draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-13.txt   rfc6925.txt 
DHC B. Joshi Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Joshi
Internet-Draft D. Ramakrishna Rao Request for Comments: 6925 R. Desetti
Intended status: Standards Track Infosys Ltd. Category: Standards Track Infosys Ltd.
Expires: August 23, 2013 M. Stapp ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Stapp
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
February 19, 2013 April 2013
The DHCPv4 Relay Agent Identifier Suboption The DHCPv4 Relay Agent Identifier Sub-Option
draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-13.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a new Relay Agent Identifier suboption for the This document defines a new Relay Agent Identifier sub-option for the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol's (DHCP) Relay Agent Information Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Relay Agent Information
option. The suboption carries a value that uniquely identifies the option. The sub-option carries a value that uniquely identifies the
relay agent device within the administrative domain. The value is relay agent device within the administrative domain. The value is
normally administratively-configured in the relay agent. The normally administratively configured in the relay agent. The sub-
suboption allows a DHCP relay agent to include the identifier in the option allows a DHCP relay agent to include the identifier in the
DHCP messages it sends. DHCP messages it sends.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 23, 2013. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6925.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology .....................................................2
3. Example Use-Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Example Use Cases ...............................................3
3.1. Bulk Leasequery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Bulk Leasequery ............................................3
3.2. Industrial Ethernet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2. Industrial Ethernet ........................................3
4. Suboption Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Sub-Option Format ...............................................4
5. Identifier Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Identifier Stability ............................................4
5.1. Identifier Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Identifier Uniqueness ......................................5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Security Considerations .........................................6
6.1. Forged Relay ID attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.1. Forged Relay ID Attacks ....................................6
6.2. Factory Floor Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.2. Factory-Floor Scenario .....................................6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. IANA Considerations .............................................7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgments .................................................7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References ......................................................7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Normative References .......................................7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References .....................................8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4) [RFC2131] The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4) [RFC2131]
provides IP addresses and configuration information for IPv4 clients. provides IP addresses and configuration information for IPv4 clients.
It includes a relay agent capability, in which network elements It includes a relay agent capability, in which network elements
receive broadcast messages from clients and forward them to DHCP receive broadcast messages from clients and forward them to DHCP
servers as unicast messages. In many network environments, relay servers as unicast messages. In many network environments, relay
agents add information to the DHCP messages before forwarding them, agents add information to the DHCP messages before forwarding them,
using the Relay Agent Information option [RFC3046]. Servers that using the Relay Agent Information option [RFC3046]. Servers that
recognize the relay agent information option echo it back in their recognize the Relay Agent Information option echo it back in their
replies. replies.
This specification introduces a Relay Agent Identifier (Relay-Id) This specification introduces a Relay Agent Identifier (Relay-ID)
suboption for the Relay Agent Information option. The Relay-Id sub-option for the Relay Agent Information option. The Relay-ID sub-
suboption carries a sequence of octets that is intended to uniquely option carries a sequence of octets that is intended to uniquely
identify the relay agent within the administrative domain. In this identify the relay agent within the administrative domain. In this
document, an administrative domain consist of all DHCP servers and document, an administrative domain consists of all DHCP servers and
relay agents that communicate with each other. relay agents that communicate with each other.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
DHCPv4 terminology is defined in [RFC2131], and the DHCPv4 Relay DHCPv4 terminology is defined in [RFC2131], and the DHCPv4 Relay
Agent Information Option in [RFC3046]. Agent Information option is defined in [RFC3046].
3. Example Use-Cases 3. Example Use Cases
3.1. Bulk Leasequery 3.1. Bulk Leasequery
There has been quite a bit of recent interest in extending the DHCP There has been quite a bit of recent interest in extending the DHCP
Leasequery protocol [RFC4388] to accommodate some additional Leasequery protocol [RFC4388] to accommodate some additional
situations. There is a recent document situations. [RFC6926] proposes a variety of enhancements to the
[I-D.ietf-dhc-dhcpv4-bulk-leasequery] proposing a variety of existing Leasequery protocol. The document describes a use case
enhancements to the existing Leasequery protocol. The document where a relay agent queries DHCP servers using the relay identifier
describes a use-case where a relay agent queries DHCP servers using to retrieve all the leases allocated through the relay agent.
the Relay Identifier to retrieve all the leases allocated through the
relay agent.
3.2. Industrial Ethernet 3.2. Industrial Ethernet
DHCP typically identifies clients based on information in their DHCP DHCP typically identifies clients based on information in their DHCP
messages - such as the Client-Identifier option, or the value of the messages, such as the Client-Identifier option or the value of the
chaddr field. In some networks, however, the location of a client - chaddr field. In some networks, however, the location of a client --
its point of attachment to the network - is a more useful identifier. its point of attachment to the network -- is a more useful
In factory-floor networks (commonly called 'Industrial' networks), identifier. In factory-floor networks (commonly called 'industrial'
for example, the role a device plays is often fixed and based on its networks), for example, the role a device plays is often fixed and
location. Using manual address configuration is possible (and is based on its location. Using manual address configuration is
common) but it would be beneficial if DHCP configuration could be possible (and is common), but it would be beneficial if DHCP
applied to these networks. configuration could be applied to these networks.
One way to provide connection-based identifiers for industrial One way to provide connection-based identifiers for industrial
networks is to have the network elements acting as DHCP relay agents networks is to have the network elements acting as DHCP relay agents
supply information that a DHCP server could use as a client supply information that a DHCP server could use as a client
identifier. A straightforward way to form identifier information is identifier. A straightforward way to form identifier information is
to combine something that is unique within the scope of the network to combine something that is unique within the scope of the network
element, such as a port/slot value, with something that uniquely element, such as a port/slot value, with something that uniquely
identifies that network element, such as a Relay Agent Identifier. identifies that network element, such as a Relay Agent Identifier.
4. Suboption Format 4. Sub-Option Format
Format of the Relay Agent Identifier suboption: Format of the Relay Agent Identifier sub-option:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|SUBOPT_RELAY_ID| length | | |SUBOPT_RELAY_ID| length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
. . . .
. identifier (variable) . . identifier (variable) .
. . . .
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------------------------+
Where: Where:
SUBOPT_RELAY_ID [TBA] SUBOPT_RELAY_ID 12
length the number of octets in the suboption length the number of octets in the sub-option
(excluding the suboption ID and length fields); (excluding the sub-option ID and length fields);
the minimum length is one. the minimum length is one.
identifier the identifying data. identifier the identifying data
5. Identifier Stability 5. Identifier Stability
If the relay identifier is to be meaningful it has to be stable. A If the relay identifier is to be meaningful, it has to be stable. A
relay agent SHOULD use a single identifier value consistently. The relay agent SHOULD use a single identifier value consistently. The
identifier used by a relay device SHOULD be committed to stable identifier used by a relay device SHOULD be committed to stable
storage, unless the relay device can regenerate the value upon storage, unless the relay device can regenerate the value upon
reboot. reboot.
If the relay-id configured in a relay agent is not unique within its If the Relay-ID configured in a relay agent is not unique within its
administrative domain, resource allocation problems may occur as the administrative domain, resource allocation problems may occur as the
DHCP server attempts to allocate the same resource to devices behind DHCP server attempts to allocate the same resource to devices behind
two different relay agents. Therefore, relay-id configured in a two different relay agents. Therefore, a Relay-ID configured in a
relay agent MUST be unique within its administrative domain. To aid relay agent MUST be unique within its administrative domain. To aid
in ensuring uniqueness of relay-ids, relay agents SHOULD make their in ensuring uniqueness of Relay-IDs, relay agents SHOULD make their
relay identifiers visible to their administrators via their user relay identifiers visible to their administrators via their user
interface, through a log entry, through a MIB field, or through some interface, through a log entry, through a MIB field, or through some
other mechanism. other mechanism.
Implementors of relay agents should note that the identifier needs to Implementors of relay agents should note that the identifier needs to
be present in all DHCP message types where its value is being used by be present in all DHCP message types where its value is being used by
the DHCP server. The relay agent may not be able to add the Relay the DHCP server. The relay agent may not be able to add the Relay
Agent Information option to all messages - such as RENEW messages Agent Information option to all messages, such as RENEW messages sent
sent as IP unicasts. In some deployments that might mean that the as IP unicasts. In some deployments, that might mean that the server
server has to be willing to continue to associate the relay has to be willing to continue to associate the relay identifier it
identifier it has last seen with a lease that is being RENEWed. has last seen with a lease that is being RENEWed. Other deployments
Other deployments may prefer to use the Server Identifier Override may prefer to use the Server Identifier Override sub-option [RFC5107]
suboption [RFC5107] to permit the relay device to insert the Relay to permit the relay device to insert the Relay Agent Information
Agent Information option into all relayed messages. option into all relayed messages.
Handling situations where a relay agent device is replaced is another Handling situations where a relay agent device is replaced is another
aspect of stability. One of the use-cases for the relay identifier aspect of stability. One of the use cases for the relay identifier
is to permit a server to associate clients' lease bindings with the is to permit a server to associate clients' lease bindings with the
relay device connected to the clients. If the relay device is relay device connected to the clients. If the relay device is
replaced, because it has failed or been upgraded, it may be desirable replaced because it has failed or been upgraded, it may be desirable
for the new device to continue to provide the same relay identifier for the new device to continue to provide the same relay identifier
as the old device. Therefore if a relay agent supports relay-id, the as the old device. Therefore, if a relay agent supports Relay-ID,
relay-id should be administratively configurable. the Relay-ID should be administratively configurable.
5.1. Identifier Uniqueness 5.1. Identifier Uniqueness
Administrators should take special care to ensure that relay-ids It is strongly recommended that administrators take special care to
configured in their relay agents are not duplicated. There are a ensure that Relay-IDs configured in their relay agents are not
number of strategies that may be used to achieve this. duplicated. There are a number of strategies that may be used to
achieve this.
Administrators may use a strategy to configure unique relay-ids. One Administrators may use a strategy to configure unique Relay-IDs. One
such strategy is that a relay-id on a relay agent may re-use an such strategy is that a Relay-ID on a relay agent may reuse an
existing identifier or set of identifiers that are already guaranteed existing identifier or set of identifiers that are already guaranteed
to be unique (e.g., UUID [RFC4122]). to be unique (e.g., Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) [RFC4122]).
For administrators who are already using a provisioning system to For administrators who are already using a provisioning system to
manage their networking infrastructure, it may work to enumerate manage their networking infrastructure, it may work to enumerate
relay agents on the basis of roles, and then as a second step, assign relay agents on the basis of roles and then, as a second step, assign
those roles to specific relay agents or groups of relay agents. In those roles to specific relay agents or groups of relay agents. In
such a scenario, when a replacement relay agent is first seen by the such a scenario, when a replacement relay agent is first seen by the
DHCP server, this could trigger a configuration event on the DHCP server, it could trigger a configuration event on the
provisioning system, and the new relay agent could be assigned to the provisioning system, and the new relay agent could be assigned to the
role of the relay agent it is replacing. role of the relay agent it is replacing.
In some cases it may be that the DHCP server has configurable event It may be that the DHCP server has configurable event notification
notification, and that a duplicate relay-id would cause some event and that a duplicate Relay-ID would trigger this notification.
that could trigger a notification, and that would never happen in any Administrators can take advantage of this feature to work out whether
other case. In this scenario, administrators should take advantage the duplication is real and unintended or whether the original relay
of this feature. This is not a perfect solution, because it will not agent is being replaced.
work until such an event occurs.
A network management/provisioning system may also be able to collect A network management/provisioning system may also be able to collect
a full list of all relay agents on the network. It may then notice a full list of all relay agents on the network. It may then notice
that more than one device reports the same relay-id. In such a case, that more than one device reports the same Relay-ID. In such a case,
the provisioning system could notify the administrator of the fault, the provisioning system could notify the administrator of the fault,
which could then be corrected. which could then be corrected.
This is not an exhaustive list of strategies. We suggest an This is not an exhaustive list of strategies. We suggest an
additional strategy in the security considerations section; additional strategy in the Security Considerations section. If none
administrators are also encouraged to consider the specifics of their of these strategies will work, administrators are also encouraged to
own network configuration to see if there is some way to detect consider the specifics of their own network configuration to see if
duplicate relay-ids other than the ones listed here, if none of these there is some way to detect duplicate Relay-IDs other than the ones
will work. listed here.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
6.1. Forged Relay ID attacks 6.1. Forged Relay ID Attacks
Security issues with the Relay Agent Information option and its use Security issues with the Relay Agent Information option and its use
by servers in address assignment are discussed in [RFC3046] and by servers in address assignment are discussed in [RFC3046] and
[RFC4030]. The DHCP Relay Agent Information option depends on a [RFC4030]. The DHCP Relay Agent Information option depends on a
trusted relationship between the DHCP relay agent and the DHCP trusted relationship between the DHCP relay agent and the DHCP
server, as described in Section 5 of RFC 3046. While the server, as described in Section 5 of [RFC3046]. While the
introduction of fraudulent DHCP relay agent information options can introduction of fraudulent DHCP Relay Agent Information options can
be prevented by a perimeter defense that blocks these options unless be prevented by a perimeter defense that blocks these options unless
the DHCP relay agent is trusted, a deeper defense using the the DHCP relay agent is trusted, a deeper defense using the
authentication suboption for DHCP relay agent information option authentication sub-option for the DHCP Relay Agent Information option
[RFC4030] SHOULD be deployed as well. It also helps in avoiding [RFC4030] SHOULD be deployed as well. It also helps in avoiding
duplication of relay identifiers by malicious entities. However, duplication of relay identifiers by malicious entities. However,
implementation of authentication suboption for DHCP relay agent implementation of the authentication sub-option for the DHCP Relay
information option [RFC4030] is not a must to support relay-id Agent Information option [RFC4030] is not a must to support the
suboption. Relay-ID sub-option.
6.2. Factory Floor Scenario 6.2. Factory-Floor Scenario
One possible use case for the relay-id suboption is the automated One possible use case for the Relay-ID sub-option is the automated
configuration of machines on a factory floor. In this situation, configuration of machines on a factory floor. In this situation,
various sections of the factory floor might be on their own network various sections of the factory floor might be on their own network
links, with a relay agent interposed between those links and the DHCP links with a relay agent interposed between those links and the DHCP
server. The relay-id of each relay agent might cause special server. The Relay-ID of each relay agent might cause special
configurations to be downloaded to those devices to control their configurations to be downloaded to those devices to control their
behavior. behavior.
If a relay agent was deployed on the factory floor in such a If a relay agent was deployed on the factory floor in such a
situation, with an incorrect relay-id, there is the potential that situation, with an incorrect Relay-ID, there is the potential that
devices could be misconfigured in a way that could produce incorrect devices could be misconfigured in a way that could produce incorrect
results, cause physical damage, or even create hazardous conditions results, cause physical damage, or even create hazardous conditions
for workers. for workers.
In deployment scenarios like this one, administrators must use some In deployment scenarios like this one, administrators must use some
dependable technique to ensure that such misconfigurations do not dependable technique to ensure that such misconfigurations do not
occur. It is beyond the scope of this document to provide a complete occur. It is beyond the scope of this document to provide a complete
list of such techniques. list of such techniques.
However, as an example, a relay agent device intended for use in such However, as an example, a relay agent device intended for use in such
a scenario could require the use of a hardware token that contains a scenario could require the use of a hardware token that contains a
the relay-id, that is physically attached to the installation Relay-ID that is physically attached to the installation location of
location of the relay agent device, and that can be connected to and the relay agent device and can be connected to and disconnected from
disconnected from the relay agent device without the use of special the relay agent device without the use of special tools. Such a
tools. Such a relay agent device should not be operable when this relay agent device should not be operable when this hardware token is
hardware token is not connected to it: either it should fail because not connected to it: either it should fail because it presents an
it presents an unknown identifier to the DHCP server, or it should unknown identifier to the DHCP server, or it should simply refuse to
simply refuse to relay DHCP packets until the token is connected to relay DHCP packets until the token is connected to it.
it.
A relay agent device that does not provide a clear mitigation A relay agent device that does not provide a clear mitigation
strategy for a scenario where misconfiguration could have damaging or strategy for a scenario where misconfiguration could have damaging or
hazardous consequences should not be deployed in such a scenario. hazardous consequences should not be deployed in such a scenario.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
We request that IANA assign a new suboption code from the registry of IANA has assigned a new sub-option code from the "DHCP Relay Agent
DHCP Agent Sub-Option Codes maintained in Sub-Option Codes" registry maintained at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters. http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters.
Relay Agent Identifier Suboption [TBA] Relay Agent Identifier Sub-Option 12
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Bernie Volz, David W. Hankins, Pavan Kurapati and Ted Lemon Thanks to Bernie Volz, David W. Hankins, Pavan Kurapati, and Ted
for providing valuable suggestions. Lemon for providing valuable suggestions.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
RFC 2131, March 1997. 2131, March 1997.
[RFC3046] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option", [RFC3046] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option", RFC
RFC 3046, January 2001. 3046, January 2001.
[RFC4030] Stapp, M. and T. Lemon, "The Authentication Suboption for [RFC4030] Stapp, M. and T. Lemon, "The Authentication Suboption for
the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Relay Agent the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Relay Agent
Option", RFC 4030, March 2005. Option", RFC 4030, March 2005.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July
July 2005. 2005.
[RFC4388] Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration [RFC4388] Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006. Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006.
[RFC5107] Johnson, R., Kumarasamy, J., Kinnear, K., and M. Stapp, [RFC5107] Johnson, R., Kumarasamy, J., Kinnear, K., and M. Stapp,
"DHCP Server Identifier Override Suboption", RFC 5107, "DHCP Server Identifier Override Suboption", RFC 5107,
February 2008. February 2008.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-dhcpv4-bulk-leasequery] [RFC6926] Kinnear, K., Stapp, M., Desetti, R., Joshi, B., Russell,
Kinnear, K., Stapp, M., Joshi, B., and N. Russell, "Bulk N., Kurapati, P., and B. Volz, "DHCPv4 Bulk Leasequery",
DHCPv4 Lease Query", RFC 6926, April 2013.
draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv4-bulk-leasequery-07 (work in
progress), October 2012.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Bharat Joshi Bharat Joshi
Infosys Ltd. Infosys Ltd.
44 Electronics City, Hosur Road 44 Electronics City, Hosur Road
Bangalore 560 100 Bangalore 560 100
India India
Email: bharat_joshi@infosys.com EMail: bharat_joshi@infosys.com
URI: http://www.infosys.com/ URI: http://www.infosys.com/
D.T.V Ramakrishna Rao D.T.V Ramakrishna Rao
Infosys Ltd. Infosys Ltd.
44 Electronics City, Hosur Road 44 Electronics City, Hosur Road
Bangalore 560 100 Bangalore 560 100
India India
Email: ramakrishnadtv@infosys.com EMail: ramakrishnadtv@infosys.com
URI: http://www.infosys.com/ URI: http://www.infosys.com/
Mark Stapp Mark Stapp
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Ave. 1414 Massachusetts Ave.
Boxborough, MA 01719 Boxborough, MA 01719
USA USA
Phone: +1 978 936 0000 Phone: +1 978 936 0000
Email: mjs@cisco.com EMail: mjs@cisco.com
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