draft-ietf-dime-erp-11.txt		draft-ietf-dime-erp-12.txt
	skipping to change at page 1, line 15		skipping to change at page 1, line 15
	Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs		Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs
	Expires: February 1, 2013 S. Decugis		Expires: February 1, 2013 S. Decugis
	INSIDE Secure		INSIDE Secure
	Q. Wu		Q. Wu
	Huawei		Huawei
	G. Zorn		G. Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	July 31, 2012		July 31, 2012
	Diameter Support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)		Diameter Support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
	draft-ietf-dime-erp-11 .txt		draft-ietf-dime-erp-12.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the		The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the
	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-
	authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)		authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)
	server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies		server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies
	Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application		Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application
	to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER		to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER
	server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the		server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the
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	11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . 14		12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . 14
	13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	RFC5296 [RFC5296] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP).		RFC6696 [RFC6696] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP).
	It consists of the following steps:		It consists of the following steps:
	Bootstrapping		Bootstrapping
	A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended		A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended
	Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication		Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication
	[RFC5295]. This root key is transported from the EAP server to		[RFC5295]. This root key is transported from the EAP server to
	the ER server.		the ER server.
	Re-authentication		Re-authentication
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	This document also discusses the distribution of the root key during		This document also discusses the distribution of the root key during
	bootstrapping, in conjunction with either the initial EAP		bootstrapping, in conjunction with either the initial EAP
	authentication (implicit bootstrapping) or the first ERP exchange		authentication (implicit bootstrapping) or the first ERP exchange
	(explicit bootstrapping). Security considerations for this key		(explicit bootstrapping). Security considerations for this key
	distribution are detailed in RFC 5295 [RFC5295].		distribution are detailed in RFC 5295 [RFC5295].
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	This document uses terminology defined in RFC3748 [RFC3748], RFC5295		This document uses terminology defined in RFC3748 [RFC3748], RFC5295
	[RFC5295], RFC5296 [RFC5296], and RFC4072 [RFC4072].		[RFC5295], RFC6696 [RFC6696], and RFC4072 [RFC4072].
	"Root key" (RK) or "bootstrapping material" refer to the rRK or rDSRK		"Root key" (RK) or "bootstrapping material" refer to the rRK or rDSRK
	derived from an EMSK, depending on the location of the ER server in		derived from an EMSK, depending on the location of the ER server in
	home or foreign domain.		home or foreign domain.
	We use the notation "ERP/DER" and "ERP/DEA" in this document to refer		We use the notation "ERP/DER" and "ERP/DEA" in this document to refer
	to Diameter-EAP-Request and Diameter-EAP-Answer commands with the		to Diameter-EAP-Request and Diameter-EAP-Answer commands with the
	Application Id set to <Diameter ERP Application> Section 12.1; the		Application Id set to <Diameter ERP Application> Section 12.1; the
	same commands are denoted "EAP/DER" and "EAP/DEA" when the		same commands are denoted "EAP/DER" and "EAP/DEA" when the
	Application Id in the message is set to <Diameter EAP Application>		Application Id in the message is set to <Diameter EAP Application>
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	Section 12.1 in the message. The generation of the ERP/DER message		Section 12.1 in the message. The generation of the ERP/DER message
	is detailed in Section 6.		is detailed in Section 6.
	If there is an ER server in the same domain as the authenticator		If there is an ER server in the same domain as the authenticator
	(i.e., the local domain), Diameter routing MUST be configured so that		(i.e., the local domain), Diameter routing MUST be configured so that
	this ERP/DER message reaches that server, even if the Destination-		this ERP/DER message reaches that server, even if the Destination-
	Realm is not the same as local domain.		Realm is not the same as local domain.
	If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to		If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to
	its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component		its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component
	of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC5296 [RFC5296],		of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC6696 [RFC6696],
	this realm is the home domain of the peer in the case of		this realm is the home domain of the peer in the case of
	bootstrapping exchange ('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain		bootstrapping exchange ('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain
	of the bootstrapped ER server otherwise .		of the bootstrapped ER server otherwise .
	If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER		If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER
	message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER		message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER
	MUST be generated as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] and		MUST be generated as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] and
	returned to the authenticator. The authenticator MAY cache this		returned to the authenticator. The authenticator MAY cache this
	information (with limited duration) to avoid further attempts to		information (with limited duration) to avoid further attempts to
	execute ERP with this realm. It MAY also fallback to full EAP		execute ERP with this realm. It MAY also fallback to full EAP
	authentication to authenticate the peer.		authentication to authenticate the peer.
	When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local		When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local
	database for a valid, unexpired root key matching the keyName part of		database for a valid, unexpired root key matching the keyName part of
	the User-Name AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the		the User-Name AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the
	ERP message as described in [RFC5296] then creates the ERP/DEA answer		ERP message as described in [RFC6696] then creates the ERP/DEA answer
	as described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.		as described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.
	Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as		Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as
	described in RFC5296 [RFC5296], and forwards the content of the EAP-		described in RFC6696 [RFC6696], and forwards the content of the EAP-
	Payload AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.		Payload AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.
	The ER server may or may not possess the root key in its local		The ER server may or may not possess the root key in its local
	database. If the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message has its 'B' flag set		database. If the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message has its 'B' flag set
	(Bootstrapping exchange) and the ER server possesses the root key,		(Bootstrapping exchange) and the ER server possesses the root key,
	the ER server SHOULD respond directly to the peer that initiated the		the ER server SHOULD respond directly to the peer that initiated the
	ERP exchange. Otherwise, the ER server SHOULD act as a proxy and		ERP exchange. Otherwise, the ER server SHOULD act as a proxy and
	forward the message to the home EAP server after changing its		forward the message to the home EAP server after changing its
	Application Id to Diameter EAP and adding the ERP-RK-Request AVP to		Application Id to Diameter EAP and adding the ERP-RK-Request AVP to
	request the root key. See Section 5 for more detail on this process.		request the root key. See Section 5 for more detail on this process.
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	the first DER of the full EAP authentication and adds the ERP-RK-		the first DER of the full EAP authentication and adds the ERP-RK-
	Request AVP inside, then forwards the request to the home EAP server.		Request AVP inside, then forwards the request to the home EAP server.
	If the home Diameter server does not support the Diameter ERP		If the home Diameter server does not support the Diameter ERP
	extensions, it simply ignores the ERP-RK-Request AVP and continues as		extensions, it simply ignores the ERP-RK-Request AVP and continues as
	specified in RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. If the server supports the ERP		specified in RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. If the server supports the ERP
	extensions, it saves the value of the ERP-Realm AVP found inside the		extensions, it saves the value of the ERP-Realm AVP found inside the
	ERP-RK-Request AVP, and continues with the EAP authentication. When		ERP-RK-Request AVP, and continues with the EAP authentication. When
	the authentication completes, if it is successful and the EAP method		the authentication completes, if it is successful and the EAP method
	has generated an EMSK, the server MUST derive the rRK as specified in		has generated an EMSK, the server MUST derive the rRK as specified in
	RFC 5296 [RFC5296], using the saved domain name. It then includes		RFC 6696 [RFC6696], using the saved domain name. It then includes
	the rRK inside a Key AVP (Section 8.3) with the Key-Type AVP set to		the rRK inside a Key AVP (Section 8.3) with the Key-Type AVP set to
	rRK, before sending the DEA as usual.		rRK, before sending the DEA as usual.
	When the ER server proxies a Diameter-EAP-Answer message with a		When the ER server proxies a Diameter-EAP-Answer message with a
	Session-Id corresponding to a message to which it added an ERP-RK-		Session-Id corresponding to a message to which it added an ERP-RK-
	Request AVP, and the Result-Code is DIAMETER_SUCCESS, it MUST examine		Request AVP, and the Result-Code is DIAMETER_SUCCESS, it MUST examine
	the message and save and remove any Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-		the message and save and remove any Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-
	Type AVP set to rRK. If the message does not contain such Key AVP,		Type AVP set to rRK. If the message does not contain such Key AVP,
	the ER server may cache the information that ERP is not possible for		the ER server may cache the information that ERP is not possible for
	this session to avoid possible subsequent attempts. In any case, the		this session to avoid possible subsequent attempts. In any case, the
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	Then the newly created EAP/DER is sent and routed to the home		Then the newly created EAP/DER is sent and routed to the home
	Diameter EAP application server.		Diameter EAP application server.
	If the home Diameter EAP server does not support ERP extensions, EAP		If the home Diameter EAP server does not support ERP extensions, EAP
	packets with an unknown ERP-specific code (EAP-Initiate) will not be		packets with an unknown ERP-specific code (EAP-Initiate) will not be
	understood. In such a case, the home Diameter EAP server MUST send		understood. In such a case, the home Diameter EAP server MUST send
	an EAP/DEA with a Result-Code indicating a Permanent Failure (for		an EAP/DEA with a Result-Code indicating a Permanent Failure (for
	example, DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN or		example, DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN or
	DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY). The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and		DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY). The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and
	contain a copy of the EAP-Payload AVP. Otherwise, it processes the		contain a copy of the EAP-Payload AVP. Otherwise, it processes the
	DSRK request as described in [RFC5296]. In particular, it includes		DSRK request as described in [RFC6696]. In particular, it includes
	the Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm		the Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm
	AVP. The server creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072]		AVP. The server creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072]
	including an instance of the Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-Type AVP		including an instance of the Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-Type AVP
	set to rRK and an instance of the Domain-Name TLV attribute with the		set to rRK and an instance of the Domain-Name TLV attribute with the
	content from the ERP-Realm AVP.		content from the ERP-Realm AVP.
	The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in		The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in
	addition to standard proxy operations:		addition to standard proxy operations:
	Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id		Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id
	(Section 12.1 )		(Section 12.1 )
	Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to		Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to
	rRK, as described in the implicit scenario (Section 5.1).		rRK, as described in the implicit scenario (Section 5.1).
	The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can		The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can
	use the rMSK as described in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].		use the rMSK as described in RFC 6696 [RFC6696].
	The figure below captures this proxy behavior:		The figure below captures this proxy behavior:
	Authenticator ER server Home Diameter server		Authenticator ER server Home Diameter server
	============= ========= ====================		============= ========= ====================
	----------------------->		----------------------->
	Diameter ERP/DER		Diameter ERP/DER
	(EAP-Initiate)		(EAP-Initiate)
	------------------------>		------------------------>
	Diameter EAP/DER		Diameter EAP/DER
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	the authenticator. Alternatively, the authenticator may send an EAP-		the authenticator. Alternatively, the authenticator may send an EAP-
	Initiate/Re-auth-Start message to the peer to trigger the mechanism.		Initiate/Re-auth-Start message to the peer to trigger the mechanism.
	In this case, the peer responds with an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message.		In this case, the peer responds with an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message.
	If the authenticator does not support ERP (pure Diameter EAP		If the authenticator does not support ERP (pure Diameter EAP
	[RFC4072] support), it discards the EAP packets with an unknown ERP-		[RFC4072] support), it discards the EAP packets with an unknown ERP-
	specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP		specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP
	authentication in this case.		authentication in this case.
	When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from		When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from
	the peer, the message is processed as described in [RFC5296] with		the peer, the message is processed as described in [RFC6696] with
	regard to the EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER		regard to the EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER
	message following the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with		message following the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with
	the following differences:		the following differences:
	The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code		The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code
	TBD ).		TBD ).
	The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter		The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter
	ERP>.		ERP>.
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	The value of the Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter		The value of the Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter
	ERP>.		ERP>.
	The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message.		The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message.
	If authentication is successful, an instance of the Key AVP		If authentication is successful, an instance of the Key AVP
	containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived		containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived
	by ERP is included.		by ERP is included.
	When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it		When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it
	as described in Diameter EAP [RFC4072] and RFC5296 [RFC5296]: the		as described in Diameter EAP [RFC4072] and RFC 6696 [RFC6696]: the
	content of the EAP-Payload AVP is forwarded to the peer, and the		content of the EAP-Payload AVP is forwarded to the peer, and the
	contents of the Keying-Material AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is		contents of the Keying-Material AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is
	used as a shared secret for a secure association protocol specific to		used as a shared secret for a secure association protocol specific to
	the lower-layer in use.		the lower-layer in use.
	7. Application Id		7. Application Id
	We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP		We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP
	Application, with an Application Id value of TBD. Diameter nodes		Application, with an Application Id value of TBD. Diameter nodes
	conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST		conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST
	skipping to change at page 12, line 48		skipping to change at page 12, line 48
	8.3.1. Key-Type AVP		8.3.1. Key-Type AVP
	The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK.		The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK.
	8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP		8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP
	The Keying-Material AVP contains the rRK sent by the home EAP server		The Keying-Material AVP contains the rRK sent by the home EAP server
	to the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request		to the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request
	AVP, or the rMSK sent by the ER server to the authenticator. How		AVP, or the rMSK sent by the ER server to the authenticator. How
	this material is derived and used is specified in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].		this material is derived and used is specified in RFC 6696 [RFC6696].
	8.3.3. Key-Name AVP		8.3.3. Key-Name AVP
	This AVP contains the EMSKname which identifies the keying material.		This AVP contains the EMSKname which identifies the keying material.
	The derivation of this name is specified in RGC 5296 [RFC5296].		The derivation of this name is specified in RGC 6696 [RFC6696].
	8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP		8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
	The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in		The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in
	seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the		seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the
	EMSK from which the material was derived.		EMSK from which the material was derived.
	9. Result-Code AVP Values		9. Result-Code AVP Values
	This section defines new Result-Code [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]		This section defines new Result-Code [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]
	skipping to change at page 14, line 48		skipping to change at page 14, line 48
	This result-code value is defined in Section 9.		This result-code value is defined in Section 9.
	13. Security Considerations		13. Security Considerations
	The security considerations from the following documents apply here:		The security considerations from the following documents apply here:
	o Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]		o Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]
	o RFC 4072 [RFC4072]		o RFC 4072 [RFC4072]
	o RFC 5296 [RFC5296]		o RFC 6696 [RFC6696]
	o Zorn, Wu and Cakulev [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]		o Zorn, Wu and Cakulev [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]
	14. Normative References		14. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,		[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,
	"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for		"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
	Cryptographic Key Transport",		Cryptographic Key Transport",
	draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work		draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work
	in progress), August 2011.		in progress), August 2011.
	skipping to change at page 15, line 43		skipping to change at page 15, line 43
	"Diameter Extensible Authentication		"Diameter Extensible Authentication
	Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,		Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
	August 2005.		August 2005.
	[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,		[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,
	V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification		V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification
	for the Derivation of Root Keys from		for the Derivation of Root Keys from
	an Extended Master Session Key		an Extended Master Session Key
	(EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008.		(EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008.
	[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP		[RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., and
	Extensions for EAP Re-authentication		G. Zorn, "EAP Extensions for the EAP
	Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296,		Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)",
	August 2008.		RFC 6696, July 2012.
	[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/>		[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/>
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Julien Bournelle		Julien Bournelle
	Orange Labs		Orange Labs
	38-40 rue du general Leclerc		38-40 rue du general Leclerc
	Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794		Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
	France		France
End of changes. 15 change blocks.
	18 lines changed or deleted		18 lines changed or added
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