draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14.txt   rfc6734.txt 
Network Working Group G. Zorn Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Zorn
Internet-Draft Network Zen Request for Comments: 6734 Network Zen
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu Category: Standards Track Q. Wu
Expires: February 20, 2012 Huawei ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei
V. Cakulev V. Cakulev
Alcatel Lucent Alcatel Lucent
August 19, 2011 October 2012
Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14
Abstract Abstract
Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications
require the transport of cryptographic keying material. This require the transport of cryptographic keying material. This
document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing
native Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. native Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 20, 2012. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6734.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology .....................................................3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Requirements Language ......................................3
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms ...............................3
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions ................................3
3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Key AVP ....................................................3
3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP ........................................4
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP ........................................4
3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP .................................4
3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP ....................................4
3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.5. Key-SPI .............................................5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Security Considerations .........................................5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. IANA Considerations .............................................5
5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. AVP Codes ..................................................5
5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. AVP Values .................................................5
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgements ................................................6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References ......................................................6
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.1. Normative References .......................................6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Informative References .....................................6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- The Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) application
Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master-Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs
cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain for the purpose of transporting cryptographic keying material derived
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] methods (for during the execution of certain Extensible Authentication Protocol
example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one instance of either of these (EAP) [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most
AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. one instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter
message.
However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified
methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during
EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the
MSK. In addition, the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] Master Session Key (MSK). Also, the EAP Re-authentication Protocol
specifies new keys that may need to be transported between Diameter (ERP) [RFC6696] specifies new keys that may need to be transported
nodes. between Diameter nodes.
This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple This document specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of
cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. multiple cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
2.1. Standards Language 2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms
DSRK DSRK
Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
MSK MSK
Master Session Key [RFC3748]. Master Session Key [RFC3748].
rMSK rMSK
reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, re-authentication MSK [RFC6696]. This is a per-authenticator key,
derived from the rRK (below). derived from the rRK (below).
rRK rRK
reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK Extended Master re-authentication Root Key, derived from the Extended Master
Session Key [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC5296]. Session Key (EMSK) [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC6696].
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions
This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys
in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter
applications. applications.
3.1. Key AVP 3.1. Key AVP
The Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped. It contains the The Key AVP (AVP Code 581) is of type Grouped. It contains the type
type and keying material and, optionally, an indication of the usable and keying material and, optionally, an indication of the usable
lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security Parameter lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security Parameter
Index (SPI) with which the key is associated. Index (SPI) with which the key is associated.
Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > Key ::= < AVP Header: 581 >
< Key-Type > < Key-Type >
{ Keying-Material } { Keying-Material }
[ Key-Lifetime ] [ Key-Lifetime ]
[ Key-Name ] [ Key-Name ]
[ Key-SPI ] [ Key-SPI ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP
The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code <AC2>) is of type Enumerated. This AVP The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code 582) is of type Enumerated. This AVP
identifies the type of the key being sent. The following decimal identifies the type of the key being sent. The following decimal
values are defined in this document: values are defined in this document:
DSRK (0) DSRK (0)
A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
rRK (1) rRK (1)
A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. A re-authentication Root Key [RFC6696].
rMSK (2) rMSK (2)
A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. A re-authentication Master Session Key [RFC6696].
If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA
according to the policy stated in Section 5.2, according to the policy stated in Section 5.2.
3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP
The Key-Name AVP (AVP Code <AC6>) is of type OctetString. It The Key-Name AVP (AVP Code 586) is of type OctetString. It contains
contains an opaque key identifier. Exactly how this name is an opaque key identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and
generated and used depends on the key type and usage in question, and used depends on the key type and usage in question and is beyond the
is beyond the scope of this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for scope of this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions
discussions of key name generation in the context of EAP). of key name generation in the context of EAP).
3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP
The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code <AC3>) is of type OctetString. The The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code 583) is of type OctetString. The
exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors,
including the type of the key and the link layer in use and is beyond including the type of the key and the link layer in use and is beyond
the scope of this document. the scope of this document.
3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Unsigned32 and The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 584) is of type Unsigned32 and
represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents of represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents of
the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid. the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid.
NOTE: NOTE:
Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the
lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the
keying material is received. In addition, client implementations keying material is received. In addition, client implementations
SHOULD check to ensure that the value is reasonable; for example, SHOULD check to ensure that the value is reasonable; for example,
the lifetime of a key should not generally be longer than the the lifetime of a key should not generally be longer than the
session lifetime (see section 8.13 of [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. session lifetime (see Section 8.13 of [RFC6733]).
3.1.5. Key-SPI 3.1.5. Key-SPI
The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code <AC5>) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code 585) is of type Unsigned32 and contains an
SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying
associated keying material. associated keying material.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
Transporting keys is a security-sensitive action. Some forms of Transporting keys is a security-sensitive action. Some forms of
keying material are already protected and can be sent safely over the keying material are already protected and can be sent safely over the
open Internet. However, if a Key AVP contains Keying-Material that open Internet. However, if a Key AVP contains a Keying-Material AVP
is not already protected, then the Diameter messages containing that that is not already protected, then the Diameter messages containing
Key AVP MUST only be sent protected via mutually authenticated TLS or that Key AVP MUST only be sent protected via mutually authenticated
IPsec. TLS or IPsec.
The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol The security considerations applicable to the Diameter base protocol
[I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] are also applicable to this document, as [RFC6733] are also applicable to this document, as are those in
are those in Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072].
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign IANA has assigned values as described in the following sections.
values as described in the following sections.
5.1. AVP Codes 5.1. AVP Codes
Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy Codes have been assigned for the following AVPs using the policy
specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Section 11.1.1: specified in [RFC6733], Section 11.1.1:
o Key (<AC1>, Section 3.1) o Key (581, Section 3.1)
o Key-Type (<AC2>, Section 3.1.1) o Key-Type (582, Section 3.1.1)
o Keying-Material (<AC3>, Section 3.1.3) o Keying-Material (583, Section 3.1.3)
o Key-Lifetime (<AC4>, Section 3.1.4) o Key-Lifetime (584, Section 3.1.4)
o Key-SPI (<AC5>, Section 3.1.5) o Key-SPI (585, Section 3.1.5)
o Key-Name (<AC6>, Section 3.1.2) o Key-Name (586, Section 3.1.2)
5.2. AVP Values 5.2. AVP Values
IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the IANA has created a new registry for values assigned to the Key-Type
Key-Type AVP and populated with the decimal values defined in this AVP and populated it with the decimal values defined in this document
document (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key- (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP
Type AVP using the "Specification Required" policy [RFC5226]; once using the "Specification Required" policy [RFC5226]; once values have
values have been assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced or been assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, or modified.
modified.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Thanks (in no particular order) to Niclas Comstedt, Semyon Thanks (in no particular order) to Niclas Comstedt, Semyon
Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom Taylor, Frank Xia, Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom Taylor, Frank Xia,
Lionel Morand, Dan Romascanu, Bernard Aboba, Jouni Korhonen, Stephen Lionel Morand, Dan Romascanu, Bernard Aboba, Jouni Korhonen, Stephen
Farrel, Joel Halpern, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Sean Turner and Sebastien Farrel, Joel Halpern, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Sean Turner, and
Decugis for useful comments, suggestions and review. Sebastien Decugis for useful comments, suggestions, and review.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]
Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-26
(work in progress), January 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, August 2008. RFC 5247, August 2008.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
"Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
August 2008. August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- [RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., Ed., and G. Zorn, Ed.,
authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. "EAP Extensions for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol
(ERP)", RFC 6696, July 2012.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Glen Zorn Glen Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand Thailand
Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617 Phone: +66 (0) 909-201060
Email: glenzorn@gmail.com EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com
Qin Wu Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District 101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001 Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001
China China
Phone: +86-25-56623633 Phone: +86-25-56623633
Email: sunseawq@huawei.com EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com
Violeta Cakulev Violeta Cakulev
Alcatel Lucent Alcatel Lucent
600 Mountain Ave. 600 Mountain Ave.
3D-517 3D-517
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 Murray Hill, NJ 07974
US US
Phone: +1 908 582 3207 Phone: +1 908 582 3207
Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com EMail: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com
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