draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-03.txt   draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-04.txt 
Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed. Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed.
Internet-Draft Network Zen Internet-Draft Network Zen
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu, Ed.
Expires: November 2, 2010 Huawei Expires: November 26, 2010 Huawei
V. Cakulev V. Cakulev
Alcatel Lucent Alcatel Lucent
May 1, 2010 May 25, 2010
Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-03 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-04
Abstract Abstract
Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications
require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document
specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native
Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master-
Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting
cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain
EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one
instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message.
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Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295] Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions
This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys
in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter
applications. applications.
3.1. Key AVP 3.1. Key AVP
The Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped [RFC3588] It contains The Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped [RFC3588]. It
the name, type and optionally, the usable lifetime of the key, as contains the type and keying material and, optionally, an indication
well as the keying material itself. of the usable lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security
Parameter Index (SPI) with which the key is associated.
Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 >
< Key-Type > < Key-Type >
{ Keying-Material } { Keying-Material }
[ Key-Lifetime ] [ Key-Lifetime ]
[ Key-Name ] [ Key-Name ]
[ Key-SPI ] [ Key-SPI ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP
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The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code <AC2>) is of type Enumerated and signifies The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code <AC2>) is of type Enumerated and signifies
the type of the key being sent. The following values are defined in the type of the key being sent. The following values are defined in
this document: this document:
MSK (0) MSK (0)
The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748]
DSRK (1) DSRK (1)
A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
USRK (2) rRK (2)
A Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
rRK (3)
A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296].
rMSK (4) rMSK (3)
A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296].
DSUSRK (5) A Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. IKEv2-PSK (4) A pre-shared key for use in IKE-V2 key exchange
[I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter].
If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA
according to the policy stated in Section 5.2 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP
The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key
identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on
the key type and link layer in question, and is beyond the scope of the key type and usage in question, and is beyond the scope of this
this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key name
name generation in the context of EAP). generation in the context of EAP).
3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP
The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code <AC3>) is of type OctetString. The The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code <AC3>) is of type OctetString. The
exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors,
including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond
the scope of this document. the scope of this document.
3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588] The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588]
and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents
of the Keying-Material AVP Section 3.1.3 is valid. of the Keying-Material AVP Section 3.1.3 is valid.
NOTE: NOTE:
Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the
lifetime to be the point in time when the keying material is first lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the
used. keying material is received.
3.1.5. Key-SPI 3.1.5. Key-SPI
The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code <AC5>) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code <AC5>) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a
Security Parameter Index (SPI) value that can be used with other SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying
parameters for identifying associated keying material. associated keying material.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol
[RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in
Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072].
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign
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5.2. AVP Values 5.2. AVP Values
IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the
Key-Type AVP and populated with the values defined in this document Key-Type AVP and populated with the values defined in this document
(Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP
using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have been using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have been
assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or deprecated. assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or deprecated.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig and Sebastien Decugis Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom
for useful comments. Taylor, Frank Xia and Sebastien Decugis for useful comments.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
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[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter]
Cakulev, V. and A. Lior, "Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared
Secret-based Support for IKEv2 Server to Diameter Server
Interaction", draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-02 (work
in progress), March 2010.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, August 2008. RFC 5247, August 2008.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
"Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
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