draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-11.txt   draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-12.txt 
Network Working Group G. Zorn Network Working Group G. Zorn
Internet-Draft Network Zen Internet-Draft Network Zen
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu
Expires: December 19, 2011 Huawei Expires: February 16, 2012 Huawei
V. Cakulev V. Cakulev
Alcatel Lucent Alcatel Lucent
June 17, 2011 August 15, 2011
Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-11 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-12
Abstract Abstract
Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications
require the transport of cryptographic keying material. This require the transport of cryptographic keying material. This
document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing
native Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. native Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 16, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master-
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Master Session Key [RFC3748]. Master Session Key [RFC3748].
rMSK rMSK
reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key,
derived from the rRK (below). derived from the rRK (below).
rRK rRK
reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK Extended Master reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK Extended Master
Session Key [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC5296]. Session Key [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC5296].
RSA
In cryptography, RSA (which stands for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
who first publicly described it) is an algorithm for public-key
cryptography (see [RSApaper] and [RFC3447]).
RSA-KEM
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) utilizing the RSA algorithm
[RFC5990].
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions
This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys
in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter
applications. applications.
3.1. Key AVP 3.1. Key AVP
The Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped. It contains the The Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped. It contains the
type and keying material and, optionally, an indication of the usable type and keying material and, optionally, an indication of the usable
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DSRK (0) DSRK (0)
A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
rRK (1) rRK (1)
A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296].
rMSK (2) rMSK (2)
A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296].
RSA-KEM (3)
A symmetric key encrypted using the RSA public key of the
recipient [RFC5990].
If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA
according to the policy stated in Section 5.2, according to the policy stated in Section 5.2,
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP
The Key-Name AVP (AVP Code <AC6>) is of type OctetString. It The Key-Name AVP (AVP Code <AC6>) is of type OctetString. It
contains an opaque key identifier. Exactly how this name is contains an opaque key identifier. Exactly how this name is
generated and used depends on the key type and usage in question, and generated and used depends on the key type and usage in question, and
is beyond the scope of this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for is beyond the scope of this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for
discussions of key name generation in the context of EAP). discussions of key name generation in the context of EAP).
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3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Unsigned32 and The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Unsigned32 and
represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents of represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents of
the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid. the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid.
NOTE: NOTE:
Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the
lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the
keying material is received. keying material is received. In addition, client implementations
SHOULD check to ensure that the value is reasonable; for example,
the lifetime of a key should not generally be longer than the
session lifetime (see section 8.13 of [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis].
3.1.5. Key-SPI 3.1.5. Key-SPI
The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code <AC5>) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code <AC5>) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a
SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying
associated keying material. associated keying material.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol
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[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, August 2008. RFC 5247, August 2008.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
"Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
August 2008. August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re-
authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008.
[RFC5990] Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner,
"Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990,
September 2010.
[RSApaper]
Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems", 1978,
<http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Glen Zorn Glen Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand Thailand
Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617 Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617
Email: gwz@net-zen.net Email: glenzorn@gmail.com
Qin Wu Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District 101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001 Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001
China China
Phone: +86-25-56623633 Phone: +86-25-56623633
Email: sunseawq@huawei.com Email: sunseawq@huawei.com
Violeta Cakulev Violeta Cakulev
Alcatel Lucent Alcatel Lucent
600 Mountain Ave. 600 Mountain Ave.
3D-517 3D-517
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 Murray Hill, NJ 07974
US US
Phone: +1 908 582 3207 Phone: +1 908 582 3207
Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com
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