draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18.txt   draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-19.txt 
DHC Working Group S. Jiang DHC Working Group S. Jiang
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track L. Li Intended status: Standards Track L. Li
Expires: June 7, 2017 Y. Cui Expires: July 6, 2017 Y. Cui
Tsinghua University Tsinghua University
T. Jinmei T. Jinmei
Infoblox Inc. Infoblox Inc.
T. Lemon T. Lemon
Nominum, Inc. Nominum, Inc.
D. Zhang D. Zhang
December 4, 2016 January 2, 2017
Secure DHCPv6 Secure DHCPv6
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18 draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-19
Abstract Abstract
DHCPv6 includes no deployable security mechanism that can protect DHCPv6 includes no deployable security mechanism that can protect
end-to-end communication between DHCP clients and servers. This end-to-end communication between DHCP clients and servers. This
document describes a mechanism for using public key cryptography to document describes a mechanism for using public key cryptography to
provide such security. The mechanism provides encryption in all provide such security. The mechanism provides encryption in all
cases, and can be used for authentication based on pre-sharing of cases, and can be used for authentication based on pre-sharing of
authorized certificates. authorized certificates.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 7, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 6, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Issues of DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Issues of DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. New Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. New Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. Caused change to RFC3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. Impact on RFC3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Relay Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Relay Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Increasing Number Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Increasing Number Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. New DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. New DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1.1. Algorithm Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1.1. Algorithm Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1.2. Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1.2. Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1.3. Signature option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10.1.3. Signature option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1.4. Increasing-number Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1.4. Increasing-number Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1.5. Encryption Key Tag Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1.5. Encryption-Key-Tag Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.2. New DHCPv6 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10.3. Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.3. Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6, [RFC3315]) The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6, [RFC3315])
allows DHCPv6 servers to flexibly provide addressing and other allows DHCPv6 servers to flexibly provide addressing and other
configuration information relating to local network infrastructure to configuration information relating to local network infrastructure to
DHCP clients. The protocol provides no deployable security DHCP clients. The protocol provides no deployable security
mechanism, and consequently is vulnerable to various attacks. mechanism, and consequently is vulnerable to various attacks.
This document provides a brief summary of the security This document provides a brief summary of the security
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The extension specified in this document applies only to end-to-end The extension specified in this document applies only to end-to-end
communication between DHCP servers and clients. Options added by communication between DHCP servers and clients. Options added by
relay agents in Relay-Forward messages, and options other than the relay agents in Relay-Forward messages, and options other than the
client message in Relay-Reply messages sent by DHCP servers, are not client message in Relay-Reply messages sent by DHCP servers, are not
protected. Such communications are already protected using the protected. Such communications are already protected using the
mechanism described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315]. mechanism described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315].
This extension introduces two new DHCPv6 messages: the Encrypted- This extension introduces two new DHCPv6 messages: the Encrypted-
Query and the Encrypted-Response messages. It defines six new DHCPv6 Query and the Encrypted-Response messages. It defines six new DHCPv6
options: the Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, Increasing-number, options: the Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, Increasing-number,
Encryption Key Tag option and Encrypted-message options. The Encryption-Key-Tag option and Encrypted-message options. The
Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, and Increasing-number options are Algorithm, Certificate, Signature, and Increasing-number options are
used for authentication. The Encryption-Query message, Encryption- used for authentication. The Encryption-Query message, Encryption-
Response message, Encrypted-message option and Encryption Key Tag Response message, Encrypted-message option and Encryption-Key-Tag
option are used for encryption. option are used for encryption.
2. Requirements Language and Terminology 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they
appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as
"should" or "Should"), they have their usual English meanings, and "should" or "Should"), they have their usual English meanings, and
are not to be interpreted as [RFC2119] key words. are not to be interpreted as [RFC2119] key words.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
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timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key
authentication method. However, this method protects only the authentication method. However, this method protects only the
Reconfigure message. The key is transmitted in plaintext to the Reconfigure message. The key is transmitted in plaintext to the
client in earlier exchanges and so this method is vulnerable to on- client in earlier exchanges and so this method is vulnerable to on-
path active attacks. path active attacks.
Anonymity Profile for DHCP Clients [RFC7844] explains how to generate Anonymity Profile for DHCP Clients [RFC7844] explains how to generate
DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 requests that minimize the disclosure of identifying DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 requests that minimize the disclosure of identifying
information. However, the anonymity profile limits the use of the information. However, the anonymity profile limits the use of the
certain options. It also cannot anticipate new options that may certain options. It also cannot anticipate new options that may
contain private information is defined. In addition, the anonymity contain private information. In addition, the anonymity profile does
profile does not work in cases where the client wants to maintain not work in cases where the client wants to maintain anonymity from
anonymity from eavesdroppers but must identify itself to the DHCP eavesdroppers but must identify itself to the DHCP server with which
server with which it intends to communicate. it intends to communicate.
Privacy consideration for DHCPv6 [RFC7824] presents an analysis of Privacy consideration for DHCPv6 [RFC7824] presents an analysis of
the privacy issues associated with the use of DHCPv6 by Internet the privacy issues associated with the use of DHCPv6 by Internet
users. No solutions are presented. users. No solutions are presented.
Current DHCPv6 messages are still transmitted in cleartext and the Current DHCPv6 messages are still transmitted in cleartext and the
privacy information within the DHCPv6 message is not protected from privacy information within the DHCPv6 message is not protected from
passive attack, such as pervasive monitoring [RFC7258]. The privacy passive attack, such as pervasive monitoring [RFC7258]. The privacy
information of the IPv6 host, such as DUID, may be gleaned to find information of the IPv6 host, such as DUID, may be gleaned to find
location information, previous visited networks and so on. [RFC7258] location information, previous visited networks and so on. [RFC7258]
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authentication without requiring a symmetric key distribution authentication without requiring a symmetric key distribution
solution for DHCP, this document defines an asymmetric key solution for DHCP, this document defines an asymmetric key
authentication and encryption mechanism. This protects against both authentication and encryption mechanism. This protects against both
active attacks, such as spoofing, and passive attacks, such as active attacks, such as spoofing, and passive attacks, such as
pervasive monitoring. pervasive monitoring.
5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview 5. Secure DHCPv6 Overview
5.1. Solution Overview 5.1. Solution Overview
The following figure illustrates secure DHCPv6 procedure. Briefly, The following figure illustrates the secure DHCPv6 procedure.
this extension establishes the server's identity with an anonymous Briefly, this extension establishes the server's identity with an
Information-Request exchange. Once the server's identity has been anonymous Information-Request exchange. Once the server's identity
established, the client may either choose to communicate with the has been established, the client may either choose to communicate
server or not. Not communicating with an unknown server avoids with the server or not. Not communicating with an unknown server
revealing private information, but if there is no known server on a avoids revealing private information, but if there is no known server
particular link, the client will be unable to communicate with a DHCP on a particular link, the client will be unable to communicate with a
server. DHCP server.
If the client chooses to communicate with the selected server(s), it If the client chooses to communicate with the selected server(s), it
uses the Encrypted-Query message to encapsulate its communications to uses the Encrypted-Query message to encapsulate its communications to
the DHCP server. The server responds with Encrypted-Response the DHCP server. The server responds with Encrypted-Response
messages. Normal DHCP messages are encapsulated in these two new messages. Normal DHCP messages are encapsulated in these two new
messages using the new defined Encrypted-message option. Besides the messages using the new defined Encrypted-message option. Besides the
Encrypted-message option, the Signature option is defined to verify Encrypted-message option, the Signature option is defined to verify
the integrity of the DHCPv6 messages and then authentication of the integrity of the DHCPv6 messages and then authentication of the
client and server. The Increasing number option is defined to detect client and the server. The Increasing number option is defined to
replay attack. detect a replay attack.
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
|DHCPv6 Client| |DHCPv6 Server| |DHCPv6 Client| |DHCPv6 Server|
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
| Information-request | | Information-request |
|----------------------------------------->| |----------------------------------------->|
| Algorithm option | | Algorithm option |
| Option Request option | | Option Request option |
| | | |
| Reply | | Reply |
|<-----------------------------------------| |<-----------------------------------------|
| Certificate option | | Certificate option |
| Signature option | | Signature option |
| Increasing-number option | | Increasing-number option |
| Server Identifier option | | Server Identifier option |
| | | |
| Encryption-Query | | Encryption-Query |
|----------------------------------------->| |----------------------------------------->|
| Encrypted-message option | | Encrypted-message option |
| Server Identifier option | | Server Identifier option |
| Encryption Key Tag option | | Encryption-Key-Tag option |
| | | |
| Encryption-Response | | Encryption-Response |
|<-----------------------------------------| |<-----------------------------------------|
| Encrypted-message option | | Encrypted-message option |
| | | |
Figure 1: Secure DHCPv6 Procedure Figure 1: Secure DHCPv6 Procedure
5.2. New Components 5.2. New Components
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certificate of the sender. certificate of the sender.
o The algorithm option is defined to carry the algorithms lists for o The algorithm option is defined to carry the algorithms lists for
algorithm agility. algorithm agility.
o The signature is generated using the private key to verify the o The signature is generated using the private key to verify the
integrity of the DHCPv6 messages. The Signature option is defined integrity of the DHCPv6 messages. The Signature option is defined
to carry the signature. to carry the signature.
o The increasing number is used to detect replayed packet. The o The increasing number is used to detect replayed packet. The
Timestamp is one of the possible implementation choices. The
Increasing-number option is defined to carry a strictly-increasing Increasing-number option is defined to carry a strictly-increasing
serial number. serial number.
o The encryption key Tag is calculated from the public key data. o The encryption key Tag is calculated from the public key data.
The Encryption Key Tag option is defined to identify the used The Encryption-Key-Tag option is defined to identify the used
public/private key pair. public/private key pair.
o The Encrypted-message option is defined to contain the encrypted o The Encrypted-message option is defined to contain the encrypted
DHCPv6 message. DHCPv6 message.
o The Encrypted-Query message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 client o The Encrypted-Query message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 client
to the secure DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query message MUST to the secure DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query message MUST
contain the Encrypted-message option. In addition, the Server contain the Encrypted-message option and Encryption-Key-Tag
Identifier option MUST be contained if it is contained in the option. In addition, the Server Identifier option MUST be
original DHCPv6 message. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT included if it is contained in the original DHCPv6 message. The
contain other options except the above options. Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT contain any other options.
o The Encrypted-Response message is sent from the secure DHCPv6 o The Encrypted-Response message is sent from the secure DHCPv6
server to the secure DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted-Response server to the secure DHCPv6 client. The Encrypted-Response
message MUST contain the Encrypted-message option. The Encrypted- message MUST contain the Encrypted-message option. The Encrypted-
Response message MUST NOT contain any other options except it. Response message MUST NOT contain any other options.
5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility 5.3. Support for Algorithm Agility
In order to provide a means of addressing problems that may emerge In order to provide a means of addressing problems that may emerge
with existing hash algorithms, signature algorithm and encryption with existing hash algorithms, signature algorithm and encryption
algorithms in the future, this document provides a mechanism to algorithms in the future, this document provides a mechanism to
support algorithm agility. The support for algorithm agility in this support algorithm agility. The support for algorithm agility in this
document is mainly a algorithm notification mechanism between the document is mainly a algorithm notification mechanism between the
client and the server. The same client and server SHOULD use the client and the server. The same client and server SHOULD use the
same algorithm in a single communication session. The sender can same algorithm in a single communication session. The sender can
offer a set of algorithms, and then the receiver selects one offer a set of algorithms, and then the receiver selects one
algorithm for the future communication. algorithm for the future communication.
5.4. Caused change to RFC3315 5.4. Impact on RFC3315
For secure DHCPv6, the Solicit and Rebind messages can be sent only For secure DHCPv6, the Solicit and Rebind messages can be sent only
to the selected server(s) which share one common certificate. If the to the selected server(s) which share one common certificate. If the
client doesn't like the received Advertise(s) it could restart the client doesn't like the received Advertise(s) it could restart the
whole process and selects another certificate, but it will be more whole process and selects another certificate, but it will be more
expensive, and there's no guarantee that other servers can provide expensive, and there's no guarantee that other servers can provide
better Advertise(s). better Advertise(s).
[RFC3315] provides an additional mechanism for preventing off-network [RFC3315] provides an additional mechanism for preventing off-network
timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key timing attacks using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key
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message using the encryption method. So the Reconfigure Key message using the encryption method. So the Reconfigure Key
authentication method SHOULD NOT be used if Secure DHCPv6 is applied. authentication method SHOULD NOT be used if Secure DHCPv6 is applied.
5.5. Applicability 5.5. Applicability
In principle, secure DHCPv6 is applicable in any environment where In principle, secure DHCPv6 is applicable in any environment where
physical security on the link is not assured and attacks on DHCPv6 physical security on the link is not assured and attacks on DHCPv6
are a concern. In practice, however, authenticated and encrypted are a concern. In practice, however, authenticated and encrypted
DHCPv6 configuration will rely on some operational assumptions mainly DHCPv6 configuration will rely on some operational assumptions mainly
regarding public key distribution and management. In order to regarding public key distribution and management. In order to
achieve the more wide use of secure DHCPv6, opportunistic security achieve the wider use of secure DHCPv6, opportunistic security
[RFC7435] can be applied to secure DHCPv6 deployment, which allows [RFC7435] can be applied to secure DHCPv6 deployment, which allows
DHCPv6 encryption in environments where support for authentication is DHCPv6 encryption in environments where support for authentication or
not available. a key distribution mechanism is not available.
Secure DHCPv6 can achieve authentication and encryption based on pre- Secure DHCPv6 can achieve authentication and encryption based on pre-
sharing of authorized certificates. The One feasible environment in sharing of authorized certificates. The One feasible environment in
an early deployment stage would be enterprise networks. In an early deployment stage would be enterprise networks. In
enterprise networks, the client is manually pre-configured with the enterprise networks, the client is manually pre-configured with the
trusted servers' public key and the server is also manually pre- trusted servers' public key and the server is also manually pre-
configured with the trusted clients' public keys. In some scenario, configured with the trusted clients' public keys. In some scenario,
such as coffee shop where the certificate cannot be validated and such as coffee shop where the certificate cannot be validated and one
don't want to be blocked from the Internet, then the DHCPv6 wants access to the Internet, then the DHCPv6 configuration process
configuration process can be encrypted without authentication. can be encrypted without authentication.
Note that this deployment scenario based on manual operation is not Note that this deployment scenario based on manual operation is not
different very much from the existing, shared-secret based much different from the existing, shared-secret based authentication
authentication mechanisms defined in [RFC3315] in terms of mechanisms defined in [RFC3315] in terms of operational costs.
operational costs. However, Secure DHCPv6 is still securer than the However, Secure DHCPv6 is still securer than the shared-secret
shared-secret mechanism in that even if clients' keys stored for the mechanism in that even if clients' keys stored for the server are
server are stolen that does not mean an immediate threat as these are stolen that does not mean an immediate threat as these are public
public keys. In addition, if some kind of PKI is used with Secure keys. In addition, if some kind of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
DHCPv6, even if the initial installation of the certificates is done is used with Secure DHCPv6, even if the initial installation of the
manually, it will help reduce operational costs of revocation in case certificates is done manually, it will help reduce operational costs
a private key (especially that of the server) is compromised. of revocation in case a private key (especially that of the server)
is compromised.
6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior 6. DHCPv6 Client Behavior
The secure DHCPv6 client is pre-configured with a certificate and its The secure DHCPv6 client is pre-configured with a certificate and its
corresponding private key for client authentication. If the client corresponding private key for client authentication. If the client
does not obtain a certificate from CA, it can generate the self- does not obtain a certificate from Certificate Authority (CA), it can
signed certificate. generate the self-signed certificate.
The secure DHCPv6 client sends Information-request message as per The secure DHCPv6 client sends an Information-request message as per
[RFC3315]. The Information-request message is used by the DHCPv6 [RFC3315]. The Information-request message is used by the DHCPv6
client to request the server's certificate information without having client to request the server's certificate information without having
addresses, prefixes or any non-security options assigned to it. The addresses, prefixes or any non-security options assigned to it. The
contained Option Request option MUST carry the option code of the contained Option Request option MUST carry the option code of the
Certificate option. In addition, the contained Algorithm option MUST Certificate option. In addition, the contained Algorithm option MUST
be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.1. The Information- be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.1. The Information-
request message MUST NOT include any other DHCPv6 options except the request message MUST NOT include any other DHCPv6 options except the
above options to minimize client's privacy information leakage. above options to minimize the client's privacy information leakage.
When receiving the Reply messages from DHCPv6 servers, a secure When receiving the Reply messages from the DHCPv6 servers, a secure
DHCPv6 client discards any DHCPv6 message that meets any of the DHCPv6 client discards any DHCPv6 message that meets any of the
following conditions: following conditions:
o the Signature option is missing, o the Signature option is missing,
o multiple Signature options are present, o multiple Signature options are present,
o the Certificate option is missing. o the Certificate option is missing.
And then the client first checks acknowledged hash, signature and And then the client first checks acknowledged hash, signature and
encryption algorithms that the server supports. If the hash encryption algorithms that the server supports. If the hash
algorithm field is zero, then it indicates that the hash algorithm is algorithm field is zero, then it indicates that the hash algorithm is
fixed according to the corresponding signature algorithm. The client fixed according to the corresponding signature algorithm. The client
also uses the acknowledged algorithms in the return messages. also uses the acknowledged algorithms in the return messages.
Then the client checks the authority of the server. The client Then the client checks the authority of the server. In some scenario
validates the certificates through the pre-configured local trusted where non-authenticated encryption can be accepted, such as coffee
certificates list or other methods. A certificate that finds a match shop, then authentication is optional and can be skipped. For the
in the local trust certificates list is treated as verified. At this certificate check method, the client validates the certificates
point, the client has either recognized the certificate of the through the pre-configured local trusted certificates list or other
server, or decided to drop the message. methods. A certificate that finds a match in the local trust
certificates list is treated as verified. If the certificate check
fails, the Reply message is dropped.
The client MUST now authenticate the server by verifying the The client MUST now authenticate the server by verifying the
signature and checking increasing number, if there is a Increasing- signature and checking increasing number, if there is a Increasing-
number option. The order of two procedures is left as an number option. The order of two procedures is left as an
implementation decision. It is RECOMMENDED to check increasing implementation decision. It is RECOMMENDED to check increasing
number first, because signature verification is much more number first, because signature verification is much more
computationally expensive. The client checks the Increasing-number computationally expensive. The client checks the Increasing-number
option according to the rule defined in Section 9.1 if it is option according to the rule defined in Section 9.1. For the message
contained. For the message without an Increasing-number option, without an Increasing-number option, according to the client's local
according to the client's local policy, it MAY be acceptable or policy, it MAY be acceptable or rejected. The Signature field
rejected. The Signature field verification MUST show that the verification MUST show that the signature has been calculated as
signature has been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.3. Only specified in Section 10.1.3. Only the messages that get through both
the messages that get through both the signature verification and the signature verification and increasing number check (if there is a
increasing number check (if there is a Increasing-number option) are Increasing-number option) are accepted. Reply message that does not
accepted. Reply message that does not pass the above tests MUST be pass the above tests MUST be discarded.
discarded.
If there are multiple authenticated DHCPv6 certs, the client selects If there are multiple authenticated DHCPv6 certs, the client selects
one DHCPv6 cert for the following communication. The selected one DHCPv6 cert for the following communication. The selected
certificate may correspond to multiple DHCPv6 servers. If there are certificate may correspond to multiple DHCPv6 servers. If there are
no authenticated DHCPv6 certs or existing servers fail no authenticated DHCPv6 certs or existing servers fail
authentication, the client should retry a number of times. The authentication, the client should retry a number of times. The
client conducts the server discovery process as per section 18.1.5 of client conducts the server discovery process as per section 18.1.5 of
[RFC3315] to avoid a packet storm. In this way, it is difficult for
[RFC3315] to avoid the packet storm. In this way, it is difficult a rogue server to beat out a busy "real" server. And then the client
for the rogue server to beat out a busy "real" server. And then the takes some alternative action depending on its local policy, such as
client takes some alternative action depending on its local policy, attempting to use an unsecured DHCPv6 server.
such as attempting to use an unsecured DHCPv6 server.
Once the server has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 client sends the Once the server has been authenticated, the DHCPv6 client sends the
Encrypted-Query message to the DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query Encrypted-Query message to the DHCPv6 server. The Encrypted-Query
message contains the Encrypted-message option, which MUST be message contains the Encrypted-message option, which MUST be
constructed as explained in Section 10.1.6. The Encrypted-message constructed as explained in Section 10.1.6. The Encrypted-message
option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 message using the public key option contains the encrypted DHCPv6 message using the public key
contained in the selected cert. In addition, the Server Identifier contained in the selected cert. In addition, the Server Identifier
option MUST be included if it is in the original message (i.e. option MUST be included if it is in the original message (i.e.
Request, Renew, Decline, Release) to avoid the need for other servers Request, Renew, Decline, Release) to avoid the need for other servers
receiving the message to attempt to decrypt it. The Encrypted-Query receiving the message to attempt to decrypt it. The Encrypted-Query
message MUST include the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the message MUST include the Encryption-Key-Tag option to identify the
used public/private key pair, which is constructed as explained in used public/private key pair, which is constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.5. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT contain any Section 10.1.5. The Encrypted-Query message MUST NOT contain any
other DHCPv6 option except the Server Identifier option, Encryption other DHCPv6 option except the Server Identifier option, Encryption-
Key Tag option, Encrypted-Message option. Key-Tag option, Encrypted-Message option.
The first DHCPv6 message sent from the client to the server, such as The first DHCPv6 message sent from the client to the server, such as
Solicit message, MUST contain the Certificate option, Signature Solicit message, MUST contain the Certificate option, Signature
option and Increasing-number option for client authentication. The option and Increasing-number option for client authentication. The
encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The encryption text SHOULD be formatted as explain in [RFC5652]. The
Certificate option MUST be constructed as explained in Certificate option MUST be constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.2. In addition, one and only one Signature option MUST Section 10.1.2. In addition, one and only one Signature option MUST
be contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in be contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.3. One and only one Increasing-number option SHOULD be Section 10.1.3. One and only one Increasing-number option SHOULD be
contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.4. contained, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.4.
In addition, the subsequent encrypted DHCPv6 message can also contain In addition, the subsequent encrypted DHCPv6 message sent from the
the Increasing-number option to defend against replay attack. client can also contain the Increasing-number option to defend
against replay attack.
For the received Encrypted-Response message, the client MUST drop the For the received Encrypted-Response message, the client MUST drop the
Encrypted-Response message if other DHCPv6 option except Encrypted- Encrypted-Response message if other DHCPv6 option except Encrypted-
message option is contained. Then, the client extracts the message option is contained. Then, the client extracts the
Encrypted-message option and decrypts it using its private key to Encrypted-message option and decrypts it using its private key to
obtain the original DHCPv6 message. In this document, it is assumed obtain the original DHCPv6 message. In this document, it is assumed
that the client uses only one certificate for the encrypted DHCPv6 that the client uses only one certificate for the encrypted DHCPv6
configuration. So, the corresponding private key is used for configuration. So, the corresponding private key is used for
decryption. After the decryption, it handles the message as per decryption. After the decryption, it handles the message as per
[RFC3315]. If the decrypted DHCPv6 message contains the Increasing- [RFC3315]. If the decrypted DHCPv6 message contains the Increasing-
skipping to change at page 11, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 24
is not able to build up the secure communication with the server. is not able to build up the secure communication with the server.
However, there may be other DHCPv6 servers available that However, there may be other DHCPv6 servers available that
successfully complete authentication. The client MAY use the successfully complete authentication. The client MAY use the
AuthenticationFail as a hint and switch to other DHCPv6 server if AuthenticationFail as a hint and switch to other DHCPv6 server if
it has another one. The client SHOULD retry with another it has another one. The client SHOULD retry with another
authenticated certificate. However, if the client decides to authenticated certificate. However, if the client decides to
retransmit using the same certificate after receiving retransmit using the same certificate after receiving
AuthenticationFail, it MUST NOT retransmit immediately and MUST AuthenticationFail, it MUST NOT retransmit immediately and MUST
follow normal retransmission routines defined in [RFC3315]. follow normal retransmission routines defined in [RFC3315].
o Upon receiving a DecryptionFail error status code, the client MAY
resend the message following normal retransmission routines
defined in [RFC3315].
o Upon receiving a ReplayDetected error status code, the client MAY o Upon receiving a ReplayDetected error status code, the client MAY
resend the message with an adjusted Increasing-number option resend the message with an adjusted Increasing-number option
according to the returned number from the DHCPv6 server. according to the returned number from the DHCPv6 server.
o Upon receiving a SignatureFail error status code, the client MAY o Upon receiving a SignatureFail error status code, the client MAY
resend the message following normal retransmission routines resend the message following normal retransmission routines
defined in [RFC3315]. defined in [RFC3315].
7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior 7. DHCPv6 Server Behavior
The secure DHCPv6 server is pre-configured with a certificate and its The secure DHCPv6 server is pre-configured with a certificate and its
corresponding private key for server authentication. If the server corresponding private key for server authentication. If the server
does not obtain the certificate from CA, it can generate the self- does not obtain the certificate from Certificate Authority (CA), it
signed certificate. can generate the self-signed certificate.
When the DHCPv6 server receives the Information-request message and When the DHCPv6 server receives the Information-request message and
the contained Option Request option identifies the request is for the the contained Option Request option identifies the request is for the
server's certificate information, it SHOULD first check the hash, server's certificate information, it SHOULD first check the hash,
signature, encryption algorithms sets that the client supports. The signature, encryption algorithms sets that the client supports. The
server selects one hash, signature, encryption algorithm from the server selects one hash, signature, encryption algorithm from the
acknowledged algorithms sets for the future communication. If the acknowledged algorithms sets for the future communication. And then,
hash algorithm is fixed according to the signature algorithm, then the server replies with a Reply message to the client. The Reply
the hash algorithm field is set to zero. And then, the server message MUST contain the requested Certificate option, which MUST be
replies with a Reply message to the client. The Reply message MUST constructed as explained in Section 10.1.2, and Server Identifier
contain the requested Certificate option, which MUST be constructed option. In addition, the Reply message MUST contain one and only one
as explained in Section 10.1.2, and Server Identifier option. In Signature option, which MUST be constructed as explained in
addition, the Reply message MUST contain one and only one Signature Section 10.1.3. Besides, the Reply message SHOULD contain one and
option, which MUST be constructed as explained in Section 10.1.3. only one Increasing-number option, which MUST be constructed as
Besides, the Reply message SHOULD contain one and only one explained in Section 10.1.4.
Increasing-number option, which MUST be constructed as explained in
Section 10.1.4.
Upon the receipt of Encrypted-Query message, the server MUST drop the Upon the receipt of Encrypted-Query message, the server MUST drop the
message if the other DHCPv6 option is contained except Server message if the other DHCPv6 option is contained except Server
Identifier option, Encryption Key Tag option, Encrypted-message Identifier option, Encryption-Key-Tag option, Encrypted-message
option. Then, the server checks the Server Identifier option if it option. Then, the server checks the Server Identifier option. The
is contained. The DHCPv6 server drops the message that is not for DHCPv6 server drops the message that is not for it, thus not paying
it, thus not paying cost to decrypt messages. If it is the target cost to decrypt messages. If it is the target server, according to
server, according to the Encryption Key Tag option, the server the Encryption-Key-Tag option, the server identifies the used public/
identifies the used public/private key pair and decrypts the private key pair and decrypts the Encrypted-message option using the
Encrypted-message option using the corresponding private key. If the corresponding private key. If the decryption fails, the server
server does not find the corresponding private key, then it tries all discards the received message.
the private keys and establishes the relationship between the
encryption key tag and the private key. If the decryption fails, the
server discards the received message.
If secure DHCPv6 server needs client authentication and decrypted If secure DHCPv6 server needs client authentication and decrypted
message is a Solicit/Information-request message which contains the message is a Solicit/Information-request message which contains the
information for client authentication, the secure DHCPv6 server information for client authentication, the secure DHCPv6 server
discards the received message that meets any of the following discards the received message that meets any of the following
conditions: conditions:
o the Signature option is missing, o the Signature option is missing,
o multiple Signature options are present, o multiple Signature options are present,
skipping to change at page 13, line 9 skipping to change at page 12, line 48
such failure, the DHCPv6 server replies with an encrypted Reply such failure, the DHCPv6 server replies with an encrypted Reply
message with an AuthenticationFail error status code, defined in message with an AuthenticationFail error status code, defined in
Section 10.3, back to the client. At this point, the server has Section 10.3, back to the client. At this point, the server has
either recognized the authentication of the client, or decided to either recognized the authentication of the client, or decided to
drop the message. drop the message.
If the decrypted message contains the Increasing-number option, the If the decrypted message contains the Increasing-number option, the
server checks it according to the rule defined in Section 9.1. If server checks it according to the rule defined in Section 9.1. If
the check fails, an encrypted Reply message with a ReplayDetected the check fails, an encrypted Reply message with a ReplayDetected
error status code, defined in Section 10.3, should be sent back to error status code, defined in Section 10.3, should be sent back to
the client. In addition, a Increasing-number option is carried to the client. In the Reply message, a Increasing-number option is
indicate the server's stored number for the client to use. According carried to indicate the server's stored number for the client to use.
to the server's local policy, the message without an Increasing- According to the server's local policy, the message without an
number option MAY be acceptable or rejected. Increasing-number option MAY be acceptable or rejected.
The Signature field verification MUST show that the signature has The Signature field verification MUST show that the signature has
been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.3. If the signature been calculated as specified in Section 10.1.3. If the signature
check fails, the DHCPv6 server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply message check fails, the DHCPv6 server SHOULD send an encrypted Reply message
with a SignatureFail error status code. Only the clients that get with a SignatureFail error status code. Only the clients that get
through both the signature verification and increasing number check through both the signature verification and increasing number check
(if there is a Increasing-number option) are accepted as (if there is a Increasing-number option) are accepted as
authenticated clients and continue to be handled their message as authenticated clients and continue to be handled their message as
defined in [RFC3315]. defined in [RFC3315].
skipping to change at page 13, line 51 skipping to change at page 13, line 42
section 20 of [RFC3315]. There is nothing more the relay agents have section 20 of [RFC3315]. There is nothing more the relay agents have
to do, it neither needs to verify the messages from client or server, to do, it neither needs to verify the messages from client or server,
nor add any secure DHCPv6 options. Actually, by definition in this nor add any secure DHCPv6 options. Actually, by definition in this
document, relay agents MUST NOT add any secure DHCPv6 options. document, relay agents MUST NOT add any secure DHCPv6 options.
Relay-forward and Relay-reply messages MUST NOT contain any Relay-forward and Relay-reply messages MUST NOT contain any
additional Certificate option or Increasing-number option, aside from additional Certificate option or Increasing-number option, aside from
those present in the innermost encapsulated messages from the client those present in the innermost encapsulated messages from the client
or server. or server.
Relay agent is RECOMMENDED to cache server announcements to form the
list of the available DHCPv6 server certs. If the relay agent
receives the Information-request message, then it replies with a list
of server certs available locally. In this way, the client can be
confident of a quick response, and therefore treat the lack of a
quick response as an indication that no authenticated DHCP servers
exist.
9. Processing Rules 9. Processing Rules
9.1. Increasing Number Check 9.1. Increasing Number Check
In order to check the Increasing-number option, defined in In order to check the Increasing-number option, defined in
Section 10.1.4, the client/server has one stable stored number for Section 10.1.4, the client/server has one stable stored number for
replay attack detection. The server should keep a record of the replay attack detection. The server should keep a record of the
increasing number forever. And the client keeps a record of the increasing number forever. And the client keeps a record of the
increasing number during the DHCPv6 configuration process with the increasing number during the DHCPv6 configuration process with the
DHCPv6 server. And the client can forget the increasing number DHCPv6 server. And the client can forget the increasing number
information after the transaction is finished. information after the transaction is finished. The client's initial
locally stored increasing number is zero.
It is essential to remember that the increasing number is finite. It is essential to remember that the increasing number is finite.
All arithmetic dealing with sequence numbers must be performed modulo All arithmetic dealing with sequence numbers must be performed modulo
2^64. This unsigned arithmetic preserves the relationship of 2^64. This unsigned arithmetic preserves the relationship of
sequence numbers as they cycle from 2^64 - 1 to 0 again. sequence numbers as they cycle from 2^64 - 1 to 0 again.
In order to check the Increasing-number option, the following In order to check the Increasing-number option, the following
comparison is needed. comparison is needed.
NUM.STO = the stored number in the client/server NUM.STO = the stored number in the client/server
NUM.REC = the acknowledged number from the received message NUM.REC = the acknowledged number from the received message
The Increasing-number option in the received message passes the The Increasing-number option in the received message passes the
increasing number check if NUM.REC is more than NUM.STO. And then, increasing number check if NUM.REC is more than NUM.STO. And then,
the value of NUM.STO is changed into the value of NUM.REC. the value of NUM.STO is changed into the value of NUM.REC.
The increasing number check fails if NUM.REC is equal with or less The increasing number check fails if NUM.REC is equal with or less
than NUM.STO than NUM.STO
It is should be noted that
10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 10. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6
This section describes the extensions to DHCPv6. Six new DHCPv6 This section describes the extensions to DHCPv6. Six new DHCPv6
options, two new DHCPv6 messages and six new status codes are options, two new DHCPv6 messages and six new status codes are
defined. defined.
10.1. New DHCPv6 Options 10.1. New DHCPv6 Options
10.1.1. Algorithm Option 10.1.1. Algorithm Option
The Algorithm option carries the algorithms sets for algorithm The Algorithm option carries the algorithms sets for algorithm
agility, which is sent from the client to server. agility, which is contained in the Information-request message.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len | | OPTION_ALGORITHM | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. EA-id List . . EA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. SA-id List . . SA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. HA-id List . . HA-id List .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Algorithm Option Figure 2: Algorithm Option
o option-code: OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA1). o option-code: OPTION_ALGORITHM (TBA1).
o option-len: length of EA-id List + length of SA-id List + length o option-len: length of EA-id List + length of SA-id List + length
of HA-id List in octets. of HA-id List in octets.
o EA-id: The format of the EA-id List field is shown in Figure 3. o EA-id: The format of the EA-id List field is shown in Figure 3.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EA-num | EA-id | | EA-len | EA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... . . ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EA-id | | EA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
EA-num The number of the following EA-ids. -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
EA-len The length of the following EA-ids.
EA-id Encryption Algorithm id. The encryption algorithm EA-id 2-octets value to indicate the Encryption Algorithm id.
is used for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration The client enumerates the list of encryption algorithms it
process. This design is adopted in order to provide supports to the server. The encryption algorithm is used
encryption algorithm agility. The value is from the for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration process. This design
Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in is adopted in order to provide encryption algorithm agility.
IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values The value is from the Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6
is defined in Section 12. The mandatory encryption registry in IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values
algorithms MUST be included. is defined in Section 12. The mandatory encryption
algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 3: EA-id List Field Figure 3: EA-id List Field
o SA-id List: The format of the SA-id List field is shown in o SA-id List: The format of the SA-id List field is shown in
Figure 4. Figure 4.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-num | SA-id | | SA-len | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... . . ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-id | | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
SA-num The number of the following SA-ids. SA-len The length of the following SA-ids.
SA-id Signature Algorithm id. This design is adopted in SA-id 2-octets value to indicate the Signature Algorithm id.
The client enumerates the list of signature algorithms it
supports to the server. This design is adopted in
order to provide signature algorithm agility. The order to provide signature algorithm agility. The
value is from the Signature Algorithm for Secure value is from the Signature Algorithm for Secure
DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The support of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The support of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
is mandatory. A registry of the initial assigned is mandatory. A registry of the initial assigned
values is defined in Section 12. The mandatory values is defined in Section 12. The mandatory
signature algorithms MUST be included. signature algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 4: SA-id List Field Figure 4: SA-id List Field
o HA-id List: The format of the HA-id List field is shown in o HA-id List: The format of the HA-id List field is shown in
Figure 5. Figure 5.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-num | HA-id | | HA-len | HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. ... . . ... .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id | | HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
HA-num The number of the following HA-ids. -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
HA-len The length of the following HA-ids.
HA-id Hash Algorithm id. This design is adopted in order to HA-id 2-octets value to indicate the Hash Algorithm id.
provide hash algorithm agility. The value is from the The client enumerates the list of hash algorithms it
Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The supports to the server. This design is adopted in order to
support of SHA-256 is mandatory. A registry of the provide hash algorithm agility. The value is from the
initial assigned values is defined in Section 12. Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The
The mandatory hash algorithms MUST be included. support of SHA-256 is mandatory. A registry of the
initial assigned values is defined in Section 12.
The mandatory hash algorithms MUST be included.
Figure 5: HA-id List Field Figure 5: HA-id List Field
10.1.2. Certificate Option 10.1.2. Certificate Option
The Certificate option carries the certificate of the client/server. The Certificate option carries the certificate of the client/server,
The format of the Certificate option is described as follows: which is contained in the Reply message. The format of the
Certificate option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_CERTIFICATE | option-len | | OPTION_CERTIFICATE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EA-id | SA-id | | EA-id | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. Certificate . . Certificate .
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Certificate Option Figure 6: Certificate Option
o option-code: OPTION_CERTIFICATE (TBA2). o option-code: OPTION_CERTIFICATE (TBA2).
o option-len: 4 + length of Certificate in octets. o option-len: 4 + length of Certificate in octets.
o EA-id: Encryption Algorithm id. The encryption algorithm is used o EA-id: Encryption Algorithm id which is used for the certificate.
for the encrypted DHCPv6 configuration process. This design is
adopted in order to provide encryption algorithm agility. The
value is from the Encryption Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry
in IANA. A registry of the initial assigned values is defined in
Section 12. If the value of EA-id is 0, then the certificate is
not used for encryption.
o SA-id: Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm is used o SA-id: Signature Algorithm id which is used for the certificate.
for computing the signature result. The value is from the
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. A
registry of the initial assigned values is defined in Section 12.
If the value of SA-id is 0, then the certificate is not used for
signature check.
o Certificate: A variable-length field containing certificates. The o Certificate: A variable-length field containing certificates. The
encoding of certificate and certificate data MUST be in format as encoding of certificate and certificate data MUST be in format as
defined in Section 3.6, [RFC7296]. The support of X.509 defined in Section 3.6, [RFC7296]. The support of X.509
certificate is mandatory. certificate is mandatory.
It should be noticed that the scenario where the values of EA-id and It should be noticed that the scenario where the values of EA-id and
SA-id are all 0, it makes no sense and MUST NOT be used. SA-id are both 0 makes no sense and the client MUST discard a message
with such values.
10.1.3. Signature option 10.1.3. Signature option
The Signature option allows a signature that is signed by the private The Signature option contains a signature that is signed by the
key to be attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option could private key to be attached to the Reply message. The Signature
be in any place within the DHCPv6 message while it is logically option could be in any place within the DHCPv6 message while it is
created after the entire DHCPv6 header and options. It protects the logically created after the entire DHCPv6 header and options. It
entire DHCPv6 header and options, including itself. The format of protects the entire DHCPv6 header and options, including itself. The
the Signature option is described as follows: format of the Signature option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len | | OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SA-id | HA-id | | SA-id | HA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. Signature (variable length) . . Signature (variable length) .
skipping to change at page 19, line 15 skipping to change at page 19, line 26
the SA-id field. the SA-id field.
Note: If Secure DHCPv6 is used, the DHCPv6 message is encrypted in a Note: If Secure DHCPv6 is used, the DHCPv6 message is encrypted in a
way that the authentication mechanism defined in RFC3315 does not way that the authentication mechanism defined in RFC3315 does not
understand. So the Authentication option SHOULD NOT be used if understand. So the Authentication option SHOULD NOT be used if
Secure DHCPv6 is applied. Secure DHCPv6 is applied.
10.1.4. Increasing-number Option 10.1.4. Increasing-number Option
The Increasing-number option carries the strictly increasing number The Increasing-number option carries the strictly increasing number
for anti-replay protection. It is optional. for anti-replay protection, which is contained in the Reply message
and the encrypted DHCPv6 message. It is optional.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_INCREASING_NUM | option-len | | OPTION_INCREASING_NUM | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| InreasingNum (64-bit) | | Increasing-Num (64-bit) |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_INCREASING_NUM (TBA4). option-code OPTION_INCREASING_NUM (TBA4).
option-len 8, in octets. option-len 8, in octets.
IncreasingNum A strictly increasing number for the replay attack detection Increasing-Num A strictly increasing number for the replay attack detection
which is more than the local stored number. which is more than the local stored number.
Figure 8: Increasing-number Option Figure 8: Increasing-number Option
10.1.5. Encryption Key Tag Option 10.1.5. Encryption-Key-Tag Option
The Encryption Key Tag option carries the key identifier which is The Encryption-Key-Tag option carries the key identifier which is
calculated from the public key data. The Encrypted-Query message calculated from the public key data. The Encrypted-Query message
MUST contain the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the used MUST contain the Encryption-Key-Tag option to identify the used
public/private key pair. public/private key pair.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| option-code | option-len | | OPTION_ENCRYPTION_KEY_TAG | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. encryption key tag . . encryption key tag .
. (variable) . . (variable) .
. . . .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Encryption Key Tag Option Figure 9: Encryption-Key-Tag Option
option-code OPTION_ENCRY_KT (TBA5). option-code OPTION_ENCRYPTION_KEY_TAG (TBA5).
option-len Length of the encryption key tag. option-len Length of the encryption key tag.
encryption key tag A variable length field containing the encryption encryption key tag A variable length field containing the encryption
key tag sent from the client to server to identify the used key tag sent from the client to server to identify the used
public/private key pair. The encryption key tag is calculated public/private key pair. The encryption key tag is calculated
from the public key data, like fingerprint of a specific public from the public key data, like fingerprint of a specific public
key. key. How to generate the encryption key tag adopts the method
define in Appendix B in [RFC4034] and section 5.5 in [RFC6840].
The data of the public key is used as input of the generation
function.
10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option 10.1.6. Encrypted-message Option
The Encrypted-message option carries the encrypted DHCPv6 message, The Encrypted-message option carries the encrypted DHCPv6 message,
which is calculated with the recipient's public key. which is calculated with the recipient's public key. The Encrypted-
message option is contained in the Encrypted-Query message or the
Encrypted-Response message.
The format of the Encrypted-message option is: The format of the Encrypted-message option is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| option-code | option-len | | option-code | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. encrypted DHCPv6 message . . encrypted DHCPv6 message .
skipping to change at page 21, line 37 skipping to change at page 22, line 6
Figure 11: The format of Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response Figure 11: The format of Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response
Messages Messages
msg-type Identifier of the message type. It can be either msg-type Identifier of the message type. It can be either
Encrypted-Query (TBA7) or DHCPv6-Response (TBA8). Encrypted-Query (TBA7) or DHCPv6-Response (TBA8).
transaction-id The transaction ID for this message exchange. transaction-id The transaction ID for this message exchange.
options The Encrypted-Query message MUST contain the options The Encrypted-Query message MUST contain the
Encrypted-message option, Encryption Key Tag option Encrypted-message option, Encryption-Key-Tag option
and Server Identifier option if the message in the and Server Identifier option if the message in the
Encrypted-message option has a Server Identifier Encrypted-message option has a Server Identifier
option. The Encrypted-Response message MUST only option. The Encrypted-Response message MUST only
contain the Encrypted-message option. contain the Encrypted-message option.
10.3. Status Codes 10.3. Status Codes
The following new status codes, see Section 5.4 of [RFC3315] are The following new status codes, see Section 5.4 of [RFC3315] are
defined. defined.
skipping to change at page 22, line 20 skipping to change at page 22, line 38
This document provides the authentication and encryption mechanisms This document provides the authentication and encryption mechanisms
for DHCPv6. for DHCPv6.
[RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used [RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used
in SEND. Since Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the same in SEND. Since Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the same
hash algorithms in similar way to SEND, analysis results could be hash algorithms in similar way to SEND, analysis results could be
applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not constitute applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not constitute
any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the signature any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the signature
algorithm in Secure DHCPv6. algorithm in Secure DHCPv6.
A server, whose local policy accepts messages without a Increasing-
number option, may have to face the risk of replay attacks.
There are some mandatory algorithm for encryption algorithm in this There are some mandatory algorithm for encryption algorithm in this
document. It may be at some point that the mandatory algorithm is no document. It may be at some point that the mandatory algorithm is no
longer safe to use. longer safe to use.
A server or a client, whose local policy accepts messages without a
Increasing-number option, may have to face the risk of replay
attacks.
If the client tries more than one cert for client authentication, the If the client tries more than one cert for client authentication, the
server can easily get a client that implements this to enumerate its server can easily get a client that implements this to enumerate its
entire cert list and probably learn a lot about a client that way. entire cert list and probably learn a lot about a client that way.
For this security item, It is RECOMMENDED that client certificates
could be tied to specific server certificates by configuration.
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
This document defines six new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options. The IANA is This document defines six new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options. The IANA is
requested to assign values for these six options from the DHCPv6 requested to assign values for these six options from the DHCPv6
Option Codes table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in Option Codes table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry maintained in
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The six options http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The six options
are: are:
The Algorithm Option (TBA1), described in Section 10.1.2. The Algorithm Option (TBA1), described in Section 10.1.2.
The Certificate Option (TBA2), described in Section 10.1.2. The Certificate Option (TBA2), described in Section 10.1.2.
The Signature Option (TBA3), described in Section 10.1.3. The Signature Option (TBA3), described in Section 10.1.3.
The Increasing-number Option (TBA4),described in Section 10.1.4. The Increasing-number Option (TBA4),described in Section 10.1.4.
The Encryption Key Tag Option (TBA5),described in Section 10.1.5. The Encryption-Key-Tag Option (TBA5),described in Section 10.1.5.
The Encrypted-message Option (TBA6), described in Section 10.1.6. The Encrypted-message Option (TBA6), described in Section 10.1.6.
The IANA is also requested to assign value for these two messages The IANA is also requested to assign value for these two messages
from the DHCPv6 Message Types table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry from the DHCPv6 Message Types table of the DHCPv6 Parameters registry
maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters. The
two messages are: two messages are:
The Encrypted-Query Message (TBA7), described in Section 10.2. The Encrypted-Query Message (TBA7), described in Section 10.2.
skipping to change at page 24, line 27 skipping to change at page 25, line 5
The authors would like to thank Tomek Mrugalski, Bernie Volz, The authors would like to thank Tomek Mrugalski, Bernie Volz,
Jianping Wu, Randy Bush, Yiu Lee, Sean Shen, Ralph Droms, Jari Arkko, Jianping Wu, Randy Bush, Yiu Lee, Sean Shen, Ralph Droms, Jari Arkko,
Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, Christian Huitema, Stephen Kent, Thomas Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, Christian Huitema, Stephen Kent, Thomas
Huth, David Schumacher, Francis Dupont, Gang Chen, Suresh Krishnan, Huth, David Schumacher, Francis Dupont, Gang Chen, Suresh Krishnan,
Fred Templin, Robert Elz, Nico Williams, Erik Kline, Alan DeKok, Fred Templin, Robert Elz, Nico Williams, Erik Kline, Alan DeKok,
Bernard Aboba, Sam Hartman, Zilong Liu and other members of the IETF Bernard Aboba, Sam Hartman, Zilong Liu and other members of the IETF
DHC working group for their valuable comments. DHC working group for their valuable comments.
This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629]. This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
14. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] 14. References
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-18: Add the Algorithm option. The algorithm
option contains the EA-id List, SA-id List, HA-id List, and then the
certificate and signature options do not contain the algorithm list;
Add the Encryption Key Tag option to identify the used public/private
key pair; Delete the AlgorithmNotSupported error status code; Delete
some description on that secure DHCPv6 exchanges the server selection
method; Delete the DecryptionFail error status code; For the case
where the client's certificate is missed, then the server discards
the received message. Add the assumption that: For DHCPv6 client,
just one certificate is used for the DHCPv6 configuration. Add the
statement that: For the first Encrypted-Query message, the server
needs to try all the possible private keys and then records the
relationship between the public key and the encryption key tag.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-17: Change the format of the certificate
option according to the comments from Bernie.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-16: For the algorithm agility part, the
provider can offer multiple EA-id, SA-id, HA-id and then receiver
choose one from the algorithm set.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-15: Increasing number option only contains
the strictly increasing number; Add some description about why
encryption is needed in Security Issues of DHCPv6 part;
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-14: For the deployment part, Tofu is out of
scope and take Opportunistic security into consideration; Increasing
number option is changed into 64 bits; Increasing number check is a
separate section; IncreasingnumFail error status code is changed into
ReplayDetected error status code; Add the section of "caused change
to RFC3315";
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-13: Change the Timestamp option into
Increasing-number option and the corresponding check method; Delete
the OCSP stampling part for the certificate check; Add the scenario
where the hash and signature algorithms cannot be separated; Add the
comparison with RFC7824 and RFC7844; Add the encryption text format
and reference of RFC5652. Add the consideration of scenario where
multiple DHCPv6 servers share one common DHCPv6 server. Add the
statement that Encrypted-Query and Encrypted-Response messages can
only contain certain options: Server Identifier option and Encrypted-
message option. Add opportunistic security for deployment
consideration. Besides authentication+encyrption mode, encryption-
only mode is added.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12: Add the Signature option and timestamp
option during server/client authentication process. Add the hash
function and signature algorithm. Add the requirement: The
Information-request message cannot contain any other options except
ORO option. Modify the use of "SHOULD"; Delete the reference of
RFC5280 and modify the method of client/server cert verification; Add
the relay agent cache function for the quick response when there is
no authenticated server. 2016-4-24.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-11: Delete the Signature option, because the
encrypted DHCPv6 message and the Information-request message (only
contain the Certificate option) don't need the Signature option for
message integrity check; Rewrite the "Applicability" section; Add the
encryption algorithm negotiation process; To support the encryption
algorithm negotiation, the Certificate option contains the EA-
id(encryption algorithm identifier) field; Reserve the Timestamp
option to defend against the replay attacks for encrypted DHCPv6
configuration process; Modify the client behavior when there is no
authenticated DHCPv6 server; Add the DecryptionFail error code.
2016-3-9.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-10: merge DHCPv6 authentication and DHCPv6
encryption. The public key option is removed, because the device can
generate the self-signed certificate if it is pre-configured the
public key not the certificate. 2015-12-10.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-09: change some texts about the deployment
part.2015-12-10.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-08: clarified what the client and the server
should do if it receives a message using unsupported algorithm;
refined the error code treatment regarding to AuthenticationFail and
TimestampFail; added consideration on how to reduce the DoS attack
when using TOFU; other general editorial cleanups. 2015-06-10.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-07: removed the deployment consideration
section; instead, described more straightforward use cases with TOFU
in the overview section, and clarified how the public keys would be
stored at the recipient when TOFU is used. The overview section also
clarified the integration of PKI or other similar infrastructure is
an open issue. 2015-03-23.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-06: remove the limitation that only clients
use PKI- certificates and only servers use public keys. The new text
would allow clients use public keys and servers use PKI-certificates.
2015-02-18.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-05: addressed comments from mail list that
responsed to the second WGLC. 2014-12-08.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-04: addressed comments from mail list.
Making timestamp an independent and optional option. Reduce the
serverside authentication to base on only client's certificate.
Reduce the clientside authentication to only Leaf of Faith base on
server's public key. 2014-09-26.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-03: addressed comments from WGLC. Added a
new section "Deployment Consideration". Corrected the Public Key
Field in the Public Key Option. Added consideration for large DHCPv6
message transmission. Added TimestampFail error code. Refined the
retransmission rules on clients. 2014-06-18.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-02: addressed comments (applicability
statement, redesign the error codes and their logic) from IETF89 DHC
WG meeting and volunteer reviewers. 2014-04-14.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-01: addressed comments from IETF88 DHC WG
meeting. Moved Dacheng Zhang from acknowledgement to be co-author.
2014-02-14.
draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-00: adopted by DHC WG. 2013-11-19.
draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-02: removed protection between relay agent
and server due to complexity, following the comments from Ted Lemon,
Bernie Volz. 2013-10-16.
draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-01: update according to review comments from
Ted Lemon, Bernie Volz, Ralph Droms. Separated Public Key/
Certificate option into two options. Refined many detailed
processes. 2013-10-08.
draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00: original version, this draft is a
replacement of draft-ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6, which reached IESG and
dead because of consideration regarding to CGA. The authors followed
the suggestion from IESG making a general public key based mechanism.
2013-06-29.
15. References
15.1. Normative References 14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>. December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>. 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010, Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6840] Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and
Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6840>.
[RFC7283] Cui, Y., Sun, Q., and T. Lemon, "Handling Unknown DHCPv6 [RFC7283] Cui, Y., Sun, Q., and T. Lemon, "Handling Unknown DHCPv6
Messages", RFC 7283, DOI 10.17487/RFC7283, July 2014, Messages", RFC 7283, DOI 10.17487/RFC7283, July 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7283>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7283>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection [RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
skipping to change at page 28, line 28 skipping to change at page 26, line 28
[RFC7824] Krishnan, S., Mrugalski, T., and S. Jiang, "Privacy [RFC7824] Krishnan, S., Mrugalski, T., and S. Jiang, "Privacy
Considerations for DHCPv6", RFC 7824, Considerations for DHCPv6", RFC 7824,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7824, May 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC7824, May 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7824>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7824>.
[RFC7844] Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity [RFC7844] Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844, Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.
15.2. Informative References 14.2. Informative References
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629, [RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999, DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
 End of changes. 86 change blocks. 
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