dhc                                                          S. Krishnan
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                              T. Mrugalski
Expires: June 29, July 23, 2016                                               ISC
                                                                S. Jiang
                                            Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
                                                       December 27, 2015
                                                        January 20, 2016

                   Privacy considerations for DHCPv6
                    draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy-02
                    draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy-03

Abstract

   DHCPv6 is a protocol that is used to provide addressing and
   configuration information to IPv6 hosts.  This document described the
   privacy issues associated with the use of DHCPv6 by the Internet
   users.  It is intended to be an analysis of the present situation and
   doe not propose any solutions.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 29, July 23, 2016.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  DHCPv6 options carrying identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  DUID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Client Identifier Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  IA_NA, IA_TA, IA_PD, IA Address and IA Prefix Options . .   4
     3.4.  Client FQDN Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.5.  Client Link-layer Address Option  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.6.  Option Request Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.7.  Vendor Class and Vendor-specific Information Options  . .   6
     3.8.  Civic Location Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.9.  Coordinate-Based Location Option  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.10. Client System Architecture Type Option  . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.11. Relay Agent Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.11.1.  Subscriber ID Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.11.2.  Interface ID Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.11.3.  Remote ID Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.11.4.  Relay-ID Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Existing Mechanisms That Affect Privacy . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Temporary addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Allocation strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Device type discovery (fingerprinting)  . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Operating system discovery (fingerprinting) . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Finding location information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  Finding previously visited networks . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.5.  Finding a stable identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.6.  Pervasive monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  11
     5.7.  Finding client's IP address or hostname . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.8.  Correlation of activities over time . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.9.  Location tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.10. Leasequery & bulk leasequery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   DHCPv6 [RFC3315] is a protocol that is used to provide addressing and
   configuration information to IPv6 hosts.  The DHCPv6 protocol uses
   several identifiers that could become a source for gleaning
   information about the IPv6 host.  This information may include device
   type, operating system information, location(s) that the device may
   have previously visited, etc.  This document discusses the various
   identifiers used by DHCPv6 and the potential privacy issues
   [RFC6973].  In particular, it also takes into consideration the
   problem of pervasive monitoring [RFC7258].

   Future works may propose protocol changes to fix the privacy issues
   that have been analyzed in this document.  Protocol changes are out
   of scope for this document.

   The primary focus of this document is around privacy considerations
   for clients to support client mobility and connection to random
   networks.  The privacy of DHCP servers and relay agents are
   considered less important as they are typically open for public
   services.  And, it is generally assumed that relay agent to server
   communication is protected from casual snooping, as that
   communication occurs in the provider's backbone.  Nevertheless, the
   topics involving relay agents and servers are explored to some
   degree.  However, future work may want to further explore privacy of
   DHCP servers and relay agents.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  When these
   words are not in ALL CAPS (such as "should" or "Should"), they have
   their usual English meanings, and are not to be interpreted as
   [RFC2119] key words.

   Naming convention from [RFC3315] and related is used throughout this
   document.  In addition the following terminology is used:

   Stable identifier  - Any property disclosed by a DHCP client that
           does not change over time or changes very infrequently and is
           unique for said client in a given context.  Examples may
           include MAC address, client-id or a hostname.  Some
           identifiers may be considered stable only under certain
           conditions, for example one client implementation may keep
           its client-id stored in stable storage while other may
           generate it on the fly and use a different one after each
           boot.  Stable identifier may or may not be globally unique.

3.  DHCPv6 options carrying identifiers

   In DHCPv6, there are many options which include identification
   information or can be used to extract the identification information
   about the client.  This section enumerates various options and
   identifiers conveyed in them, which can be used to disclose client
   identification.  The attacks that are enabled by such disclosures are
   detailed in Section 5.

3.1.  DUID

   Each DHCPv6 client and server has a DHCPv6 Unique Identifier (DUID)
   [RFC3315].  The DUID is designed to be unique across all DHCPv6
   clients and servers, and to remain stable after it has been initially
   generated.  The DUID can be of different forms.  Commonly used forms
   are based on the link-layer address of one of the device's network
   interfaces (with or without a timestamp), on the Universally Unique
   IDentifier (UUID) [RFC6355].  The default type, defined in
   Section 9.2 of [RFC3315] is DUID-LLT that is based on link-layer
   address.  It is commonly implemented in most popular clients.

   It is important to understand DUID lifecycle.  Clients and servers
   are expected to generate their DUID once (during first operation) and
   store it in a non-volatile storage or use the same deterministic
   algorithm to generate the same DUID value again.  This means that
   most implementations will use the available link-layer address during
   its first boot.  Even if the administrator enables link-layer address
   randomization, it is likely that it was disabled during the first
   device boot.  Hence the original, unobfuscated link-layer address
   will likely end up being announced as client DUID, even if the link-
   layer address has changed (or even if being changed on a periodic
   basis).  The exposure of the original link-layer address in DUID will
   also undermine other privacy extensions such as [RFC4941].

3.2.  Client Identifier Option

   The Client Identifier Option (OPTION_CLIENTID) [RFC3315] is used to
   carry the DUID of a DHCPv6 client between a client and a server.
   There is an analogous Server Identifier Option but it is not as
   interesting in the privacy context (unless a host can be convinced to
   start acting as a server).  See Section 3.1 for relevant discussion
   about DUIDs.

3.3.  IA_NA, IA_TA, IA_PD, IA Address and IA Prefix Options

   The Identity Association for Non-temporary Addresses (IA_NA) option
   [RFC3315] is used to carry the parameters and any non-temporary
   addresses associated with the given IA_NA.  The Identity Association
   for Temporary Addresses (IA_TA) option [RFC3315] is analogous to the
   IA_NA option but for temporary addresses.  The IA Address option
   [RFC3315] is used to specify IPv6 addresses associated with an IA_NA
   or an IA_TA and is encapsulated within the Options field of such an
   IA_NA or IA_TA option.  The Identity Association for Prefix
   Delegation (IA_PD) [RFC3633] option is used to carry the prefixes
   that are assigned to the requesting router.  IA Prefix option
   [RFC3633] is used to specify IPv6 prefixes associated with an IA_PD
   and is encapsulated within the Options field of such an IA_PD option.

   To differentiate between instances of the same type of IA containers
   for a client, each IA_NA, IA_TA and IA_PD options have an IAID field
   with a unique value for a given IA type.  It is up to the client to
   pick unique IAID values.  At least one popular implementation uses
   last four octets of the link-layer address.  In most cases, that
   means that merely two bytes are missing for a full link-layer address
   reconstruction.  However, the first three octets in a typical link-
   layer address are vendor identifier.  That can be determined with
   high level of certainty using other means, thus allowing full link-
   layer address discovery.

3.4.  Client FQDN Option

   The Client Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) option [RFC4704] is
   used by DHCPv6 clients and servers to exchange information about the
   client's fully qualified domain name and about who has the
   responsibility for updating the DNS with the associated AAAA and PTR
   RRs.

   A client can use this option to convey all or part of its domain name
   to a DHCPv6 server for the IPv6-address-to-FQDN mapping.  In most
   case a client sends its hostname as a hint for the server.  The
   DHCPv6 server MAY be configured to modify the supplied name or to
   substitute a different name.  The server should send its notion of
   the complete FQDN for the client in the Domain Name field.

3.5.  Client Link-layer Address Option

   The Client link-layer address option [RFC6939] is used by first-hop
   DHCPv6 relays to provide the client's link-layer address towards the
   server.

   DHCPv6 relay agents that receive messages originating from clients
   may include the link-layer source address of the received DHCPv6
   message in the Client Link-Layer Address option, in relayed DHCPv6
   Relay-Forward messages.

3.6.  Option Request Option

   DHCPv6 clients include an Option Request option [RFC3315] in DHCPv6
   messages to inform the server about options the client wants the
   server to send to the client.

   The content of an Option Request option are the option codes for an
   option requested by the client.  The client may additionally include
   instances of those options that are identified in the Option Request
   option, with data values as hints to the server about parameter
   values the client would like to have returned.

3.7.  Vendor Class and Vendor-specific Information Options

   The Vendor Class option, defined in Section 22.16 of [RFC3315] is
   used by a DHCPv6 client to identify the vendor that manufactured the
   hardware on which the client is running.

   The Vendor-specific Information Option, defined in Section 22.17 of
   [RFC3315] includes enterprise number, which identifies the client's
   vendor and often includes a number of additional parameters that are
   specific to a given vendor.  That may include any type of information
   the vendor deems useful.  It should be noted that this information
   may be present (and different) in both directions: client to server
   and server to client communications.

   The information contained in the data area of this option is
   contained in one or more opaque fields that identify details of the
   hardware configuration, for example, the version of the operating
   system the client is running or the amount of memory installed on the
   client.

3.8.  Civic Location Option

   DHCPv6 servers use the Civic Location option [RFC4776] to deliver the
   location information (the civic and postal addresses) from the DHCPv6
   server to the DHCPv6 clients.  It may refer to three locations: the
   location of the DHCPv6 server, the location of the network element
   believed to be closest to the client, or the location of the client,
   identified by the "what" element within the option.

3.9.  Coordinate-Based Location Option

   The GeoLoc options [RFC6225] is used by DHCPv6 server to provide the
   coordinate- based geographic location information to the DHCPv6
   clients.  It enable a DHCPv6 client to obtain its location.

3.10.  Client System Architecture Type Option

   The Client System Architecture Type option [RFC5970] is used by
   DHCPv6 client to send a list of supported architecture types to the
   DHCPv6 server.  It is used by clients that must be booted using the
   network rather than from local storage, so the server can decide
   which boot file should be provided to the client.

3.11.  Relay Agent Options

   A DHCPv6 relay agent may include a number of options.  Those option
   contain information that can be used to identify the client.  Those
   options are almost exclusively exchanged between the relay agent and
   the server, thus never leaving the operators network.  In particular,
   they're almost never present in the last wireless hop in case of WiFi
   networks.  The only exception to that rule is somewhat infrequently
   used Relay Supplied Options option [RFC6422].  This fact implies that
   the threat model related relay options is slightly different.
   Traffic sniffing at the last hop and related class of attacks
   typically do not apply.  On the other hand, all attacks that involve
   operator's intfrastructure (either willing or coerced cooperation or
   infrastructure being compromised) usually apply.

   The following subsections describe various options inserted by the
   relay agents.

3.11.1.  Subscriber ID Option

   A DHCPv6 relay may include a Subscriber ID option [RFC4580] to
   associate some provider-specific information with clients' DHCPv6
   messages that is independent of the physical network configuration.

   In many deployments, the relay agent that inserts this option is
   configured to use client's link-layer address as Subscriber ID.

3.11.2.  Interface ID Option

   A DHCPv6 relay includes the Interface ID [RFC3315] option to identify
   the interface on which it received the client message that is being
   relayed.

   Although in principle Interface ID can be arbitrarily long with
   completely random values, it is sometimes a text string that includes
   the relay agent name followed by interface name.  This can be used
   for fingerprinting the relay or determining client's point of
   attachment.

3.11.3.  Remote ID Option

   A DHCPv6 relay includes a Remote ID option [RFC4649] to identify the
   remote host end of the circuit.

   The remote-id is vendor specific, for which the vendor is indicated
   in the enterprise-number field.  The remote-id field may encode the
   information that identified the DHCPv6 clients:

   o  a "caller ID" telephone number for dial-up connection

   o  a "user name" prompted for by a Remote Access Server

   o  a remote caller ATM address o a "modem ID" of a cable data modem

   o  the remote IP address of a point-to-point link

   o  an interface or port identifier

3.11.4.  Relay-ID Option

   Relay agent may include Relay-ID [RFC5460], which contains a unique
   relay agent identifier.  While its intended use is to provide
   additional information for the server, so it would be able to respond
   to leasequeries later, this information can be also used to identify
   client's location within the network.

4.  Existing Mechanisms That Affect Privacy

   This section describes deployed DHCPv6 mechanisms that can affect
   privacy.

4.1.  Temporary addresses

   [RFC3315] defines a mechanism for a client to request temporary
   addresses.  The idea behind temporary addresses is that a client can
   request a temporary address for a specific purpose, use it, and then
   never renew it. i.e. let it expire.

   There are a number of serious issues, both related to protocol and
   its implementations, that make temporary addresses nearly useless for
   their original goal.  First, [RFC3315] does not include T1 and T2
   renewal timers in IA_TA (a container for temporary addresses).
   However, in section 18.1.3 it explicitly mentions that temporary
   addresses can be renewed.  Client implementations may mistakenly
   renew temporary addresses if they are not careful (i.e., by including
   the IA_TA with the same IAID in Renew or Rebind requests, rather than
   a new IAID - see [RFC3315] Section 22.5), thus forfeiting short
   liveness.  [RFC4704] does not explicitly prohibit servers to update
   DNS for assigned temporary addresses and there are implementations
   that can be configured to do that.  However, this is not advised as
   publishing a client's IPv6 address in DNS that is publicly available
   is a major privacy breach.

4.2.  DNS Updates

   The Client FQDN Option[RFC4704] used along with DNS Update [RFC2136]
   defines a mechanism that allows both clients and server to insert
   into the DNS domain information about clients.  Both forward (AAAA)
   and reverse (PTR) resource records can be updated.  This allows other
   nodes to conveniently refer to a host, despite the fact that its IPv6
   address may be changing.

   This mechanism exposes two important pieces of information: current
   address (which can be mapped to current location) and client's
   hostname.  The stable hostname can then by used to correlate the
   client across different network attachments even when its IPv6
   address keeps changing.

4.3.  Allocation strategies

   A DHCPv6 server running in typical, stateful mode is given a task of
   managing one or more pools of IPv6 resources (currently non-temporary
   addresses, temporary addresses and/or prefixes, but more resource
   types may be defined in the future).  When a client requests a
   resource, server must pick a resource out of configured pool.
   Depending on the server's implementation, various allocation
   strategies are possible.  Choices in this regard may have privacy
   implications.

   Iterative allocation - a server may choose to allocate addresses one
   by one.  That strategy has the benefit of being very fast, thus can
   be favored in deployments that prefer performance.  However, it makes
   the resources very predictable.  Also, since the resources allocated
   tend to be clustered at the beginning of available pool, it makes
   scanning attacks much easier.

   Identifier-based allocation - some server implementations use a fixed
   identifier for a specific client, seemingly taken from the client's
   MAC address when available or some lower bits of client's source IPv6
   address.  This has a property of being convenient for converting IP
   address to/from other identifiers, especially if the identifier is or
   contains MAC address.  It is also convenient, as returning client is
   very likely to get the same address, even if the server does not
   retain previous client's address.  Those properties are convenient
   for system administrators, so DHCPv6 server implementors are
   sometimes requested to implement it.  There is at least one
   implementation that supports it.  The downside of such allocation is
   that the client now discloses its identifier in its IPv6 address to
   all services it connects to.  That means that correlation of
   activities over time, location tracking, address scanning and OS/
   vendor discovery apply.

   Hash allocation - it's an extension of identifier based allocation.
   Instead of using the identifier directly, it is being hashed first.
   If the hash is implemented correctly, it removes the flaw of
   disclosing the identifier, a property that eliminates susceptibility
   to address scanning and OS/vendor discovery.  If the hash is poorly
   implemented (e.g. can be reverted), it introduces no improvement over
   identifier-based allocation.

   Random allocation - a server can pick a resource randomly out of
   available pool.  That strategy works well in scenarios where pool
   utilization is small, as the likelihood of collision (resulting in
   the server needing to repeat randomization) is small.  With the pool
   allocation increasing, the collision is disproportionally large, due
   to birthday paradox.  With high pool utilization (e.g. when 90% of
   available resources being allocated already), the server will use
   most computational resources to repeatedly pick a random resource,
   which will degrade its performance.  This allocation scheme
   essentially prevents returning clients from getting the same address
   or prefix again.  On the other hand, it is beneficial from privacy
   perspective as addresses and prefixes generated that way are not
   susceptible to correlation attacks, OS/vendor discovery attacks or
   identity discovery attacks.  Note that even though the address or
   prefix itself may be resilient to a given attack, the client may
   still be susceptible if additional information is disclosed other
   way, e.g. client's address can be randomized, but it still can leak
   its MAC address in client-id option.

   Other allocation strategies may be implemented.

5.  Attacks

5.1.  Device type discovery (fingerprinting)

   The type of device used by the client can be guessed by the attacker
   using the Vendor Class option, Vendor-specific Information option,
   the Client Link-layer Address option, and by parsing the Client ID
   option.  All of those options may contain OUI (Organizationally
   Unique Identifier) that represents the device's vendor.  That
   knowledge can be used for device-specific vulnerability exploitation
   attacks.  See Section 3.4 of

   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] for a discussion
   about this type of attack.

5.2.  Operating system discovery (fingerprinting)

   The operating system running on a client can be guessed using the
   Vendor Class option, the Vendor-specific Information option, the
   Client System Architecture Type option, or by using fingerprinting
   techniques on the combination of options requested using the Option
   Request option.  See Section 3.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] for a discussion
   about this type of attack.

5.3.  Finding location information

   The location information can be obtained by the attacker by many
   means.  The most direct way to obtain this information is by looking
   into a message originating from the server server that contains the Civic
   Location or GeoLoc option.  It can also be indirectly inferred using
   the Remote ID Option, the Interface ID option (e.g. if an access
   circuit on an Access Node corresponds to a civic location), or the
   Subscriber ID Option (if the attacker has access to subscriber info).

5.4.  Finding previously visited networks

   When DHCPv6 clients connect to a network, they attempt to obtain the
   same address they had used before they attached to the network.  They
   do this by putting the previously assigned address(es) in the IA
   Address Option(s).  [RFC3315] does not exclude IA_TA in such a case,
   so it is possible that a client implementation includes an address
   contained in an IA_TA for the Confirm message.  By observing these
   addresses, an attacker can identify the network the client had
   previously visited.

5.5.  Finding a stable identity

   An attacker might use a stable identity gleaned from DHCPv6 messages
   to correlate activities of a given client on unrelated networks.  The
   Client FQDN option, the Subscriber ID Option and the Client ID
   options can serve as long lived identifiers of DHCPv6 clients.  The
   Client FQDN option can also provide an identity that can easily be
   correlated with web server activity logs.

5.6.  Pervasive monitoring

   This is an enhancement, or a combination of most aforementioned
   mechanisms.  Operator (or anyone who has access to its data), who
   controls non-trivial number of access points or network segments, may
   use obtained information about a single client and observer client's
   habits.

5.7.  Finding client's IP address or hostname

   Many DHCPv6 deployments use DNS Updates [RFC4704] that put client's
   information (current IP address, client's hostname) into DNS, where
   it is easily accessible by anyone interested.  Client ID is also
   disclosed, albeit in not easily accessible form (SHA-256 digest of
   the client-id).  As SHA-256 is considered irreversible, DHCID can't
   be converted back to client-id.  However, SHA-256 digest can be used
   as an unique identifier that is accessible by any host.

5.8.  Correlation of activities over time

   As with other identifiers, an IPv6 address can be used to correlate
   the activities of a host for at least as long as the lifetime of the
   address.  If that address was generated from some other, stable
   identifier and that generation scheme can be deducted by an attacker,
   the duration of correlation attack extends to that identifier.  In
   many cases, its lifetime is equal to the lifetime of the device
   itself.  See Section 3.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] for detailed
   discussion.

5.9.  Location tracking

   If a stable identifier is used for assigning an address and such
   mapping is discovered by an attacker (e.g. a server that uses IEEE-
   identifier-based IID to generate IPv6 address), all scenarios
   discussed in Section 3.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] apply.  In particular
   both passive (a service that the client connects to can log client's
   address and draw conclusions regarding its location and movement
   patterns based on prefix it is connecting from) and active (attacker
   can send ICMPv6 echo requests or other probe packets to networks of
   suspected client locations) can be used.  To give specific example,
   by accessing a social portal from tomek-
   laptop.coffee.somecity.com.example, tomek-
   laptop.mycompany.com.example and tomek-laptop.myisp.example.com, the
   portal administrator can draw conclusions about tomek-laptop's owner
   current location and his habits.

5.10.  Leasequery & bulk leasequery

   Attackers may pretend masquerade as an access concentrator, either DHCPv6
   relay agent or DHCPv6 client, to obtain location information directly
   from the DHCP server(s) using the DHCPv6 Leasequery [RFC5007]
   mechanism.

   Location information is information needed by the access concentrator
   to forward traffic to a broadband-accessible host.  This information
   includes knowledge of the host hardware address, the port or virtual
   circuit that leads to the host, and/or the hardware address of the
   intervening subscriber modem.

   Furthermore, the attackers may use DHCPv6 bulk leasequery [RFC5460]
   mechanism to obtain bulk information about DHCPv6 bindings, even
   without knowing the target bindings.

   Additionally, active leasequery [RFC7653] is a mechanism for
   subscribing to DHCPv6 lease update changes in near real-time.  The
   intent of this mechanism is to update operator's database, but if
   misused, an attacker could defeat server's authentication mechanisms
   and subscribe to all updates.  He then could continue receiving
   updates, without any need for local presence.

6.  Security Considerations

   In current practice, the client privacy and the client authentication
   are mutually exclusive.  The client authentication procedure reveals
   additional client information in their certificates/identifiers.
   Full privacy for the clients may mean the clients are also anonymous
   for the server and the network.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   This document at its entirety discusses privacy considerations in
   DHCPv6.  As such, no dedicated discussion is needed.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This draft does not request any IANA action.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Ted Lemon, Ines
   Robles, Russ White, Christian Schaefer, Jinmei Tatuya, Bernie Volz,
   Marcin Siodelski, Christian Huitema Huitema, Brian Haberman and other members
   of DHC WG for their valuable comments.

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
              2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy]
              Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-08 (work
              in progress), September 2015.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>.

   [RFC3633]  Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3633, December 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3633>.

   [RFC4580]  Volz, B., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
              (DHCPv6) Relay Agent Subscriber-ID Option", RFC 4580,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4580, June 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4580>.

   [RFC4649]  Volz, B., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
              (DHCPv6) Relay Agent Remote-ID Option", RFC 4649,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4649, August 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4649>.

   [RFC4704]  Volz, B., "The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6) Client Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
              Option", RFC 4704, DOI 10.17487/RFC4704, October 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4704>.

   [RFC4776]  Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              (DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses
              Configuration Information", RFC 4776,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4776, November 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4776>.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

   [RFC5007]  Brzozowski, J., Kinnear, K., Volz, B., and S. Zeng,
              "DHCPv6 Leasequery", RFC 5007, DOI 10.17487/RFC5007,
              September 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5007>.

   [RFC5460]  Stapp, M., "DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery", RFC 5460,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5460, February 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5460>.

   [RFC5970]  Huth, T., Freimann, J., Zimmer, V., and D. Thaler, "DHCPv6
              Options for Network Boot", RFC 5970, DOI 10.17487/RFC5970,
              September 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5970>.

   [RFC6225]  Polk, J., Linsner, M., Thomson, M., and B. Aboba, Ed.,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Options for
              Coordinate-Based Location Configuration Information",
              RFC 6225, DOI 10.17487/RFC6225, July 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6225>.

   [RFC6355]  Narten, T. and J. Johnson, "Definition of the UUID-Based
              DHCPv6 Unique Identifier (DUID-UUID)", RFC 6355,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6355, August 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6355>.

   [RFC6422]  Lemon, T. and Q. Wu, "Relay-Supplied DHCP Options",
              RFC 6422, DOI 10.17487/RFC6422, December 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6422>.

   [RFC6939]  Halwasia, G., Bhandari, S., and W. Dec, "Client Link-Layer
              Address Option in DHCPv6", RFC 6939, DOI 10.17487/RFC6939,
              May 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6939>.

   [RFC7653]  Raghuvanshi, D., Kinnear, K., and D. Kukrety, "DHCPv6
              Active Leasequery", RFC 7653, DOI 10.17487/RFC7653,
              October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7653>.

Authors' Addresses

   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson
   8400 Decarie Blvd.
   Town of Mount Royal, QC
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
   Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com

   Tomek Mrugalski
   Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
   950 Charter Street
   Redwood City, CA  94063
   USA

   Email: tomasz.mrugalski@gmail.com

   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 BeiQing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing  100095
   P.R. China

   Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com