draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-17.txt   draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18.txt 
DHC Working Group S. Jiang DHC Working Group S. Jiang
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track L. Li Intended status: Standards Track L. Li
Expires: April 23, 2017 Y. Cui Expires: June 7, 2017 Y. Cui
Tsinghua University Tsinghua University
T. Jinmei T. Jinmei
Infoblox Inc. Infoblox Inc.
T. Lemon T. Lemon
Nominum, Inc. Nominum, Inc.
D. Zhang D. Zhang
October 20, 2016 December 4, 2016
Secure DHCPv6 Secure DHCPv6
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-17 draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18
Abstract Abstract
DHCPv6 includes no deployable security mechanism that can protect DHCPv6 includes no deployable security mechanism that can protect
end-to-end communication between DHCP clients and servers. This end-to-end communication between DHCP clients and servers. This
document describes a mechanism for using public key cryptography to document describes a mechanism for using public key cryptography to
provide such security. The mechanism provides encryption in all provide such security. The mechanism provides encryption in all
cases, and can be used for authentication based on pre-sharing of cases, and can be used for authentication based on pre-sharing of
authorized certificates. authorized certificates.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 7, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2. Requirements Language and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Issues of DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Issues of DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. New Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. New Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. Caused change to RFC3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. Caused change to RFC3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Relay Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Relay Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Increasing Number Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Increasing Number Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. New DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1. New DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1.1. Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1.1. Algorithm Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1.2. Signature option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1.2. Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1.3. Increasing-number Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1.3. Signature option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1.4. Encrypted-message Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.1.4. Increasing-number Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1.5. Encryption Key Tag Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10.3. Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.3. Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6, [RFC3315]) The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6, [RFC3315])
allows DHCPv6 servers to flexibly provide addressing and other allows DHCPv6 servers to flexibly provide addressing and other
configuration information relating to local network infrastructure to configuration information relating to local network infrastructure to
DHCP clients. The protocol provides no deployable security DHCP clients. The protocol provides no deployable security
mechanism, and consequently is vulnerable to various attacks. mechanism, and consequently is vulnerable to various attacks.
This document provides a brief summary of the security This document provides a brief summary of the security
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monitoring. monitoring.
The extension specified in this document applies only to end-to-end The extension specified in this document applies only to end-to-end
communication between DHCP servers and clients. Options added by communication between DHCP servers and clients. Options added by
relay agents in Relay-Forward messages, and options other than the relay agents in Relay-Forward messages, and options other than the
client message in Relay-Reply messages sent by DHCP servers, are not client message in Relay-Reply messages sent by DHCP servers, are not
protected. Such communications are already protected using the protected. Such communications are already protected using the
mechanism described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315]. mechanism described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315].
This extension introduces two new DHCPv6 messages: the Encrypted- This extension introduces two new DHCPv6 messages: the Encrypted-
Query and the Encrypted-Response messages. It defines four new Query and the Encrypted-Response messages. It defines six new DHCPv6
DHCPv6 options: the Certificate, the Signature, the Increasing- options: the Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, Increasing-number,
number, and the Encrypted-message options. The Certificate, Encryption Key Tag option and Encrypted-message options. The
Signature, and Increasing-number options are used for authentication. Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, and Increasing-number options are
The Encryption-Query message, Encryption-Response message and used for authentication. The Encryption-Query message, Encryption-
Encrypted-message option are used for encryption. Response message, Encrypted-message option and Encryption Key Tag
option are used for encryption.
2. Requirements Language and Terminology 2. Requirements Language and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they
appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as
"should" or "Should"), they have their usual English meanings, and "should" or "Should"), they have their usual English meanings, and
are not to be interpreted as [RFC2119] key words. are not to be interpreted as [RFC2119] key words.
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authentication without requiring a symmetric key distribution authentication without requiring a symmetric key distribution
solution for DHCP, this document defines an asymmetric key solution for DHCP, this document defines an asymmetric key
authentication and encryption mechanism. This protects against both authentication and encryption mechanism. This protects against both
active attacks, such as spoofing, and passive attacks, such as active attacks, such as spoofing, and passive attacks, such as
pervasive monitoring. pervasive monitoring.
5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview 5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview
5.1. Solution Overview 5.1. Solution Overview
The following figure illustrated secure DHCPv6 procedure. Briefly, The following figure illustrates secure DHCPv6 procedure. Briefly,
this extension establishes the server's identity with an anonymous this extension establishes the server's identity with an anonymous
Information-Request exchange. Once the server's identity has been Information-Request exchange. Once the server's identity has been
established, the client may either choose to communicate with the established, the client may either choose to communicate with the
server or not. Not communicating with an unknown server avoids server or not. Not communicating with an unknown server avoids
revealing private information, but if there is no known server on a revealing private information, but if there is no known server on a
particular link, the client will be unable to communicate with a DHCP particular link, the client will be unable to communicate with a DHCP
server. server.
If the client chooses to communicate with a server, it uses the If the client chooses to communicate with the selected server(s), it
Encrypted-Query message to encapsulate its communications to the DHCP uses the Encrypted-Query message to encapsulate its communications to
server. The server responds with Encrypted-Response messages. the DHCP server. The server responds with Encrypted-Response
Normal DHCP messages are encapsulated in these two new messages using messages. Normal DHCP messages are encapsulated in these two new
the new defined Encrypted-message option. Besides the Encrypted- messages using the new defined Encrypted-message option. Besides the
message option, the Signature option is defined to verify the Encrypted-message option, the Signature option is defined to verify
integrity of the DHCPv6 messages and then authentication of client the integrity of the DHCPv6 messages and then authentication of
and server. The Increasing number option is defined to detect replay client and server. The Increasing number option is defined to detect
attack. replay attack.
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
|DHCPv6 Client| |DHCPv6 Server| |DHCPv6 Client| |DHCPv6 Server|
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
| Information-request | | Information-request |
|----------------------------------------->| |----------------------------------------->|
| Algorithm option |
| Option Request option | | Option Request option |
| | | |
| Reply | | Reply |
|<-----------------------------------------| |<-----------------------------------------|
| Certificate option | | Certificate option |
| Signature option | | Signature option |
| Increasing-number option | | Increasing-number option |
| Server Identifier option | | Server Identifier option |
| | | |
| Encryption-Query | | Encryption-Query |
|----------------------------------------->| |----------------------------------------->|
| Encrypted-message option | | Encrypted-message option |
| Server Identifier option | | Server Identifier option |
| Encryption Key Tag option |
| | | |
| Encryption-Response | | Encryption-Response |
|<-----------------------------------------| |<-----------------------------------------|
| Encrypted-message option | | Encrypted-message option |
| | | |
Figure 1: Secure DHCPv6 Procedure Figure 1: Secure DHCPv6 Procedure
5.2. New Components 5.2. New Components
The new components of the mechanism specified in this document are as The new components of the mechanism specified in this document are as
follows: follows:
o Servers and clients that use certificates first generate a public/ o Servers and clients that use certificates first generate a public/
private key pair and then obtain a certificate that signs the private key pair and then obtain a certificate that signs the
public key. The Certificate option is defined to carry the public key. The Certificate option is defined to carry the
certificate of the sender. certificate of the sender.
o A signature is generated using the private key to verify the o The algorithm option is defined to carry the algorithms lists for
algorithm agility.
o The signature is generated using the private key to verify the
integrity of the DHCPv6 messages. The Signature option is defined integrity of the DHCPv6 messages. The Signature option is defined
to carry the signature. to carry the signature.
o A Increasing-number is used to detect replayed packet. The o The increasing number is used to detect replayed packet. The
Timestamp is one of the possible implementation choices. The Timestamp is one of the possible implementation choices. The
Increasing-number option is defined to carry a strictly-increasing Increasing-number option is defined to carry a strictly-increasing
serial number. serial number.
o The Encrypted-message option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 o The encryption key Tag is calculated from the public key data.
message. The Encryption Key Tag option is defined to identify the used
public/private key pair.
o The Encrypted-message option is defined to contain the encrypted
DHCPv6 message.
o The Encrypted-Query message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 client o The Encrypted-Query message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 client
to the secure DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query message MUST to the secure DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query message MUST
contain the Encrypted-message option. In addition, the Server contain the Encrypted-message option. In addition, the Server
Identifier option MUST be contained if it is contained in the Identifier option MUST be contained if it is contained in the
original DHCPv6 message. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT original DHCPv6 message. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT
contain other options except the above options. contain other options except the above options.
o The Encrypted-Response message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 o The Encrypted-Response message is sent from the secure DHCPv6
server to the secure DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted-Response server to the secure DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted-Response
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In order to provide a means of addressing problems that may emerge In order to provide a means of addressing problems that may emerge
with existing hash algorithms, signature algorithm and encryption with existing hash algorithms, signature algorithm and encryption
algorithms in the future, this document provides a mechanism to algorithms in the future, this document provides a mechanism to
support algorithm agility. The support for algorithm agility in this support algorithm agility. The support for algorithm agility in this
document is mainly a algorithm notification mechanism between the document is mainly a algorithm notification mechanism between the
client and the server. The same client and server SHOULD use the client and the server. The same client and server SHOULD use the
same algorithm in a single communication session. The sender can same algorithm in a single communication session. The sender can
offer a set of algorithms, and then the receiver selects one offer a set of algorithms, and then the receiver selects one
algorithm for the future communication. algorithm for the future communication.
If the server does not support the algorithm used by the client, the
server SHOULD reply with an AlgorithmNotSupported status code
(defined in Section 10.3) to the client. Upon receiving this status
code, the client MAY resend the message protected with the mandatory
algorithm.
5.4. Caused change to RFC3315 5.4. Caused change to RFC3315
This protocol changes DHCPv6 message exchanges quite substantially: For secure DHCPv6, the Solicit and Rebind messages can be sent only
previously, the client first sends a Solicit message, gets possibly to the selected server(s) which share one common certificate. If the
multiple Advertise messages, chooses the server (= sender of one of client doesn't like the received Advertise(s) it could restart the
the Advertises) that would be best for the client, and then sends a whole process and selects another certificate, but it will be more
Request to that chosen server. Now the server selection is done at expensive, and there's no guarantee that other servers can provide
the key exchange phase (the initial Information-request and Reply better Advertise(s).
exchange). In addition, the Solicit and Rebind messages can be sent
only to a single server. If the client doesn't like the Advertise it
could restart the whole process, but it will be more expensive, and
there's no guarantee that other servers can provide a better
Advertise. For the privacy consideration, we have to give up the
previous server selection feature.
[RFC3315] provides an additional mechanism for preventing off-network [RFC3315] provides an additional mechanism for preventing off-network
timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key
authentication method. Secure DHCPv6 can protect the Reconfigure authentication method. Secure DHCPv6 can protect the Reconfigure
message using the encryption method. So the Reconfigure Key message using the encryption method. So the Reconfigure Key
authentication method SHOULD NOT be used if Secure DHCPv6 is applied. authentication method SHOULD NOT be used if Secure DHCPv6 is applied.
5.5. Applicability 5.5. Applicability
In principle, secure DHCPv6 is applicable in any environment where In principle, secure DHCPv6 is applicable in any environment where
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server are stolen that does not mean an immediate threat as these are server are stolen that does not mean an immediate threat as these are
public keys. In addition, if some kind of PKI is used with Secure public keys. In addition, if some kind of PKI is used with Secure
DHCPv6, even if the initial installation of the certificates is done DHCPv6, even if the initial installation of the certificates is done
manually, it will help reduce operational costs of revocation in case manually, it will help reduce operational costs of revocation in case
a private key (especially that of the server) is compromised. a private key (especially that of the server) is compromised.
6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior 6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior
The secure DHCPv6 client is pre-configured with a certificate and its The secure DHCPv6 client is pre-configured with a certificate and its
corresponding private key for client authentication. If the client corresponding private key for client authentication. If the client
is pre-configured with public key but not with a certificate, it can does not obtain a certificate from CA, it can generate the self-
generate the self-signed certificate. signed certificate.
The secure DHCPv6 client sends Information-request message as per The secure DHCPv6 client sends Information-request message as per
[RFC3315]. The Information-request message is used by the DHCPv6 [RFC3315]. The Information-request message is used by the DHCPv6
client to request the server's identity verification information client to request the server's certificate information without having
without having addresses, prefixes or any non-security options addresses, prefixes or any non-security options assigned to it. The
assigned to it. The Information-request message MUST NOT include any contained Option Request option MUST carry the option code of the
other DHCPv6 options except the ORO option to minimize client's Certificate option. In addition, the contained Algorithm option MUST
privacy information leakage. The Option Request option in the be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.1. The Information-
Information-request message MUST contain the option code of the request message MUST NOT include any other DHCPv6 options except the
Certificate option. above options to minimize client's privacy information leakage.
When receiving the Reply messages from DHCPv6 servers, a secure When receiving the Reply messages from DHCPv6 servers, a secure
DHCPv6 client discards any DHCPv6 messages that meet any of the DHCPv6 client discards any DHCPv6 message that meets any of the
following conditions: following conditions:
o the Signature option is missing, o the Signature option is missing,
o multiple Signature options are present, o multiple Signature options are present,
o the Certificate option is missing. o the Certificate option is missing.
And then the client first checks the support of the hash algorithm, And then the client first checks acknowledged hash, signature and
signature algorithm and encryption algorithms that the server encryption algorithms that the server supports. If the hash
supports. If the checks fails, the Reply message is dropped. If the algorithm field is zero, then it indicates that the hash algorithm is
hash algorithm field is zero, then it indicates that the hash fixed according to the corresponding signature algorithm. The client
algorithm is fixed according to the corresponding signature also uses the acknowledged algorithms in the return messages.
algorithm. If all the algorithms are supported, then the client
selects one hash algorithm, signature algorithm and encryption
algorithm from the provided algorithms set. And then the client also
uses the same algorithms in the return messages.
Then the client checks the authority of the server. The client Then the client checks the authority of the server. The client
validates the certificates through the pre-configured local trusted validates the certificates through the pre-configured local trusted
certificates list or other methods. A certificate that finds a match certificates list or other methods. A certificate that finds a match
in the local trust certificates list is treated as verified. The in the local trust certificates list is treated as verified. At this
message transaction-id is used as the identifier of the authenticated point, the client has either recognized the certificate of the
server's public key for further message encryption. At this point, server, or decided to drop the message.
the client has either recognized the certificate of the server, or
decided to drop the message.
The client MUST now authenticate the server by verifying the The client MUST now authenticate the server by verifying the
signature and checking increasing number, if there is a Increasing- signature and checking increasing number, if there is a Increasing-
number option. The order of two procedures is left as an number option. The order of two procedures is left as an
implementation decision. It is RECOMMENDED to check increasing implementation decision. It is RECOMMENDED to check increasing
number first, because signature verification is much more number first, because signature verification is much more
computationally expensive. If the decrypted message contains the computationally expensive. The client checks the Increasing-number
Increasing-number option, the client checks it according to the rule option according to the rule defined in Section 9.1 if it is
defined in Section 9.1. For the message without an Increasing-number contained. For the message without an Increasing-number option,
option, according to the client's local policy, it MAY be acceptable according to the client's local policy, it MAY be acceptable or
or rejected. If the server rejects such a message, the increasing rejected. The Signature field verification MUST show that the
number check fails. signature has been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.3. Only
the messages that get through both the signature verification and
The Signature field verification MUST show that the signature has increasing number check (if there is a Increasing-number option) are
been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.2. Only the messages accepted. Reply message that does not pass the above tests MUST be
that get through both the signature verification and increasing discarded.
number check (if there is a Increasing-number option) are accepted.
Reply message that does not pass the above tests MUST be discarded.
If there are multiple authenticated DHCPv6 certs, the client selects If there are multiple authenticated DHCPv6 certs, the client selects
one DHCPv6 cert. The client can also choose other implementation one DHCPv6 cert for the following communication. The selected
method depending on the client's local policy if the defined protocol certificate may correspond to multiple DHCPv6 servers. If there are
can also run normally. For example, the client can try multiple no authenticated DHCPv6 certs or existing servers fail
transactions (each encrypted with different public key) at the "same"
time. It should be noted that the selected certificate may
correspond to multiple DHCPv6 servers.
If there are no authenticated DHCPv6 certs or existing servers fail
authentication, the client should retry a number of times. The authentication, the client should retry a number of times. The
client conducts the server discovery process as per section 18.1.5 of client conducts the server discovery process as per section 18.1.5 of
[RFC3315] to avoid the packet storm. In this way, it is difficult [RFC3315] to avoid the packet storm. In this way, it is difficult
for the rogue server to beat out a busy "real" server. And then the for the rogue server to beat out a busy "real" server. And then the
client takes some alternative action depending on its local policy, client takes some alternative action depending on its local policy,
such as attempting to use an unsecured DHCPv6 server. such as attempting to use an unsecured DHCPv6 server.
Once the server has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 client sends the Once the server has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 client sends the
Encrypted-Query message to the DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query Encrypted-Query message to the DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query
message contains the Encrypted-message option, which MUST be message contains the Encrypted-message option, which MUST be
constructed as explained in Section 10.1.4. In addition, the Server constructed as explained in Section 10.1.6. The Encrypted-message
Identifier option MUST be included if it is in the original message option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 message using the public key
(i.e. Request, Renew, Decline, Release) to avoid the need for other contained in the selected cert. In addition, the Server Identifier
servers receiving the message to attempt to decrypt it. The option MUST be included if it is in the original message (i.e.
Encrypted-message option contains the DHCPv6 message that is Request, Renew, Decline, Release) to avoid the need for other servers
encrypted using the public key contained in the selected cert. The receiving the message to attempt to decrypt it. The Encrypted-Query
Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT contain any other DHCPv6 option message MUST include the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the
except the Server Identifier option and Encrypted-Message option. used public/private key pair, which is constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.5. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT contain any
other DHCPv6 option except the Server Identifier option, Encryption
Key Tag option, Encrypted-Message option.
The first DHCPv6 message sent from the client to the server, such as The first DHCPv6 message sent from the client to the server, such as
Solicit message, MUST contain the Certificate option, Signature Solicit message, MUST contain the Certificate option, Signature
option and Increasing-number option for client authentication. The option and Increasing-number option for client authentication. The
encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The
Certificate option MUST be constructed as explained in Certificate option MUST be constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.1. It should be noted that a client's certificate for Section 10.1.2. In addition, one and only one Signature option MUST
the mandatory algorithm MUST be contained to ensure that the Reply be contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in
message with the error code can be encrypted using the mandatory Section 10.1.3. One and only one Increasing-number option SHOULD be
algorithm. In addition, one and only one Signature option MUST be contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.4.
contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.2. In addition, the subsequent encrypted DHCPv6 message can also contain
One and only one Increasing-number option SHOULD be contained, which the Increasing-number option to defend against replay attack.
MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.3.
If the client has multiple certificates with different public/private
key pairs, the message transaction-id is also used as the identifier
of the client's private key for decryption. In addition, the
subsequent encrypted DHCPv6 message can contain the Increasing-number
option to defend against replay attack.
For the received Encrypted-Response message, the client MUST drop the For the received Encrypted-Response message, the client MUST drop the
Encrypted-Response message if other DHCPv6 option except Encrypted- Encrypted-Response message if other DHCPv6 option except Encrypted-
message option is contained. Then, the client extracts the message option is contained. Then, the client extracts the
Encrypted-message option and decrypts it using its private key to Encrypted-message option and decrypts it using its private key to
obtain the original DHCPv6 message. Then it handles the message as obtain the original DHCPv6 message. In this document, it is assumed
per [RFC3315]. If the decrypted DHCPv6 message contains the that the client uses only one certificate for the encrypted DHCPv6
Increasing-number option, the DHCPv6 client checks it according to configuration. So, the corresponding private key is used for
the rule defined in Section 9.1. If the client fails to get the decryption. After the decryption, it handles the message as per
proper parameters from the chosen server, it sends the Encrypted- [RFC3315]. If the decrypted DHCPv6 message contains the Increasing-
Query message to another authenticated server for parameters number option, the DHCPv6 client checks it according to the rule
configuration until the client obtains the proper parameters. defined in Section 9.1.
If the client fails to get the proper parameters from the chosen
server(s), it can select another authenticated certificate and send
the Encrypted-Query message to another authenticated server(s) for
parameters configuration until the client obtains the proper
parameters.
When the decrypted message is Reply message with an error status When the decrypted message is Reply message with an error status
code, the error status code indicates the failure reason on the code, the error status code indicates the failure reason on the
server side. According to the received status code, the client MAY server side. According to the received status code, the client MAY
take follow-up action: take follow-up action:
o Upon receiving an AlgorithmNotSupported error status code, the
client SHOULD resend the message protected with one of the
mandatory algorithms.
o Upon receiving an AuthenticationFail error status code, the client o Upon receiving an AuthenticationFail error status code, the client
is not able to build up the secure communication with the server. is not able to build up the secure communication with the server.
However, there may be other DHCPv6 servers available that However, there may be other DHCPv6 servers available that
successfully complete authentication. The client MAY use the successfully complete authentication. The client MAY use the
AuthenticationFail as a hint and switch to other certificate if it AuthenticationFail as a hint and switch to other DHCPv6 server if
has another one; but otherwise treat the message containing the it has another one. The client SHOULD retry with another
status code as if it had not been received. But it SHOULD NOT authenticated certificate. However, if the client decides to
retry with the same certificate. However, if the client decides retransmit using the same certificate after receiving
to retransmit using the same certificate after receiving
AuthenticationFail, it MUST NOT retransmit immediately and MUST AuthenticationFail, it MUST NOT retransmit immediately and MUST
follow normal retransmission routines defined in [RFC3315]. follow normal retransmission routines defined in [RFC3315].
o Upon receiving a DecryptionFail error status code, the client MAY o Upon receiving a DecryptionFail error status code, the client MAY
resend the message following normal retransmission routines resend the message following normal retransmission routines
defined in [RFC3315]. defined in [RFC3315].
o Upon receiving a ReplayDetected error status code, the client MAY o Upon receiving a ReplayDetected error status code, the client MAY
resend the message with an adjusted Increasing-number option resend the message with an adjusted Increasing-number option
according to the returned number from the DHCPv6 server. according to the returned number from the DHCPv6 server.
o Upon receiving a SignatureFail error status code, the client MAY o Upon receiving a SignatureFail error status code, the client MAY
resend the message following normal retransmission routines resend the message following normal retransmission routines
defined in [RFC3315]. defined in [RFC3315].
7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior 7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior
The secure DHCPv6 server is pre-configured with a certificate and its The secure DHCPv6 server is pre-configured with a certificate and its
corresponding private key for server authentication. If the server corresponding private key for server authentication. If the server
is pre-configured with public key but not with a certificate, it can does not obtain the certificate from CA, it can generate the self-
generate the self-signed certificate. signed certificate.
When the DHCPv6 server receives the Information-request message and When the DHCPv6 server receives the Information-request message and
the contained Option Request option identifies the request is for the the contained Option Request option identifies the request is for the
server certificate information, it replies with a Reply message to server's certificate information, it SHOULD first check the hash,
the client. The Reply message MUST contain the requested Certificate signature, encryption algorithms sets that the client supports. The
option, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.1, and server selects one hash, signature, encryption algorithm from the
Server Identifier option. In addition, the Reply message MUST acknowledged algorithms sets for the future communication. If the
contain one and only one Signature option, which MUST be constructed hash algorithm is fixed according to the signature algorithm, then
as explained in Section 10.1.2. Besides, the Reply message SHOULD the hash algorithm field is set to zero. And then, the server
contain one and only one Increasing-number option, which MUST be replies with a Reply message to the client. The Reply message MUST
constructed as explained in Section 10.1.3. In addition, if client contain the requested Certificate option, which MUST be constructed
authentication is needed, then the ORO option in the Reply message as explained in Section 10.1.2, and Server Identifier option. In
contains the code of the certificate option to indicate the request addition, the Reply message MUST contain one and only one Signature
of the client certificate information. option, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.3.
Besides, the Reply message SHOULD contain one and only one
Increasing-number option, which MUST be constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.4.
Upon the receipt of Encrypted-Query message, the server MUST drop the Upon the receipt of Encrypted-Query message, the server MUST drop the
message if the other DHCPv6 option is contained except Server message if the other DHCPv6 option is contained except Server
Identifier option and Encrypted-message option. Then, the server Identifier option, Encryption Key Tag option, Encrypted-message
checks the Server Identifier option if the Encrypted-Query message option. Then, the server checks the Server Identifier option if it
contains it. The DHCPv6 server drops the message that is not for it, is contained. The DHCPv6 server drops the message that is not for
thus not paying cost to decrypt messages. It decrypts the Encrypted- it, thus not paying cost to decrypt messages. If it is the target
message option using its private key if it is the target server. If server, according to the Encryption Key Tag option, the server
the decryption fails, the server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply identifies the used public/private key pair and decrypts the
message with a DecryptionFail error status code, defined in Encrypted-message option using the corresponding private key. If the
Section 10.3, back to the client. server does not find the corresponding private key, then it tries all
the private keys and establishes the relationship between the
encryption key tag and the private key. If the decryption fails, the
server discards the received message.
If secure DHCPv6 server needs client authentication and decrypted If secure DHCPv6 server needs client authentication and decrypted
message is a Solicit/Information-request message which contains the message is a Solicit/Information-request message which contains the
information for client authentication, the secure DHCPv6 server information for client authentication, the secure DHCPv6 server
discards the received message that meets any of the following discards the received message that meets any of the following
conditions: conditions:
o the Signature option is missing, o the Signature option is missing,
o multiple Signature options are present, o multiple Signature options are present,
o the Certificate option is missing. o the Certificate option is missing.
In such failure, the server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply message For the signature failure, the server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply
with an UnspecFail (value 1, [RFC3315]) error status code to the message with an UnspecFail (value 1, [RFC3315]) error status code to
client. the client.
The server SHOULD first check the support of the hash function,
signature algorithm, encryption algorithm that the client supports.
If the hash algorithm field is zero, then the corresponding hash
algorithm is fixed according to the signature algorithm. If the
check fails, the server SHOULD reply with an AlgorithmNotSupported
error status code, defined in Section 10.3, back to the client.
Because the server does not support the acknowledged algorithm, the
Reply message with the AlgorithmNotSupported error status code is
encrypted with the mandatory algorithm. If all the algorithms are
supported, the server then uses the acknowledged algorithms in the
future communication.
The server validates the client's certificate through the local pre- The server validates the client's certificate through the local pre-
configured trusted certificates list. A certificate that finds a configured trusted certificates list. A certificate that finds a
match in the local trust certificates list is treated as verified. match in the local trust certificates list is treated as verified.
The message that fails authentication validation MUST be dropped. In The message that fails authentication validation MUST be dropped. In
such failure, the DHCPv6 server replies with an AuthenticationFail such failure, the DHCPv6 server replies with an encrypted Reply
error status code, defined in Section 10.3, back to the client. The message with an AuthenticationFail error status code, defined in
Reply message with the AuthenticationFail error status code is also Section 10.3, back to the client. At this point, the server has
encrypted. At this point, the server has either recognized the either recognized the authentication of the client, or decided to
authentication of the client, or decided to drop the message. drop the message.
If the decrypted message contains the Increasing-number option, the If the decrypted message contains the Increasing-number option, the
server checks it according to the rule defined in Section 9.1. If server checks it according to the rule defined in Section 9.1. If
the check fails, an encrypted Reply message with a ReplayDetected the check fails, an encrypted Reply message with a ReplayDetected
error status code, defined in Section 10.3, should be sent back to error status code, defined in Section 10.3, should be sent back to
the client. In addition, a Increasing-number option is carried to the client. In addition, a Increasing-number option is carried to
indicate the server's stored number for the client to use. According indicate the server's stored number for the client to use. According
to the server's local policy, the message without an Increasing- to the server's local policy, the message without an Increasing-
number option MAY be acceptable or rejected. If the server rejects number option MAY be acceptable or rejected.
such a message, the server processes it as the increasing number
check fails.
The Signature field verification MUST show that the signature has The Signature field verification MUST show that the signature has
been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.2. If the signature been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.3. If the signature
check fails, the DHCPv6 server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply message check fails, the DHCPv6 server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply message
with a SignatureFail error status code. Only the clients that get with a SignatureFail error status code. Only the clients that get
through both the signature verification and increasing number check through both the signature verification and increasing number check
(if there is a Increasing-number option) are accepted as (if there is a Increasing-number option) are accepted as
authenticated clients and continue to be handled their message as authenticated clients and continue to be handled their message as
defined in [RFC3315]. defined in [RFC3315].
Once the client has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 server sends the Once the client has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 server sends the
Encrypted-response message to the DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted- Encrypted-response message to the DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted-
response message MUST only contain the Encrypted-message option, response message MUST only contain the Encrypted-message option,
which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.4. The which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.6. The
encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The
Encrypted-message option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 message that Encrypted-message option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 message that
is encrypted using the authenticated client's public key. To provide is encrypted using the authenticated client's public key. To provide
the replay protection, the Increasing-number option can be contained the replay protection, the Increasing-number option can be contained
in the encrypted DHCPv6 message. in the encrypted DHCPv6 message.
8. Relay Agent Behavior 8. Relay Agent Behavior
When a DHCPv6 relay agent receives an Encrypted-query or Encrypted- When a DHCPv6 relay agent receives an Encrypted-query or Encrypted-
response message, it may not recognize this message. The unknown response message, it may not recognize this message. The unknown
skipping to change at page 14, line 39 skipping to change at page 14, line 15
of server certs available locally. In this way, the client can be of server certs available locally. In this way, the client can be
confident of a quick response, and therefore treat the lack of a confident of a quick response, and therefore treat the lack of a
quick response as an indication that no authenticated DHCP servers quick response as an indication that no authenticated DHCP servers
exist. exist.
9. Processing Rules 9. Processing Rules
9.1. Increasing Number Check 9.1. Increasing Number Check
In order to check the Increasing-number option, defined in In order to check the Increasing-number option, defined in
Section 10.1.3, the client/server has one stable stored number for Section 10.1.4, the client/server has one stable stored number for
replay attack detection. The server should keep a record of the replay attack detection. The server should keep a record of the
increasing number forever. And the client keeps a record of the increasing number forever. And the client keeps a record of the
increasing number during the transaction with the DHCPv6 server. In increasing number during the DHCPv6 configuration process with the
addition, the client can forget the increasing number information DHCPv6 server. And the client can forget the increasing number
after the transaction is finished. information after the transaction is finished.
It is essential to remember that the increasing number is finite. It is essential to remember that the increasing number is finite.
All arithmetic dealing with sequence numbers must be performed modulo All arithmetic dealing with sequence numbers must be performed modulo
2^64. This unsigned arithmetic preserves the relationship of 2^64. This unsigned arithmetic preserves the relationship of
sequence numbers as they cycle from 2^64 - 1 to 0 again. sequence numbers as they cycle from 2^64 - 1 to 0 again.
In order to check the Increasing-number option, the following In order to check the Increasing-number option, the following
comparison is needed. The symbol means "less or equal" (modulo comparison is needed.
2^64).
NUM.STO = the stored number in the client/server NUM.STO = the stored number in the client/server
NUM.REC = the acknowledged number from the received message NUM.REC = the acknowledged number from the received message
The Increasing-number option in the received message passes the The Increasing-number option in the received message passes the
increasing number check if NUM.REC is more than NUM.STO. And then, increasing number check if NUM.REC is more than NUM.STO. And then,
the value of NUM.STO is changed into the value of NUM.REC. the value of NUM.STO is changed into the value of NUM.REC.
The increasing number check fails if NUM.REC is equal or less than The increasing number check fails if NUM.REC is equal with or less
NUM.STO than NUM.STO
10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6
This section describes the extensions to DHCPv6. Four new DHCPv6 This section describes the extensions to DHCPv6. Six new DHCPv6
options, two new DHCPv6 messages and five new status codes are options, two new DHCPv6 messages and six new status codes are
defined. defined.
10.1. New DHCPv6 Options 10.1. New DHCPv6 Options
10.1.1. Algorithm Option
10.1.1. Certificate Option The Algorithm option carries the algorithms sets for algorithm
agility, which is sent from the client to server.
The Certificate option carries the certificate(s) of the client/
server. The format of the Certificate option is described as
follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_CERTIFICATE | option-len | | OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. EA-id List . . EA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | . SA-id List .
. Certificate List(variable length) . +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | . HA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Certificate Option Figure 2: Algorithm Option
o option-code: OPTION_CERTIFICATE (TBA1). o option-code: OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA1).
o option-len: length of EA-id List + length of Certificate List in o option-len: length of EA-id List + length of SA-id List + length
octets. of HA-id List in octets.
o EA-id List: The format of the EA-id List field is shown in o EA-id: The format of the EA-id List field is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EA-num | EA-id | | EA-num | EA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... . . ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EA-id | | EA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
EA-num The number of the following EA-ids. EA-num The number of the following EA-ids.
EA-id Encryption Algorithm id. The encryption algorithm EA-id Encryption Algorithm id. The encryption algorithm
is used for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration is used for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration
process. This design is adopted in order to provide process. This design is adopted in order to provide
encryption algorithm agility. The value is from the encryption algorithm agility. The value is from the
Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in
IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values
is defined in Section 12. is defined in Section 12. The mandatory encryption
algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 3: EA-id List Field Figure 3: EA-id List Field
o Certificate List: The format of the Certificate List Field is o SA-id List: The format of the SA-id List field is shown in
shown in Figure 4. Figure 4.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-num | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
SA-num The number of the following SA-ids.
SA-id Signature Algorithm id. This design is adopted in
order to provide signature algorithm agility. The
value is from the Signature Algorithm for Secure
DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The support of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
is mandatory. A registry of the initial assigned
values is defined in Section 12. The mandatory
signature algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 4: SA-id List Field
o HA-id List: The format of the HA-id List field is shown in
Figure 5.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| cert-len | cert-data | | HA-num | HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ...cert-data(variable length)(cont) .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. .
. ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| cert-len | cert-data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ...cert-data(variable length)(cont) . . ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
cert-len The length of the certificate. HA-num The number of the following HA-ids.
Cert-data A variable-length field containing certificates. The HA-id Hash Algorithm id. This design is adopted in order to
encoding of certificate and certificate data MUST provide hash algorithm agility. The value is from the
be in format as defined in Section 3.6, [RFC7296]. Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The
The support of X.509 certificate is mandatory. support of SHA-256 is mandatory. A registry of the
initial assigned values is defined in Section 12.
The mandatory hash algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 4: Certificate List Field Figure 5: HA-id List Field
10.1.2. Signature option 10.1.2. Certificate Option
The Signature option allows a signature that is signed by the private The Certificate option carries the certificate of the client/server.
key to be attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option could The format of the Certificate option is described as follows:
be in any place within the DHCPv6 message while it is logically
created after the entire DHCPv6 header and options. It protects the
entire DHCPv6 header and options, including itself. The format of
the Signature option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len | | OPTION_CERTIFICATE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. SA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. HA-id List . | EA-id | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. Signature (variable length) . . Certificate .
. . | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Signature Option Figure 6: Certificate Option
o option-code: OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA2). o option-code: OPTION_CERTIFICATE (TBA2).
o option-len: length of SA-id list + length of HA-id list + length o option-len: 4 + length of Certificate in octets.
of Signature field in octets.
o SA-id List: The format of the SA-id List field is shown in o EA-id: Encryption Algorithm id. The encryption algorithm is used
Figure 6. for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration process. This design is
adopted in order to provide encryption algorithm agility. The
value is from the Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry
in IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values is defined in
Section 12. If the value of EA-id is 0, then the certificate is
not used for encryption.
0 1 2 3 o SA-id: Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm is used
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 for computing the signature result. The value is from the
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. A
| SA-num | SA-id | registry of the initial assigned values is defined in Section 12.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ If the value of SA-id is 0, then the certificate is not used for
. ... . signature check.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
SA-num The number of the following SA-ids. o Certificate: A variable-length field containing certificates. The
encoding of certificate and certificate data MUST be in format as
defined in Section 3.6, [RFC7296]. The support of X.509
certificate is mandatory.
SA-id Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm is It should be noticed that the scenario where the values of EA-id and
used for computing the signature result. This SA-id are all 0, it makes no sense and MUST NOT be used.
design is adopted in order to provide signature
algorithm agility. The value is from the Signature
Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The
support of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is mandatory. A
registry of the initial assigned values is defined
in Section 12.
Figure 6: EA-id List Field 10.1.3. Signature option
o HA-id List: The format of the HA-id List field is shown in The Signature option allows a signature that is signed by the private
Figure 7. key to be attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option could
be in any place within the DHCPv6 message while it is logically
created after the entire DHCPv6 header and options. It protects the
entire DHCPv6 header and options, including itself. The format of
the Signature option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-num | HA-id | | OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... . | SA-id | HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Signature (variable length) .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
HA-num The number of the following HA-ids. Figure 7: Signature Option
HA-id Hash Algorithm id. The hash algorithm is used for o option-code: OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA3).
computing the signature result. This design is
adopted in order to provide hash algorithm agility.
The value is from the Hash Algorithm for Secure
DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The support of SHA-256 is
mandatory. A registry of the initial assigned values
is defined in Section 12. If the signature algorithm
and hash algorithm cannot be separated, the HA-id
field is zero. The hash algorithm is decided by the
corresponding signature algorithm.
Figure 7: HA-id List Field o option-len: 4 + length of Signature field in octets.
o SA-id: Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm is used
for computing the signature result. This design is adopted in
order to provide signature algorithm agility. The value is from
the Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The
support of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is mandatory. A registry of the
initial assigned values is defined in Section 12.
o HA-id: Hash Algorithm id. The hash algorithm is used for
computing the signature result. This design is adopted in order
to provide hash algorithm agility. The value is from the Hash
Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The support of
SHA-256 is mandatory. A registry of the initial assigned values
is defined in Section 12. If the hash algorithm is fixed
according to the corresponding signature algorithm, the HA-id
field is set to zero.
o Signature: A variable-length field containing a digital signature. o Signature: A variable-length field containing a digital signature.
The signature value is computed with the hash algorithm and the The signature value is computed with the hash algorithm and the
signature algorithm, as described in HA-id and SA-id. The signature algorithm, as described in HA-id and SA-id. The
Signature field MUST be padded, with all 0, to the next octet Signature field MUST be padded, with all 0, to the next octet
boundary if its size is not a multiple of 8 bits. The padding boundary if its size is not a multiple of 8 bits. The padding
length depends on the signature algorithm, which is indicated in length depends on the signature algorithm, which is indicated in
the SA-id field. the SA-id field.
Note: If Secure DHCPv6 is used, the DHCPv6 message is encrypted in a Note: If Secure DHCPv6 is used, the DHCPv6 message is encrypted in a
way that the authentication mechanism defined in RFC3315 does not way that the authentication mechanism defined in RFC3315 does not
understand. So the Authentication option SHOULD NOT be used if understand. So the Authentication option SHOULD NOT be used if
Secure DHCPv6 is applied. Secure DHCPv6 is applied.
10.1.3. Increasing-number Option 10.1.4. Increasing-number Option
The Increasing-number option carries the number which is higher than The Increasing-number option carries the strictly increasing number
the local stored number on the client/server. It adds the anti- for anti-replay protection. It is optional.
replay protection to the DHCPv6 messages. It is optional.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_INCREASING_NUM | option-len | | OPTION_INCREASING_NUM | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| InreasingNum (64-bit) | | InreasingNum (64-bit) |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_INCREASING_NUM (TBA3). option-code OPTION_INCREASING_NUM (TBA4).
option-len 8, in octets. option-len 8, in octets.
IncreasingNum A strictly increasing number for the replay attack detection IncreasingNum A strictly increasing number for the replay attack detection
which is more than the local stored number. which is more than the local stored number.
Figure 8: Incresing-number Option Figure 8: Increasing-number Option
10.1.4. Encrypted-message Option 10.1.5. Encryption Key Tag Option
The Encrypted-message option carries the encrypted DHCPv6 message The Encryption Key Tag option carries the key identifier which is
with the recipient's public key. calculated from the public key data. The Encrypted-Query message
MUST contain the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the used
public/private key pair.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| option-code | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. encryption key tag .
. (variable) .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Encryption Key Tag Option
option-code OPTION_ENCRY_KT (TBA5).
option-len Length of the encryption key tag.
encryption key tag A variable length field containing the encryption
key tag sent from the client to server to identify the used
public/private key pair. The encryption key tag is calculated
from the public key data, like fingerprint of a specific public
key.
10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option
The Encrypted-message option carries the encrypted DHCPv6 message,
which is calculated with the recipient's public key.
The format of the Encrypted-message option is: The format of the Encrypted-message option is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| option-code | option-len | | option-code | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. encrypted DHCPv6 message . . encrypted DHCPv6 message .
. (variable) . . (variable) .
. . . .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Encrypted-message Option Figure 10: Encrypted-message Option
option-code OPTION_ENCRYPTED_MSG (TBA4). option-code OPTION_ENCRYPTED_MSG (TBA6).
option-len Length of the encrypted DHCPv6 message. option-len Length of the encrypted DHCPv6 message.
encrypted DHCPv6 message A variable length field containing the encrypted DHCPv6 message A variable length field containing the
encrypted DHCPv6 message sent by the client or the server. In encrypted DHCPv6 message. In Encrypted-Query message, it contains
Encrypted-Query message, it contains encrypted DHCPv6 message sent encrypted DHCPv6 message sent from a client to server. In
by a client. In Encrypted-response message, it contains encrypted Encrypted-response message, it contains encrypted DHCPv6 message
DHCPv6 message sent by a server. sent from a server to client.
10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages 10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages
Two new DHCPv6 messages are defined to achieve the DHCPv6 encryption: Two new DHCPv6 messages are defined to achieve the DHCPv6 encryption:
Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response. Both the DHCPv6 messages Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response. Both the DHCPv6 messages
defined in this document share the following format: defined in this document share the following format:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| msg-type | transaction-id | | msg-type | transaction-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. options . . options .
. (variable) . . (variable) .
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: The format of Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response Figure 11: The format of Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response
Messages Messages
msg-type Identifier of the message type. It can be either msg-type Identifier of the message type. It can be either
Encrypted-Query (TBA5) or DHCPv6-Response (TBA6). Encrypted-Query (TBA7) or DHCPv6-Response (TBA8).
transaction-id The transaction ID for this message exchange. transaction-id The transaction ID for this message exchange.
options The Encrypted-Query message MUST contain the options The Encrypted-Query message MUST contain the
Encrypted-message option and MUST contain the Server Encrypted-message option, Encryption Key Tag option
Identifier option if the message in the Encrypted- and Server Identifier option if the message in the
message option has a Server Identifier option. The Encrypted-message option has a Server Identifier
Encrypted-Response message MUST only contain the option. The Encrypted-Response message MUST only
Encrypted-message option. contain the Encrypted-message option.
10.3. Status Codes 10.3. Status Codes
The following new status codes, see Section 5.4 of [RFC3315] are The following new status codes, see Section 5.4 of [RFC3315] are
defined. defined.
o AlgorithmNotSupported (TBD7): indicates that the DHCPv6 server o AuthenticationFail (TBD9): indicates that the message from the
does not support algorithms that sender used.
o AuthenticationFail (TBD8): indicates that the message from the
DHCPv6 client fails authentication check. DHCPv6 client fails authentication check.
o ReplayDetected (TBD9): indicates the message from DHCPv6 client o ReplayDetected (TBD10): indicates the message from DHCPv6 client
fails the increasing number check. fails the increasing number check.
o SignatureFail (TBD10): indicates the message from DHCPv6 client o SignatureFail (TBD11): indicates the message from DHCPv6 client
fails the signature check. fails the signature check.
o DecryptionFail (TBD11): indicates the message from DHCPv6 client
fails the DHCPv6 message decryption.
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
This document provides the authentication and encryption mechanisms This document provides the authentication and encryption mechanisms
for DHCPv6. for DHCPv6.
[RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used [RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used
in SEND. Since Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the same in SEND. Since Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the same
hash algorithms in similar way to SEND, analysis results could be hash algorithms in similar way to SEND, analysis results could be
applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not constitute applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not constitute
any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the signature any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the signature
skipping to change at page 22, line 36 skipping to change at page 22, line 33
There are some mandatory algorithm for encryption algorithm in this There are some mandatory algorithm for encryption algorithm in this
document. It may be at some point that the mandatory algorithm is no document. It may be at some point that the mandatory algorithm is no
longer safe to use. longer safe to use.
If the client tries more than one cert for client authentication, the If the client tries more than one cert for client authentication, the
server can easily get a client that implements this to enumerate its server can easily get a client that implements this to enumerate its
entire cert list and probably learn a lot about a client that way. entire cert list and probably learn a lot about a client that way.
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
This document defines four new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options. The IANA is This document defines six new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options. The IANA is
requested to assign values for these four options from the DHCPv6 requested to assign values for these six options from the DHCPv6
Option Codes table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in Option Codes table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The four options http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The six options
are: are:
The Certificate Option (TBA1), described in Section 10.1.1. The Algorithm Option (TBA1), described in Section 10.1.2.
The Signature Option (TBA2), described in Section 10.1.2. The Certificate Option (TBA2), described in Section 10.1.2.
The Increasing-number Option (TBA3),described in Section 10.1.3. The Signature Option (TBA3), described in Section 10.1.3.
The Encrypted-message Option (TBA4), described in Section 10.1.4. The Increasing-number Option (TBA4),described in Section 10.1.4.
The Encryption Key Tag Option (TBA5),described in Section 10.1.5.
The Encrypted-message Option (TBA6), described in Section 10.1.6.
The IANA is also requested to assign value for these two messages The IANA is also requested to assign value for these two messages
from the DHCPv6 Message Types table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry from the DHCPv6 Message Types table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry
maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The
two messages are: two messages are:
The Encrypted-Query Message (TBA5), described in Section 10.2. The Encrypted-Query Message (TBA7), described in Section 10.2.
The Encrypted-Response Message (TBA6), described in Section 10.2. The Encrypted-Response Message (TBA8), described in Section 10.2.
The IANA is also requested to add three new registry tables to the The IANA is also requested to add three new registry tables to the
DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The three tables http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The three tables
are the Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 table, the Signature are the Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 table, the Signature
Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 table and the Encryption Algorithm for Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 table and the Encryption Algorithm for
Secure DHCPv6 table. Secure DHCPv6 table.
Initial values for these registries are given below. Future Initial values for these registries are given below. Future
assignments are to be made through Standards Action [RFC5226]. assignments are to be made through Standards Action [RFC5226].
skipping to change at page 23, line 39 skipping to change at page 23, line 39
SigAlg-Combined | ox00 | this document SigAlg-Combined | ox00 | this document
SHA-256 | 0x01 | this document SHA-256 | 0x01 | this document
SHA-512 | 0x02 | this document SHA-512 | 0x02 | this document
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this table are Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this table are
8-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned 8-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned
for Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document: for Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+-------------- -------------------+---------+--------------
Non-SigAlg | 0x00 | this document
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 | 0x01 | this document RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 | 0x01 | this document
Encryption algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this table are Encryption algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this table are
8-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned 8-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned
for encryption algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document: for encryption algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+-------------- -------------------+---------+--------------
Non-EncryAlg | 0x00 | this document
RSA | 0x01 | this document RSA | 0x01 | this document
IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Status Codes, IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Status Codes,
defined in Section 10.3, in the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained defined in Section 10.3, in the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained
in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters: in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters:
Code | Name | Reference Code | Name | Reference
---------+-----------------------+-------------- ---------+-----------------------+--------------
TBD7 | AlgorithmNotSupported | this document TBD9 | AuthenticationFail | this document
TBD8 | AuthenticationFail | this document TBD10 | ReplayDetected | this document
TBD9 | ReplayDetected | this document TBD11 | SignatureFail | this document
TBD10 | SignatureFail | this document
TBD11 | DecryptionFail | this document
13. Acknowledgements 13. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tomek Mrugalski, Bernie Volz, The authors would like to thank Tomek Mrugalski, Bernie Volz,
Jianping Wu, Randy Bush, Yiu Lee, Sean Shen, Ralph Droms, Jari Arkko, Jianping Wu, Randy Bush, Yiu Lee, Sean Shen, Ralph Droms, Jari Arkko,
Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, Christian Huitema, Stephen Kent, Thomas Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, Christian Huitema, Stephen Kent, Thomas
Huth, David Schumacher, Francis Dupont, Gang Chen, Suresh Krishnan, Huth, David Schumacher, Francis Dupont, Gang Chen, Suresh Krishnan,
Fred Templin, Robert Elz, Nico Williams, Erik Kline, Alan DeKok, Fred Templin, Robert Elz, Nico Williams, Erik Kline, Alan DeKok,
Bernard Aboba, Sam Hartman, Qi Sun, Zilong Liu and other members of Bernard Aboba, Sam Hartman, Zilong Liu and other members of the IETF
the IETF DHC working group for their valuable comments. DHC working group for their valuable comments.
This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629]. This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] 14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18: Add the Algorithm option. The algorithm
option contains the EA-id List, SA-id List, HA-id List, and then the
certificate and signature options do not contain the algorithm list;
Add the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the used public/private
key pair; Delete the AlgorithmNotSupported error status code; Delete
some description on that secure DHCPv6 exchanges the server selection
method; Delete the DecryptionFail error status code; For the case
where the client's certificate is missed, then the server discards
the received message. Add the assumption that: For DHCPv6 client,
just one certificate is used for the DHCPv6 configuration. Add the
statement that: For the first Encrypted-Query message, the server
needs to try all the possible private keys and then records the
relationship between the public key and the encryption key tag.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-17: Change the format of the certificate
option according to the comments from Bernie.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-16: For the algorithm agility part, the
provider can offer multiple EA-id, SA-id, HA-id and then receiver
choose one from the algorithm set.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-15: Increasing number option only contains draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-15: Increasing number option only contains
the strictly increasing number; Add some description about why the strictly increasing number; Add some description about why
encryption is needed in Security Issues of DHCPv6 part; For the encryption is needed in Security Issues of DHCPv6 part;
algorithm agility part, the provider can offer multiple EA-id, SA-id,
HA-id and then receiver choose one from the algorithm set.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-14: For the deployment part, Tofu is out of draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-14: For the deployment part, Tofu is out of
scope and take Opportunistic security into consideration; Increasing scope and take Opportunistic security into consideration; Increasing
number option is changed into 64 bits; Increasing number check is a number option is changed into 64 bits; Increasing number check is a
separate section; IncreasingnumFail error status code is changed into separate section; IncreasingnumFail error status code is changed into
ReplayDetected error status code; Add the section of "caused change ReplayDetected error status code; Add the section of "caused change
to RFC3315"; to RFC3315";
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-13: Change the Timestamp option into draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-13: Change the Timestamp option into
Increasing-number option and the corresponding check method; Delete Increasing-number option and the corresponding check method; Delete
the OCSP stampling part for the certificate check; Add the scenario the OCSP stampling part for the certificate check; Add the scenario
 End of changes. 111 change blocks. 
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