draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-12.txt   draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-13.txt 
Network Working Group R. Droms, Editor Network Working Group R. Droms, Editor
INTERNET DRAFT Bucknell University INTERNET DRAFT Bucknell University
Obsoletes: draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-11.txt W. Arbaugh, Editor Obsoletes: draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-12.txt W. Arbaugh, Editor
University of Pennsylvania University of Maryland
October 1999 June 2000
Expires June 1999 Expires December 2000
Authentication for DHCP Messages Authentication for DHCP Messages
<draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-12.txt> <draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-13.txt>
Status of this memo Status of this memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt, and the list of http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt, and the list of
Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract Abstract
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a framework The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a framework
for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network. for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network.
In some situations, network administrators may wish to constrain the In some situations, network administrators may wish to constrain the
allocation of addresses to authorized hosts. Additionally, some allocation of addresses to authorized hosts. Additionally, some
skipping to change at page 2, line 5 skipping to change at page 2, line 5
generated and newly attached hosts with proper authorization can be generated and newly attached hosts with proper authorization can be
automatically configured from an authenticated DHCP server. automatically configured from an authenticated DHCP server.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
DHCP [1] transports protocol stack configuration parameters from DHCP [1] transports protocol stack configuration parameters from
centrally administered servers to TCP/IP hosts. Among those centrally administered servers to TCP/IP hosts. Among those
parameters are an IP address. DHCP servers can be configured to parameters are an IP address. DHCP servers can be configured to
dynamically allocate addresses from a pool of addresses, eliminating dynamically allocate addresses from a pool of addresses, eliminating
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
a manual step in configuration of TCP/IP hosts. a manual step in configuration of TCP/IP hosts.
Some network administrators may wish to provide authentication of the Some network administrators may wish to provide authentication of the
source and contents of DHCP messages. For example, clients may be source and contents of DHCP messages. For example, clients may be
subject to denial of service attacks through the use of bogus DHCP subject to denial of service attacks through the use of bogus DHCP
servers, or may simply be misconfigured due to unintentionally servers, or may simply be misconfigured due to unintentionally
instantiated DHCP servers. Network administrators may wish to instantiated DHCP servers. Network administrators may wish to
constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts to avoid constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts to avoid
denial of service attacks in "hostile" environments where the network denial of service attacks in "hostile" environments where the network
medium is not physically secured, such as wireless networks or medium is not physically secured, such as wireless networks or
college residence halls. college residence halls.
This document defines a technique that can provide both entity This document defines a technique that can provide both entity
authentication and message authentication. authentication and message authentication.
DISCUSSION: DISCUSSION:
This draft combines the original Schiller-Huitema-Droms This draft combines the original Schiller-Huitema-Droms
authentication mechanism (<draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-06.txt>) authentication mechanism defined in a previous Internet Draft with
with the "delayed authentication" proposal developed by Bill the "delayed authentication" proposal developed by Bill Arbaugh.
Arbaugh. This draft has been published as a revision to <draft-
ietf-dhc-authentication-06.txt>.
1.1 DHCP threat model 1.1 DHCP threat model
The threat to DHCP is inherently an insider threat (assuming a The threat to DHCP is inherently an insider threat (assuming a
properly configured network where BOOTP ports are blocked on the properly configured network where BOOTP ports are blocked on the
enterprise's perimeter gateways.) Regardless of the gateway enterprise's perimeter gateways.) Regardless of the gateway
configuration, however, the potential attacks by insiders and configuration, however, the potential attacks by insiders and
outsiders are the same. outsiders are the same.
The attack specific to a DHCP client is the possibility of the The attack specific to a DHCP client is the possibility of the
skipping to change at page 3, line 4 skipping to change at page 2, line 53
accidentally configured DHCP servers that answer DHCP client requests accidentally configured DHCP servers that answer DHCP client requests
with unintentionally incorrect configuration parameters. with unintentionally incorrect configuration parameters.
The threat specific to a DHCP server is an invalid client The threat specific to a DHCP server is an invalid client
masquerading as a valid client. The motivation for this may be for masquerading as a valid client. The motivation for this may be for
"theft of service", or to circumvent auditing for any number of "theft of service", or to circumvent auditing for any number of
nefarious purposes. nefarious purposes.
The threat common to both the client and the server is the resource The threat common to both the client and the server is the resource
"denial of service" (DoS) attack. These attacks typically involve the "denial of service" (DoS) attack. These attacks typically involve the
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
exhaustion of valid addresses, or the exhaustion of CPU or network exhaustion of valid addresses, or the exhaustion of CPU or network
bandwidth, and are present anytime there is a shared resource. In bandwidth, and are present anytime there is a shared resource. In
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
current practice, redundancy mitigates DoS attacks the best. current practice, redundancy mitigates DoS attacks the best.
1.2 Design goals 1.2 Design goals
These are the goals that were used in the development of the These are the goals that were used in the development of the
authentication protocol, listed in order of importance: authentication protocol, listed in order of importance:
1. Address the threats presented in Section 1.1. 1. Address the threats presented in Section 1.1.
2. Avoid changing the current protocol. 2. Avoid changing the current protocol.
3. Limit state required by the server. 3. Limit state required by the server.
4. Limit complexity (complexity breads design and implementation 4. Limit complexity (complexity breeds design and implementation
errors). errors).
1.3 Requirements Terminology 1.3 Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5].
1.4 DHCP Terminology 1.4 DHCP Terminology
This document uses the following terms: This document uses the following terms:
o "DHCP client" o "DHCP client"
A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain
configuration parameters such as a network address. configuration parameters such as a network address.
o "DHCP server" o "DHCP server"
A DHCP server of "server"is an Internet host that returns A DHCP server or "server" is an Internet host that returns
configuration parameters to DHCP clients. configuration parameters to DHCP clients.
2. Format of the authentication option 2. Format of the authentication option
The following diagram defines the format of the DHCP The following diagram defines the format of the DHCP
authentication option: authentication option:
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Length | Protocol (2) |RDM| Algorithm | | Code | Length | Protocol | Algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | Replay Detection (64 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Replay cont. | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
| | | |
+ Replay Detection (64 bits) + | Authentication Information |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
| Authentication Information ...
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The code for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field The code for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field
contains the length of the protocol, RDM, algorithm, Replay Detection contains the length of the protocol, RDM, algorithm, Replay Detection
fields and authentication information fields in octets. fields and authentication information fields in octets.
The protocol field defines the particular technique for The protocol field defines the particular technique for
authentication used in the option. New protocols are defined as authentication used in the option. New protocols are defined as
decribed in Section 6. described in Section 6.
The Replay Detection Method (RDM) bit field determines the type of
replay detection used in the Replay Detection Field. The following
defines the possible values for the RDM:
00 The replay detection field MUST be set to the value
of a monotonically increasing counter. Using a
counter value such as the current time of day (e.g.,
an NTP-format timestamp [4]) can reduce the danger of
replay attacks. This method MUST be supported by all
protocols.
01 Reserved to be defined as described in Section 6.
10 Reserved to be defined as described in Section 6.
11 Reserved to be defined as described in Section 6.
The algorithm field defines the specific algorithm within the The algorithm field defines the specific algorithm within the
technique identified by the protocol field. technique identified by the protocol field.
The Replay Detection field is per the RDM, and the authentication The Replay Detection field is per the RDM, and the authentication
information field is per the protocol in use. information field is per the protocol in use.
This document defines two protocols in sections 4 and 5, encoded with The Replay Detection Method (RDM) field determines the type of replay
protocol field values 0 and 1. Protocol field values 2-254 are detection used in the Replay Detection field.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 If the RDM field contains 0x00, the replay detection field MUST be
set to the value of a monotonically increasing counter. Using a
counter value such as the current time of day (e.g., an NTP-format
timestamp [4]) can reduce the danger of replay attacks. This
method MUST be supported by all protocols.
Other values of the RDM field are reserved for future definition
according to the procedures described in section 6.
This document defines two protocols in sections 4 and 5, encoded with
protocol field values 0 and 1. Protocol field values 2-254 are
reserved for future use. Other protocols may be defined according to reserved for future use. Other protocols may be defined according to
the procedure described in section 6. the procedure described in section 6.
3. Interaction with Relay Agents 3. Interaction with Relay Agents
Because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the 'giaddr' and Because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the 'giaddr' and
'hops' fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two fields 'hops' fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two fields
MUST be set to zero for the computation of any hash function over the MUST be set to zero for the computation of any hash function over the
message header. Additionally, a relay agent may append the DHCP relay message header. Additionally, a relay agent may append the DHCP relay
agent information option 82 [7] as the last option in a message to agent information option 82 [7] as the last option in a message to
servers. If a server finds option 82 included in a received message, servers. If a server finds option 82 included in a received message,
the server MUST compute any hash function as if the option were NOT the server MUST compute any hash function as if the option were NOT
included in the message without changing the order of options. If the included in the message without changing the order of options.
server understands option 82 and will echo the option back to the
relay agent, the server MUST not include the option in the DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
computation of any hash function over the message.
Whenever the server sends back option 82 to a relay agent, the server
MUST not include the option in the computation of any hash function
over the message.
4. Protocol 0 4. Protocol 0
If the protocol field is 0, the authentication information field If the protocol field is 0, the authentication information field
holds a simple authentication token: holds a simple authentication token:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0| | Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| Replay Detection (64 bits) |
+ Replay Detection (64 bits) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Replay cont. | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
+ Authentication token (n octets) ... + | Authentication Information |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The authentication token is an opaque, unencoded value known to both The authentication token is an opaque, unencoded value known to both
the sender and receiver. The sender inserts the authentication token the sender and receiver. The sender inserts the authentication token
in the DHCP message and the receiver matches the token from the in the DHCP message and the receiver matches the token from the
message to the shared token. If the authentication option is present message to the shared token. If the authentication option is present
and the token from the message does not match the shared token, the and the token from the message does not match the shared token, the
receiver MUST discard the message. receiver MUST discard the message.
Protocol 0 may be used to pass a plain-text password and provides Protocol 0 may be used to pass a plain-text password and provides
only weak entity authentication and no message authentication. This only weak entity authentication and no message authentication. This
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
protocol is only useful for rudimentary protection against protocol is only useful for rudimentary protection against
inadvertently instantiated DHCP servers. inadvertently instantiated DHCP servers.
DISCUSSION: DISCUSSION:
The intent here is to pass a constant, non-computed token such as The intent here is to pass a constant, non-computed token such as
a plain-text password. Other types of entity authentication using a plain-text password. Other types of entity authentication using
computed tokens such as Kerberos tickets or one-time passwords computed tokens such as Kerberos tickets or one-time passwords
will be defined as separate protocols. will be defined as separate protocols.
5. Protocol 1 5. Protocol 1
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
If the protocol field is 1, the message is using the "delayed If the protocol field is 1, the message is using the "delayed
authentication" mechanism. In delayed authentication, the client authentication" mechanism. In delayed authentication, the client
requests authentication in its DHCPDISCOVER message and the server requests authentication in its DHCPDISCOVER message and the server
replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication
information information. This authentication information contains a information information. This authentication information contains a
nonce value generated by the source as a message authentication code nonce value generated by the source as a message authentication code
(MAC) to provide message authentication and entity authentication. (MAC) to provide message authentication and entity authentication.
This document defines the use of a particular technique based on the This document defines the use of a particular technique based on the
HMAC protocol [3] using the MD5 hash [2]. HMAC protocol [3] using the MD5 hash [2].
5.1 Management Issues 5.1 Management Issues
This protocol does not attempt to address situations where a client The "delayed authentication" protocol does not attempt to address
may roam from one administrative domain to another, i.e. interdomain situations where a client may roam from one administrative domain to
roaming. This protocol is focused solving the intradomain problem another, i.e. interdomain roaming. This protocol is focused on
where the out-of-band exchange of a shared secret is feasible. solving the intradomain problem where the out-of-band exchange of a
shared secret is feasible.
5.2 Format 5.2 Format
The format of the authentication request in a DHCPDISCOVER message The format of the authentication request in a DHCPDISCOVER message
for protocol 1 is: for protocol 1 is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|RDM| Algorithm | | Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1| Algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | RDM | Replay Detection (64 bits) |
+ Replay Detection (64 bits) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Replay cont. |
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The format of the authentication information for protocol 1 is: The format of the authentication information for protocol 1 is:
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|RDM| Algorithm | | Code | Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1| Algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | RDM | Replay Detection (64 bits) |
+ Replay Detection (64 bits) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| secret ID | | Replay cont. | Secret ID (32 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HMAC-MD5 ... | secret id cont| HMAC-MD5 (128 bits) ....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This document defines one technique for use with protocol 1, which is This document defines one technique for use with protocol 1, which is
identified by setting the algorithm field to 1. Other techniques identified by setting the algorithm field to 1. Other techniques
that use different algorithms may be defined by future that use different algorithms may be defined by future
specifications, see section 6. The following definitions will be specifications, see section 6. The following definitions will be
used in the description of the authentication information for used in the description of the authentication information for
protocol 1, algorithm 1: protocol 1, algorithm 1:
Replay Detection - as defined by the RDM field Replay Detection - as defined by the RDM field
skipping to change at page 8, line 4 skipping to change at page 7, line 49
generate the MAC. generate the MAC.
DISCUSSION: DISCUSSION:
Algorithm 1 specifies the use of HMAC-MD5. Use of a different Algorithm 1 specifies the use of HMAC-MD5. Use of a different
technique, such as HMAC-SHA, will be specified as a separate technique, such as HMAC-SHA, will be specified as a separate
protocol. protocol.
Protocol 1 requires a shared secret key for each client on each Protocol 1 requires a shared secret key for each client on each
DHCP server with which that client may wish to use the DHCP DHCP server with which that client may wish to use the DHCP
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
protocol. Each secret key has a unique identifier that can be protocol. Each secret key has a unique identifier that can be
used by a receiver to determine which secret was used to generate used by a receiver to determine which secret was used to generate
the MAC in the DHCP message. Therefore, protocol 1 may not scale the MAC in the DHCP message. Therefore, protocol 1 may not scale
well in an architecture in which a DHCP client may connect to well in an architecture in which a DHCP client connects to
multiple administrative domains. multiple administrative domains.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
Note that the meaning of an authentication option can be changed Note that the meaning of an authentication option can be changed
by removing the secret ID, and MAC, transforming an authentication by removing the secret ID, and MAC, transforming an authentication
option with authentication information into a request for option with authentication information into a request for
authentication. Therefore, the authentication request form of authentication. Therefore, the authentication request form of
this option can only appear in a DHCPDISCOVER message. this option can only appear in a DHCPDISCOVER message.
5.3 Message validation 5.3 Message validation
To validate an incoming message, the receiver checks the 'counter' To validate an incoming message, the receiver first checks that
field and computes the MAC as described in [3]. If the 'counter' the value in the replay detection field is acceptable according to
field does not contain a value larger than the last value of the replay detection method specified by the RDM field. Next, the
'counter' used by the sender, the receiver MUST discard the receive computes the MAC as described in [3]. The receiver MUST
incoming message. The receiver MUST set the 'MAC' field of the set the 'MAC' field of the authentication option to all 0s for
authentication option to all 0s for computation of the MAC, and computation of the MAC, and because a DHCP relay agent may alter
because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the 'giaddr' the values of the 'giaddr' and 'hops' fields in the DHCP message,
and 'hops' fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two the contents of those two fields MUST also be set to zero for the
fields MUST also be set to zero for the computation of the MAC. If computation of the MAC. If the MAC computed by the receiver does
the MAC computed by the receiver does not match the MAC contained not match the MAC contained in the authentication option, the
in the authentication option, the receiver MUST discard the DHCP receiver MUST discard the DHCP message.
message.
Section 3 provides additional information on handling messages
that include option 82 (Relay Agents).
5.4 Key utilization 5.4 Key utilization
Each DHCP client has a key, K. The client uses its key to encode Each DHCP client has a key, K. The client uses its key to encode
any messages it sends to the server and to authenticate and verify any messages it sends to the server and to authenticate and verify
any messages it receives from the server. The client's key SHOULD any messages it receives from the server. The client's key SHOULD
be initially distributed to the client through some out-of-band be initially distributed to the client through some out-of-band
mechanism, and SHOULD be stored locally on the client for use in mechanism, and SHOULD be stored locally on the client for use in
all authenticated DHCP messages. Once the client has been given all authenticated DHCP messages. Once the client has been given
its key, it SHOULD use that key for all transactions even if the its key, it SHOULD use that key for all transactions even if the
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 52
Each DHCP server MUST know, or be able to obtain in a secure Each DHCP server MUST know, or be able to obtain in a secure
manner, the keys for all authorized clients. If all clients use manner, the keys for all authorized clients. If all clients use
the same key, clients can perform both entity and message the same key, clients can perform both entity and message
authentication for all messages received from servers. However, authentication for all messages received from servers. However,
the sharing of keys is strongly discouraged as it allows for the sharing of keys is strongly discouraged as it allows for
unauthorized clients to masquerade as authorized clients by unauthorized clients to masquerade as authorized clients by
obtaining a copy of the shared key. To authenticate the identity obtaining a copy of the shared key. To authenticate the identity
of individual clients, each client MUST be configured with a of individual clients, each client MUST be configured with a
unique key. Appendix A describes a technique for key management. unique key. Appendix A describes a technique for key management.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
5.5 Client considerations 5.5 Client considerations
This section describes the behavior of a DHCP client using This section describes the behavior of a DHCP client using
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
authentication protocol 1. authentication protocol 1.
5.5.1 INIT state 5.5.1 INIT state
When in INIT state, the client uses protocol 1 as follows: When in INIT state, the client uses protocol 1 as follows:
1. The client MUST include the authentication request option in 1. The client MUST include the authentication request option in
its DHCPDISCOVER message along with option 61 [6] to identify its DHCPDISCOVER message along with option 61 [6] to identify
itself uniquely to the server. itself uniquely to the server.
2. The client MUST validate any DHCPOFFER messages that include 2. The client MUST validate any DHCPOFFER messages that include
authentication information using the mechanism specified in authentication information using the mechanism specified in
section 5.2. The client MUST discard any messages which fail section 5.3. The client MUST discard any messages which fail
to pass validation and MAY log the validation failure. The to pass validation and MAY log the validation failure. The
client selects one DHCPOFFER message as its selected client selects one DHCPOFFER message as its selected
configuration. If none of the DHCPOFFER messages received by configuration. If none of the DHCPOFFER messages received by
the client include authentication information, the client MAY the client include authentication information, the client MAY
choose an unauthenticated message as its selected choose an unauthenticated message as its selected
configuration. The client SHOULD be configurable to accept or configuration. The client SHOULD be configurable to accept or
reject unauthenticated DHCPOFFER messages. reject unauthenticated DHCPOFFER messages.
3. The client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message that MUST include 3. The client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message that MUST include
authentication information encoded with the same secret used by authentication information encoded with the same secret used by
the server in the selected DHCPOFFER message. the server in the selected DHCPOFFER message.
skipping to change at page 9, line 50 skipping to change at page 9, line 47
that server. that server.
5.5.2 INIT-REBOOT state 5.5.2 INIT-REBOOT state
When in INIT-REBOOT state, the client MUST use the secret it used When in INIT-REBOOT state, the client MUST use the secret it used
in its DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to in its DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.
The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK
messages if no authenticated messages were received. The client messages if no authenticated messages were received. The client
MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK
messages as specified in RFC 2131, section 3.2. messages as specified in section 3.2 of [1].
5.5.3 RENEWING state 5.5.3 RENEWING state
When in RENEWING state, the client uses the secret it used in its When in RENEWING state, the client uses the secret it used in its
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.
If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not
received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP
specification [1]. specification [1].
5.5.4 REBINDING state 5.5.4 REBINDING state
When in REBINDING state, the client uses the secret it used in its When in REBINDING state, the client uses the secret it used in its
initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.
If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK
skipping to change at page 11, line 4 skipping to change at page 10, line 52
5.6.1 General considerations 5.6.1 General considerations
Each server maintains a list of secrets and identifiers for those Each server maintains a list of secrets and identifiers for those
secrets that it shares with clients and potential clients. This secrets that it shares with clients and potential clients. This
information must be maintained in such a way that the server can: information must be maintained in such a way that the server can:
* Identify an appropriate secret and the identifier for that * Identify an appropriate secret and the identifier for that
secret for use with a client that the server may not have secret for use with a client that the server may not have
previously communicated with previously communicated with
* Retrieve the secret and identifier used by a client to which the * Retrieve the secret and identifier used by a client to which the
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
server has provided previous configuration information server has provided previous configuration information
Each server MUST save the counter from the previous authenticated Each server MUST save the counter from the previous authenticated
message. A server MUST discard any incoming message whose counter
is not strictly greater than the counter from the previous message DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
to avoid replay attacks.
message. A server MUST discard any incoming message which fails
the replay detection check as defined by the RDM avoid replay
attacks.
DISCUSSION: DISCUSSION:
The authenticated DHCPREQUEST message from a client in INIT- The authenticated DHCPREQUEST message from a client in INIT-
REBOOT state can only be validated by servers that used the REBOOT state can only be validated by servers that used the
same secret in their DHCPOFFER messages. Other servers will same secret in their DHCPOFFER messages. Other servers will
discard the DHCPREQUEST messages. Thus, only servers that used discard the DHCPREQUEST messages. Thus, only servers that used
the secret selected by the client will be able to determine the secret selected by the client will be able to determine
that their offered configuration information was not selected that their offered configuration information was not selected
and the offered network address can be returned to the server's and the offered network address can be returned to the server's
pool of available addresses. The servers that cannot validate pool of available addresses. The servers that cannot validate
the DHCPREQUEST message will eventually return their offered the DHCPREQUEST message will eventually return their offered
network addresses to their pool of available addresses as network addresses to their pool of available addresses as
described in section 3.1 of the DHCP specification [1]. described in section 3.1 of the DHCP specification [1].
5.6.2 After receiving a DHCPDISCOVER message 5.6.2 After receiving a DHCPDISCOVER message
The server selects a secret for the client and includes The server selects a secret for the client and includes
authentication information generated by that secret as specified authentication information in the DHCPOFFER message as specified
in section 4.1. The server MUST record the secret selected for in section 5, above. The server MUST record the identifier of the
the client and use that secret for validating subsequent messages secret selected for the client and use that same secret for
with the client. validating subsequent messages with the client.
5.6.3 After receiving a DHCPREQUEST message 5.6.3 After receiving a DHCPREQUEST message
The server uses the secret identified in the message and validates The server uses the secret identified in the message and validates
the message as specified in section 4.2. If the message fails to the message as specified in section 5.3. If the message fails to
pass validation or the server does not know the secret identified pass validation or the server does not know the secret identified
by the 'secret ID' field, the server MUST discard the message and by the 'secret ID' field, the server MUST discard the message and
MAY choose to log the validation failure. MAY choose to log the validation failure.
If the message passes the validation procedure, the server If the message passes the validation procedure, the server
responds as described in the DHCP specification. The server MUST responds as described in the DHCP specification. The server MUST
include authentication information generated as specified in include authentication information generated as specified in
section 4.1. section 5.2.
5.6.4 After receiving a DHCPINFORM message 5.6.4 After receiving a DHCPINFORM message
The server MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPINFORM The server MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPINFORM
messages, or only accept authenticated DHCPINFORM messages based messages, or only accept authenticated DHCPINFORM messages based
on a site policy. on a site policy.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
When a client includes the authentication request in a DHCPINFORM When a client includes the authentication request in a DHCPINFORM
message, the server MUST respond with an authenticated DHCPACK message, the server MUST respond with an authenticated DHCPACK
message. If the server does not have a shared secret value message. If the server does not have a shared secret value
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
established with the sender of the DHCPINFORM message, then the established with the sender of the DHCPINFORM message, then the
server can either respond with an unauthenticated DHCPACK message, server MAY respond with an unauthenticated DHCPACK message, or a
or a DHCPNACK if the server does not accept unauthenticated DHCPNAK if the server does not accept unauthenticated clients
clients. based on the site policy.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
The author of a new DHCP option will follow these steps to obtain The author of a new DHCP authentication protocol, algorithm or
acceptance of the protocol as a part of the DHCP Internet replay detection method will follow these steps to obtain
acceptance of the new procedure as a part of the DHCP Internet
Standard: Standard:
1. The author devises the new authentication protocol and/or 1. The author devises the new authentication protocol, algorithm
algorithm. or replay detection method.
2. The author documents the new technique as an Internet Draft. 2. The author documents the new technique as an Internet Draft.
If this is a new protocol, the protocol code is left as "To Be The protocol, algorithm or RDM code for any new procedure is
Determined" (TBD); otherwise, the protocol code is the code left as "To Be Determined" (TBD).
from the existing protocol. The algorithm code is left as
"TBD".
3. The author submits the Internet Draft for review through the 3. The author submits the Internet Draft for review through the
IETF standards process as defined in "Internet Official IETF standards process as defined in "Internet Official
Protocol Standards" (STD 1). Protocol Standards" (STD 1).
4. The new protocol progresses through the IETF standards process; 4. The new protocol progresses through the IETF standards process;
the specification of the new protocol will be reviewed by the the specification of the new protocol will be reviewed by the
Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group (if that group still Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group (if that group still
exists), or as an Internet Draft not submitted by an IETF exists), or as an Internet Draft not submitted by an IETF
working group. If the options is accepted as a Standard, the working group. If the option is accepted as a Standard, the
specification for the option is published as a separate RFC. specification for the option is published as a separate RFC.
5. At the time of acceptance as an Internet Standard and 5. At the time of acceptance as a Proposed Internet Standard and
publication as an RFC, IANA assigns a DHCP authentication publication as an RFC, IANA assigns a DHCP authentication
protocol number to the new protocol. protocol number to the new protocol.
This procedure for defining new authentication protocols will This procedure for defining new authentication protocols will
ensure that: ensure that:
* allocation of new protocol numbers is coordinated from a single * allocation of new protocol numbers is coordinated from a single
authority, authority,
* new protocols are reviewed for technical correctness and * new protocols are reviewed for technical correctness and
appropriateness, and appropriateness, and
* documentation for new protocols is complete and published. * documentation for new protocols is complete and published.
DISCUSSION: DISCUSSION:
This procedure is patterned after the procedure for acceptance This procedure is patterned after the procedure for acceptance
of new DHCP options. of new DHCP options.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 7. References
6. References
[1] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131, [1] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
Bucknell University, March 1997. Bucknell University, March 1997.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
[2] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", [2] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
RFC-1321, April 1992. RFC-1321, April 1992.
[3] Krawczyk H., M. Bellare and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for [3] Krawczyk H., M. Bellare and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication," RFC-2104, February 1997. Message Authentication," RFC-2104, February 1997.
[4] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)", RFC-1305, March [4] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)", RFC-1305, March
1992. 1992.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
skipping to change at page 13, line 36 skipping to change at page 13, line 31
progress, November 1998. progress, November 1998.
[7] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option," [7] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option,"
<draft-ietf-dhc-agent-options-05.txt> (work in progress), <draft-ietf-dhc-agent-options-05.txt> (work in progress),
November 1998. November 1998.
[8] Gupta, V., "Flexible Authentication for DHCP Messages," [8] Gupta, V., "Flexible Authentication for DHCP Messages,"
<draft-gupta-dhcp-auth-00.txt> (work in progress, June <draft-gupta-dhcp-auth-00.txt> (work in progress, June
1998. 1998.
7. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
Jeff Schiller and Christian Huitema developed this scheme during a Jeff Schiller and Christian Huitema developed this scheme during a
terminal room BOF at the Dallas IETF meeting, December 1995. The terminal room BOF at the Dallas IETF meeting, December 1995. The
editor transcribed the notes from that discussion, which form the editor transcribed the notes from that discussion, which form the
basis for this document. The editor appreciates Jeff's and basis for this document. The editor appreciates Jeff's and
Christian's patience in reviewing this document and its earlier Christian's patience in reviewing this document and its earlier
drafts. drafts.
The "delayed authentication" mechanism used in section 4 is due to The "delayed authentication" mechanism used in section 5 is due to
William Arbaugh. The threat model and requirements in sections Bill Arbaugh. The threat model and requirements in sections 1.1
1.1 and 1.2 come from Bill's negotiation protocol proposal. The and 1.2 come from Bill's negotiation protocol proposal. The
attendees of an interim meeting of the DHC WG held in June, 1998, attendees of an interim meeting of the DHC WG held in June, 1998,
including Peter Ford, Kim Kinnear, Glenn Waters, Rob Stevens, Bill including Peter Ford, Kim Kinnear, Glenn Waters, Rob Stevens, Bill
Arbaugh, Baiju Patel, Carl Smith, Thomas Narten, Stewart Kwan, Arbaugh, Baiju Patel, Carl Smith, Thomas Narten, Stewart Kwan,
Munil Shah, Olafur Gudmundsson, Robert Watson, Ralph Droms, Mike Munil Shah, Olafur Gudmundsson, Robert Watson, Ralph Droms, Mike
Dooley, Greg Rabil and Arun Kapur, developed the threat model and Dooley, Greg Rabil and Arun Kapur, developed the threat model and
reviewed several alternative proposals. reviewed several alternative proposals.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999
The replay detection method field is due to Vipul Gupta [8]. The replay detection method field is due to Vipul Gupta [8].
Other input from Bill Sommerfield is gratefully acknowledged. Other input from Bill Sommerfield is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks also to John Wilkins, Ran Atkinson, Shawn Mamros and Thomas Thanks also to John Wilkins, Ran Atkinson, Shawn Mamros and Thomas
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
Narten for reviewing earlier drafts of this document. Narten for reviewing earlier drafts of this document.
8. Security considerations 9. Security considerations
This document describes authentication and verification mechanisms This document describes authentication and verification mechanisms
for DHCP. for DHCP.
9. Editors' addresses 10. Editors' addresses
Ralph Droms Ralph Droms
Computer Science Department Computer Science Department
323 Dana Engineering 323 Dana Engineering
Bucknell University Bucknell University
Lewisburg, PA 17837 Lewisburg, PA 17837
Phone: (717) 524-1145 Phone: (717) 524-1145
EMail: droms@bucknell.edu EMail: droms@bucknell.edu
William Arbaugh Bill Arbaugh
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer Science
Philadelphia, PA University of Maryland
A.V. Williams Building
College Park, MD 20742
EMail: waa@dsl.cis.upenn.edu Phone: (301) 455-2774
Email: waa@cs.umd.edu
10. Expiration 10. Expiration
This document will expire on June 30, 2000. This document will expire on December 31, 2000.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
skipping to change at page 16, line 5 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN
WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages October 1999 DRAFT Authentication for DHCP Messages March 2000
Appendix A - Key Management Technique Appendix A - Key Management Technique
To avoid centralized management of a list of random keys, suppose K To avoid centralized management of a list of random keys, suppose K
for each client is generated from the pair (client identifier, subnet for each client is generated from the pair (client identifier [6],
address), which must be unique to that client. That is, K = MAC(MK, subnet address, e.g. 192.168.1.0), which must be unique to that
unique-id), where MK is a secret master key and MAC is a keyed one- client. That is, K = MAC(MK, unique-id), where MK is a secret master
way function such as HMAC-MD5. key and MAC is a keyed one-way function such as HMAC-MD5.
Without knowledge of the master key MK, an unauthorized client cannot Without knowledge of the master key MK, an unauthorized client cannot
generate its own key K. The server can quickly validate an incoming generate its own key K. The server can quickly validate an incoming
message from a new client by regenerating K from the client-id. For message from a new client by regenerating K from the client-id. For
known clients, the server can choose to recover the client's K known clients, the server can choose to recover the client's K
dynamically from the client-id in the DHCP message, or can choose to dynamically from the client-id in the DHCP message, or can choose to
precompute and cache all of the Ks a priori. precompute and cache all of the Ks a priori.
 End of changes. 

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.23, available from http://www.levkowetz.com/ietf/tools/rfcdiff/