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35  33
     10.1.  AES GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35  33
       10.1.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  34
     10.2.  AES CCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  34
       10.2.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39  37
     10.3.  ChaCha20 and Poly1305  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39  37
       10.3.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40  38
   11. Key Derivation Functions (KDF)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40  38
     11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
            (HKDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41  39
     11.2.  Context Information Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42  40
   12. Recipient Algorithm Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46  44
     12.1.  Direct Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46  44
       12.1.1.  Direct Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47  45
       12.1.2.  Direct Key with KDF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47  45
     12.2.  Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49  47
       12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49  47
     12.3.  Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       12.3.1.  RSAES-OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50  48
     12.4.  Direct Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51  48
       12.4.1.  ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52  49
     12.5.  Key Agreement with KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56  53
       12.5.1.  ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56  53
   13. Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56  53
     13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57  54
       13.1.1.  Single Coordinate Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       13.1.2.  Double Coordinate Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58  54
     13.2.  RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     13.3.  Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61  55
   14. CBOR Encoder Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62  56
   15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62  56
     15.1.  CBOR Tag assignment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62  56
     15.2.  COSE Header Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62  57
     15.3.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table  . . . . . . . . . . .  63  58
     15.4.  COSE Algorithm Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64  58
     15.5.  COSE Key Common Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . .  65  59
     15.6.  COSE Key Type Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . .  65  60
     15.7.  COSE Elliptic Curve Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66  60
     15.8.  Media Type Registration Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67  61
       15.8.1.  COSE Security Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67  61
       15.8.2.  COSE Key media type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69  63
     15.9.  CoAP Content Format Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   16. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70  65
   17. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71  66
     17.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71  66
     17.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71  66
   Appendix A.  CDDL Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74  68
   Appendix B.  Three Levels of Recipient Information  . . . . . . .  74  69
   Appendix C.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76  70
     C.1.  Examples of MAC messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76  71
       C.1.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76  71
       C.1.2.  ECDH Direct MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77  72
       C.1.3.  Wrapped MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78  73
       C.1.4.  Multi-recipient MAC message . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79  74
     C.2.  Examples of Encrypted Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81  75
       C.2.1.  Direct ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81  75
       C.2.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81  76
     C.3.  Examples of Signed Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82  77
       C.3.1.  Single Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82  77
       C.3.2.  Multiple Signers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83  78
     C.4.  COSE Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84  78
       C.4.1.  Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84  78
       C.4.2.  Private Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86  81
   Appendix D.  Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88  82
     D.1.  Version -05 to -06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     D.2.  Version -04 to -05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.2.  83
     D.3.  Version -03 to -04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.3.  83
     D.4.  Version -02 to -03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.4.  83
     D.5.  Version -02 to -03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.5.  83
     D.6.  Version -01 to -2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
     D.6.  84
     D.7.  Version -00 to -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   Authors' Addresses  84
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92  85

1.  Introduction

   There has been an increased focus on the small, constrained devices
   that make up the Internet of Things (IOT).  One of the standards that
   has come of out of this process is the Concise Binary Object
   Representation (CBOR).  CBOR extended the data model of the
   JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) by allowing for binary data among
   other changes.  CBOR is being adopted by several of the IETF working
   groups dealing with the IOT world as their encoding of data
   structures.  CBOR was designed specifically to be both small in terms
   of messages transport and implementation size as well having a schema
   free decoder.  A need exists to provide basic message security
   services for IOT and using CBOR as the message encoding format makes
   sense.

   The JOSE working group produced a set of documents
   [RFC7515][RFC7516][RFC7517][RFC7518] that defined how to perform
   encryption, signatures and message authentication (MAC) operations
   for JSON documents and then to encode the results using the JSON
   format [RFC7159].  This document does the same work for use with the
   CBOR [RFC7049] document format.  While there is a strong attempt to
   keep the flavor of the original JOSE documents, two considerations
   are taken into account:

   o  CBOR has capabilities that are not present in JSON and should be
      used.  One example of this is the fact that CBOR has a method of
      encoding binary directly without first converting it into a base64
      encoded string.

   o  COSE is not a direct copy of the JOSE specification.  In the
      process of creating COSE, decisions that were made for JOSE were
      re-examined.  In many cases different results were decided on as
      the criteria were not always the same as for JOSE.

1.1.  Design changes from JOSE

   o  Define a top level message structure so that encrypted, signed and
      MACed messages can easily identified and still have a consistent
      view.

   o  Signed messages separate the concept of protected and unprotected
      parameters that are for the content and the signature.

   o  Recipient processing has been made more uniform.  A recipient
      structure is required for all recipients rather than only for
      some.

   o  MAC messages are separated from signed messages.

   o  MAC messages have the ability to do use all recipient algorithms
      on the MAC authentication key.

   o  Use binary encodings for binary data rather than base64url
      encodings.

   o  Combine the authentication tag for encryption algorithms with the
      ciphertext.

   o  Remove the flattened mode of encoding.  Forcing the use of an
      array of recipients at all times forces the message size to be two
      bytes larger, but one gets a corresponding decrease in the
      implementation size that should compensate for this.  [CREF1]

1.2.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning
   is used.

1.3.  CBOR Grammar

   There currently is no standard CBOR grammar available for use by
   specifications.  We therefore describe the CBOR structures in prose.
   There is a version of a CBOR grammar in the CBOR Data Definition
   Language (CDDL) [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].  An
   informational version of the CBOR grammar that reflects what is in
   the prose can be found in Appendix A.  CDDL has not been fixed, so
   this grammar may will only work with the version of CDDL at the time
   of publishing.

   The document was developed by first working on the grammar and then
   developing the prose to go with it.  An artifact of this is that the
   prose was written using the primitive type strings defined by early
   versions CDDL.  In this specification the following primitive types
   are used:

      bstr - byte string (major type 2).

      int - an unsigned integer or a negative integer.

      nil - a null value (tag 7.22). (major type 7, value 22).

      nint - a negative integer (major type 1).

      tstr - a UTF-8 text string (major type 3).

      uint - an unsigned integer (major type 0).

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   NOTE: For the purposes of review, we are currently interlacing the
   CDLL
   CDDL grammar into the text of document.  This is being done for
   simplicity of comparision comparison of the grammar againist against the prose.  The
   grammar will be removed to an appendix during WGLC.

   start = COSE_MSG COSE_Untagged_Message / COSE_Tagged_MSG COSE_Tagged_Message /
           COSE_Key / COSE_KeySet

1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology

   In JSON, maps are called objects and only have one kind of map key: a
   string.  In COSE, we use both strings and integers (both negative and
   non-negative integers) as map keys, as well as data items to identify
   specific choices.  The integers (both positive and negative) are used
   for compactness of encoding and easy comparison.  (Generally, in this
   document the value zero is going to be reserved and not used.)  Since
   the work "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, as a
   cryptographic key, we use the term "label" for this usage of either
   an integer or a string to identify map keys and choose data items.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   label = int / tstr
   values = any

1.5.  Document Terminology

   In this document we use the following terminology: [CREF2]

   Byte is a synonym for octet.

   Key management is used as a term to describe how a key at level n is
   obtained from level n+1 in encrypted and MACed messages.  The term is
   also used to discuss key life cycle management, this document does
   not discuss key life cycle operations.

1.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms

   One of the issues that needs to be addressed is a requirement that a
   standard specify a set of algorithms that are required to be
   implemented.  [CREF3] This is done to promote interoperability as it
   provides a minimal set of algorithms that all devices can be sure
   will exist at both ends.  However, we have elected not to specify a
   set of mandatory algorithms in this document.

   It is expected that COSE is going to be used in a wide variety of
   applications and on a wide variety of devices.  Many of the
   constrained devices are going to be setup to used use a small fixed set of
   algorithms, and this set of algorithms may not match those available
   on a device.  We therefore have deferred to the application protocols
   the decision of what to specify for mandatory algorithms.

   Since the set of algorithms in an environment of constrained devices
   may depend on what the set of devices are and how long they have been
   in operation, we want to highlight that application protocols will
   need to specify some type of discovery method of algorithm
   capabilities.  The discovery method may be as simple as requiring
   preconfiguration of the set of algorithms to providing a discovery
   method built into the protocol.  S/MIME provided a number of
   different ways to approach the problem:

   o  Advertising in the message (S/MIME capabilities) [RFC5751].

   o  Advertising in the certificate (capabilities extension) [RFC4262]

   o  Minimum requirements for the S/MIME which have been updated over
      time [RFC2633][RFC5751]

2.  Basic COSE Structure

   The COSE_MSG structure

   The COSE_MSG structure is a top level CBOR object that corresponds to
   the DataContent type in the Cryptographic COSE Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652].  [CREF4] This structure allows for a top level message to
   be sent is designed so that could there can be any a large
   amount of common code when parsing and processing the different
   security services.  The
   security service is identified within the message.

   The COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR type takes messages.  All of the COSE_MSG and prepends message structures are built on a CBOR
   tag
   array type.  The first three elements of TBD1 to the encoding of COSE_MSG.  By having both a tagged and
   untagged version of array contains the COSE_MSG structure, it becomes easy to either
   use COSE_MSG as a top level object or embedded in another object. same
   basic information.  The tagged version allows for first element is a method set of placing the COSE_MSG
   structure into a choice, using a consistent tag value to determine
   that this protected header
   information.  The second element is a COSE object.

   The existence set of the COSE_MSG and COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR data types are
   not intended to prevent protocols from using the individual security
   primitives directly.  Where only a single service unprotected header
   information.  The third element is required, that
   structure can be used directly.

   Each the content of the top-level security objects use a CBOR array message (either
   as plain text or encrypted).  Elements after this point are dependent
   on the base
   structure.  For each specific message type.

   Identification of the top-level security objects, the first
   field is a 'msg_type'.  The CBOR type for a 'msg_type' which message is 'int'.  The
   'msg_type' present is defined to distinguish between the different structures
   when they appear as part done by one of a COSE_MSG object.  [CREF5] [CREF6]
   [CREF7] two
   methods:

   o  The message types defined in this document are:

      0 - Reserved.

      1 - Signed Message.

      2 - Enveloped Message

      3 - Authenticated Message (MACed message)

      4 - Encrypted Message

   Implementations MUST be prepared to find an integer in this field
   that does not correspond to the values 1 to 3.  If a specific message type is
   found then the client does not support the associated security
   object, the client MUST stop attempting to process known from the structure and
   fail.  The value of 0 context in which it is reserved and not assigned to
      placed.  This may be defined by a security
   object.  If the value of 0 is found, then clients MUST fail
   processing marker in the structure.  Implementations need to recognize that containing
      structure or by restrictions specified by the
   set of values might be extended at application
      protocol.

   o  The message type is identified by a later date, but they should not
   provide CBOR tag.  This document
      defines a security service based on guesses CBOR tag for each of what the security
   object might be. message structures.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   COSE_MSG

   COSE_Untagged_Message = COSE_Sign /
       COSE_enveloped /
       COSE_encryptData /
       COSE_mac

   COSE_Tagged_MSG
       COSE_Mac

   COSE_Tagged_Message = #6.999(COSE_MSG)   ; Replace 999 with TBD1

   ; msg_type values
   msg_type_reserved=0
   msg_type_signed=1
   msg_type_enveloped=2
   msg_type_mac=3
   msg_type_encryptData=4 COSE_Sign_Tagged /
       COSE_Enveloped_Tagged /
       COSE_EncryptedData_Tagged /
       COSE_Mac_Tagged

3.  Header Parameters

   The structure of COSE has been designed to have two buckets of
   information that are not considered to be part of the payload itself,
   but are used for holding information about content, algorithms, keys,
   or evaluation hints for the processing of the layer.  These two
   buckets are available for use in all of the structures in this
   document except for keys.  While these buckets can be present, they
   may not all be usable in all instances.  For example, while the
   protected bucket is defined as part of recipient structures, most of
   the algorithms that are used for recipients do not provide the
   necessary functionality to provide the needed protection and thus the
   bucket should not be used.

   Both buckets are implemented as CBOR maps.  The map key is a 'label'
   (Section 1.4).  The value portion is dependent on the definition for
   the label.  Both maps use the same set of label/value pairs.  The
   integer and string values for labels has been divided into several
   sections with a standard range, a private range, and a range that is
   dependent on the algorithm selected.  The defined labels can be found
   in the 'COSE Header Parameters' IANA registry (Section 15.2).

   Two buckets are provided for each layer:

   protected  contains

   protected:  Contains parameters about the current layer that are to
      be cryptographically protected.  This bucket MUST be empty if it
      is not going to be included in a cryptographic computation.  This
      bucket is encoded in the message as a binary object.  This value
      is obtained by CBOR encoding the protected map and wrapping it in
      a bstr object.  Senders SHOULD encode an empty protected map as a
      zero length binary object (it is shorter).  Recipients MUST accept
      both a zero length binary value and a zero length map encoded in
      the binary value.  The wrapping allows for the encoding of the
      protected map to be transported with a greater chance that it will
      not be altered in transit.  (Badly behaved intermediates could
      decode and re-encode, but this will result in a failure to verify
      unless the re-encoded byte string is identical to the decoded byte
      string.)  This finesses the problem of all parties needing to be
      able to do a common canonical encoding.

   unprotected  contains

   unprotected:  Contains parameters about the current layer that are
      not cryptographically protected.

   Only parameters that deal with the current layer are to be placed at
   that layer.  As an example of this, the parameter 'content type'
   describes the content of the message being carried in the message.
   As such this parameter is placed only the in the content layer and is not
   placed in the recipient or signature layers.  In principle, one
   should be able to process any given layer without reference to any
   other layer.  (The only data that should need to cross layers is the
   cryptographic key.)

   The buckets are present in all of the security objects defined in
   this document.  The fields in order are the 'protected' bucket (as a
   CBOR 'bstr' type) and then the 'unprotected' bucket (as a CBOR 'map'
   type).  The presence of both buckets is required.  The parameters
   that go into the buckets come from the IANA "COSE Header Parameters"
   (Section 15.2).  Some common parameters are defined in the next
   section, but a number of parameters are defined throughout this
   document.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed [CREF8] [CREF4]

   header_map = {+ label => any }

   Headers = (
       protected : bstr,                  ; Contains a header_map
       unprotected : header_map
   )

3.1.  Common COSE Headers Parameters

   This section defines a set of common header parameters.  A summary of
   those parameters can be found in Table 1.  This table should be
   consulted to determine the value of label used as well as the type of
   the value.

   The set of header parameters defined in this section are:

   alg  This parameter is used to indicate the algorithm used for the
      security processing.  This parameter MUST be present at each level
      of a signed, encrypted or authenticated message.  The value is
      taken from the 'COSE Algorithm Registry' (see Section 15.4).

   crit  This parameter is used to ensure that applications will take
      appropriate action based on the values found.  The parameter is
      used to indicate which protected header labels an application that
      is processing a message is required to understand.  The value is
      an array of COSE Header Labels.  When present, this parameter MUST
      be placed in the protected header bucket.

      *  Integer labels in the range of 0 to 10 SHOULD be omitted.

      *  Integer labels in the range -1 to -255 can be omitted as they
         are algorithm dependent.  If an application can correctly
         process an algorithm, it can be assumed that it will correctly
         process all of the parameters associated with that algorithm.
         (The algorithm range is -1 to -65536, it is assumed that the
         higher end will deal with more optional algorithm specific
         items.)

      The header parameter values indicated by 'crit' can be processed
      by either the security library code or by an application using a
      security library, the only requirement is that the parameter is
      processed.  If the 'crit' value list includes a value for which
      the parameter is not in the protected bucket, this is a fatal
      error in processing the message.

   content type  This parameter is used to indicate the content type of
      the data in the payload or ciphertext fields.  Integers are from
      the 'CoAP Content-Formats' IANA registry table.  Strings are from
      the IANA 'Media Types' registry.  Applications SHOULD provide this
      parameter if the content structure is potentially ambiguous.

   kid  This parameter one of the ways that can be used to find the key
      to be used.  The value of this parameter is matched against the
      'kid' member in a COSE_Key structure.  Applications MUST NOT
      assume that 'kid' values are unique.  There may be more than one
      key with the same 'kid' value, it may be required that all of the
      keys need to be checked to find the correct one.  The internal
      structure of 'kid' values is not defined and generally cannot be
      relied on by applications.  Key identifier values are hints about
      which key to use, they are not directly a security critical field,
      for this reason they can be placed in the unprotected headers
      bucket.

   nonce  This parameter holds either a nonce or Initialization Vector
      value.  The value can be used either as a counter value for a
      protocol or as an IV for an algorithm.

   counter signature  This parameter holds a counter signature value.
      Counter signatures provide a method of having a second party sign
      some data, the counter signature can occur as an unprotected
      attribute in any of the following structures: COSE_Sign,
      COSE_signature, COSE_enveloped, COSE_recipient,
      COSE_encryptedData, COSE_mac.  These structures all have the same
      basic structure so that a consistent calculation of the counter
      signature can be computed.  Details on computing counter
      signatures are found in Section 4.3.

   +----------+-------+---------------+----------------+---------------+
   | name     | label | value type    | value registry | description   |
   +----------+-------+---------------+----------------+---------------+
   | alg      | 1     | int / tstr    | COSE Algorithm | Integers are  |
   |          |       |               | Registry       | taken from    |
   |          |       |               |                | table

   creation time  This parameter provides the time the content was
      created.  For signatures and recipient structures, this would be
      the time that the signature or recipient key object was created.
      For content structures, this would be the time that the content
      was created.  The unsigned integer value is the number of seconds,
      excluding leap seconds; after midnight UTC, January 1, 1970.

   sequence number  This parameter provides a counter field.  The use of
      this parameter is application specific.

   +----------+-------+---------------+----------------+---------------+
   | name     | label | value type    | value registry | description   |
   +----------+-------+---------------+----------------+---------------+
   | alg      | 1     | int / tstr    | COSE Algorithm | Integers are  |
   |          |       |               | Registry       | taken from    |
   |          |       |               |                | table --POINT |
   |          |       |               |                | TO REGISTRY-- |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | crit     | 2     | [+ label]     | COSE Header    | integer       |
   |          |       |               | Label Registry | values are    |
   |          |       |               |                | from  --      |
   |          |       |               |                | POINT TO      |
   |          |       |               |                | REGISTRY --   |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | content  | 3     | tstr / int    | CoAP Content-  | Value is      |
   | type     |       |               | Formats or     | either a      |
   |          |       |               | Media Types    | Media Type or |
   |          |       |               | registry       | an integer    |
   |          |       |               |                | from the CoAP |
   |          |       |               |                | Content       |
   |          |       |               |                | Format        |
   |          |       |               |                | registry      |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | kid      | 4     | bstr          |                | key           |
   |          |       |               |                | identifier    |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | nonce    | 5     | bstr          |                | Nonce or Init |
   |          |       |               |                | ialization    |
   |          |       |               |                | Vector (IV)   |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | counter  | 6     | COSE_signatur |                | CBOR encoded  |
   | signatur |       | e             |                | signature     |
   | e        |       |               |                | structure     |
   |          |       |               |                |               |
   | zip creation | *     | int / tstr uint          |                | Integers are Time the      |
   | time     |       |               |                | taken from content was   |
   |          |       |               |                | the table created       |
   |          |       |               |                | --POINT TO               |
   | sequence | *     | uint          |                | REGISTRY-- Application   |
   | number   |       |               |                | specific      |
   |          |       |               |                | Integer value |
   +----------+-------+---------------+----------------+---------------+

                     Table 1: Common Header Parameters

   OPEN ISSUES:

   1.  Do we want to have a zip/compression header standardized in this
       document?

   2.  I am currently torn on the question "Should epk and iv/nonce be
       algorithm specific or generic headers?"  They are really specific
       to an algorithm and can potentially be defined in different ways
       for different algorithms.  As an example, it would make sense to
       defined nonce for CCM and GCM modes that can have the leading
       zero bytes stripped, while for other algorithms this might be
       undesirable.

   3.

   2.  We might want to define some additional items.  What are they?  A
       possible example would be a sequence number as this might be
       common.  On the other hand, this is the type of things that is
       frequently used as the nonce in some places and thus should not
       be used in the same way.  Other items might be challenge/response
       fields for freshness as these are likely to be common.

4.  Signing Structure

   The signature structure allows for one or more signatures to be
   applied to a message payload.  There are provisions for parameters
   about the content and parameters about the signature to be carried
   along with the signature itself.  These parameters may be
   authenticated by the signature, or just present.  Examples of
   parameters about the content would be the type of content, when the
   content was created, and who created the content.  [CREF5] Examples
   of parameters about the signature would be the algorithm and key used
   to create the signature, when the signature was created, and counter-
   signatures.

   When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of
   one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a
   successful signature by that signer.  However, there are some
   application environments where other rules are needed.  An
   application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for
   each signer must specify those rules.  Also, where simple matching of
   the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the
   signatures were generated by the same signer, the application
   specification must describe how to determine which signatures were
   generated by the same signer.  Support of different communities of
   recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more
   than one signature.  For example, the COSE_Sign structure might
   include signatures generated with the RSA signature algorithm and
   with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature
   algorithm.  This allows recipients to verify the signature associated
   with one algorithm or the other.  (The original source of this text
   is [RFC5652].)  More detailed information on multiple signature
   evaluation can be found in [RFC5752].

   The COSE_Sign structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the signed security service.
      The value MUST be msg_type_signed (1).

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   payload  contains the serialized content to be signed.  If the
      payload is not present in the message, the application is required
      to supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a
      bstr to ensure that it is transported without changes.  If the
      payload is transported separately, then a nil CBOR object is
      placed in this location and it is the responsibility of the
      application to ensure that it will be transported without changes.

   signatures  is an array of signature items.  Each of these items uses
      the COSE_signature structure for its representation.

   The COSE_signature structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   array in order are:

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   signature  contains the computed signature value.  The type of the
      field is a bstr.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   COSE_Sign_Tagged = #6.999(COSE_Sign) ; Replace 999 with TBD1

   COSE_Sign = [
       msg_type: msg_type_signed,
       Headers,
       payload : bstr / nil,
       signatures : [+ COSE_signature]
   ]

   COSE_signature =  [
       Headers,
       signature : bstr
   ]

4.1.  Externally Supplied Data

   One of the features that we supply in the COSE document is the
   ability for applications to provide additional data to be
   authenticated as part of the security, but that is not carried as
   part of the COSE object.  The primary reason for supporting this can
   be seen by looking at the CoAP message struture structure [RFC7252] where the
   facility exists for options to be carried before the payload.  An
   example of data that can be placed in this location would be
   transaction ids and nonces to check for replay protection.  If the
   data is in the options section, then it is available for routers to
   help in performing the replay detection and prevention.  However, it
   may also be desired to protect these values so that they cannot be
   modified in transit.  This is the purpose of the externally supplied
   data field.

   This document describes the process for using a byte array of
   externally supplied authenticated data, however the method of
   constructing the byte array is a function of the application.
   Applications which use this feature need to define how the externally
   supplied authenticated data is to be constructed.  Such a
   construction needs to take into account the following issues:

   o  If multiple items are included, care needs to be taken that data
      cannot bleed between the items.  This is usually addressed by
      making fields fixed width and/or encoding the length of the field.
      Using options from CoAP as an example, these fields use a TLV
      structure so they can be concatenated without any problems.

   o  If multiple items are included, a defined order for the items
      needs to be defined.  Using options from CoAP as an example, an
      application could state that the fields are to be ordered by the
      option number.

4.2.  Signing and Verification Process

   In order to create a signature, a consistent byte stream is needed in
   order to process.  This document uses a CBOR array to construct the
   byte stream to be processed.  The fields of the array in order are:

   1.  The body protected attributes.  This is a bstr type containing
       the protected attributes of the body.

   2.  The signature protected attributes.  This is a bstr type
       containing the protected attributes of the signature.

   3.  The external protected attributes.  This is a bstr type
       containing the protected attributes external to the
       COSE_Signature structure.

   4.  The payload to be signed.  The payload is encoded in a bstr.  The
       payload is placed here independent of how it is transported.

   How to compute a signature:

   1.  Create a CBOR array and populate it with the appropriate fields.
       For body_protected and sign_protected, if the fields are not
       present in their corresponding maps, an a bstr of length zero is
       used.

   2.  If the application has supplied external additional authenticated
       data to be included in the computation, then it is placed in the
       third field.  If no data was supplied, then a zero length binary
       value is used.

   3.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string.

   4.  Call the signature creation algorithm passing in K (the key to
       sign with), alg (the algorithm to sign with) and ToBeSigned (the
       value to sign).

   5.  Place the resulting signature value in the 'signature' field of
       the map.

   How to verify a signature:

   1.  Create a Sig_structure object and populate it with the
       appropriate fields.  For body_protected and sign_protected, if
       the fields are not present in their corresponding maps, an a bstr of
       length zero is used.

   2.  If the application has supplied external additional authenticated
       data to be included in the computation, then it is placed in the
       third field.  If no data was supplied, then a zero length binary
       value is used.

   3.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string.

   4.  Call the signature verification algorithm passing in K (the key
       to verify with), alg (the algorithm to sign with), ToBeSigned
       (the value to sign), and sig (the signature to be verified).

   In addition to performing the signature verification, one must also
   perform the appropriate checks to ensure that the key is correctly
   paired with the signing identity and that the appropriate
   authorization is done.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   The COSE structure used to create the byte stream to be signed uses
   the following CDDL grammar structure:

   Sig_structure = [
       body_protected: bstr,
       sign_protected: bstr,
       external_aad: bstr,
       payload: bstr
   ]

4.3.  Computing Counter Signatures

   Counter signatures provide a method of having a different signature
   occur on some piece of content.  This is normally used to provide a
   signature on a signature allowing for a proof that a signature
   existed at a given time.  In this document we allow for counter
   signatures to exist in a greater number of environments.  A counter
   signature can exist, for example, on a COSE_encyptedData COSE_encryptedData object and
   allow for a signature to be present on the encrypted content of a
   message.

   The creation and validation of counter signatures over the different
   items relies on the fact that the structure all of our objects have
   the same structure.  The first element may be a message type, this is
   followed by a set of protected attributes, a set of unprotected
   attributes and a body in that order.  This means that the
   Sig_structure can be used for in a uniform manner to get the byte
   stream for processing a signature.  If the counter signature is going
   to be computed over a COSE_encryptedData structure, the
   body_protected and payload items can be mapped into the Sig_structure
   in the same manner as from the COSE_Sign structure.

   While one can create a counter signature for a COSE_Sign structure,
   there is not much of a point to doing so.  It is equivalent to create
   a new COSE_signature structure and placing it in the signatures
   array.  It is strongly suggested that it not be done, but it is not
   banned.

5.  Encryption objects

   COSE supports two different encryption structures.  OOSE_enveloped is
   used when the key needs to be explicilty explicitly identified.  This structure
   supports the use of recipient structures to allow for random content
   encryption keys to be used.. used.  COSE_encrypted is used when the a recipient
   structure is not needed because the key to be used is known
   implicitly.

5.1.  Enveloped COSE structure

   The enveloped structure allows for one or more recipients of a
   message.  There are provisions for parameters about the content and
   parameters about the recipient information to be carried in the
   message.  The parameters associated with the content can be
   authenticated by the content encryption algorithm.  The parameters
   associated with the recipient can be authenticated by the recipient
   algorithm (when the algorithm supports it).  Examples of parameters
   about the content are the type of the content, when the content was
   created, and the content encryption algorithm.  Examples of
   parameters about the recipient are the recipients recipient's key identifier,
   the recipient encryption algorithm.

   In COSE, the same techniques and structures for encrypting both the
   plain text and the keys used to protect the text.  This is different
   from the approach used by both [RFC5652] and [RFC7516] where
   different structures are used for the content layer and for the
   recipient layer.

   The COSE_encrypt structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array
   in order are:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the encrypted security
      service.  The value MUST be msg_type_encrypted (2).

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   ciphertext  contains the encrypted plain text encoded as a bstr.  If
      the ciphertext is to be transported independently of the control
      information about the encryption process (i.e. detached content)
      then the field is encoded as a null object.

   recipients  contains an array of recipient information structures.
      The type for the recipient information structure is a
      COSE_recipient.

   The COSE_recipient structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   array in order are:

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   ciphertext  contains the encrypted key encoded as a bstr.  If there
      is not an encrypted key, then this field is encoded as a nil type.

   recipients  contains an array of recipient information structures.
      The type for the recipient information structure is a
      COSE_recipient.  If there are no recipient information structures,
      this element is absent.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

COSE_Enveloped_Tagged = #6.998(COSE_enveloped)    ; Replace 998 with TBD32

COSE_enveloped = [
       msg_type: msg_type_enveloped,
    COSE_encrypt_fields
    recipients: [+COSE_recipient]
]

COSE_encrypt_fields = (
    Headers,
    ciphertext: bstr / nil,
)

COSE_recipient = [
    COSE_encrypt_fields
    ? recipients: [+COSE_recipient]
]

5.1.1.  Recipient Algorithm Classes

   A typical encrypted message consists of an encrypted content and an
   encrypted CEK for one or more recipients.  The content-encryption key
   is encrypted for each recipient, using a key specific to that
   recipient.  The details of this encryption depends on which class the
   recipient algorithm falls into.  Specific details on each of the
   classes can be found in Section 12.  A short summary of the six
   recipient algorithm classes is:

   none:  The CEK is the same as as the identified previously distributed
      symmetric key or derived from a previously distributed secret.

   symmetric key-encryption keys:  The CEK is encrypted using a
      previously distributed symmetric key-encryption key.

   key agreement:  the recipient's public key and a sender's private key
      are used to generate a pairwise secret, a KDF is applied to derive
      a key, and then the CEK is either the derived key or encrypted by
      the derived key.

   key transport:  the CEK is encrypted in the recipient's public key

   passwords:  the CEK is encrypted in a key-encryption key that is
      derived from a password.

5.2.  Encrypted COSE structure

   The encrypted structure does not have the ability to specify
   recipients of the message.  The structure assumes that the recipient
   of the object will already know the identity of the key to be used in
   order to decrypt the message.  If a key needs to be identified to the
   recipient, the enveloped structure is used.

   The CDDL grammar structure for encrypted data is:

COSE_EncryptedData_Tagged = #6.997(COSE_encryptData)     ; Replace 997 with TBD3

COSE_encryptData = [
       msg_type: msg_type_encryptData,
    COSE_encrypt_fields
]

   The COSE_encryptedData structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   array in order are:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the encrypted data security
      service.  This value MUST be mg_type_encrypted (4).

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   ciphertext  contains the encrypted plain text.  If the ciphertext is
      to be transported independently of the control information about
      the encryption process (i.e. detached content) then the field is
      encoded as a null object.

5.3.  Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms

   The encryption algorithm for AEAD algorithms is fairly simple.  In
   order to get a consistent encoding of the data to be authenticated,
   the Enc_structure is used to have canonical form of the AAD.

   1.  Copy the protected header field from the message to be sent.

   2.  If the application has supplied external additional authenticated
       data to be included in the computation, then it is placed in the
       'external_aad' field.  If no data was supplied, then a zero
       length binary value is used.  (See Section 4.1 for application
       guidance on constructing this field.)

   3.  Encode the Enc_structure using a CBOR Canonical encoding
       Section 14 to get the AAD value.

   4.  Determine the encryption key.  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current level.

       Direct and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is determined by the
          key and algorithm in the recipient structure.  The encryption
          algorithm and size of the key to be used are inputs into the
          KDF used for the recipient.  (For direct, the KDF can be
          thought of as the identity operation.)

       Other:  The key is randomly generated.

   5.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key to use),
       P (the plain text) and AAD (the additional authenticated data).
       Place the returned cipher text into the 'ciphertext' field of the
       structure.

   6.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient using the encryption key as the
       plain text.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   Enc_structure = [
       protected: bstr,
       external_aad: bstr
   ]

5.4.  Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms

   1.  Verify that the 'protected' field is absent.

   2.  Verify that there was no external additional authenticated data
       supplied for this operation.

   3.  Determine the encryption key.  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current level.

       Direct and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is determined by the
          key and algorithm in the recipient structure.  The encryption
          algorithm and size of the key to be used are inputs into the
          KDF used for the recipient.  (For direct, the KDF can be
          thought of as the identity operation.)

       Other:  The key is randomly generated.

   4.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key to use)
       and the P (the plain text).  Place the returned cipher text into
       the 'ciphertext' field of the structure.

   5.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient using the encryption key as the
       plain text.

6.  MAC objects

   In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when
   doing MAC authentication in COSE.  This document allows for the use
   of all of the same classes of recipient algorithms as are allowed for
   encryption.

   When using MAC operations, there are two modes in which it can be
   used.  The first is just a check that the content has not been
   changed since the MAC was computed.  Any class of recipient algorithm
   can be used for this purpose.  The second mode is to both check that
   the content has not been changed since the MAC was computed, and to
   use recipient algorithm to verify who sent it.  The classes of
   recipient algorithms that support this are those that use a pre-
   shared secret or do static-static key agreement (without the key wrap
   step).  In both of these cases the entity MACing the message can be
   validated by a key binding.  (The binding of identity assumes that
   there are only two parties involved and you did not send the message
   yourself.)

   The COSE_encrypt COSE_Mac structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the encrypted security
      service.  The value MUST be msg_type_mac (3).

   protected  is described in Section 3.

   unprotected  is described in Section 3.

   payload  contains the serialized content to be MACed.  If the payload
      is not present in the message, the application is required to
      supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a bstr
      to ensure that it is transported without changes.  If the payload
      is transported separately, then a null CBOR object is placed in
      this location and it is the responsibility of the application to
      ensure that it will be transported without changes.

   tag  contains the MAC value.

   recipients  contains the recipient information.  See the description
      under COSE_Encryption for more info.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   COSE_mac

 COSE_Mac_Tagged = #6.996(COSE_Mac)              ; Replace 996 with TBD4

 COSE_Mac = [
      msg_type: msg_type_mac,
    Headers,
    payload: bstr / nil,
    tag: bstr,
    recipients: [+COSE_recipient]
 ]

6.1.  How to compute a MAC

   How to compute a MAC:

   1.  Create a MAC_structure and copy the protected and payload fields
       from the COSE_mac COSE_Mac structure.

   2.  If the application has supplied external authenticated data,
       encode it as a binary value and place in the MAC_structure.  If
       there is no external authenticated data, then use a zero length
       'bstr'.  (See Section 4.1 for application guidance on
       constructing this field.)

   3.  Encode the MAC_structure using a canonical CBOR encoder.  The
       resulting bytes is the value to compute the MAC on.

   4.  Compute the MAC and place the result in the 'tag' field of the
       COSE_mac
       COSE_Mac structure.

   5.  Encrypt and encode the MAC key for each recipient of the message.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed
   MAC_structure = [
        protected: bstr,
        external_aad: bstr,
        payload: bstr
   ]

7.  Key Structure

   A COSE Key structure is built on a CBOR map object.  The set of
   common parameters that can appear in a COSE Key can be found in the
   IANA registry 'COSE Key Common Parameter Registry' (Section 15.5).
   Additional parameters defined for specific key types can be found in
   the IANA registry 'COSE Key Type Parameters' (Section 15.6).

   A COSE Key Set uses a CBOR array object as it's its underlying type.  The
   values of the array elements are COSE Keys.  A Key Set MUST have at
   least one element in the array.  [CREF9]

   The element "kty" is a required element in a COSE_Key map.

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   The CDDL grammar describing a COSE_Key and COSE_KeySet is: [CREF10] [CREF6]

   COSE_Key = {
       key_kty => tstr / int,
       ? key_ops => [+ (tstr / int) ],
       ? key_alg => tstr / int,
       ? key_kid => bstr,
       * label => values
   }

   COSE_KeySet = [+COSE_Key]

7.1.  COSE Key Common Parameters

   This document defines a set of common parameters for a COSE Key
   object.  Table 2 provides a summary of the parameters defined in this
   section.  There are also a set of parameters that are defined for a
   specific key type.  Key type specific parameters can be found in
   Section 13.

   +---------+-------+-------------+-------------+---------------------+
   | name    | label | CBOR type   | registry    | description         |
   +---------+-------+-------------+-------------+---------------------+
   | kty     | 1     | tstr / int  | COSE        | Identification of   |
   |         |       |             | General     | the key type        |
   |         |       |             | Values      |                     |
   |         |       |             |             |                     |
   | key_ops | 4     | [*          |             | Restrict set of     |
   |         |       | (tstr/int)] |             | permissible         |
   |         |       |             |             | operations          |
   |         |       |             |             |                     |
   | alg     | 3     | tstr / int  | COSE        | Key usage           |
   |         |       |             | Algorithm   | restriction to this |
   |         |       |             | Values      | algorithm           |
   |         |       |             |             |                     |
   | kid     | 2     | bstr        |             | Key Identification  |
   |         |       |             |             | value - match to    |
   |         |       |             |             | kid in message      |
   |         |       |             |             |                     |
   | use     | *     | tstr        |             | deprecated - don't  |
   |         |       |             |             | use                 |
   +---------+-------+-------------+-------------+---------------------+

                          Table 2: Key Map Labels

   kty:  This parameter is used to identify the family of keys for this
      structure, and thus the set of key type specific parameters to be
      found.  The set of values can be found in Table 20. 18.  This
      parameter MUST be present in a key object.  Implementations MUST
      verify that the key type is appropriate for the algorithm being
      processed.  The key type MUST be included as part of a trust
      decision process.

   alg:  This parameter is used to restrict the algorithms that are to
      be used with this key.  If this parameter is present in the key
      structure, the application MUST verify that this algorithm matches
      the algorithm for which the key is being used.  If the algorthms algorithms
      do not match, then this key object MUST NOT be used to perform the
      cryptographic operation.  Note that the same key can be in a
      different key structure with a different or no algorithm
      specified, however this is considered to be a poor security
      practice.

   kid:  This parameter is used to give an identifier for a key.  The
      identifier is not structured and can be anything from a user
      provided string to a value computed on the public portion of the
      key.  This field is intended for matching against a 'kid'
      parameter in a message in order to filter down the set of keys
      that need to be checked.

   key_ops:  This parameter is defined to restrict the set of operations
      that a key is to be used for.  The value of the field is an array
      of values from Table 3.

   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | name    | value | description                                     |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | sign    | 1     | The key is used to create signatures.  Requires |
   |         |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | verify  | 2     | The key is used for verification of signatures. |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | encrypt | 3     | The key is used for key transport encryption.   |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | decrypt | 4     | The key is used for key transport decryption.   |
   |         |       | Requires private key fields.                    |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | wrap    | 5     | The key is used for key wrapping.               |
   | key     |       |                                                 |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | unwrap  | 6     | The key is used for key unwrapping.  Requires   |
   | key     |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | key     | 7     | The key is used for key agreement.              |
   | agree   |       |                                                 |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+

                       Table 3: Key Operation Values

   Text from here to start of next section to be removed

   The following provides a CDDL fragment which duplicates the
   assignment labels from Table 2 and Table 3.

   ;key_labels
   key_kty=1
   key_kid=2
   key_alg=3
   key_ops=4

   ;key_ops values
   key_ops_sign=1
   key_ops_verify=2
   key_ops_encrypt=3
   key_ops_decrypt=4
   key_ops_wrap=5
   key_ops_unwrap=6
   key_ops_agree=7

8.  Signature Algorithms

   There are two basic signature algorithm structures that can be used.
   The first is the common signature with appendix.  In this structure,
   the message content is processed and a signature is produced, the
   signature is called the appendix.  This is the message structure used
   by our common algorithms such as ECDSA and RSASSA-PSS.  (In fact the
   SSA in RSASSA-PSS stands for Signature Scheme with Appendix.)  The
   basic structure becomes:

   signature = Sign(message content, key)

   valid = Verification(message content, key, signature)

   The second is a signature with message recovery.  (An example of such
   an algorithm is [PVSig].)  In this structure, the message content is
   processed, but part of is included in the signature.  Moving bytes of
   the message content into the signature allows for an effectively
   smaller signature, the signature size is still potentially large, but
   the message content is shrunk.  This has implications for systems
   implementing these algoritms algorithms and for applications that use them.
   The first is that the message content is not fully available until
   after a signature has been validated.  Until that point the part of
   the message contained inside of the signature is unrecoverable.  The
   second is that the security analysis of the strength of the signature
   is very much based on the structure of the message content.  Messages
   which are highly predictable require additional randomness to be
   supplied as part of the signature process, in the worst case it
   becomes the same as doing a signature with appendix.  Thirdly, in the
   event that multple multiple signatures are applied to a message, all of the
   signature algorithms are going to be required to consume the same
   number of bytes of message content.

   signature, message sent = Sign(message content, key)

   valid, message content = Verification(message sent, key, signature)

   At this time, only signatures with appendixes are defined for use
   with COSE, however considerable interest has been expressed in using
   a signature with message recovery algorithm due to the effective size
   reduction that is possible.  Implementations will need to keep this
   in mind for later possible integration.

8.1.  ECDSA

   ECDSA [DSS] defines a signature algorithm using ECC.

   The ECDSA signature algorithm is parameterized with a hash function
   (h).  In the event that the length of the hash function output is
   greater than group of the key, the left most bytes of the hash output
   are used.

   The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 4.

              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | name  | value | hash    | description      |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | ES256 | -7    | SHA-256 | ECDSA w/ SHA-256 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES384 | -8    | SHA-384 | ECDSA w/ SHA-384 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES512 | -9    | SHA-512 | ECDSA w/ SHA-512 |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+

                      Table 4: ECDSA Algorithm Values

   This document defines ECDSA to work only with the curves P-256, P-384
   and P-521.  This document requires that the curves be encoded using
   the 'EC2' key type.  Implementations need to check that the key type
   and curve are correct when creating and verifying a signature.  Other
   documents can defined it to work with other curves and points in the
   future.

   In order to promote interoperability, it is suggested that SHA-256 be
   used only with curve P-256, SHA-384 be used only with curve P-384 and
   SHA-512 be used with curve P-521.  This is aligned with the
   recommendation in Section 4 of [RFC5480].

   The signature algorithm results in a pair of integers (R, S).  These
   integers will be of the same order as length of the key used for the
   signature process.  The signature is encoded by converting the
   integers into byte strings of the same length as the key size.  The
   length is rounded up to the nearest byte and is left padded with zero
   bits to get to the correct length.  The two integers are then
   concatenated together to form a byte string that is the resulting
   signature.

   Using the function defined in [RFC3447] the signature is:
   Signature = I2OSP(R, n) | I2OSP(S, n)
   where n = ceiling(key_length / 8)

8.1.1.  Security Considerations

   The security strength of the signature is no greater than the minimum
   of the security strength associated with the bit length of the key
   and the security strength of the hash function.

   System which have poor random number generation can leak their keys
   by signing two different messages with the same value of 'k'.
   [RFC6979] provides a method to deal with this problem by making 'k'
   be deterministic based on the message content rather than randomly
   generated.  Applications which specify ECDSA should evaluate the
   ability to get good random number generation and require this when it
   is not possible.  Note: Use of this technique a good idea even when
   good random number generation exists.  Doing so both reduces the
   possiblity
   possibility of having the same value of 'k' in two signature
   operations, but allows for reproducable reproducible signature values which helps
   testing.

   There are two substitution that can theoretically be mounted against
   the ECDSA signature algorithm.

   o  Changing the curve used to validate the signature: If one changes
      the curve used to validate the signature, then potentially one
      could have a two messages with the same signature each computed
      under a different curve.  The only requirement on the new curve is
      that it's its order be the same as the old one and it be acceptable to
      the client.  An example would be to change from using the curve
      secp256r1 (aka P-256) to using secp256k1.  (Both are 256 bit
      curves.)  We current do not have any way to deal with this version
      of the attack except to restrict the overall set of curves that
      can be used.

   o  Change the hash function used to validate the signature: If one
      has either two different hash functions of the same length, or one
      can truncate a hash function down, then one could potentially find
      collisions between the hash functions rather than within a single
      hash function.  (For example, truncating SHA-512 to 256 bits might
      collide with a SHA-256 bit hash value.)  This attack can be
      mitigated by including the signature algorithm identifier in the
      data to be signed.

8.2.  RSASSA-PSS

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in [RFC3447].

   The RSASSA-PSS

9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms

   Message Authentication Codes (MACs) provide data authentication and
   integrity protection.  They provide either no or very limited data
   origination.  (One cannot, for example, be used to prove the identity
   of the sender to a third party.)

   MACs are designed in the same basic structure as signature algorithm is parametized with
   appendix algorithms.  The message content is processed and an
   authentication code is produced, the authentication code is
   frequently called a hash
   function (h), tag.  The basic structure becomes:

   tag = MAC_Create(message content, key)

   valid = MAC_Verify(message content, key, tag)

   MAC algorithms can be based on either a mask generation function (mgf) and block cipher algorithm (i.e.
   AES-MAC) or a salt hash algorithm (i.e.  HMAC).  This document defines a
   MAC algorithm for each of these two constructions.

9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)

   The Hash-base Message Authentication Code algorithm (HMAC)
   [RFC2104][RFC4231] was designed to deal with length
   (sLen).  For this specification, the mask generation function is
   fixed extension
   attacks.  The algorithm was also designed to allow for new hash
   algorithms to be MGF1 as defined directly plugged in [RFC3447].  It without changes to the hash
   function.  The HMAC design process has been recommended
   that vindicated as, while the same
   security of hash function be used for hashing the data as well algorithms such as
   in MD5 has decreased over time, the mask generation function, for this specification we following
   this recommendation.
   security of HMAC combined with MD5 has not yet been shown to be
   compromised [RFC6151].

   The salt length HMAC algorithm is the same length as the parameterized by an inner and outer padding, a
   hash function output.

   Implementations need to check that (h) and an authentication tag value length.  For this
   specification, the key type is 'RSA' when
   creating or verifying a signature. inner and outer padding are fixed to the values
   set in [RFC2104].  The length of the authentication tag corresponds
   to the difficulty of producing a forgery.  For use in constrained
   environments, we define a set of HMAC algorithms that are truncated.

   There are currently no known issues when truncating, however the
   security strength of the message tag is correspondingly reduced in
   strength.  When truncating, the left most tag length bits are kept
   and transmitted.

   The algorithm defined in this document can be found in Table 5.

     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+

   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | name      | value | hash Hash    | salt length Length | description                |
     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | PS256 HMAC      | -26 *     | SHA-256 | 32 64     | RSASSA-PSS HMAC w/ SHA-256 truncated  |
   | 256/64    |       |         |        | to 64 bits                 |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 4     | SHA-256 | 256    | HMAC w/ SHA-256            |
   | 256/256   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         |        | PS384                            | -27
   | HMAC      | 5     | SHA-384 | 48 384    | RSASSA-PSS HMAC w/ SHA-384            |
   | 384/384   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         | PS512        | -28                            |
   | HMAC      | 6     | SHA-512 | 64 512    | RSASSA-PSS HMAC w/ SHA-512            |
     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | 512/512   |       |         |        |                            |
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+

                      Table 5: RSASSA-PSS HMAC Algorithm Values

8.2.1.  Security Considerations

   In addition to needing to worry about keys that are too small to
   provide

   Some recipient algorithms carry the required security, there are issues with keys that are
   too large.  Denial key while others derive a key
   from secret data.  For those algorithms which carry the key (i.e.
   RSA-OAEP and AES-KeyWrap), the size of service attacks have been mounted with overly
   large keys.  This has the potential to consume resources with
   potentially bad keys.  There are two reasonable ways to address this
   attack.  First, a HMAC key should not SHOULD be used for a cryptographic
   operation until it has been matched back to an authorized user.  This
   approach means that no cryptography would be done except for
   authorized users.  Second, applications can impose maximum as well the
   same size as
   minimum length requirements on keys.  This limits the resources
   consumed even if underlying hash function.  For those algorithms
   which derive the matching is not performed until key, the cryptography
   has been done.

   There is a theoretical hash substitution attack that can derived key MUST be mounted
   against RSASSA-PSS.  However, the requirement that the same size as the
   underlying hash
   function function.

   If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type MUST be used consistently for all operations is an effective
   mitigation against it.  Unlike ECDSA, hash functions are not
   truncated so
   'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC values MUST
   validate that the full hash value is always signed.  The internal
   padding structure of RSASSA-PSS means that one needs to have multiple
   collisions between key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the two entities involved.

9.1.1.  Security Considerations

   HMAC has proved to be resistant even when used with weakening hash functions in order
   algorithms.  The current best method appears to be successful
   in producing a forgery based brute force
   attack on changing the hash function. key.  This means that key size is
   highly unlikely.

9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms going to be directly
   related to the security of an HMAC operation.

9.2.  AES Message Authentication Codes (MACs) provide data Code (AES-CBC-MAC)

   AES-CBC-MAC is defined in [MAC].

   AES-CBC-MAC is parameterized by the key length, the authentication
   tag length and
   integrity protection.  They provide either no or very limited data
   origination.  (One cannot, for example, be used to prove the identity IV used.  For all of these algorithms, the sender IV is
   fixed to a third party.)

   MACs are designed in the same basic structure as signature with
   appendix algorithms.  The message content is processed and all zeros.  We provide an
   authentication code is produced, the authentication code is
   frequently called a tag. array of algorithms for various
   key lengths and tag lengths.  The basic structure becomes: algorithms defined in this document
   are found in Table 6.

   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
   | name        | value | key      | tag = MAC_Create(message content, key)

   valid = MAC_Verify(message content,      | description           |
   |             |       | length   | length   |                       |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 128      | 64       | AES-MAC 128 bit key, tag)

   MAC algorithms can  |
   | 128/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 256      | 64       | AES-MAC 256 bit key,  |
   | 256/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 128      | 128      | AES-MAC 128 bit key,  |
   | 128/128     |       |          |          | 128-bit tag           |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 256      | 128      | AES-MAC 256 bit key,  |
   | 256/128     |       |          |          | 128-bit tag           |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+

                     Table 6: AES-MAC Algorithm Values

   Keys may be based on obtained either from a block cipher algorithm (i.e.
   AES-MAC) key structure or from a hash algorithm (i.e.  HMAC).  This document defines recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for each of these two constructions.

9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)

   The Hash-base Message Authentication Code algorithm (HMAC)
   [RFC2104][RFC4231] was designed to deal with length extension
   attacks.  The algorithm was also designed to allow for new hash
   algorithms to be directly plugged in without changes to the hash
   function.  The HMAC design process has been vindicated as, while the
   security of hash algorithms such as MD5 has decreased over time, the
   security entities involved.

9.2.1.  Security Considerations

   A number of HMAC combined with MD5 has not yet been shown attacks exist against CBC-MAC that need to be
   compromised [RFC6151].

   The HMAC algorithm is parameterized by an inner and outer padding, considered.

   o  A single key must only be used for messages of a
   hash function (h) fixed and an authentication tag value known
      length.  For  If this
   specification, the inner and outer padding are fixed to the values
   set in [RFC2104].  The length of is not the authentication tag corresponds case, an attacker will be able to the difficulty of producing a forgery.  For use in constrained
   environments, we define
      generate a set of HMAC algorithms that are truncated.
   There are currently no known issues when truncating, however the
   security strength of the message with a valid tag is correspondingly reduced in
   strength.  When truncating, the left most given two message, tag pairs.
      This can be addressed by using different keys for different length bits are kept
   and transmitted.

   The algorithm defined in
      messages.  (CMAC mode also addresses this document issue.)

   o  If the same key is used for both encryption and authentication
      operations, using CBC modes an attacker can be found in Table 6.

   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | name      | value | Hash    | Length | description                |
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | HMAC      | *     | SHA-256 | 64     | HMAC w/ SHA-256 truncated  |
   | 256/64    |       |         |        | to 64 bits                 |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 4     | SHA-256 | 256    | HMAC w/ SHA-256            |
   | 256/256   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 5     | SHA-384 | 384    | HMAC w/ SHA-384            |
   | 384/384   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 6     | SHA-512 | 512    | HMAC w/ SHA-512            |
   | 512/512   |       |         |        |                            |
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+

                      Table 6: HMAC Algorithm Values

   Some recipient algorithms carry the key while others derive produce messages with
      a key
   from secret data.  For those algorithms which carry valid authentication code.

   o  If the key (i.e.
   RSA-OAEP and AES-KeyWrap), IV can be modified, then messages can be forged.  This is
      addressed by fixing the size IV to all zeros.

10.  Content Encryption Algorithms

   Content Encryption Algorithms provide data confidentiality for
   potentially large blocks of the HMAC key SHOULD data using a symmetric key.  They provide
   either no or very limited data origination.  (One cannot, for
   example, be used to prove the
   same size as the underlying hash function.  For those algorithms
   which derive identity of the key, sender to a third
   party.)  The ability to provide data origination is linked to how the derived
   symmetric key MUST be the same size as the
   underlying hash function.

   If is obtained.

   We restrict the key obtained from a key structure, set of legal content encryption algorithms to those
   which support authentication both of the key type MUST be
   'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating content and validating MAC values MUST
   validate additional data.
   The encryption process will generate some type of authentication
   value, but that value may be either explicit or implicit in terms of
   the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for definition.  For simplicity sake, the entities involved.

9.1.1.  Security Considerations

   HMAC has proved to authentication
   code will normally be resistant even when used with weakening hash
   algorithms.  The current best method appears defined as being appended to be a brute force
   attack on the key.  This means that key size cipher text
   stream.  The basic structure becomes:

   ciphertext = Encrypt(message content, key, additional data)

   valid, message content = Decrypt(cipher text, key, additional data)

   Most AEAD algorithms are logically defined as returning the message
   content only if the decryption is going to valid.  Many but not all
   implementations will follow this convention.  The message content
   MUST NOT be directly
   related to used if the security of an HMAC operation.

9.2. decryption does not validate.

10.1.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-CBC-MAC)

   AES-CBC-MAC GCM

   The GCM mode is a generic authenticated encryption block cipher mode
   defined in [MAC].

   AES-CBC-MAC [AES-GCM].  The GCM mode is combined with the AES block
   encryption algorithm to define an AEAD cipher.

   The GCM mode is parameterized with by the key length, size of the authentication
   tag length and
   tag.  The size of the IV used. authentication tag is limited to a small set of
   values.  For all this document however, the size of these algorithms, the IV authentication
   tag is fixed to all zeros.  We provide an array of algorithms for various
   key lengths and tag lengths. at 128-bits.

   The set of algorithms defined in this document are found in Table 7.

   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+

             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+
             | name    | value | key      | tag      | description                 |
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+
             | A128GCM | 1     | length   | length   |                       |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 128      | 64       | AES-MAC 128 bit key,  |
   | 128/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 256      | 64       | AES-MAC 256 bit key,  |
   | 256/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | *     | 128      | 128      | AES-MAC 128 bit key,  |
   | 128/128     |       |          |          | AES-GCM mode w/ 128-bit tag           |
   | key |
             |         |       |                             |
             | AES-MAC A192GCM | * 2     | 256 AES-GCM mode w/ 192-bit key | 128
             | AES-MAC 256 bit key,         |       | 256/128                             |
             | A256GCM | 3     | 128-bit tag AES-GCM mode w/ 256-bit key |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+

                   Table 7: AES-MAC Algorithm Values Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

9.2.1.

10.1.1.  Security Considerations

   A number of attacks exist against CBC-MAC that need to

   When using AES-CCM the following restrictions MUST be considered. enforced:

   o  A single  The key must only and nonce pair MUST be used unique for messages every message encrypted.

   o  The total amount of a fixed and known
      length.  If this data encrypted MUST NOT exceed 2^39 - 256
      bits.  An explicit check is not the case, an attacker will required only in environments where it
      is expected that it might be able to
      generated a message exceeded.

10.2.  AES CCM

   Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) is a valid tag given two message, tag pairs.
      This can be addressed by using different keys for different length
      messages.  (CMAC generic authentication encryption
   block cipher mode defined in [RFC3610].  The CCM mode also addresses this issue.)

   o  If the same key is combined
   with the AES block encryption algorithm to define a commonly used for both
   content encryption and algorithm used in constrained devices.

   The CCM mode has two parameter choices.  The first choice is M, the
   size of the authentication
      operations, using CBC modes field.  The choice of the value for M
   involves a trade-off between message expansion and the probably that
   an attacker can produce messages with undetectably modify a valid authentication code.

   o  If the IV can be modified, then messages can be forged.  This message.  The second choice is
      addressed by fixing
   L, the IV to all zeros.

10.  Content Encryption Algorithms

   Content Encryption Algorithms provide data confidentialty for
   potentially large blocks size of data using the length field.  This value requires a symmetric key.  They provide
   either no or very limited data origination.  (One cannot, for
   example, be used to prove trade-off
   between the identity maximum message size and the size of the sender to Nonce.

   It is unfortunate that the specification for CCM specified L and M as
   a third
   party.)  The ability count of bytes rather than a count of bits.  This leads to provide data origination possible
   misunderstandings where AES-CCM-8 is linked frequently used to how the
   symmetric key is obtained.

   We restrict the set of legal content encryption algorithms refer to those
   which support authentication both a
   version of CCM mode where the content and additional data.
   The encryption process will generate some type of authentication
   value, but that value may be either explicit or implicit in terms size of the algorithm definition.  For simplicity sake, the authentication
   code will normally be defined as being appended to the cipher text
   stream.  The basic structure becomes:

   ciphertext = Encrypt(message content, key, additional data)

   valid, message content = Decrypt(cipher text, key, additional data)

   Most AEAD algorithms are logically defined as returning the message
   content only if the decryption is valid.  Many but 64-bits
   and not all
   implementations 8-bits.  These values have traditionally been specified as
   bit counts rather than byte counts.  This document will follow this convention.  The message content
   MUST NOT be used if the decryption does not validate.

10.1.  AES GCM

   The GCM mode is is a generic authenticated encryption block cipher
   mode defined in [AES-GCM].  The GCM mode
   tradition of using bit counts so that it is combined with the AES
   block encryption algorithm easier to compare the
   different algorithms presented in this document.

   We define a an AEAD cipher.

   The GCM mode is parameterized with by the size matrix of algorithms in this document over the authentication
   tag.  The size values of the authentication tag is limited
   L and M.  Constrained devices are usually operating in situations
   where they use short messages and want to avoid doing recipient
   specific cryptographic operations.  This favors smaller values of M
   and larger values of L.  Less constrained devices do will want to be
   able to user larger messages and are more willing to generate new
   keys for every operation.  This favors larger values of M and smaller
   values of L.  (The use of a small set large nonce means that random generation
   of
   values.  For this document however, both the size of key and the authentication
   tag is fixed at 128-bits. nonce will decrease the chances of repeating
   the pair on two different messages.)

   The set following values are used for L:

   16-bits (2)  limits messages to 2^16 bytes (64 KiB) in length.  This
      sufficiently long for messages in the constrained world.  The
      nonce length is 13 bytes allowing for 2^(13*8) possible values of algorithms defined
      the nonce without repeating.

   64-bits (8)  limits messages to 2^64 bytes in this document length.  The nonce
      length is 7 bytes allowing for 2^56 possible values of the nonce
      without repeating.

   The following values are used for M:

   64-bits (8)  produces a 64-bit authentication tag.  This implies that
      there is a 1 in Table 8.

             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+ 2^64 chance that a modified message will
      authenticate.

   128-bits (16)  produces a 128-bit authentication tag.  This implies
      that there is a 1 in 2^128 chance that a modified message will
      authenticate.

   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | name               | value | L  | M   | k   | description         |
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | A128GCM AES-CCM-16-64-128  | 1 10    | AES-GCM 16 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode w/        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     | A192GCM     | 2 tag, 13-byte nonce  | AES-GCM mode w/ 192-bit key
   |                    |       |    |     |     | A256GCM                     | 3
   | AES-GCM AES-CCM-16-64-256  | 11    | 16 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode w/        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 13-byte nonce  |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-128  | 30    | 64 | 64  | 128 |
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+

                   Table 8: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

10.1.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-CCM the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.

   o  The total amount of data encrypted MUST NOT exceed 2^39 -   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-256  | 31    | 64 | 64  | 256 bits
      .  An explicit check is required only in environments where it is
      expected that it might be exceeded.

10.2.  AES CCM

   Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) is a generic authentication encryption
   block cipher mode defined in [RFC3610].  The CCM | AES-CCM mode is combined
   with the AES block encryption algorithm to define a commonly used
   content encryption algorithm used in constrainted devices.

   The CCM        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-128 | 12    | 16 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode has two parameter choices.  The first choice is M, the
   size of the authentication field.  The choice of the value for M
   involves a trade-off between message expansion and the probably that
   an attacker can undetecably modify a message.  The second choice is
   L, the size of        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-256 | 13    | 16 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-128 | 32    | 64 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-256 | 33    | 64 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+

                   Table 8: Algorithm Values for AES-CCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the length field.  This value requires key obtained from a trade-off
   between key structure, the maximum message size key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and the size of the Nonce.

   It is unfortunate validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the specification for CCM specified L key type, key length and M as
   a count of bytes rather than a count of bits.  This leads to possible
   misunderstandings where AES-CCM-8 is frequently used to refer to a
   version of CCM mode where algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the size entities involved.

10.2.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-CCM the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.

   o  The total number of times the authentication AES block cipher is 64-bits
   and not 8-bits.  These values have traditionally been specified as
   bit counts rather than byte counts. used MUST NOT
      exceed 2^61 operations.  This document will follow the
   tradition of using bit counts so that it limitation is easier to compare the
   different algorithms presented in this document.

   We define a matrix sum of algorithms times the
      block cipher is used in this document over computing the values of
   L MAC value and M.  Constrained devices are usually operating in situations
   where they use short messages and want to avoid doing recipient
   specific cryptographic performing
      stream encryption operations.  This favors smaller values of M
   and larger values of L.  Less constrained devices do will want to  An explicit check is required only
      in environments where it is expected that it might be
   able to user larger messages and are more willing to generate new
   keys for every operation.  This favors larger values of M and smaller
   values of L.  (The use exceeded.

   [RFC3610] additionally calls out one other consideration of note.  It
   is possible to do a large nonce means that random generation
   of both pre-computation attack against the key and algorithm in
   cases where the nonce will decrease portions encryption content is highly predictable.
   This reduces the chances security of repeating the pair on two different messages.)

   The following values are used for L:

   16-bits (2)  limits messages key size by half.  Ways to deal with
   this attack include adding a random portion to 2^16 bytes (64Kbyte) in length.  This
      sufficently long for messages in the constrainted world.  The nonce length is 13 bytes allowing for 2^(13*8) possible values value and/or
   increasing the key size used.  Using a portion of the nonce without repeating.

   64-bits (8)  limits messages to 2^64 byes in length.  The nonce
      length is 7 bytes allowing for 2^56 possible values of a
   random value will decrease the nonce
      without repeating.

   The following values are number of messages that a single key
   can be used for.  Increasing the key size may require more resources
   in the constrained device.  See sections 5 and 10 of [RFC3610] for M:

   64-bits (8)  produces
   more information.

10.3.  ChaCha20 and Poly1305

   ChaCha20 and Poly1305 combined together is a 64-bit authentication tag.  This implies new AEAD mode that
      there is a 1
   defined in 2^64 chance that an modified message will
      authenticate.

   128-bits (16)  produces a 128-bit authentication tag. [RFC7539].  This implies
      that there is a 1 new algorithm defined to be a cipher
   which is not AES and thus would not suffer from any future weaknesses
   found in 2^128 chance that AES.  These cryptographic functions are designed to be fast
   in software only implementations.

   The ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD construction defined in [RFC7539] has no
   parameterization.  It takes a 256-bit key and a 96-bit nonce as well
   as the plain text and additional data as inputs and produces the
   cipher text as an modified message will
      authenticate.

   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | name               | value | L  | M   | k   | description         |
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | AES-CCM-16-64-128  | 10    | 16 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 13-byte nonce  |
   |                    |       | option.  We define one algorithm identifier for
   this algorithm in Table 9.

     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+
     | name              | value | description                      |
     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+
     | AES-CCM-16-64-256 ChaCha20/Poly1305 | 11    | 16 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | ChaCha20/Poly1305 w/ 256-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 13-byte nonce  |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-128  | 30    | 64 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-256  | 31    | 64 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     | key | 256-bit
     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+

                   Table 9: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

10.3.1.  Security Considerations

   The pair of key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-128 | 12    | 16 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-256 | 13    | 16 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-128 | 32    | 64 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-256 | 33    | 64 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+

                   Table 9: Algorithm Values for AES-CCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

10.2.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-CCM the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.

   o  The total number invocation of times the AES block cipher is used MUST NOT
      exceed 2^61 operations.  This limitation is the sum
   algorithm.  Nonce counters are considered to be an acceptable way of times the
      block cipher is
   ensuring that they are unique.

11.  Key Derivation Functions (KDF)

   Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) are used in computing the MAC to take some secret value
   and generate a different one.  The original secret values come in performing
      stream encryption operations.  An explicit check is required only
      in environments where it
   three basic flavors:

   o  Secrets which are uniformly random: This is expected that it might be exceeded.

   [RFC3610] additionally calls out one other consideration the type of note.  It secret
      which is possible to do created by a pre-computation attack against the algorithm in
   cases where the portions encryption content good random number generator.

   o  Secrets which are not uniformly random: This is highly predictable. type of secret
      which is created by operations like key agreement.

   o  Secrets which are not random: This reduces is the security type of secret that
      people generate for things like passwords.

   General KDF functions work well with the key size by half.  Ways to deal first type of secret, can do
   reasonable well with
   this attack include adding a random portion to the nonce value and/or
   increasing second type of secret and generally do
   poorly with the key size used.  Using a portion last type of secret.  None of the nonce for a
   random value will decrease KDF functions in
   this section are designed to deal with the number type of messages secrets that a single key
   can are
   used for passwords.  Functions like PBSE2 [RFC2898] need to be used for.  Increasing the key size may require more resources
   for that type of secret.

   Many functions are going to handle the first two type of secrets
   differently.  The KDF function defined in Section 11.1 can use
   different underlying constructions if the secret is uniformly random
   than if the secret is not uniformly random.  This is reflected in the constrained device.  See sections 5 and 10
   set of [RFC3610] algorithms defined for
   more HKDF.

   When using KDF functions, one component that is generally included is
   context information.

10.3.  ChaCha20 and Poly1305

   ChaCha20 and Poly1305 combined together  Context information is used to allow for
   different keying information to be derived from the same secret.  The
   use of context based keying material is considered to be a new AEAD mode that good
   security practice.  This document defines a single context structure
   and a single KDF function.

11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)

   The HKDF key derivation algorithm is defined in [RFC7539].  This is a new [RFC5869].

   The HKDF algorithm is defined to be take a cipher
   which is not AES and thus would not suffer from any future weaknesses
   found in AES. number of inputs.  These cryptographic functions are designed to
   inputs are:

      secret - a shared value that is secret.  Secrets may be fast
   in software only implementations.

   The ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD construction defined in [RFC7539] has no
   parameterization.  It takes either
      previously shared or derived from operations like a 256-bit DH key and
      agreement.

      salt - an a 96-bit nonce as
   well as optional public value that is used to change the plain text and additional data as inputs and produces
      generation process.  If specified, the
   cipher text as an option.  We define one algorithm identifier for
   this algorithm in Table 10.

     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+
     | name              | value | description                      |
     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+
     | ChaCha20/Poly1305 | 11    | ChaCha20/Poly1305 w/ 256-bit key |
     +-------------------+-------+----------------------------------+

                   Table 10: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, salt is carried using the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate
      'salt' algorithm parameter.  While [RFC5869] suggests that the key type, key
      length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

10.3.1.  Security Considerations

   The pair of key, nonce MUST the salt be unique for every invocation the same as the length of the
   algorithm.  Nonce counters are considered to be an acceptable way underlying
      hash value, any amount of
   ensuring that they are unique.

11.  Key Derivation Functions (KDF)

   Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) are used to take some secret value
   and generate a salt will improve the security as
      different one.  The original secret key values come in
   three basic flavors:

   o  Secrets which are uniformly random: This is will be generated.  A parameter to carry the type of secret
      which
      salt is created by a good random number generator.

   o  Secrets which are not uniformly random: defined in Table 11.  This parameter is type of secret
      which is created protected by operations like being
      included in the key agreement.

   o  Secrets which are computation and does not random: This is need to be separately
      authenticated.

      length - the type number of secret bytes of output that
      people generate for things like passwords.

   General KDF functions work well with the first type of secret, can do
   reasonable well with the second type of secret and generally do
   poorly with the last type of secret.  None of need to be generated.

      context information - Information that describes the KDF functions context in
      which the resulting value will be used.  Making this section are designed information
      specific to deal with the type of secrets context that are
   used for passwords.  Functions like PBSE2 [RFC2898] need the material is going to be used
   for
      ensures that type of secret.

   Many functions are going the resulting material will always be unique.  The
      context structure used is encoded into the algorithm identifier.

      hash function - The underlying hash function to handle be used in the first two type of secrets
   differently.
      HKDF algorithm.  The KDF hash function is encoded into the HKDF
      algorithm selection.

   HKDF is defined to use HMAC as the underlying PRF.  However, it is
   possible to use other functions in Section 11.1 the same construct to provide a
   different KDF function that may be more appropriate in the
   constrained world.  Specifically, one can use
   different underlying constructions if AES-CBC-MAC as the secret is uniformly PRF
   for the expand step, but not for the extract step.  When using a good
   random
   than shared secret of the correct length, the extract step can be
   skipped.  The extract cannot be skipped if the secret is not
   uniformly random.  This random, for example if it is reflected in the
   set result of an ECDH key
   agreement step.

   The algorithms defined for HKDF.

   When using KDF functions, one component that is generally included is in this document are found in Table 10
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | name        | hash        | Skip     | context information.  Context information                    |
   |             |             | extract  |                            |
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | HKDF        | SHA-256     | no       | XXX                        |
   | SHA-256     |             |          |                            |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF        | SHA-512     | no       | XXX                        |
   | SHA-512     |             |          |                            |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF AES-   | AES-CBC-128 | yes      | HKDF using AES-MAC as the  |
   | MAC-128     |             |          | PRF w/ 128-bit key         |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF AES-   | AES-CBC-128 | yes      | HKDF using AES-MAC as the  |
   | MAC-256     |             |          | PRF w/ 256-bit key         |
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+

                         Table 10: HKDF algorithms

                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | name | label | type | description |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | salt | -20   | bstr | Random salt |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+

                    Table 11: HKDF Algorithm Parameters

11.2.  Context Information Structure

   The context information structure is used to allow for
   different keying information to be derived from ensure that the same secret.  The
   use of context based derived
   keying material is considered "bound" to be a good
   security practice.  This document defines a single the context structure
   and a single KDF function.

11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) of the transaction.  The HKDF key derivation algorithm
   context information structure used here is based on that defined in [RFC5869].

   The HKDF algorithm
   [SP800-56A].  By using CBOR for the encoding of the context
   information structure, we automatically get the same type of type and
   length separation of fields that is defined to take a number obtained by the use of inputs These inputs
   are:

      secret - a shared value ASN.1.
   This means that there is secret.  Secrets may be either
      previously shared or derived from operations like a DH key
      agreement.

      salt - an optional public value that is used no need to change encode the
      generation process.  If specified, lengths for the salt base
   elements as it is carried using the
      'salt' algorithm parameter.  While [RFC5869] suggests that the
      length of the salt be done by the same JOSE encoding.  [CREF7]

   The context information structure refers to PartyU and PartyV as the length of the underlying
      hash value, any amount of salt will improve
   two parties which are doing the security as
      different key values will be generated.  A parameter derivation.  Unless the
   application protocol defines differently, we assign PartyU to carry the
      salt is defined in Table 12.  This parameter
   entity that is protected by being
      included in creating the key computation message and does not need PartyV to be separately
      authenticated.

      length - the number of bytes of output that need to be generated.

      context information - Information entity that describes the context in
      which is
   receiving the resulting value message.  By doing this association, different keys
   will be used.  Making this derived for each direction as the context information
      specific is
   different in each direction.

   Application protocols are free to define the context that roles differently.  For
   example, they could assign the material is going PartyU role to be used
      ensures the entity that
   initiates the resulting material will always be unique.  The
      context structure used is encoded into connection and allow directly sending multiple messages
   over the algorithm identifier.

      hash function - The underlying hash function to be used connection in both directions without changing the
      HKDF algorithm. role
   information.

   The hash function is encoded into the HKDF
      algorithm selection.

   HKDF is defined to use HMAC of a transaction identifier, either in one of the
   supplemental fields or as the underlying PRF.  However, it salt if one is
   possible to use other functions in using HKDF, ensures that
   a unique key is generated for each set of transactions.  Combining
   nonce fields with the same construct to provide transaction identifier provides a method so
   that a different KDF function key is used for each message in each direction.

   The context structure is built from information that may is known to both
   entities.  Some of the information is known only to the two entities,
   some is implied based on the application and some is explicitly
   transported as part of the message.  The information that can be more appropriate
   carried in the
   constrained world.  Specifically, one message, parameters have been defined and can use AES-CBC-MAC as be found
   in Table 12.  These parameters are designed to be placed in the PRF
   for
   unprotected bucket of the expand step, but recipient structure.  (They do not for need to
   be in the extract step.  When protected bucket since they already are included in the
   cryptographic computation by virtue of being included in the context
   structure.)

   We encode the context specific information using a good
   random shared secret of CBOR array type.
   The fields in the correct length, array are:

   AlgorithmID  This field indicates the extract step can algorithm for which the key
      material will be
   skipped.  The extract cannot used.  This field is required to be skipped present and
      is a copy of the algorithm identifier in the message.  The field
      exists in the context information so that if the secret same environment
      is not
   uniformly random, used for example different algorithms, then completely different keys
      will be generated each of those algorithms.  (This practice means
      if it algorithm A is broken and thus can is easier to find, the result of a ECDH key
   agreement step.

   The algorithms defined in this document are found in Table 11
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | name        | hash        | Skip     | context                    |
   |             |             | extract  |                            |
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | HKDF        | SHA-256     | no       | XXX                        |
   | SHA-256     |             |          |                            |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF        | SHA-512     | no       | XXX                        |
   | SHA-512     |             |          |                            |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF AES-   | AES-CBC-128 | yes      | HKDF using AES-MAC as
      derived for algorithm B will not be the  |
   | MAC-128     |             |          | PRF w/ 128-bit key         |
   |             |             |          |                            |
   | HKDF AES-   | AES-CBC-128 | yes      | HKDF using AES-MAC same as the  |
   | MAC-256     |             |          | PRF w/ 256-bit key         |
   +-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+

                         Table 11: HKDF algorithms

                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | name | label | type | description |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | salt | -20   | bstr | Random salt |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+

                    Table 12: HKDF Algorithm Parameters

11.2.  Context Information Structure

   The context for
      algorithm B.)

   PartyUInfo  This field holds information structure about party U.  The
      PartyUInfo is used to ensure that encoded as a CBOR structure.  The elements of
      PartyUInfo are encoded in the derived
   keying material order presented, however if the
      element does not exist no element is "bound" to placed in the context array.  The
      elements of the transaction.  The
   context information structure used here is based on that defined in
   [SP800-56A].  By using CBOR for the encoding of PartyUInfo array are:

      identity  This contains the context identity information structure, we automatically get for party U.  The
         identities can be assigned in one of two manners.  Firstly, a
         protocol can assign identities based on roles.  For example,
         the same type roles of type "client" and
   length separation of fields that is obtained by "server" may be assigned to different
         entities in the protocol.  Each entity would then use of ASN.1.
   This means that there is no need to encode the lengths
         correct label for the base
   elements as it is done by the JOSE encoding.  [CREF11] data they send or receive.  The context information structure refers to PartyU and PartyV as the
   two parties which are doing the key derivation.  Unless the
   application second
         way is for a protocol defines differently, we assign PartyU to the
   entity that assign identities is creating the message and PartyV to the entity use a name
         based on a naming system (i.e.  DNS, X.509 names).

         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU identity' that is
   receiving can be
         used to carry identity information in the message.  By doing this association, different keys
   will be derived for each direction  However,
         identity information is often known as part of the context protocol and
         can thus be inferred rather than made explicit.  If identity
         information is
   different carried in each direction.

   Application protocols are free to define the roles differently.  For
   example, they could assign message, applications SHOULD have
         a way of validating the PartyU role supplied identity information.  The
         identity information does not need to the entity that
   initiates the connection be specified and allow directly sending multiple messages
   over the connection in both directions without changing the role
   information. can be
         left as absent.
         The use identity value supplied will be integrity checked as part
         of the key derivation process.  If the identity string is
         wrong, then the wrong key will be created.

      nonce  This contains a transaction identifier, either in one of time nonce value.  The nonce can either
         be implicit from the
   supplemental fields protocol or carried as a value in the salt if one is using HKDF, ensures
         unprotected headers.
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU nonce' that
   a unique key is generated for each set of transactions.  Combining can be
         used to carry this value in the message However, the nonce fields with
         value could be determined by the transaction identifier provides a method so application and the value
         determined from elsewhere.
         This item is optional and can be absent.

      other  This contains other information that a different key is used for each message in each direction.

   The context structure defined by the
         protocol.
         This item is built optional and can be absent.

   PartyVInfo  M00TODO: Copy down from PartyUInfo when that text is
      ready.

   SuppPubInfo  This field contains public information that is mutually
      known to both
   entities.  Some of the information parties.

      keyDataLength  This is known only set to the number of bits of the desired
         output value.  (This practice means if algorithm A can use two entities,
   some is implied based on
         different key lengths, the application and some is explicitly
   transported key derived for longer key size will
         not contain the key for shorter key size as part of a prefix.)

      protected  This field contains the message. protected parameter field.

      other  The information that can be
   carried in field other is for free form data defined by the message, parameters have been
         application.  An example is that an application could defined and can be found
   in Table 13.  These parameters are designed
         two different strings to be placed in the
   unprotected bucket of the recipient structure.  (They do not need here to
   be in the protected bucket since they already are included in the
   cryptographic computation by virtue of being included in the context
   structure.)

   We encode the context specific information using a CBOR array type.
   The fields in the array are:

   AlgorithmID  This field indicates the algorithm generate different
         keys for which the key
      material will be used. a data stream vs a control stream.  This field is required to
         optional and will only be present and
      is a copy of if the algorithm identifier in application defines a
         structure for this information.  Applications that define this
         SHOULD use CBOR to encode the message.  The data so that types and lengths
         are correctly include.

   SuppPrivInfo  This field
      exists in the context contains private information so that if the same environment is used for different algorithms, then completely different keys
      will be generated each
      mutually known information.  An example of those algorithms.  (This practice means
      if algorithm A this information would
      be a pre-existing shared secret.  The field is broken optional and thus can is easier to find, the key
      derived for algorithm B will not
      only be present if the same as the key for
      algorithm B.)

   PartyUInfo  This field holds information about party U.  The
      PartyUInfo is encoded as application defines a structure for this
      information.  Applications that define this SHOULD use CBOR struture.  The elements of
      PartyUInfo are encoded in the order presented, however if the
      element does not exist no element is placed in the array.  The
      elements of the PartyUInfo array are:

      identity  This contains the identity information for party U.  The
         identities can be assigned in one of two manners.  Firstly, a
         protocol can assign identities based on roles.  For example,
         the roles of "client" and "server" may be assigned to different
         entities in the protocol.  Each entity would then use the
         correct label for
      encode the data they they send or receive.  The
         second way is for a protocol to assign identities is to use a
         name based on a naming system (i.e.  DNS, X.509 names).

         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU identity' so that can be
         used to carry identity information in the message.  However,
         identity information is often known as part of the protocol and
         can thus be inferred rather than made explicit.  If identity
         information is carried in the message, applications SHOULD have
         a way of validating the supplied identity information.  The
         identity information does not need to be specified types and can be
         left as absent.
         The lengths are correctly include.

   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
   | name          | label | type      | description                   |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
   | PartyU        | -21   | bstr      | Party U identity value supplied will be integrity checked as part
         of the key derivation process.  If the Information  |
   | identity string is
         wrong, then the wrong key will be created.

      nonce  This contains a one time      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU nonce value.  The  | -22   | bstr /    | Party U provided nonce can either
         be implicit from the protocol or carried as a value in the
         unprotected headers.
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU nonce' that can be
         used to carry this value in the message However, the        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU other  | -23   | bstr      | Party U other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information                   |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV        | -24   | bstr      | Party V identity Information  |
   | identity      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV nonce
         value could be determined by the application and the value
         determined from elsewhere.
         This item is optional and can be absent.  | -25   | bstr /    | Party V provided nonce        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV other  This contains  | -26   | bstr      | Party V other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information that is defined by the
         protocol.
         This item is optional and can be absent.

   PartyVInfo  M00TODO: Copy down                   |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+

                  Table 12: Context Algorithm Parameters

   Text from PartyUInfo when that text is
      ready.

   SuppPubInfo  This field contains public information that is mutually
      known to both parties.

      keyDataLength  This is set here to the number of bits start of the desired
         output value.  (This practice means if algorithm A can use two
         different key lengths, the key derived for longer key size will
         not contain the key for shorter key size as a prefix.)

      protected  This field contains the protected parameter field. next section to be removed
   COSE_KDF_Context = [
       AlgorithmID : int / tstr,
       PartyUInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr / int,
           ? identity : bstr,
           ? other  The field : bstr
       ],
       PartyVInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr,
           ? identity : bstr / tstr,
           ? other is for free form data defined by the
         application.  An example is that an application could : bstr
       ],
       SuppPubInfo : [
           keyDataLength : uint,
           protected : bstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       ? SuppPrivInfo : bstr
   ]

12.  Recipient Algorithm Classes

   Recipient algorithms can be defined
         two into a number of different strings
   classes.  COSE has the ability to be placed support many classes of recipient
   algorithms.  In this section, a number of classes are listed and then
   a set of algorithms are specified for each of the classes.  The names
   of the recipient algorithm classes used here to generate are the same as are
   defined in [RFC7517].  Other specifications use different
         keys terms for
   the recipient algorithm classes or do not support some of our
   recipient algorithm classes.

12.1.  Direct Encryption

   The direct encryption class algorithms share a data stream vs a control stream.  This field is
         optional secret between the
   sender and will only the recipient that is used either directly or after
   manipulation as the content key.  When direct encryption mode is
   used, it MUST be present if the application defines a only mode used on the message.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for this information.  Applications that define this
         SHOULD use CBOR to encode the data so that types and lengths
         are correctly include.

   SuppPrivInfo  This recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field contains private information that MUST be a zero length item if it is
      mutually known information.  An example not used
      in the computation of this information would the content key.

   o  The 'alg' parameter MUST be a pre-existing present.

   o  A parameter identifying the shared secret. secret SHOULD be present.

   o  The 'ciphertext' field is optional and will
      only MUST be present if the application defines a structure zero length item.

   o  The 'recipients' field MUST be absent.

12.1.1.  Direct Key

   This recipient algorithm is the simplest, the supplied key is
   directly used as the key for the next layer down in the message.
   There are no algorithm parameters defined for this
      information.  Applications that define algorithm.  The
   algorithm identifier value is assigned in Table 13.

   When this SHOULD use CBOR to
      encode algorithm is used, the data so that types and lengths are correctly include.

   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+ protected field MUST be zero length.
   The key type MUST be 'Symmetric'.

                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | name   | label | type value | description       |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
   | PartyU        | -21   | bstr      | Party U identity Information  |
   | identity      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU nonce  | -22   | bstr /    | Party U provided nonce        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU other  | -23   | bstr      | Party U other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information                   |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV        | -24
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | bstr direct | Party V identity Information -6    | Direct use of CEK | identity      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV nonce  | -25   | bstr /    | Party V provided nonce        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV other  | -26   | bstr      | Party V other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information                   |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+

                           Table 13: Context Algorithm Parameters

   Text from here Direct Key

12.1.1.1.  Security Considerations

   This recipient algorithm has several potential problems that need to start of next section
   be considered:

   o  These keys need to have some method to be removed
   COSE_KDF_Context = [
       AlgorithmID : int / tstr,
       PartyUInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr / int,
           ? identity : bstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       PartyVInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr,
           ? identity : bstr / tstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       SuppPubInfo : [
           keyDataLength : uint,
           protected : bstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       ? SuppPrivInfo : bstr
   ]

12.  Recipient Algorithm Classes

   Recipient regularly updated over
      time.  All of the content encryption algorithms specified in this
      document have limits on how many times a key can be defined into a number used without
      significant loss of different
   classes.  COSE has the ability security.

   o  These keys need to support many classes of recipient
   algorithms.  In this section, be dedicated to a single algorithm.  There have
      been a number of classes are listed and then attacks developed over time when a set of algorithms are specified single key is
      used for each multiple different algorithms.  One example of this is
      the classes.  The names use of the recipient algorithm classes used here are the same as a single key both for CBC encryption mode and CBC-MAC
      authentication mode.

   o  Breaking one message means all messages are
   defined broken.  If an
      adversary succeeds in [RFC7517].  Other specifications use different terms determining the key for a single message,
      then the recipient algorithm classes or do not support some of our
   recipient algorithm classes.

12.1. key for all messages is also determined.

12.1.2.  Direct Encryption

   The direct encryption class Key with KDF

   These recipient algorithms share take a common shared secret between the
   sender
   two parties and applies the recipient that is used either directly or after
   manipulation as the content key.  When direct encryption mode is
   used, it MUST be the only mode used on HKDF function (Section 11.1) using the message.

   The COSE_encrypt
   context structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be a zero length item if it is not used defined in Section 11.2 to transform the computation of shared
   secret into the content necessary key.

   o  The 'alg'  Either the 'salt' parameter MUST be present.

   o  A of HKDF
   or the partyU 'nonce' parameter identifying of the shared secret SHOULD be present.

   o  The 'ciphertext' field MUST be a zero length item.

   o  The 'recipients' field context structure MUST be absent.

12.1.1.  Direct Key
   present.  This recipient algorithm is the simplest, parameter can be generated either randomly or
   deterministically, the supplied key requirement is
   directly used as the key that it be a unique value for
   the next layer down key pair in question.

   If the message.
   There are no algorithm parameters defined for this algorithm.  The
   algorithm identifier salt/nonce value is assigned in Table 14.

   When this algorithm generated randomly, then it is used, suggested
   that the protected field MUST length of the random value be zero length.
   The key type MUST the same length as the hash
   function underlying HKDF.  While there is no way to guarantee that it
   will be 'Symmetric'.

                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | name   | value | description       |
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | direct | -6    | Direct use of CEK |
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+

                           Table 14: Direct Key

12.1.1.1.  Security Considerations

   This recipient algorithm has several potential problems unique, there is a high probability that need to it will be considered:

   o  These keys need to have some method unique.
   If the salt/nonce value is generated deterministically, it can be
   guaranteed to be regularly updated over
      time.  All of unique and thus there is no length requirement.

   A new IV must be used if the content encryption algorithms specified same key is used in more than one
   message.  The IV can be modified in this
      document have limits on how many times a key predictable manner, a random
   manner or an unpredictable manner.  One unpredictable manner that can
   be used without
      significant loss of security.

   o  These keys need is to be dedicated use the HKDF function to a single algorithm.  There have
      been a number of attacks developed over time when a single key generate the IV.  If HKDF is
   used for multiple different algorithms.  One example of this is generating the use of a single key both for CBC encryption mode and CBC-MAC
      authentication mode.

   o  Breaking one message means all messages are broken.  If an
      adversary succeeds in determining IV, the key for a single message,
      then the key for all messages is also determined.

12.1.2.  Direct Key with KDF

   These recipient algorithms take a common shared secret between the
   two parties and applies the HKDF function (Section 11.1) using the
   context structure defined in Section 11.2 to transform the shared
   secret into the necessary key.  Either the 'salt' parameter of HKDF
   or the partyU 'nonce' parameter of the context structure MUST be
   present.  This parameter can be generated either randomly or
   deterministically, the requirement is that it be a unique value for
   the key pair in question.

   If the salt/nonce value is generated randomly, then it is suggested
   that the length of the random value be the same length as the hash
   function underlying HKDF.  While there is no way to guarantee that it
   will be unique, there is a high probability that it will be unique.
   If the salt/nonce value is generated deterministically, it can be
   guaranteed to be unique and thus there is no length requirement.

   A new IV must be used if the same key is used in more than one
   message.  The IV can be modified in a predictable manner, a random
   manner or an unpredictable manner.  One unpredictable manner that can
   be used is to use the HKDF function to generate the IV.  If HKDF is
   used for generating the IV, the algorithm identifier is set to "IV-
   GENERATION".

   When these algorithms are used, algorithm identifier is set to "IV-
   GENERATION".

   When these algorithms are used, the key type MUST be 'symmetric'.

   The set of algorithms defined in this document can be found in
   Table 15. 14.

   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | name                | value | KDF         | description           |
   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | direct+HKDF-SHA-256 | *     | HKDF        | Shared secret w/ HKDF |
   |                     |       | SHA-256     | and SHA-256           |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-SHA-512 | *     | HKDF        | Shared secret w/ HKDF |
   |                     |       | SHA-512     | and SHA-512           |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-AES-128 | *     | HKDF AES-   | Shared secret w/ AES- |
   |                     |       | MAC-128     | MAC 128-bit key       |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-AES-256 | *     | HKDF AES-   | Shared secret w/ AES- |
   |                     |       | MAC-256     | MAC 256-bit key       |
   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+

                           Table 15: 14: Direct Key

12.1.2.1.  Security Considerations

   The shared secret need to have some method to be regularly updated
   over time.  The shared secret is forming the basis of trust, although
   not used directly it should still be subject to scheduled rotation.

12.2.  Key Wrapping

   In key wrapping mode, the CEK is randomly generated and that key is
   then encrypted by a shared secret between the sender and the
   recipient.  All of the currently defined key wrapping algorithms for
   JOSE (and thus for COSE) are AE algorithms.  Key wrapping mode is
   considered to be superior to direct encryption if the system has any
   capability for doing random key generation.  This is because the
   shared key is used to wrap random data rather than data has some
   degree of organization and may in fact be repeating the same content.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent if the key wrap algorithm is
      an AE algorithm.

   o  The 'recipients' field is normally absent, but can be used.
      Applications MUST deal with a recipients field present, not being
      able to decrypt that recipient is an acceptable way of dealing
      with it.  Failing to process the message is not an acceptable way
      of dealing with it.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the shared
      secret.

12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping

   The AES Key Wrapping algorithm is defined in [RFC3394].  This
   algorithm uses an AES key to wrap a value that is a multiple of
   64-bits, as such it can be used to wrap a key for any of the content
   encryption algorithms defined in this document.  The algorithm
   requires a single fixed parameter, the initial value.  This is fixed
   to the value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of [RFC3394].  There are no
   public parameters that vary on a per invocation basis.

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  If the key obtained from a key structure, the key type
   MUST be 'Symmetric'.  Implementations creating and validating MAC
   values MUST validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are
   correct and appropriate for the entities involved.

        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | name   | value | key size | description                 |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | A128KW | -3    | 128      | AES Key Wrap w/ 128-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A192KW | -4    | 192      | AES Key Wrap w/ 192-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A256KW | -5    | 256      | AES Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+

                  Table 16: 15: AES Key Wrap Algorithm Values

12.2.1.1.  Security Considerations for AES-KW

   The shared secret need to have some method to be regularly updated
   over time.  The shared secret is forming the basis of trust, although
   not used directly it should still be subject to scheduled rotation.

12.3.  Key Encryption

   Key Encryption mode is also called key transport mode in some
   standards.  Key Encryption mode differs from Key Wrap mode in that it
   uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm rather than a symmetric
   encryption algorithm to protect the key.  This document defines one
   Key Encryption mode algorithm.

   When using a key encryption algorithm, the COSE_encrypt structure for
   the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the
      asymmetric key.

12.3.1.  RSAES-OAEP

   RSAES-OAEP is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm.

12.4.  Direct Key Agreement

   The defintion
   of RSAEA-OAEP can be find in Section 7.1 of [RFC3447].  The algorithm
   is parameterized using a masking generation function (mgf), a hash
   function (h) and encoding parameters (P).  For the algorithm
   identifiers defined in this section:

   o  mgf is always set to MFG1 from [RFC3447] and uses the same hash
      function as h.

   o  P is always set to the empty octet string.

   Table 17 summarizes the rest of the values.

    +----------------------+-------+---------+-----------------------+
    | name                 | value | hash    | description           |
    +----------------------+-------+---------+-----------------------+
    | RSAES-OAEP w/SHA-256 | -25   | SHA-256 | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-256 |
    |                      |       |         |                       |
    | RSAES-OAEP w/SHA-512 | -26   | SHA-512 | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-512 |
    +----------------------+-------+---------+-----------------------+

                   Table 17: RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Values

   The key type MUST be 'RSA'.

12.3.1.1.  Security Considerations for RSAES-OAEP

   A key size of 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
   This key size corresponds roughly to the same strength as provided by
   a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm.

   It is highly recommended that checks on the key length be done before
   starting a decryption operation.  One potential denial of service
   operation is to provide encrypted objects using either abnormally
   long or oddly sized RSA modulus values.  Implementations SHOULD be
   able to encrypt and decrypt with modulus between 2048 and 16K bits in
   length.  Applications can impose additional restrictions on the
   length of the modulus.

12.4.  Direct Key Agreement

   The 'direct key agreement' class 'direct key agreement' class of recipient algorithms uses a key
   agreement method to create a shared secret.  A KDF is then applied to
   the shared secret to derive a key to be used in protecting the data.
   This key is normally used as a CEK or MAC key, but could be used for
   other purposes if more than two layers are in use (see Appendix B).

   The most commonly used key agreement algorithm used is Diffie-
   Hellman, but other variants exist.  Since COSE is designed for a
   store and forward environment rather than an on-line environment,
   many of the DH variants cannot be used as the receiver of the message
   cannot provide any key material.  One side-effect of this is that
   perfect forward security is not achievable, a static key will always
   be used for the receiver of the COSE message.

   Two variants of DH that are easily supported are:

      - Ephemeral-Static DH: where the sender of the message creates a
      one time DH key and uses a static key for the recipient.  The use
      of the ephemeral sender key means that no additional random input
      is needed as this is randomly generated for each message.

      Static-Static DH: where a static key is used for both the sender
      and the recipient.  The use of static keys allows for recipient to
      get a weak version of data origination for the message.  When
      static-static key agreement is used, then some piece of unique
      data is require to ensure that a different key is created for each
      message

   In this specification, both variants are specified.  This has been
   done to provide the weak data origination option for use with MAC
   operations.

   When direct key agreement mode is used, there MUST be only one
   recipient in the message.  This method creates the key directly and
   that makes it difficult to mix with additional recipients.  If
   multiple recipients are needed, then the version with key wrap needs
   to be used.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent.

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the
      recipient's asymmetric key.

   o  The 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'epk' parameter.

12.4.1.  ECDH

   The basic mathematics for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman can be found
   in [RFC6090].  Two new curves have been defined in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves].

   ECDH is parameterized by the following:

   o  Curve Type/Curve: The curve selected controls not only the size of
      the shared secret, but the mathematics for computing the shared
      secret.  The curve selected also controls how a point in the curve
      is represented and what happens for the identity points on the
      curve.  In this specification we allow for a number of different
      curves to be used.  The curves are defined in Table 21. 19.
      Since the only the math is changed by changing the curve, the
      curve is not fixed for any of the algorithm identifiers we define,
      instead it is defined by the points used.

   o  Ephemeral-static or static-static: The key agreement process may
      be done using either a static or an ephemeral key at the senders sender's
      side.  When using ephemeral keys, the sender MUST generate a new
      ephemeral key for every key agreement operation.  The ephemeral
      key is placed in in the 'ephemeral key' parameter and MUST be present
      for all algorithm identifiers which use ephemeral keys.  When
      using static keys, the sender MUST either generate a new random
      value placed in either in the KDF parameters or the context
      structure.  For the KDF functions used, this means either in the
      'salt' parameter for HKDF (Table 12) 11) or in in the 'PartyU nonce'
      parameter for the context struture structure (Table 13) 12) MUST be present.
      (Both may be present if desired.)  The value in the parameter MUST
      be unique for the key pair being used.  It is acceptable to use a
      global counter which is incremented for every static-static
      operation and use the resulting value.  When using static keys,
      the static key needs to be identified to the recipient.  The
      static key can be identified either by providing the key ('static
      key') or by providing a key identifier for the static key ('static
      key id').  Both of these parameters are defined in Table 19 17

   o  Key derivation algorithm: The result of an ECDH key agreement
      process does not provide a uniformly random secret, as such it
      needs to be run through a KDF in order to produce a usable key.
      Processing the secret through a KDF also allows for the
      introduction of both context material, how the key is going to be
      used, and one time material in the even to of a static-static key
      agreement.

   o  Key Wrap algorithm: The key wrap algorithm can be 'none' if the
      result of the KDF is going to be used as the key directly.  This
      option, along with static-static, should be used if knowledge
      about the sender is desired.  If 'none' is used then the content
      layer encryption algorithm size is value fed to the context
      structure.  Support is also provided for any of the key wrap
      algorithms defined in section Section 12.2.1.  If one of these options is
      used, the input key size to the key wrap algorithm is the value
      fed into the context structure as the key size.

   The set of algorithms direct ECDH defined in this document are found
   in Table 18. 16.

   +-------------+------+-------+----------------+--------+------------+
   | name        | valu | KDF   | Ephemeral-     | Key    | descriptio |
   |             | e    |       | Static         | Wrap   | n          |
   +-------------+------+-------+----------------+--------+------------+
   | ECDH-ES +   | 50   | HKDF  | yes            | none   | ECDH ES w/ |
   | HKDF-256    |      | - SHA |                |        | HKDF -     |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | generate   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        | directly   |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-ES +   | 51   | HKDF  | yes            | none   | ECDH ES w/ |
   | HKDF-512    |      | - SHA |                |        | HKDF -     |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | generate   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        | directly   |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-SS +   | 52   | HKDF  | no             | none   | ECDH ES w/ |
   | HKDF-256    |      | - SHA |                |        | HKDF -     |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | generate   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        | directly   |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-SS +   | 53   | HKDF  | no             | none   | ECDH ES w/ |
   | HKDF-512    |      | - SHA |                |        | HKDF -     |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | generate   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        | directly   |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 54   | HKDF  | yes            | A128KW | ECDH ES w/ |
   | ES+A128KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 128 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 55   | HKDF  | yes            | A192KW | ECDH ES w/ |
   | ES+A192KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 192 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 56   | HKDF  | yes            | A256KW | ECDH ES w/ |
   | ES+A256KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 256 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 57   | HKDF  | no             | A128KW | ECDH SS w/ |
   | SS+A128KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 128 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 58   | HKDF  | no             | A192KW | ECDH SS w/ |
   | SS+A192KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 192 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 59   | HKDF  | no             | A256KW | ECDH SS w/ |
   | SS+A256KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 256 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   +-------------+------+-------+----------------+--------+------------+

                      Table 18: ECDH Algorithm Values

   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | name      | label | type     | algorithm | description            |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | ephemeral | -1    | COSE_Key | ECDH-ES   | Ephemeral Public key   |
   | key       |       |          |           | for the sender         |
   |           |       |          |           |                        |
   | static    | -2    | COSE_Key | ECDH-ES   | Static Public key for  |
   | key       |       |          |           | the sender             |
   |           |       |          |           |                        |
   | static    | -3    | bstr     | ECDH-SS   | Static Public key      |
   | key id    |       |          |           | identifier for the     |
   |           |       |          |           | sender                 |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+

                    Table 19: ECDH Algorithm Parameters

   This document defines these algorithms to be used with the curves
   P-256, P-384, P-521, X25519 and X448.  Implementations MUST verify
   that the key type and curve are correct, different curves are
   restricted to different key types.  Implementations MUST verify that
   the curve and algorithm are appropriate for the entities involved.

12.5.  Key Agreement with KDF

   Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK.  The
   CEK is then encrypted using a Key Wrapping algorithm and a key
   derived from the shared secret computed by the key agreement
   algorithm.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field is fed into the KDF context structure.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  The 'alg' parameter MUST be present in the layer.

   o  A parameter identifying the recipient's key SHOULD be present.  A
      parameter identifying the senders key SHOULD be present.

12.5.1.  ECDH

   These algorithms are defined in Table 18.

13.  Keys

   The COSE_Key object defines a way to hold a single key object, it is
   still required that the members of individual key types be defined.
   This section of the document is where we define an initial set of
   members for specific key types.

   For each of the key types, we define both public and private members.
   The public members are what is transmitted to others for their usage.
   We define private members mainly for the purpose of archival of keys
   by individuals.  However, there are some circumstances where private
   keys may be distributed by various entities in a protocol.  Examples
   include: Entities which have poor random number generation.
   Centralized key creation for multi-cast type operations.  Protocols
   where a shared secret is used as a bearer token for authorization
   purposes.

   Key types are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object.
   In this document we define four values for the member.

    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | name      | value and AES    | description
   |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+             | EC1      | 1       | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X Coordinate only                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       | EC2                | 2        | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X,Y Coordinate pair 192 bit |
   |             |      |       |                | RSA        | 3 key        | RSA Keys
   |             |      |       |                |        | Symmetric            | 4
   | Symmetric Keys ECDH-       | 56   | HKDF  | yes            | A256KW | ECDH ES w/ |
   | ES+A256KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and AES    |
   |             |      | Reserved       | 0                | This value is reserved        |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+

                         Table 20: Key Type Values

13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys

   Two different wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 256 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key structures are being defined for Elliptic Curve
   keys.  One version uses both an x        |
   |             |      |       |                |        |            |
   | ECDH-       | 57   | HKDF  | no             | A128KW | ECDH SS w/ |
   | SS+A128KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                |        | and a y coordinate, potentially
   with point compression.  This is the traditional EC point
   representation that is used in [RFC5480].  The other version uses
   only the x coordinate as the y coordinate is either to be recomputed
   or not needed for the key agreement operation.  An example of this is
   Curve25519 [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves].  [CREF12]

   +------------+----------+-------+-----------------------------------+ AES    |
   |             |      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             |      |       |                |        | w/ 128 bit |
   |             |      |       |                | name        | key type        | value
   | description             |
   +------------+----------+-------+-----------------------------------+      | P-256       | EC2                | 1        | NIST P-256 also known as            |
   | ECDH-       | 58   | HKDF  | no             | A192KW | ECDH SS w/ |
   | secp256r1 SS+A192KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   | P-384             | EC2      | 2 -256  | NIST P-384 also known as                |        | and AES    |
   |             | secp384r1      |       |                |        | Key wrap   |
   |             | P-521      | EC2       | 3                | NIST P-521 also known as        | w/ 192 bit |
   |             |      | secp521r1       |                |        | key        |
   |             |      | Curve25519       | EC1                | 1        | Curve 25519            |
   | ECDH-       | 59   | HKDF  | no             | A256KW | Curve448 ECDH SS w/ | EC1
   | 2 SS+A256KW   |      | - SHA |                |        | Concat KDF |
   |             |      | -256  |                | Curve 448        |
   +------------+----------+-------+-----------------------------------+

                            Table 21: EC Curves

13.1.1.  Single Coordinate Curves

   One class of Elliptic Curve mathematics allows for a point to be
   completely defined using the curve and the x coordinate of the point
   on the curve.  The two curves that are initially setup to use is
   point format are Curve 25519 and Curve 448 which are defined in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves].

   For EC keys with only the x coordinates, the 'kty' member is set to 1
   (EC1).  The key parameters defined in this section are summarized in
   Table 22.  The members that are defined for this key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      [CREF13] The curves defined in this document for this key type can
      be found in Table 21.  Other curves may be registered in the
      future and private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point.  The octet string
      represents a little-endian encoding of x.

   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'x' be present in the
   structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd' be
   present in the structure.  For private keys, it is RECOMMENDED that
   'x' also be present, but it can be recomputed from the required
   elements and omitting it saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+ AES    | name
   | key             | value      | type       | description                |        | Key wrap   | type
   |             |      |       |
   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+                | crv        | 1 w/ 256 bit |
   |             |      |       |                |        | key        |
   +-------------+------+-------+----------------+--------+------------+

                      Table 16: ECDH Algorithm Values

   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | name      | label | type     | algorithm | description            |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | ephemeral | -1    | int / COSE_Key | EC Curve identifier - Taken from ECDH-ES   | Ephemeral Public key   |
   | key       |       | tstr          | the COSE General Registry           | for the sender         |
   |           |       |          |           |                        | x
   | 1 static    | -2    | bstr COSE_Key | ECDH-ES   | Static Public key for  | X Coordinate
   | key       |       |          |           | the sender             |
   |           | d       | 1          | -4           |                        |
   | static    | -3    | bstr     | Private ECDH-SS   | Static Public key      |
   | key id    |       |          |           | identifier for the     |
   |           |
   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+       |          |           | sender                 |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+

                    Table 22: EC Key 17: ECDH Algorithm Parameters

13.1.2.  Double Coordinate Curves

   The traditional way of sending EC

   This document defines these algorithms to be used with the curves has been
   P-256, P-384, P-521.  Implementations MUST verify that the key type
   and curve are correct, different curves are restricted to send either both different
   key types.  Implementations MUST verify that the x curve and y coordinates, or algorithm
   are appropriate for the x coordinate entities involved.

12.5.  Key Agreement with KDF

   Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK.  The
   CEK is then encrypted using a Key Wrapping algorithm and a sign bit key
   derived from the shared secret computed by the key agreement
   algorithm.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the y
   coordinate. recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field is fed into the KDF context structure.

   o  The latter encoding has not been recommend in the IETF
   due plain text to potential IPR issues with Certicom.  However, for operations be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  The 'alg' parameter MUST be present in constrained environments, the ability to shrink a message by not
   sending layer.

   o  A parameter identifying the y coordinate is potentially useful.

   For EC keys with both coordinates, recipient's key SHOULD be present.  A
      parameter identifying the 'kty' member is set to 2
   (EC2).  The sender's key parameters defined in this section SHOULD be present.

12.5.1.  ECDH

   These algorithms are summarized defined in Table 23. 16.

13.  Keys

   The members that are defined for this COSE_Key object defines a way to hold a single key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of object, it is
   still required that the curve to members of individual key types be used with defined.
   This section of the key.
      The curves defined in this document is where we define an initial set of
   members for this specific key type can be found
      in Table 21.  Other curves may be registered in types.

   For each of the future key types, we define both public and private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point. members.
   The integer public members are what is
      converted transmitted to an octet string as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets
      MUST NOT be removed from the front of the octet string.  [CREF14]

   y  contains either the sign bit or the value of y coordinate others for their usage.
   We define private members mainly for the
      EC point.  For the value, the integer purpose of archival of keys
   by individuals.  However, there are some circumstances where private
   keys may be distributed by various entities in a protocol.  Examples
   include: Entities which have poor random number generation.
   Centralized key creation for multi-cast type operations.  Protocols
   where a shared secret is converted to an octet
      string used as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets MUST NOT be removed from a bearer token for authorization
   purposes.

   Key types are identified by the front 'kty' member of the octet string.  For the sign bit, COSE_Key object.
   In this document we define four values for the member.

    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | name      | value is
      true if the | description                                |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | EC2       | 2     | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X,Y Coordinate pair |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | Symmetric | 4     | Symmetric Keys                             |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | Reserved  | 0     | This value of is reserved                     |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+

                         Table 18: Key Type Values

13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys

   Two different key structures could be defined for Elliptic Curve
   keys.  One version uses both an x and a y coordinate, potentially
   with point compression.  This is positive.

   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED traditional EC point
   representation that 'crv', 'x' and 'y' be present in
   the structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd'
   be present used in [RFC5480].  The other version uses
   only the structure.  For private keys, it x coordinate as the y coordinate is RECOMMENDED
   that 'x' and 'y' also be present, but they can either to be recomputed from the
   required elements and omitting them saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   or not needed for the key agreement operation Currently no algorithms
   are defined using this key structure.

     +-------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+
     | name  | key type | value | type    | description                        |
     +-------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+
     | P-256 | type  |       |         |                                  |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | crv  | 2     | -1    | int /   | EC Curve identifier - Taken from |
   |      |       |       | tstr    | the COSE General Registry        |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | x    | 2     | -2 EC2      | bstr 1     | X Coordinate NIST P-256 also known as secp256r1 |
     |       |          |       |                                    |
     | P-384 | y EC2      | 2     | -3    | bstr /  | Y Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       | bool    |                                  |
   | NIST P-384 also known as secp384r1 |
     |       |          |       |                                    | d
     | 2 P-521 | -4 EC2      | bstr 3     | Private key NIST P-521 also known as secp521r1 |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
     +-------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+

                            Table 23: 19: EC Key Parameters

13.2.  RSA Keys

   This document defines Curves

13.1.1.  Double Coordinate Curves

   The traditional way of sending EC curves has been to send either both
   the x and y coordinates, or the x coordinate and a key structure sign bit for the y
   coordinate.  The latter encoding has not been recommended in the IETF
   due to potential IPR issues.  However, for operations in constrained
   environments, the ability to shrink a message by not sending the y
   coordinate is potentially useful.

   For EC keys with both coordinates, the public and private
   halves of RSA keys.  Together, an RSA public 'kty' member is set to 2
   (EC2).  The key and an RSA private parameters defined in this section are summarized in
   Table 20.  The members that are defined for this key form type are:

   crv  contains an RSA key pair.  [CREF15] identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      The curves defined in this document also provides support for the so-called "multi-prime"
   RSA where the modulus this key type can be found
      in Table 19.  Other curves may have more than two prime factors.  The
   benefit of multi-prime RSA is lower computational cost for be registered in the
   decryption future and signature primitives.  For a discussion on how multi-
   prime affects
      private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the security of RSA crypto-systems, x coordinate for the reader EC point.  The integer is
   referred
      converted to [MultiPrimeRSA].

   This document follows an octet string as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets
      MUST NOT be removed from the naming convention front of [RFC3447] for the
   naming of octet string.

   y  contains either the fields of an RSA public sign bit or private key.  The table
   Table 24 provides a summary of the label values and the types
   associated with each value of those labels.  The requirements for fields y coordinate for RSA keys are as follows:

   o the
      EC point.  For all keys, 'kty' the value, the integer is converted to an octet
      string as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets MUST NOT be present and MUST have a removed from
      the front of the octet string.  For the sign bit, the value is
      true if the value of 3.

   o y is positive.

   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, the fields 'n' it is REQUIRED that 'crv', 'x' and 'e' MUST 'y' be present.  All
      other fields defined present in Table 24 MUST be absent.

   o
   the structure.  For private keys with two primes, the fields 'other', 'r_i', 'd_i' keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 't_i' MUST be absent, all other fields MUST 'd'
   be present.

   o present in the structure.  For private keys with more than two primes, all fields MUST keys, it is RECOMMENDED
   that 'x' and 'y' also be present, but they can be
      present.  For the third to nth primes, each of the primes is
      represented as a map containing recomputed from the fields 'r_i', 'd_i'
   required elements and 't_i'.
      The field 'other' is an array of those maps.

   +-------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------------------+ omitting them saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | name | key type   | value | type    | description                      |
   +-------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------------------+
   | n     | 3        | -1    | bstr  | Modulus Parameter              |
   |      | type  |       |         |                                  |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | e crv  | 3 2     | -2 -1    | int /   | Exponent Parameter             |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | d     | 3        | -3    | bstr  | Private Exponent Parameter     |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | p     | 3        | -4    | bstr  | First Prime Factor             |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | q     | 3        | -5    | bstr  | Second Prime Factor            |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | dP    | 3        | -6    | bstr  | First Factor CRT Exponent      |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | dQ    | 3        | -7    | bstr  | Second Factor CRT Exponent     |
   |       |          |       |       |                                |
   | qInv  | 3        | -8    | bstr  | First CRT Coefficient          |
   |       |          |       |       | EC Curve identifier - Taken from |
   | other      | 3       | -9       | array tstr    | Other Primes Info the COSE General Registry        |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | r_i x    | 3 2     | -10 -2    | bstr    | i-th factor, Prime Factor X Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | d_i y    | 3 2     | -11 -3    | bstr /  | i-th factor, Factor CRT Y Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       | bool    | Exponent                                  |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | t_i d    | 3 2     | -12 -4    | bstr    | i-th factor, Factor CRT        |
   |       |          |       |       | Coefficient Private key                      |
   +-------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------------------+
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+

                        Table 24: RSA 20: EC Key Parameters

13.3.

13.2.  Symmetric Keys

   Occasionally it is required that a symmetric key be transported
   between entities.  This key structure allows for that to happen.

   For symmetric keys, the 'kty' member is set to 3 (Symmetric).  The
   member that is defined for this key type is:

   k  contains the value of the key.

   This key structure contains only private key information, care must
   be taken that it is never transmitted accidentally.  For public keys,
   there are no required fields.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that
   'k' be present in the structure.

             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | name | key type | value | type | description |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | k    | 4        | -1    | bstr | Key Value   |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+

                    Table 25: 21: Symmetric Key Parameters

14.  CBOR Encoder Restrictions

   There as has been an attempt to limit the number of places where the
   document needs to impose restrictions on how the CBOR Encoder needs
   to work.  We have managed to narrow it down to the following
   restrictions:

   o  The restriction applies to the encoding the Sig_structure, the
      Enc_structure, and the MAC_structure.

   o  The rules for Canonical CBOR (Section 3.9 of RFC 7049) MUST be
      used in these locations.  The main rule that needs to be enforced
      is that all lengths in these structures MUST be encoded such that
      they are encoded using definite lengths and the minimum length
      encoding is used.

   o  All parsers used SHOULD fail on both parsing and generation if the
      same label is used twice as a key for the same map.

15.  IANA Considerations

15.1.  CBOR Tag assignment

   It is requested that IANA assign a new tag the following tags from the "Concise
   Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags" registry.  It is requested
   that the tag tags be assigned in the 0 24 to 23 255 value range.

   The tags to be assigned are:

   +-----------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
   | Tag Value: Value | Data Item             | Semantics                     |
   +-----------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
   | TBD1      | COSE_Sign             | COSE Signed Data Object       |
   |           |                       |                               |
   | TBD2      | COSE_enveloped        | COSE Enveloped Data Object    |
   |           |                       |                               |
   | TBD3      | COSE_encryptData      | COSE Encrypted Data Item: COSE_Msg

   Semantics: Object    |
   |           |                       |                               |
   | TBD4      | COSE_Mac              | COSE security message. Mac-ed Data Object       |
   |           |                       |                               |
   | TBD5      | COSE_Key, COSE_KeySet | COSE Key or COSE Key Set      |
   |           |                       | Object                        |
   +-----------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+

15.2.  COSE Header Parameter Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Parameters".

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.
      Names are to be unique in the table.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label can be either
      an integer or a string.  Registration in the table is based on the
      value of the label requested.  Integer values between 1 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are delegated to the "COSE Header Algorithm
      Label" registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as
      private use.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   value registry  This contains a pointer to the registry used to
      contain values where the set is limited.

   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 1.  The
   specification column for all rows in that table should be this
   document.

   Additionally, the label of 0 is to be marked as 'Reserved'.

15.3.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Algorithm Labels".

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.

   algorithm  The algorithm(s) that this registry entry is used for.
      This value is taken from the "COSE Algorithm Value" registry.
      Multiple algorithms can be specified in this entry.  For the
      table, the algorithm, label pair MUST be unique.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label is an integer
      in the range of -1 to -65536.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   value registry  This contains a pointer to the registry used to
      contain values where the set is limited.

   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in: Table 12, 11,
   Table 13, 12, Table 19. 17.  The specification column for all rows in that
   table should be this document.

15.4.  COSE Algorithm Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE
   Algorithm Registry".

   The columns of the registry are:

   value  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Algorithm
      values MUST be unique.  The value can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between 0 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are delegated to the "COSE Header Algorithm
      Label" registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as
      private use.

   description  A short description of the algorithm.

   specification  A document where the algorithm is defined (if publicly
      available).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in the following:
   Table 9, Table 8, Table 10, 7, Table 9, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, 13,
   Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18. 16.  The specification column for all rows
   in that table should be this document.

15.5.  COSE Key Common Parameter Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Key
   Common Parameter" Registry.

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   label  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Key map
      labels MUST be unique.  The label can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between 0 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are used for key parameters specific to a
      single algorithm delegated to the "COSE Key Parameter Label"
      registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as private use.

   CBOR Type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field

   registry  This field denotes the registry that values come from, if
      one exists.

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field
   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in
   Section 7.1.  The specification column for all of these entries will
   be this document.

15.6.  COSE Key Type Parameter Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Key Type
   Parameters".

   The columns of the table are:

   key type  This field contains a descriptive string of a key type.
      This should be a value that is in the COSE General Values table
      and is placed in the 'kty' field of a COSE Key structure.

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   label  The label is to be unique for every value of key type.  The
      range of values is from -256 to -1.  Labels are expected to be
      reused for different keys.

   CBOR type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 22,
   Table 23, Table 24, 20,
   and Table 25. 21.  The specification column for all of these entries will
   be this document.

15.7.  COSE Elliptic Curve Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Elliptic Curve
   Parameters".

   The columns of the table are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   value  This is the value used to identify the curve.  These values
      MUST be unique.  The integer values from -256 to 255 are
      designated as Standards Track Document Required.  The the integer
      values from 256 to 65535 and -65536 to -257 are designated as
      Specification Required.  Integer values over 65535 are designated
      as first come first serve.  Integer values less than -65536 are
      marked as private use.

   key type  This designates the key type(s) that can be used with this
      curve.

   description  This field contains a brief description of the curve.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the curve if one exists.

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 20. 18.
   The specification column for all of these entries will be this
   document.

15.8.  Media Type Registration Registrations

15.8.1.  COSE Security Message

   This section registers the "application/cose" and "application/
   cose+cbor" media types in the "Media Types" registry.  [CREF16]  [CREF8] These
   media types are used to indicate that the content is a COSE_MSG.
   [CREF9]

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor
      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

15.8.2.  COSE Key media type

   This section registers the "application/cose+json" and "application/
   cose-set+json" media types in the "Media Types" registry.  These
   media types are used to indicate, respectively, that content is a
   COSE_Key or COSE_KeySet object.

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor
      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key-set+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON
      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

15.9.  CoAP Content Format Registrations

   This section registers a set of content formats for CoAP.  ID
   assignment in the 24-255 range requested.

     +--------------------------+----------+-------+-----------------+
     | Media Type               | Encoding | ID    | Reference       |
     +--------------------------+----------+-------+-----------------+
     | application/cose         |          | TBD10 | [This Document] |
     |                          |          |       |                 |
     | application/cose-key     |          | TBD11 | [This Document] |
     |                          |          |       |                 |
     | application/cose-key-set |          | TBD12 | [This Document  |
     +--------------------------+----------+-------+-----------------+

16.  Security Considerations

   There are security considerations:

   1.  Protect private keys

   2.  MAC messages with more than one recipient means one cannot figure
       out who sent the message

   3.  Use of direct key with other recipient structures hands the key
       to other recipients.

   4.  Use of direct ECDH direct encryption is easy for people to leak
       information on if there are other recipients in the message.

   5.  Considerations about protected vs unprotected header fields.

   6.  Need to verify that: 1) the kty field of the key matches the key
       and algorithm being used.  2) that the kty field needs to be included
       in the trust decision as well as the other key fields.  3) that the
       algorithm be included in the trust decision.

17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.

17.2.  Informative References

   [AES-GCM]  Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", Nov 2007.

   [DSS]      U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", July 2013.

   [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]
              Vigano, C., Birkholz, H., and R. Sun, "CBOR data
              definition language: a notational convention to express
              CBOR data structures.", draft-greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-
              cddl-05 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves]
              Langley, A. and R. Salz, "Elliptic Curves for Security",
              draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [MAC]      NiST, N., "FIPS PUB 113: Computer Data Authentication",
              May 1985.

   [MultiPrimeRSA]
              Hinek, M. and D. Cheriton, "On the Security of Multi-prime
              RSA", June 2006.

   [PVSig]    Brown, D. and D. Johnson, "Formal Security Proofs for a
              Signature Scheme with Partial Message Recover", February
              2000.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC2633]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
              RFC 2633, June 1999.

   [RFC2898]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
              Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2898, September 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>.

   [RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC3610]  Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
              CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512", RFC
              4231, December 2005.

   [RFC4262]  Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
              Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

   [RFC5752]  Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752, January
              2010.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010.

   [RFC5990]  Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner,
              "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990, September
              2010.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, March 2011.

   [RFC6979]  Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
              Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
              2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC7252, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, May 2015.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, May
              2015.

   [RFC7539]  Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
              Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>.

   [SEC1]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
              Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009.

   [SP800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., and M. Smid, "NIST
              Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise
              Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
              Cryptography", May 2013.

Appendix A.  CDDL Grammar

   For people who prefer using a formal language to describe the syntax
   of the CBOR, in this section a CDDL grammar is given that corresponds
   to [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].  This grammar is
   informational, in the event of differences between this grammar and
   the prose, the prose is considered to be authorative. authoritative.

   The collected CDDL can be extracted from the XML version of this
   document via the following XPath expression below.  (Depending on the
   XPath evaluator one is using, it may be necessary to deal with &gt;
   as an entity.)

   //artwork[@type='CDDL']/text()

Appendix B.  Three Levels of Recipient Information

   All of the currently defined recipient algorithms classes only use
   two levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.  The first level is the
   message content and the second level is the content key encryption.
   However, if one uses a recipient algorithm such as RSA-KEM (see
   Appendix A of RSA-KEM [RFC5990], then it make sense to have three
   levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.

   These levels would be:

   o  Level 0: The content encryption level.  This level contains the
      payload of the message.

   o  Level 1: The encryption of the CEK by a KEK.

   o  Level 2: The encryption of a long random secret using an RSA key
      and a key derivation function to convert that secret into the KEK.

   This is an example of what a triple layer message would look like.
   The message has the following layers:

   o  Level 0: Has a content encrypted with AES-GCM using a 128-bit key.

   o  Level 1: Uses the AES Key wrap algorithm with a 128-bit key.

   o  Level 2: Uses ECDH Ephemeral-Static direct to generate the level 1
      key.

   In effect this example is a decomposed version of using the ECDH-
   ES+A128KW algorithm.

   Size of binary file is 214 216 bytes
   998( [
     2,
     h'a10101',
     {
       5: h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ce'
     },
     h'64f84d913ba60a76070a9a48f26e97e863e285295a44320878caceb0763a3
   34806857c67',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -3
         },
         h'5a15dbf5b282ecb31a6074ee3815c252405dd7583e078188',
         [
           [
             h'',
             {
               1: 50,
               4: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b
   6c616e642e6578616d706c65',
               -1: {
                 1: 2,
                 -1: 1,
                 -2: h'b2add44368ea6d641f9ca9af308b4079aeb519f11e9b8
   a55a600b21233e86e68',
                 -3: h'1a2cf118b9ee6895c8f415b686d4ca1cef362d4a7630a
   31ef6019c0c56d33de0'
               }
             },
             h''
           ]
         ]
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

Appendix C.  Examples

   The examples can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples.
   The file names in each section correspond the the same file names in the
   repository.  I am currently still in the process of getting the
   examples up there along with some control information for people to
   be able to check and reproduce the examples.

   Examples may have some features that are in questions but not yet
   incorporated in the document.

   To make it easier to read, the examples are presented using the
   CBOR's diagnostic notation rather than a binary dump.  A ruby based
   tool exists to convert between a number of formats.  This tool can be
   installed with the command line:

           gem install cbor-diag

   The diagnostic notation can be converted into binary files using the
   following command line:

            diag2cbor < inputfile > outputfile

   The examples can be extracted from the XML version of this docuent document
   via an XPath expression as all of the artwork is tagged with the
   attribute type='CBORdiag'.

C.1.  Examples of MAC messages

C.1.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC

   This example users the following:

   o  MAC: AES-CMAC, 256-bit key, trucated truncated to 64 bits

   o  Recipient class: direct shared secret

   o  File name: Mac-04

   Size of binary file is 71 73 bytes
   996( [
     3,
     h'a1016f4145532d434d41432d3235362f3634',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     h'd9afa663dd740848',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -6,
           4: h'6f75722d736563726574'
         },
         h''
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.1.2.  ECDH Direct MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/SHA-256, 256-bit key

   o  Recipient class: ECDH key agreement, two static keys, HKDF w/
      context structure

   Size of binary file is 215 217 bytes
   996( [
     3,
     h'a10104',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     h'2ba937ca03d76c3dbad30cfcbaeef586f9c0f9ba616ad67e9205d38576ad9
   930',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: 52,
           4: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
   6e642e6578616d706c65',
           -3: h'706572656772696e2e746f6f6b407475636b626f726f7567682
   e6578616d706c65',
           "apu": h'4d8553e7e74f3c6a3a9dd3ef286a8195cbf8a23d19558ccf
   ec7d34b824f42d92bd06bd2c7f0271f0214e141fb779ae2856abf585a58368b01
   7e7f2a9e5ce4db5'
         },
         h''
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.1.3.  Wrapped MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: AES-MAC, 128-bit key, truncated to 64 bits

   o  Recipient class: AES keywrap w/ a pre-shared 256-bit key

   Size of binary file is 122 124 bytes
   996( [
     3,
     h'a1016e4145532d3132382d4d41432d3634',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     h'6d1fa77b2dd9146a',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -5,
           4: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
   66333134626337303337'
         },
         h'711ab0dc2fc4585dce27effa6781c8093eba906f227b6eb0'
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.1.4.  Multi-recipient MAC message

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/ SHA-256, 128-bit key

   o  Recipient class: Uses three different methods

      1.  ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-521, AES-Key Wrap w/ 128-bit
          key

      2.  RSA-OAEP w/ SHA-256

      3.  AES-Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key

   Size of binary file is 670 374 bytes
   996( [
     3,
     h'a10104',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     h'7aaa6e74546873061f0a7de21ff0c0658d401a68da738dd893748651983ce
   1d0',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: 55,
           4: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65',
           -1: {
             1: 2,
             -1: 3,
             -2: h'43b12669acac3fd27898ffba0bcd2e6c366d53bc4db71f909
   a759304acfb5e18cdc7ba0b13ff8c7636271a6924b1ac63c02688075b55ef2d61
   3574e7dc242f79c3',
             -3: h'812dd694f4ef32b11014d74010a954689c6b6e8785b333d1a
   b44f22b9d1091ae8fc8ae40b687e5cfbe7ee6f8b47918a07bb04e9f5b1a51a334
   a16bc09777434113'
           }
         },
         h'f20ad9c96134f3c6be4f75e7101c0ecc5efa071ff20a87fd1ac285109
   41ee0376573e2b384b56b99'
       ],
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -26,
           4: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65'
         },
         h'46c4f88069b650909a891e84013614cd58a3668f88fa18f3852940a20
   b35098591d3aacf91c125a2595cda7bee75a490579f0e2f20fd6bc956623bfde3
   029c318f82c426dac3463b261c981ab18b72fe9409412e5c7f2d8f2b5abaf780d
   f6a282db033b3a863fa957408b81741878f466dcc437006ca21407181a016ca60
   8ca8208bd3c5a1ddc828531e30b89a67ec6bb97b0c3c3c92036c0cb84aa0f0ce8
   c3e4a215d173bfa668f116ca9f1177505afb7629a9b0b5e096e81d37900e06f56
   1a32b6bc993fc6d0cb5d4bb81b74e6ffb0958dac7227c2eb8856303d989f93b4a
   051830706a4c44e8314ec846022eab727e16ada628f12ee7978855550249ccb58
   '
       ],
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -5,
           4: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
   66333134626337303337'
         },
         h'0b2c7cfce04e98276342d6476a7723c090dfdd15f9a518e7736549e99
   8370695e6d6a83b4ae507bb'
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.2.  Examples of Encrypted Messages

C.2.1.  Direct ECDH

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-GCM w/ 128-bit key
   o  Recipient class: ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-256

   Size of binary file is 182 184 bytes

   998( [
     2,
     h'a10101',
     {
       5: h'c9cf4df2fe6c632bf7886413'
     },
     h'45fce2814311024d3a479e7d3eed063850f3f0b9f3f948677e3ae9869bcf9
   ff4e1763812',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: 50,
           4: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
   6e642e6578616d706c65',
           -1: {
             1: 2,
             -1: 1,
             -2: h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf05
   4e1c7b4d91d6280',
             -3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d
   924b7e03bf822bb'
           }
         },
         h''
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.2.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-CCM w/128-bit key, trucate truncate the tag to 64-bits

   o  Recipient class: Use HKDF on a shared secret with the following
      implicit fields as part of the context.

      *  APU identity: "lighting-client"

      *  APV identity: "lighting-server"

      *  Supplimentary  Supplementary Public Other: "Encryption Example 02"

   Size of binary file is 95 97 bytes
   998( [
     2,
     h'a1010a',
     {
       5: h'89f52f65a1c580933b5261a7'
     },
     h'7b9dcfa42c4e1d3182c402dc18ef8b5637de4fb62cf1dd156ea6e6e0',
     [
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: "dir+kdf",
           4: h'6f75722d736563726574',
           -20: h'61616262636364646565666667676868'
         },
         h''
       ]
     ]
   ]
   ])

C.3.  Examples of Signed Message

C.3.1.  Single Signature

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: RSA-PSS ECDSA w/ SHA-384, MGF-1 SHA-256, Curve P-256-1

   Size of binary file is 330 105 bytes

   999( [
     1,
     h'',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     [
       [
         h'a20165505333383404581e62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626
   269746f6e2e6578616d706c65',
         h'a10126',
         {
           4: h'3131'
         },
         h'6d9d88a90ef4d6d7c0079fb11a33c855e2274c773f358df43b68f7873
   eeda210692a61d70cd6a24ba0e3d82e359384be09faafea496bb0ed16f02091c4
   8c02f33574edab5b3e334bae68d19580021327cc131fbee38eb0b28289dbce118
   3f9067891b17fe752674b80437da02e9928ab7a155fef707b11d2bd38a71f224f
   53170480116d96cc3f7266487b268679a13cdedffa93252a550371acc19971369
   b58039056b308cc4e158bebe7c55db7874442d4321fd27f17dbb820ef19f43dcc
   16cd50ccdd1b7dfd7cdde239a9245af41d949cdbbf1337ca254af20eeb167a62d
   a5a51c83899c6f6e7c7e01dc3db21a250092a69fc635b74a2e54f5c98cb955d83
   '
       ]
         h'4358e9e92b46d45134548b6e3b4eae3d2f801bce85236c7aab42968ad
   8e3e92400873ed761735222a6d1f442c4bb3a3151946b16900048572455e65451
   d89aaba7'
       ]
     ]
   ])

C.3.2.  Multiple Signers

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: RSA-PSS ECDSA w/ SHA-256, MGF-1 Curve P-256-1

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-512, Curve P-521

   Size of binary file is 496 277 bytes

   999( [
     1,
     h'',
     {
     },
     h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     [
       [
         h'a1013819',
         h'a10126',
         {
           4: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65' h'3131'
         },
         h'0ee972d931c7ab906e4bb71b80da0cc99c104fa53ebbf1f2cf7b668b9
   3d766d3d2da28299f074675bb0db3cd0792ba83050c23c96795d58f9c7d68f66a
   bbb8f35af8a0b5df369517b6db85e2cb62d852b666bc135c9022e46b538f78c26
   adc2668963e74a019de718254385bb9cb137926ad6a88d1ff70043f85e555fb57
   84107ce6e9de7c89c4fbadf8eca363a35f415f7a23523a8331b1aa2dfbac59a06
   3e4357bde8e53fe34195d59bcda37d2c604804fffe60362e81476436aaa677129
   f34b26639fc41b8e758e5edf273079c61b30130f0f83c57aa6856347e2556f718
   eaf79a1fee1397a4f0b16b1b34db946eaaff10c793e5d1e681cb21c4fd20c5fdf
   '
         h'0dc1c5e62719d8f3cce1468b7c881eee6a8088b46bf836ae956dd38fe
   931991900823ea760648f2425b96c39e23ddc4b7faed56d4a9bd0f3752cfdc628
   254ed0f2'
       ],
       [
         h'',
         {
           1: -9,
           4: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65'
         },
         h'0118eaa7d62778b5a9525a583f06b115d80cd246bc930f0c2850588ee
   c85186b427026e096a076bfab738215f354be59f57643a7f6b2c92535cf3c37ee
   2746a908ab1dcc673a63f327d9eff852b874f7a98b6638c7054fdeeaa3dce6542
   4a21bd5dc728acedda7fcae6df6fc3298ff51ac911603a0f26d066935dccb85ea
   eb0ae6d0e6'
       ]
         h'012ce5b1dfe8b5aa6eaa09a54c58a84ad0900e4fdf2759ec22d1c861c
   ccd75c7e1c4025a2da35e512fc2874d6ac8fd862d09ad07ed2deac297b897561e
   04a8d42476011eb209c016416b4247b4d1475c398d35c4ac24d1c9fadda7eefe2
   857e25a500d29aea539e58e8ca7737fe450d4e87ed3f78e637c12bbd213e78ba8
   3a55f7e89934'
       ]
     ]
   ])

C.4.  COSE Keys

C.4.1.  Public Keys

   This is an example of a COSE Key set.  This example includes the
   public keys for all of the previous examples.

   In order the keys are:

   o  An EC key with a kid of "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"

   o  An RSA EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" "11"

   Size of binary file is 703 481 bytes

   [
     {
       -1: 1,
       -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de4
   39c08551d',
       -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eec
   d0084d19c',
       1: 2,
       2: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c616e64
   2e6578616d706c65'
     },
     {
       -1: 1,
       -2: h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b
   4d91d6280',
       -3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d924b7e
   03bf822bb',
       1: 2,
       2: h'706572656772696e2e746f6f6b407475636b626f726f7567682e6578
   616d706c65'
     },
     {
       -1: 3,
       -2: h'0072992cb3ac08ecf3e5c63dedec0d51a8c1f79ef2f82f94f3c737b
   f5de7986671eac625fe8257bbd0394644caaa3aaf8f27a4585fbbcad0f2457620
   085e5c8f42ad',
       -3: h'01dca6947bce88bc5790485ac97427342bc35f887d86d65a089377e
   247e60baa55e4e8501e2ada5724ac51d6909008033ebc10ac999b9d7f5cc2519f
   3fe1ea1d9475',
       1: 2,
       2: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e6578616d70
   6c65'
     },
     {
       -1: 1,
       -2: h'9f810fb4038273d02591e4073f31d2b6001b82cedb4d92f050165d4
   7cfcab8a3c41cb778ac7553793f8ef975768d1a2374d8712564c3bcd77b9ea434
   544899407cff0099920a931a24c4414852ab29bdb0a95c0653f36c60e60bf90b6
   258dda56f37047ba5c2d1d029af9c9d40bac7aa41c78a0dd1068add699e808fea
   011ea1441d8a4f7bb4e97be39f55f1ddd44e9c4ba335159703d4d34b603e65147
   a4f23d6d3c0996c75edee846a82d190ae10783c961cf0387aed2106d2d0555b6f
   d937fad5535387e0ff72ffbe78941402b0b822ea2a74b6058c1dabf9b34a76cb6
   3b87faa2c6847b8e2837fff91186e6b1c14911cf989a89092a81ce601ddacd3f9
   cf', h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b
   4d91d6280',
       -3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d924b7e
   03bf822bb',
       1: 2,
       2: h'706572656772696e2e746f6f6b407475636b626f726f7567682e6578
   616d706c65'
     },
     {
       -1: h'010001', 1,
       -2: h'bac5b11cad8f99f9c72b05cf4b9e26d244dc189f745228255a219a8
   6d6a09eff',
       -3: h'20138bf82dc1b6d562be0fa54ab7804a3a64b6d72ccfed6b6fb6ed2
   8bbfc117e',
       1: 3, 2,
       2: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e6578616d70
   6c65' h'3131'
     }
   ]

C.4.2.  Private Keys

   This is an example of a COSE Key set.  This example includes the
   private keys for all of the previous examples.

   In order the keys are:

   o  An EC key with a kid of "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example"

   o  A shared-secret key with a kid of "our-secret"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"

   o  A shared-secret key with a kid of "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-
      bfd6-eef314bc7037"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"

   o  An RSA EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" "11"

   Size of binary file is 1884 782 bytes

   [
     {
       1: 2,
       2: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c616e64
   2e6578616d706c65',
       -1: 1,
       -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de4
   39c08551d',
       -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eec
   d0084d19c',
       -4: h'aff907c99f9ad3aae6c4cdf21122bce2bd68b5283e6907154ad9118
   40fa208cf'
     },
     {
       1: 4,
       2: h'6f75722d736563726574',
       -1: h'849b57219dae48de646d07dbb533566e976686457c1491be3a76dce
   a6c427188'
     },
     {
       1: 2,
       2: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e6578616d70
   6c65',
       -1: 3,
       -2: h'0072992cb3ac08ecf3e5c63dedec0d51a8c1f79ef2f82f94f3c737b
   f5de7986671eac625fe8257bbd0394644caaa3aaf8f27a4585fbbcad0f2457620
   085e5c8f42ad',
       -3: h'01dca6947bce88bc5790485ac97427342bc35f887d86d65a089377e
   247e60baa55e4e8501e2ada5724ac51d6909008033ebc10ac999b9d7f5cc2519f
   3fe1ea1d9475',
       -4: h'00085138ddabf5ca975f5860f91a08e91d6d5f9a76ad4018766a476
   680b55cd339e8ab6c72b5facdb2a2a50ac25bd086647dd3e2e6e99e84ca2c3609
   fdf177feb26d'
     },
     {
       1: 2,
       -1: 1,
       2: h'706572656772696e2e746f6f6b407475636b626f726f7567682e6578
   616d706c65',
       -2: h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b
   4d91d6280',
       -3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d924b7e
   03bf822bb',
       -4: h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ceb2353161740aacf1f7163647984b522
   a848df1c3'
     },
     {
       1: 4,
       2: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d65656633
   3134626337303337',
       -1: h'849b57219dae48de646d07dbb533566e976686457c1491be3a76dce
   a6c427188'
     },
     {
       1: 2,
       2: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e6578616d70
   6c65',
       -1: 3,
       -2: h'0072992cb3ac08ecf3e5c63dedec0d51a8c1f79ef2f82f94f3c737b
   f5de7986671eac625fe8257bbd0394644caaa3aaf8f27a4585fbbcad0f2457620
   085e5c8f42ad',
       -3: h'01dca6947bce88bc5790485ac97427342bc35f887d86d65a089377e
   247e60baa55e4e8501e2ada5724ac51d6909008033ebc10ac999b9d7f5cc2519f
   3fe1ea1d9475',
       -4: h'00085138ddabf5ca975f5860f91a08e91d6d5f9a76ad4018766a476
   680b55cd339e8ab6c72b5facdb2a2a50ac25bd086647dd3e2e6e99e84ca2c3609
   fdf177feb26d'
   a6c427188'
     },
     {
       1: 3, 2,
       2: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e6578616d70
   6c65',
       -2: h'9f810fb4038273d02591e4073f31d2b6001b82cedb4d92f050165d4
   7cfcab8a3c41cb778ac7553793f8ef975768d1a2374d8712564c3bcd77b9ea434
   544899407cff0099920a931a24c4414852ab29bdb0a95c0653f36c60e60bf90b6
   258dda56f37047ba5c2d1d029af9c9d40bac7aa41c78a0dd1068add699e808fea
   011ea1441d8a4f7bb4e97be39f55f1ddd44e9c4ba335159703d4d34b603e65147
   a4f23d6d3c0996c75edee846a82d190ae10783c961cf0387aed2106d2d0555b6f
   d937fad5535387e0ff72ffbe78941402b0b822ea2a74b6058c1dabf9b34a76cb6
   3b87faa2c6847b8e2837fff91186e6b1c14911cf989a89092a81ce601ddacd3f9
   cf', h'3131',
       -1: h'010001', 1,
       -2: h'bac5b11cad8f99f9c72b05cf4b9e26d244dc189f745228255a219a8
   6d6a09eff',
       -3: h'6d6502f41f84151228f24a467e1d19bb218fbcc34abd858db41fe29
   221fd936d1e4fe3b5abf23bf1e8999295f15d0d144c4b362ec3514bef2e25bbd0
   f80d62ae4c0c48c90ad49dd74c681dae10a4bbd81195d63bb0d03f00a64687e43
   aeb5ff8dab20d2d109ef16fa7677e2e8bfa8e7e42e72bd4160c3aa9688b00f9b3
   3059648316ed8c5016309074cc1332d81aa39ed389e8a9eab5844c414c704e05d
   90c5e2b85854ab5054ea5f83a84896c6a83cdac5edda1f8b3274f7d38e8039826
   8462a33ef9b525107c60ac8564c19cfe6e0e3775f242a1cafd3b9617d225dacf7
   4ce4f972976d61b057f82ff9870aea056aeee076c3df1cfc718d539c3a906b433
   c1', h'20138bf82dc1b6d562be0fa54ab7804a3a64b6d72ccfed6b6fb6ed2
   8bbfc117e',
       -4: h'dd297183f0f04d725c6fad3de51a17ca0402019e519c0bd9967a35c
   a11ed9d47b1fdfa7b019ffd9d168eec75fff9215f1907aeb5aa364c38c3016538
   56ea64f2bc3d251d00cd9d0dd9fbee2009abfd60ac986a5e36a4277afd53ec8c8
   4b2787c50cb7e9f909a7e1922933844b2b9a7747e8bc4eaef44996c3e9e99bfc6
   d4ab49',
       -5: h'b8a136761f9c4dfe84445e24e1efe3cbbf067cf61421a532a12489b
   81ce9dc2b9b937382aacea0ad3f1b47f72ed039b5319c169ad76a0f223de47ad4
   7aadcc3f5e6f30c38df251d3799bb69662afc2a5bb6a757953384cd6267bcf8c8
   c92e530156a01bf263cf7c117bd10fe85da91c47952a80675f76cc1de9545274b
   3ba457',
       -6: h'07c3d5bd792f26b8f62fe19843bbf7cbdafa2b0e60f526a15c1c2c5
   94ce9d7d4d596023e615f39ab53486f5af142d0fe22c5d7477f936a77afb913d1
   b7938139d88c190a7ca5bb76ea096361f294fc4f719fe4542c7cf4f9e77d13d81
   72ca0f85469e0a73f8f7d0feadbda64e71587a09a74d3d41fd47bc2862c515f9f
   5e8629',
       -7: h'08b0e60c676e87295cf68eebf38ac45159fba7343a3c5f3763e8816
   71e4d4fe4e99ce64a175a44ac031578acc5125e350e51c7aaa04b48cd16d6c385
   6f04f16166439bab08ea88398936f0406202de09c929b8bfee4fef260187c07c6
   03da5f63e7bcffb3c84903111b9ffabcb873f675d42abd02a0b6c9e2fa91d293d
   5c605f',
       -8: h'dcf8aabd740dd33c0c784fac06f6608b6f3d5cff57090177556a8fc
   cc2a7220429eff4ee828ebe35904a090b0c7f71da1060634d526cfe370af3e4d1
   5ef68a7beed931a423f157c175892cb1bbb434a0c386327e1ad8ac79a0d55aded
   d707d1c7f0c601541e9421ec5a02ae3149ea1e99129305eb19ae8ece2a3293f3f
   1a688e' h'57c92077664146e876760c9520d054aa93c3afb04e306705db60903
   08507b4d3'
     }
   ]

Appendix D.  Document Updates

D.1.  Version -05 to -06

   o  Remove new CFRG Elliptical Curve key agreement algorithms.

   o  Remove RSA algorithms
   o  Define a creation time and sequence number for discussions.

   o  Remove message type field from all structures.

   o  Define CBOR tagging for all structures with IANA registrations.

D.2.  Version -04 to -05

   o  Removed the jku, x5c, x5t, x5t#S256, x5u, and jwk headers.

   o  Add enveloped data vs encrypted data structures.

   o  Add counter signature parameter.

D.2.

D.3.  Version -03 to -04

   o  Change top level from map to array.

   o  Eliminate the term "key managment" management" from the document.

   o  Point to content registries for the 'content type' attribute

   o  Push protected field into the KDF functions for recipients.

   o  Remove password based recipient information.

   o  Create EC Curve Registry.

D.3.

D.4.  Version -02 to -03

   o  Make a pass over all of the algorithm text.

   o  Alter the CDDL so that Keys and KeySets are top level items and
      the key examples validate.

   o  Add sample key structures.

   o  Expand text on dealing with Externally Supplied Data.

   o  Update the examples to match some of the renumbering of fields.

D.4.

D.5.  Version -02 to -03

   o  Add a set of straw man proposals for algorithms.  It is possible/
      expected that this text will be moved to a new document.

   o  Add a set of straw man proposals for key structures.  It is
      possible/expected that this text will be moved to a new document.

   o  Provide guidance on use of externally supplied authenticated data.

   o  Add external authenticated data to signing structure.

D.5.

D.6.  Version -01 to -2

   o  Add first pass of algorithm information

   o  Add direct key derivation example.

D.6.

D.7.  Version -00 to -01

   o  Add note on where the document is being maintained and
      contributing notes.

   o  Put in proposal on MTI algorithms.

   o  Changed to use labels rather than keys when talking about what
      indexes a map.

   o  Moved nonce/IV to be a common header item.

   o  Expand section to discuss the common set of labels used in
      COSE_Key maps.

   o  Start marking element 0 in registries as reserved.

   o  Update examples.

Editorial Comments

[CREF1] JLS: Need to check this list for correctness before publishing.

[CREF2] JLS: I have not gone through the document to determine what
        needs to be here yet.  We mostly want to grab terms which are
        used in unusual ways or are not generally understood.

[CREF3] JLS: It would be possible to extend this section to talk about
        those decisions which an application needs to think about rather
        than just talking about MTI algoithms.

[CREF4] Hannes: I would remove references to CMS and S/MIME since they
        are most likely only helpful to a very small audience.

[CREF5] JLS: I have moved msg_type into the individual structures.
        However, they would not be necessary in the cases where a) the
        security service is known and b) security libraries can setup to
        take individual structures.  Should they be moved back to just
        appearing if used in a COSE_MSG rather than on the individual
        structure?  This would make things shorter if one was using just
        a signed message because the msg_type field can be omitted as
        well as the COSE_Tagged_MSG tag field.  One the other hand, it
        will complicated the code if one is doing general purpose
        library type things.

[CREF6] JLS: Should we create an IANA
      COSE_Key maps.

   o  Start marking element 0 in registries as reserved.

   o  Update examples.

Editorial Comments

[CREF1] JLS: Need to check this list for the values of
        msg_type?

[CREF7] CB: correctness before publishing.

[CREF2] JLS: I have not gone through the document to determine what
        needs to be here yet.  We mostly want to grab terms which are
        used in unusual ways or are not generally understood.

[CREF3] JLS: It would like be possible to make msg_type go away

[CREF8] extend this section to talk about
        those decisions which an application needs to think about rather
        than just talking about MTI algorithms.

[CREF4] JLS: A completest version of this grammar would list the options
        available in the protected and unprotected headers.  Do we want
        to head that direction?

[CREF9] JLS: Is there a reason to assign a CBOR tag to identify keys
        and/or key sets?

[CREF10]

[CREF5] Hannes: Ensure that the list of examples only includes items
        which are implemented in this specification.  Check the other
        places where such lists occur and ensure that they also follow
        this rule.

[CREF6] JLS: We can really simplify the grammar for COSE_Key to be just
        the kty (the one required field) and the generic item.  The
        reason to do this is that it makes things simpler.  The reason
        not to do this says that we really need to add a lot more items
        so that a grammar check can be done that is more tightly
        enforced.

[CREF11]

[CREF7] Ilari: Look to see if we need to be clearer about how the fields
        defined in the table are transported and thus why they have
        labels.

[CREF12] Ilari: Check to see what the curves are renamed to during final
         publishing.  It appears to be X25519 now.

[CREF13] JLS: Do we create a registry for curves?  Is is the same
         registry for both EC1 and EC2?

[CREF14] JLS: Should we use the bignum encoding for x, y and d instead
         of bstr?

[CREF15] JLS: Looking at the CBOR specification, the bstr that we are
         looking in our table below should most likely be specified as
         big numbers rather than as binary strings.  This means that we
         would use the tag 6.2 instead.  From my reading of the
         specification, there is no difference in the encoded size of
         the resulting output.  The specification of bignum does
         explicitly allow for integers encoded with leading zeros.

[CREF16]

[CREF8] JLS: Should we register both or just the cose+cbor one?
Authors' Addresses

[CREF9] JLS: Should we create the equivalent of the smime-type parameter
        to identify the inner content type?

Author's Address

   Jim Schaad
   August Cellars

   Email: ietf@augustcellars.com

   Brian Campbell
   Ping Identity

   Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com