draft-ietf-dane-srv-03.txt   draft-ietf-dane-srv-04.txt 
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) T. Finch DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) T. Finch
Internet-Draft University of Cambridge Internet-Draft University of Cambridge
Intended status: Standards Track M. Miller Intended status: Standards Track M. Miller
Expires: June 16, 2014 P. Saint-Andre Expires: August 15, 2014 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco Systems, Inc. P. Saint-Andre
December 13, 2013 &yet
February 11, 2014
Using DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records Using DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records
with SRV and MX records. with SRV and MX records.
draft-ietf-dane-srv-03 draft-ietf-dane-srv-04
Abstract Abstract
The DANE specification (RFC 6698) describes how to use TLSA resource The DANE specification (RFC 6698) describes how to use TLSA resource
records in the DNS to associate a server's host name with its TLS records in the DNS to associate a server's host name with its TLS
certificate. The association is secured with DNSSEC. Some certificate. The association is secured with DNSSEC. Some
application protocols use SRV records (RFC 2782) to indirectly name application protocols use SRV records (RFC 2782) to indirectly name
the server hosts for a service domain (SMTP uses MX records for the the server hosts for a service domain (SMTP uses MX records for the
same purpose). This specification gives generic instructions for how same purpose). This specification gives generic instructions for how
these application protocols locate and use TLSA records when these application protocols locate and use TLSA records when
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Relation between SRV and MX records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Relation between SRV and MX records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. DNS Checks for TLSA and SRV Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. DNS Checks for TLSA and SRV Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. SRV Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. SRV Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. TLSA Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. TLSA Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TLS Checks for TLSA and SRV Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. TLS Checks for TLSA and SRV Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Guidance for Application Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Guidance for Application Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Guidance for Server Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Guidance for Server Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Mixed Security Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.1. Mixed Security Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. A Service Domain Trusts its Servers . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. A Service Domain Trusts its Servers . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.3. Certificate Subject Name Matching . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.3. Certificate Subject Name Matching . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.4. Deliberate Omissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. Mail Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix B. XMPP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix C. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The base DANE specification [RFC6698] describes how to use TLSA The base DANE specification [RFC6698] describes how to use TLSA
resource records in the DNS to associate a server's host name with resource records in the DNS to associate a server's host name with
its TLS certificate. The association is secured using DNSSEC. That its TLS certificate. The association is secured using DNSSEC. That
document "only relates to securely associating certificates for TLS document "only relates to securely associating certificates for TLS
and DTLS with host names" (see the last paragraph of section 1.2 of and DTLS with host names" (see the last paragraph of section 1.2 of
[RFC6698]). [RFC6698]).
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[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
3. Relation between SRV and MX records 3. Relation between SRV and MX records
For the purpose of this specification (to avoid cluttering the For the purpose of this specification (to avoid cluttering the
description with special cases) we treat each MX record ([RFC5321] description with special cases) we treat each MX record ([RFC5321]
section 5) as being equivalent to an SRV record [RFC2782] with section 5) as being equivalent to an SRV record [RFC2782] with
corresponding fields copied from the MX record and the remaining corresponding fields copied from the MX record and the remaining
fields having fixed values as follows: fields having fixed values as follows:
Service - smtp Table 1: SRV Fields and MX Equivalents
+---------------+-----------------------------+
Proto - tcp | DNS SRV Field | Equivalent MX Value |
+---------------+-----------------------------+
Name - MX owner name (mail domain) | Service | smtp |
+---------------+-----------------------------+
TTL - MX TTL | Proto | tcp |
Class - MX Class +---------------+-----------------------------+
| Name | MX owner name (mail domain) |
Priority - MX Priority +---------------+-----------------------------+
| TTL | MX TTL |
Weight - 0 +---------------+-----------------------------+
| Class | MX Class |
Port - 25 +---------------+-----------------------------+
| Priority | MX Priority |
Target - MX Target +---------------+-----------------------------+
| Weight | 0 |
+---------------+-----------------------------+
| Port | 25 |
+---------------+-----------------------------+
| Target | MX Target |
+---------------+-----------------------------+
Thus we can treat the following MX record as if it were the SRV Thus we can treat the following MX record as if it were the SRV
record shown below: record shown below:
example.com. 86400 IN MX 10 mx.example.net. example.com. 86400 IN MX 10 mx.example.net.
_smtp._tcp.example.com. 86400 IN SRV 10 0 25 mx.example.net. _smtp._tcp.example.com. 86400 IN SRV 10 0 25 mx.example.net.
Other details that are specific to SMTP are described in Other details that are specific to SMTP are described in
[I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane]. [I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane].
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In the successful case, the client now has an authentic list of In the successful case, the client now has an authentic list of
server host names with weight and priority values. It performs server host names with weight and priority values. It performs
server ordering and selection using the weight and priority values server ordering and selection using the weight and priority values
without regard to the presence or absence of DNSSEC or TLSA records. without regard to the presence or absence of DNSSEC or TLSA records.
It takes note of the DNSSEC validation status of the SRV response for It takes note of the DNSSEC validation status of the SRV response for
use when checking certificate names (see Section 5). use when checking certificate names (see Section 5).
4.2. TLSA Queries 4.2. TLSA Queries
This sub-section applies to each server host name individually, If the SRV response was insecure or indeterminate, the client MUST
provided the SRV response was secure according to DNSSEC validation. NOT perform any TLSA queries. If the SRV response is secure
according to DNSSEC validation, the client performs a TLSA query for
each SRV target as describes in this section.
For each SRV target host name, if the response to the address (A or
AAAA) query is insecure or indeterminate, the client MUST NOT perform
a TLSA query for that target; the TLSA a query will most likely fail.
The client SHALL construct the TLSA query name as described in The client SHALL construct the TLSA query name as described in
[RFC6698] section 3, based on fields from the SRV record: the port [RFC6698] section 3, based on fields from the SRV record: the port
from the SRV RDATA, the protocol from the SRV query name, and the from the SRV RDATA, the protocol from the SRV query name, and the
TLSA base domain set to the SRV target host name. TLSA base domain set to the SRV target host name.
For example, the following SRV record leads to the TLSA query shown For example, the following SRV record leads to the TLSA query shown
below: below:
_imap._tcp.example.com. 86400 IN SRV 10 0 143 imap.example.net. _imap._tcp.example.com. 86400 IN SRV 10 0 143 imap.example.net.
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When connecting to a server, the client MUST use TLS if the responses When connecting to a server, the client MUST use TLS if the responses
to the SRV and TLSA queries were "secure" as described above. If the to the SRV and TLSA queries were "secure" as described above. If the
client received zero usable TLSA certificate associations, it SHALL client received zero usable TLSA certificate associations, it SHALL
validate the server's TLS certificate using the normal PKIX rules validate the server's TLS certificate using the normal PKIX rules
[RFC5280] or protocol-specific rules (e.g., following [RFC6125]) [RFC5280] or protocol-specific rules (e.g., following [RFC6125])
without further input from the TLSA records. If the client received without further input from the TLSA records. If the client received
one or more usable TLSA certificate associations, it SHALL process one or more usable TLSA certificate associations, it SHALL process
them as described in [RFC6698] section 2.1. them as described in [RFC6698] section 2.1.
The client uses the DNSSEC validation status of the SRV query in its If a usable TLSA record with Certificate Usage "3" matches the TLS
server certificate identity checks. (The TLSA validation status does server's certificate, or public key for the certificate, all other
not affect the server certificate identity checks.) It SHALL use the validation and verification checks MAY be ignored (e.g., reference
identifier, key usage, expiration, issuance, etc.).
Otherwise, the client uses the DNSSEC validation status of the SRV
query in its server certificate identity checks. It SHOULD use the
Server Name Indication extension (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] or its Server Name Indication extension (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] or its
functional equivalent in the relevant application protocol (e.g., in functional equivalent in the relevant application protocol (e.g., in
XMPP [RFC6120] this is the the 'to' address of the initial stream XMPP [RFC6120] this is the the 'to' address of the initial stream
header). The preferred name SHALL be chosen as follows, and the header). The preferred name SHALL be chosen as follows, and the
client SHALL verify the identity asserted by the server's certificate client SHALL verify the identity asserted by the server's certificate
according to [RFC6125] section 6, using a list of reference according to [RFC6125] section 6, using a list of reference
identifiers constructed as follows. (Note again that in RFC 6125 the identifiers constructed as follows. (Note again that in RFC 6125 the
terms "source domain" and "derived domain" refer to the same things terms "source domain" and "derived domain" refer to the same things
as "service domain" and "target host name" in this document.) as "service domain" and "target host name" in this document.)
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Separate documents describe how to apply this specification to Separate documents describe how to apply this specification to
particular application protocols. If you are writing such as particular application protocols. If you are writing such as
document the following points ought to be covered: document the following points ought to be covered:
o Fallback logic in the event of bogus replies and the like. o Fallback logic in the event of bogus replies and the like.
o Compatibility with clients that do not support SRV lookups. o Compatibility with clients that do not support SRV lookups.
7. Guidance for Server Operators 7. Guidance for Server Operators
In order to support this specification, server software MUST To conform to this specification, the published SRV records and
implement the TLS Server Name Indication extension (TLS SNI) subsequent address (A, AAAA) records MUST be secured with DNSSEC.
[RFC6066] (or its functional equivalent in the relevant application There SHOULD also be at least one TLSA record published that
protocol) for selecting the appropriate certificate. authenticates the server's certificate. Except for Certificate Usage
"3", the certificate authenticated by the TLSA record(s) MUST contain
a reference identifier that matches:
A server that supports TLS and is the target of an SRV record MUST o the service domain name (the "source domain" in [RFC6125] terms,
have a TLS certificate that authenticates the SRV query domain (i.e. which is the SRV query domain); and/or
the service domain, or "source domain" in [RFC6125] terms). This is
necessary for clients that cannot perform DNSSEC validation. This
certificate MUST be the default that is presented if the client does
not use TLS SNI or its functional equivalent.
In order to support this specification, the server SHOULD also have a o the server host name (the "derived domain" in [RFC6125] terms,
certificate that authenticates the SRV target domain (e.g., the mail which is the SRV target).
server hostname). This can be done using a multi-name certificate or
by using the client's TLS SNI or its functional equivalent to select
the appropriate certificate. The server's TLSA record SHOULD
correspond to this certificate.
Note: In some application protocols, there are old non-SRV clients Servers that support multiple service domains (i.e., multi-tenant)
that expect a server's TLS certificate to authenticate its host name; can implement Server Name Identifier (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] or its
they are also unlikely to support SNI. This means that servers for functional equivalent to determine which certificate to offer.
old clients need a different default certificate from servers that Clients that do not support this specification will indicate a
are the targets of SRV records. If the server does not have a preference for the service domain name, while clients that support
certificate that authenticates all relevant names, it is necessary to this specification will indicate the server host name. However, the
segregate old and new clients. This can be done by using different server determines what certificate to present in the TLS handshake;
target hosts or non-standard ports in the SRV targets. (The latter e.g., the presented certificate might only authenticate the server
avoids the need for additional certificates.) host name.
8. Internationalization Considerations 8. Internationalization Considerations
If any of the DNS queries are for an internationalized domain name, If any of the DNS queries are for an internationalized domain name,
then they need to use the A-label form [RFC5890]. then they need to use the A-label form [RFC5890].
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
No IANA action is required. No IANA action is required.
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installing a TLS certificate with the correct name, and publishing a installing a TLS certificate with the correct name, and publishing a
TLSA record under that name. If these are not correct then TLSA record under that name. If these are not correct then
connections from TLSA-aware clients might fail. connections from TLSA-aware clients might fail.
10.3. Certificate Subject Name Matching 10.3. Certificate Subject Name Matching
Section 4 of the TLSA specification [RFC6698] leaves the details of Section 4 of the TLSA specification [RFC6698] leaves the details of
checking names in certificates to higher level application protocols, checking names in certificates to higher level application protocols,
though it suggests the use of [RFC6125]. though it suggests the use of [RFC6125].
Name checking might appear to be unnecessary, since DNSSEC provides a Name checks are not necessary if the matching TLSA record is of
secure binding between the server name and the TLSA record, which in Certificate Usage "3". Because such a record identifies the specific
turn authenticates the certificate. However this latter step can be certificate (or public key of the certificate), additional checks are
indirect, via a chain of certificates. A usage=0 TLSA record only superfluous and potentially conflicting.
authenticates the CA that issued the certificate, and third parties
can obtain certificates from the same CA.
Therefore this specification says that a client needs to check
whether the server's certificate matches the server host name, to
ensure that the certificate was issued by the CA to the server that
the client is connecting to. The client always performs this check
regardless of the TLSA usage, to simplify implementation and so that
this specification is less likely to need updating when new TLSA
usages are added.
10.4. Deliberate Omissions
We do not specify that clients check the DNSSEC state of the server Otherwise, while DNSSEC provides a secure binding between the server
address records. This is not necessary since the certificate checks name and the TLSA record, and the TLSA record provides a binding to a
ensure that the client has connected to the correct server. (The certificate, this latter step can be indirect via a chain of
address records will normally have the same security state as the certificates. For example, a Certificate Usage "0" TLSA record only
TLSA records, but they can differ if there are CNAME or DNAME authenticates the CA that issued the certificate, and third parties
indirections.) can obtain certificates from the same CA. Therefore, clients need to
check whether the server's certificate matches one of the expected
reference identifiers to ensure the certificate was issued by the CA
to the server the client expects.
11. Acknowledgements 11. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Mark Andrews for arguing that authenticating the server Thanks to Mark Andrews for arguing that authenticating the server
host name is the right thing, and that we ought to rely on DNSSEC to host name is the right thing, and that we ought to rely on DNSSEC to
secure the SRV / MX lookup. Thanks to James Cloos, Ned Freed, Olafur secure the SRV / MX lookup. Thanks to James Cloos, Viktor Dukhovni,
Gudmundsson, Paul Hoffman, Phil Pennock, Hector Santos, Jonas Ned Freed, Olafur Gudmundsson, Paul Hoffman, Phil Pennock, Hector
Schneider, and Alessandro Vesely for helpful suggestions. Santos, Jonas Schneider, and Alessandro Vesely for helpful
suggestions.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for [RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782, specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
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(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012. Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane] [I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane]
Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "(DANE) TLSA records.", Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP security via
draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane (work in progress), opportunistic DANE TLS", draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-05
November 2013. (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna]
Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations
(DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-04 (work in progress), (XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-05 (work in progress),
October 2013. February 2014.
Appendix A. Example Appendix A. Mail Example
In the following, most of the DNS resource data is elided for In the following, most of the DNS resource data is elided for
simplicity. simplicity.
; mail domain ; mail domain
example.com. MX 1 mx.example.net. example.com. MX 1 mx.example.net.
example.com. RRSIG MX ... example.com. RRSIG MX ...
; SMTP server host name ; SMTP server host name
mx.example.net. A 192.0.2.1 mx.example.net. A 192.0.2.1
mx.example.net. RRSIG A ...
mx.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8:212:8::e:1 mx.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8:212:8::e:1
mx.example.net. RRSIG ...
; TLSA resource record ; TLSA resource record
_25._tcp.mx.example.net. TLSA ... _25._tcp.mx.example.net. TLSA ...
_25._tcp.mx.example.net. RRSIG TLSA ... _25._tcp.mx.example.net. RRSIG TLSA ...
Mail for addresses at example.com is delivered by SMTP to Mail for addresses at example.com is delivered by SMTP to
mx.example.net. Connections to mx.example.net port 25 that use mx.example.net. Connections to mx.example.net port 25 that use
STARTTLS will get a server certificate that authenticates the name STARTTLS will get a server certificate that authenticates the name
mx.example.net. mx.example.net.
Appendix B. Rationale Appendix B. XMPP Example
In the following, most of the DNS resource data is elided for
simplicity.
; XMPP domain
_xmpp-client.example.com. SRV 1 0 5222 im.example.net.
_xmpp-clientexample.com. RRSIG SRV ...
; XMPP server host name
im.example.net. A 192.0.2.3
im.example.net. RRSIG A ...
im.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8:212:8::e:4
im.example.net. RRSIG AAAA ...
; TLSA resource record
_5222._tcp.im.example.net. TLSA ...
_5222._tcp.im.example.net. RRSIG TLSA ...
Mail for addresses at example.com is delivered by SMTP to
mx.example.net. Connections to mx.example.net port 25 that use
STARTTLS will get a server certificate that authenticates the name
mx.example.net.
Appendix C. Rationale
The long-term goal of this specification is to settle on TLS The long-term goal of this specification is to settle on TLS
certificates that verify the server host name rather than the service certificates that verify the server host name rather than the service
domain, since this is more convenient for servers hosting multiple domain, since this is more convenient for servers hosting multiple
domains (so-called "multi-tenanted environments") and scales up more domains (so-called "multi-tenanted environments") and scales up more
easily to larger numbers of service domains. easily to larger numbers of service domains.
There are a number of other reasons for doing it this way: There are a number of other reasons for doing it this way:
o The certificate is part of the server configuration, so it makes o The certificate is part of the server configuration, so it makes
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Tony Finch Tony Finch
University of Cambridge Computing Service University of Cambridge Computing Service
New Museums Site New Museums Site
Pembroke Street Pembroke Street
Cambridge CB2 3QH Cambridge CB2 3QH
ENGLAND ENGLAND
Phone: +44 797 040 1426 Phone: +44 797 040 1426
Email: dot@dotat.at Email: dot@dotat.at
URI: http://dotat.at/ URI: http://dotat.at/
Matthew Miller Matthew Miller
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600 1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202 Denver, CO 80202
USA USA
Email: mamille2@cisco.com Email: mamille2@cisco.com
Peter Saint-Andre Peter Saint-Andre
Cisco Systems, Inc. &yet
1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202
USA
Email: psaintan@cisco.com Email: ietf@stpeter.im
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