draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-06.txt   draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-07.txt 
Network Working Group D. Crocker, Ed. Network Working Group D. Crocker, Ed.
Internet-Draft Brandenburg InternetWorking Internet-Draft Brandenburg InternetWorking
Obsoletes: 4871 (if approved) T. Hansen, Ed. Obsoletes: 4871, 5672 T. Hansen, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track AT&T Laboratories (if approved) AT&T Laboratories
Expires: October 14, 2011 M. Kucherawy, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Kucherawy, Ed.
Cloudmark Expires: October 26, 2011 Cloudmark
April 12, 2011 April 24, 2011
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures
draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-06 draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-07
Abstract Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or
organization that owns the signing domain to claim some organization that owns the signing domain to claim some
responsibility for a message by associating the domain with the responsibility for a message by associating the domain with the
message. This can be an author's organization, an operational relay message. This can be an author's organization, an operational relay
or one of their agents. DKIM separates the question of the identity or one of their agents. DKIM separates the question of the identity
of the signer of the message from the purported author of the of the signer of the message from the purported author of the
message. Assertion of responsibility is validated through a message. Assertion of responsibility is validated through a
cryptographic signature and querying the signer's domain directly to cryptographic signature and querying the signer's domain directly to
retrieve the appropriate public key. Message transit from author to retrieve the appropriate public key. Message transit from author to
recipient is through relays that typically make no substantive change recipient is through relays that typically make no substantive change
to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature. to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature.
This memo obsoletes RFC4871 and RFC5672 {DKIM 14}.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 14, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 26, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Notes to Editor and Reviewers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Signing Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Signing Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Simple Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Simple Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Verifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Verifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6. Agent or User Identifier (AUID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.5. Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7. Identity Assessor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.6. Agent or User Identifier (AUID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.8. Whitespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.7. Identity Assessor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.9. Imported ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.8. Whitespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.10. Common ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9. Imported ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.11. DKIM-Quoted-Printable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.10. Common ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Protocol Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.11. DKIM-Quoted-Printable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Protocol Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Tag=Value Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Signing and Verification Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Tag=Value Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. Signing and Verification Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5. The DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.6. Key Management and Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.5. The DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7. Computing the Message Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.6. Key Management and Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8. Input Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.7. Computing the Message Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.9. Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.8. Input Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.10. Relationship between SDID and AUID . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.9. Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Semantics of Multiple Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.10. Relationship between SDID and AUID . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. Example Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5. Semantics of Multiple Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2. Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.1. Example Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5. Signer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.2. Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1. Determine Whether the Email Should Be Signed and by 6. Signer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Whom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.1. Determine Whether the Email Should Be Signed and by
5.2. Select a Private Key and Corresponding Selector Whom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2. Select a Private Key and Corresponding Selector
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.3. Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions . . 40 6.3. Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions . . 41
5.4. Determine the Header Fields to Sign . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.4. Determine the Header Fields to Sign . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.5. Recommended Signature Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6.5. Recommended Signature Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.6. Compute the Message Hash and Signature . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.6. Compute the Message Hash and Signature . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.7. Insert the DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.7. Insert the DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . 45
6. Verifier Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7. Verifier Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1. Extract Signatures from the Message . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.1. Extract Signatures from the Message . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2. Communicate Verification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 7.2. Communicate Verification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3. Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 52 7.3. Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.1. DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.1. DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.2. DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.2. DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3. DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry . . . . . . . . . 54 8.3. DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry . . . . . . . . . 54
7.4. _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications . . . . . . . 55 8.4. _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications . . . . . . . 55
7.5. DKIM Key Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.5. DKIM Key Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.6. DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.6. DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.7. DKIM Service Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.7. DKIM Service Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.8. DKIM Selector Flags Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.8. DKIM Selector Flags Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.9. DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.9. DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.1. Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag) . . . . . . . . . 57 9.1. Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag) . . . . . . . . . 57
8.2. Misappropriated Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9.2. Misappropriated Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.3. Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.3. Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.4. Attacks Against the DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.4. Attacks Against the DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.5. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 9.5. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.6. Limits on Revoking Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.6. Limits on Revoking Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.7. Intentionally Malformed Key Records . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.7. Intentionally Malformed Key Records . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.8. Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature Header Fields . . . 61 9.8. Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature Header Fields . . . 61
8.9. Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.9. Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.10. Remote Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.10. Remote Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.11. Reordered Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.11. Reordered Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.12. RSA Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.12. RSA Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.13. Inappropriate Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . . 62 9.13. Inappropriate Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . . 62
8.14. Attacks Involving Addition of Header Fields . . . . . . . 62 9.14. Attacks Involving Addition of Header Fields . . . . . . . 62
8.15. Malformed Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 9.15. Malformed Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix A. Example of Use (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Appendix A. Example of Use (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.1. The User Composes an Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 A.1. The User Composes an Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.2. The Email is Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 A.2. The Email is Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.3. The Email Signature is Verified . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 A.3. The Email Signature is Verified . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix B. Usage Examples (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Appendix B. Usage Examples (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.1. Alternate Submission Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 B.1. Alternate Submission Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.2. Alternate Delivery Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 B.2. Alternate Delivery Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix C. Creating a Public Key (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . 73 Appendix C. Creating a Public Key (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . 73
C.1. Compatibility with DomainKeys Key Records . . . . . . . . 74 C.1. Compatibility with DomainKeys Key Records . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix D. MUA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix D. MUA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Introduction 1. Notes to Editor and Reviewers
This version of the memo contains notations such as "{DKIM 2}".
These correspond to DKIM working group issue tracker items. they
should be deleted prior to publication.
2. Introduction
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or
organization to claim some responsibility for a message by organization to claim some responsibility for a message by
associating a domain name [RFC1034] with the message [RFC5322], which associating a domain name [RFC1034] with the message [RFC5322], which
they are authorized to use. This can be an author's organization, an they are authorized to use. This can be an author's organization, an
operational relay or one of their agents. Assertion of operational relay or one of their agents. Assertion of
responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and
querying the signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate querying the signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate
public key. Message transit from author to recipient is through public key. Message transit from author to recipient is through
relays that typically make no substantive change to the message relays that typically make no substantive change to the message
skipping to change at page 6, line 9 skipping to change at page 6, line 14
o requires minimal new infrastructure; o requires minimal new infrastructure;
o can be implemented independently of clients in order to reduce o can be implemented independently of clients in order to reduce
deployment time; deployment time;
o can be deployed incrementally; o can be deployed incrementally;
o allows delegation of signing to third parties. o allows delegation of signing to third parties.
1.1. Signing Identity 2.1. Signing Identity
DKIM separates the question of the identity of the signer of the DKIM separates the question of the identity of the signer of the
message from the purported author of the message. In particular, a message from the purported author of the message. In particular, a
signature includes the identity of the signer. Verifiers can use the signature includes the identity of the signer. Verifiers can use the
signing information to decide how they want to process the message. signing information to decide how they want to process the message.
The signing identity is included as part of the signature header The signing identity is included as part of the signature header
field. field.
INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: The signing identity specified by a DKIM INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: The signing identity specified by a DKIM
signature is not required to match an address in any particular signature is not required to match an address in any particular
header field because of the broad methods of interpretation by header field because of the broad methods of interpretation by
recipient mail systems, including MUAs. recipient mail systems, including MUAs.
1.2. Scalability 2.2. Scalability
DKIM is designed to support the extreme scalability requirements that DKIM is designed to support the extreme scalability requirements that
characterize the email identification problem. There are currently characterize the email identification problem. There are currently
over 70 million domains and a much larger number of individual over 70 million domains and a much larger number of individual
addresses. DKIM seeks to preserve the positive aspects of the addresses. DKIM seeks to preserve the positive aspects of the
current email infrastructure, such as the ability for anyone to current email infrastructure, such as the ability for anyone to
communicate with anyone else without introduction. communicate with anyone else without introduction.
1.3. Simple Key Management 2.3. Simple Key Management
DKIM differs from traditional hierarchical public-key systems in that DKIM differs from traditional hierarchical public-key systems in that
no Certificate Authority infrastructure is required; the verifier no Certificate Authority infrastructure is required; the verifier
requests the public key from a repository in the domain of the requests the public key from a repository in the domain of the
claimed signer directly rather than from a third party. claimed signer directly rather than from a third party.
The DNS is proposed as the initial mechanism for the public keys. The DNS is proposed as the initial mechanism for the public keys.
Thus, DKIM currently depends on DNS administration and the security Thus, DKIM currently depends on DNS administration and the security
of the DNS system. DKIM is designed to be extensible to other key of the DNS system. DKIM is designed to be extensible to other key
fetching services as they become available. fetching services as they become available.
1.4. Data Integrity 2.4. Data Integrity
A DKIM signature associates the d= name with the computed hash of A DKIM signature associates the d= name with the computed hash of
some or all of the message (see Section 3.7) in order to prevent the some or all of the message (see Section 3.7) in order to prevent the
re-use of the signature with different messages. Verifying the re-use of the signature with different messages. Verifying the
signature asserts that the hashed content has not changed since it signature asserts that the hashed content has not changed since it
was signed, and asserts nothing else about "protecting" the end-to- was signed, and asserts nothing else about "protecting" the end-to-
end integrity of the message. end integrity of the message.
2. Terminology and Definitions 3. Terminology and Definitions
This section defines terms used in the rest of the document. This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.
DKIM is designed to operate within the Internet Mail service, as DKIM is designed to operate within the Internet Mail service, as
defined in [RFC5598]. Basic email terminology is taken from that defined in [RFC5598]. Basic email terminology is taken from that
specification. specification.
Syntax descriptions use Augmented BNF (ABNF) [RFC5234]. Syntax descriptions use Augmented BNF (ABNF) [RFC5234].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.1. Signers 3.1. Signers
Elements in the mail system that sign messages on behalf of a domain Elements in the mail system that sign messages on behalf of a domain
are referred to as signers. These may be MUAs (Mail User Agents), are referred to as signers. These may be MUAs (Mail User Agents),
MSAs (Mail Submission Agents), MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents), or other MSAs (Mail Submission Agents), MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents), or other
agents such as mailing list exploders. In general, any signer will agents such as mailing list exploders. In general, any signer will
be involved in the injection of a message into the message system in be involved in the injection of a message into the message system in
some way. The key issue is that a message must be signed before it some way. The key issue is that a message must be signed before it
leaves the administrative domain of the signer. leaves the administrative domain of the signer.
2.2. Verifiers 3.2. Verifiers
Elements in the mail system that verify signatures are referred to as Elements in the mail system that verify signatures are referred to as
verifiers. These may be MTAs, Mail Delivery Agents (MDAs), or MUAs. verifiers. These may be MTAs, Mail Delivery Agents (MDAs), or MUAs.
In most cases it is expected that verifiers will be close to an end In most cases it is expected that verifiers will be close to an end
user (reader) of the message or some consuming agent such as a user (reader) of the message or some consuming agent such as a
mailing list exploder. mailing list exploder.
2.3. Identity 3.3. Identity
A person, role, or organization. In the context of DKIM, examples A person, role, or organization. In the context of DKIM, examples
include the author, the author's organization, an ISP along the include the author, the author's organization, an ISP along the
handling path, an independent trust assessment service, and a mailing handling path, an independent trust assessment service, and a mailing
list operator. list operator.
2.4. Identifier 3.4. Identifier
A label that refers to an identity. A label that refers to an identity.
2.5. Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) 3.5. Signing Domain Identifier (SDID)
A single domain name that is the mandatory payload output of DKIM and A single domain name that is the mandatory payload output of DKIM and
that refers to the identity claiming responsibility for introduction that refers to the identity claiming responsibility for introduction
of a message into the mail stream. For DKIM processing, the name has of a message into the mail stream. For DKIM processing, the name has
only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner-specific only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner-specific
semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. It is specified in semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. It is specified in
Section 3.5. Section 4.5.
2.6. Agent or User Identifier (AUID) 3.6. Agent or User Identifier (AUID)
A single identifier that refers to the agent or user on behalf of A single identifier that refers to the agent or user on behalf of
whom the Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) has taken responsibility. whom the Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) has taken responsibility.
The AUID comprises a domain name and an optional <Local-part>. The The AUID comprises a domain name and an optional <Local-part>. The
domain name is the same as that used for the SDID or is a sub-domain domain name is the same as that used for the SDID or is a sub-domain
of it. For DKIM processing, the domain name portion of the AUID has of it. For DKIM processing, the domain name portion of the AUID has
only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner-specific only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner-specific
semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. It is specified in semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. It is specified in
Section 3.5 . Section 4.5 .
2.7. Identity Assessor 3.7. Identity Assessor
A module that consumes DKIM's mandatory payload, which is the A module that consumes DKIM's mandatory payload, which is the
responsible Signing Domain Identifier (SDID). The module is responsible Signing Domain Identifier (SDID). The module is
dedicated to the assessment of the delivered identifier. Other DKIM dedicated to the assessment of the delivered identifier. Other DKIM
(and non-DKIM) values can also be delivered to this module as well as (and non-DKIM) values can also be delivered to this module as well as
to a more general message evaluation filtering engine. However, this to a more general message evaluation filtering engine. However, this
additional activity is outside the scope of the DKIM signature additional activity is outside the scope of the DKIM signature
specification. specification.
2.8. Whitespace 3.8. Whitespace
There are three forms of whitespace: There are three forms of whitespace:
o WSP represents simple whitespace, i.e., a space or a tab character o WSP represents simple whitespace, i.e., a space or a tab character
(formal definition in [RFC5234]). (formal definition in [RFC5234]).
o LWSP is linear whitespace, defined as WSP plus CRLF (formal o LWSP is linear whitespace, defined as WSP plus CRLF (formal
definition in [RFC5234]). definition in [RFC5234]).
o FWS is folding whitespace. It allows multiple lines separated by o FWS is folding whitespace. It allows multiple lines separated by
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The formal ABNF for these are (WSP and LWSP are given for information The formal ABNF for these are (WSP and LWSP are given for information
only): only):
WSP = SP / HTAB WSP = SP / HTAB
LWSP = *(WSP / CRLF WSP) LWSP = *(WSP / CRLF WSP)
FWS = [*WSP CRLF] 1*WSP FWS = [*WSP CRLF] 1*WSP
The definition of FWS is identical to that in [RFC5322] except for The definition of FWS is identical to that in [RFC5322] except for
the exclusion of obs-FWS. the exclusion of obs-FWS.
2.9. Imported ABNF Tokens 3.9. Imported ABNF Tokens
The following tokens are imported from other RFCs as noted. Those The following tokens are imported from other RFCs as noted. Those
RFCs should be considered definitive. RFCs should be considered definitive.
The following tokens are imported from [RFC5321]: The following tokens are imported from [RFC5321]:
o "Local-part" (implementation warning: this permits quoted strings) o "Local-part" (implementation warning: this permits quoted strings)
o "sub-domain" o "sub-domain"
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o "hex-octet" (a quoted-printable encoded octet) o "hex-octet" (a quoted-printable encoded octet)
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Be aware that the ABNF in [RFC2045] does not INFORMATIVE NOTE: Be aware that the ABNF in [RFC2045] does not
obey the rules of [RFC5234] and must be interpreted accordingly, obey the rules of [RFC5234] and must be interpreted accordingly,
particularly as regards case folding. particularly as regards case folding.
Other tokens not defined herein are imported from [RFC5234]. These Other tokens not defined herein are imported from [RFC5234]. These
are intuitive primitives such as SP, HTAB, WSP, ALPHA, DIGIT, CRLF, are intuitive primitives such as SP, HTAB, WSP, ALPHA, DIGIT, CRLF,
etc. etc.
2.10. Common ABNF Tokens 3.10. Common ABNF Tokens
The following ABNF tokens are used elsewhere in this document: The following ABNF tokens are used elsewhere in this document:
hyphenated-word = ALPHA [ *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") (ALPHA / DIGIT) ] hyphenated-word = ALPHA [ *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") (ALPHA / DIGIT) ]
ALPHADIGITPS = (ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") ALPHADIGITPS = (ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/")
base64string = ALPHADIGITPS *([FWS] ALPHADIGITPS) base64string = ALPHADIGITPS *([FWS] ALPHADIGITPS)
[ [FWS] "=" [ [FWS] "=" ] ] [ [FWS] "=" [ [FWS] "=" ] ]
hdr-name = field-name hdr-name = field-name
qp-hdr-value = dkim-quoted-printable ; with "|" encoded qp-hdr-value = dkim-quoted-printable ; with "|" encoded
2.11. DKIM-Quoted-Printable 3.11. DKIM-Quoted-Printable
The DKIM-Quoted-Printable encoding syntax resembles that described in The DKIM-Quoted-Printable encoding syntax resembles that described in
Quoted-Printable [RFC2045], Section 6.7: any character MAY be encoded Quoted-Printable [RFC2045], Section 6.7: any character MAY be encoded
as an "=" followed by two hexadecimal digits from the alphabet as an "=" followed by two hexadecimal digits from the alphabet
"0123456789ABCDEF" (no lowercase characters permitted) representing "0123456789ABCDEF" (no lowercase characters permitted) representing
the hexadecimal-encoded integer value of that character. All control the hexadecimal-encoded integer value of that character. All control
characters (those with values < %x20), 8-bit characters (values > characters (those with values < %x20), 8-bit characters (values >
%x7F), and the characters DEL (%x7F), SPACE (%x20), and semicolon %x7F), and the characters DEL (%x7F), SPACE (%x20), and semicolon
(";", %x3B) MUST be encoded. Note that all whitespace, including (";", %x3B) MUST be encoded. Note that all whitespace, including
SPACE, CR, and LF characters, MUST be encoded. After encoding, FWS SPACE, CR, and LF characters, MUST be encoded. After encoding, FWS
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the case here. the case here.
3. The "soft line break" syntax ("=" as the last non-whitespace 3. The "soft line break" syntax ("=" as the last non-whitespace
character on the line) does not apply. character on the line) does not apply.
4. DKIM-Quoted-Printable does not require that encoded lines be 4. DKIM-Quoted-Printable does not require that encoded lines be
no more than 76 characters long (although there may be other no more than 76 characters long (although there may be other
requirements depending on the context in which the encoded requirements depending on the context in which the encoded
text is being used). text is being used).
3. Protocol Elements 4. Protocol Elements
Protocol Elements are conceptual parts of the protocol that are not Protocol Elements are conceptual parts of the protocol that are not
specific to either signers or verifiers. The protocol descriptions specific to either signers or verifiers. The protocol descriptions
for signers and verifiers are described in later sections (Signer for signers and verifiers are described in later sections (Signer
Actions (Section 5) and Verifier Actions (Section 6)). NOTE: This Actions (Section 6) and Verifier Actions (Section 7)). NOTE: This
section must be read in the context of those sections. section must be read in the context of those sections.
3.1. Selectors 4.1. Selectors
To support multiple concurrent public keys per signing domain, the To support multiple concurrent public keys per signing domain, the
key namespace is subdivided using "selectors". For example, key namespace is subdivided using "selectors". For example,
selectors might indicate the names of office locations (e.g., selectors might indicate the names of office locations (e.g.,
"sanfrancisco", "coolumbeach", and "reykjavik"), the signing date "sanfrancisco", "coolumbeach", and "reykjavik"), the signing date
(e.g., "january2005", "february2005", etc.), or even an individual (e.g., "january2005", "february2005", etc.), or even an individual
user. user.
Selectors are needed to support some important use cases. For Selectors are needed to support some important use cases. For
example: example:
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value, such as a fingerprint of the public key. value, such as a fingerprint of the public key.
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS NOTE: Reusing a selector with a new key INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS NOTE: Reusing a selector with a new key
(for example, changing the key associated with a user's name) (for example, changing the key associated with a user's name)
makes it impossible to tell the difference between a message that makes it impossible to tell the difference between a message that
didn't verify because the key is no longer valid versus a message didn't verify because the key is no longer valid versus a message
that is actually forged. For this reason, signers are ill-advised that is actually forged. For this reason, signers are ill-advised
to reuse selectors for new keys. A better strategy is to assign to reuse selectors for new keys. A better strategy is to assign
new keys to new selectors. new keys to new selectors.
3.2. Tag=Value Lists 4.2. Tag=Value Lists
DKIM uses a simple "tag=value" syntax in several contexts, including DKIM uses a simple "tag=value" syntax in several contexts, including
in messages and domain signature records. in messages and domain signature records.
Values are a series of strings containing either plain text, "base64" Values are a series of strings containing either plain text, "base64"
text (as defined in [RFC2045], Section 6.8), "qp-section" (ibid, text (as defined in [RFC2045], Section 6.8), "qp-section" (ibid,
Section 6.7), or "dkim-quoted-printable" (as defined in Section 6.7), or "dkim-quoted-printable" (as defined in
Section 2.11). The name of the tag will determine the encoding of Section 3.11). The name of the tag will determine the encoding of
each value. Unencoded semicolon (";") characters MUST NOT occur in each value. Unencoded semicolon (";") characters MUST NOT occur in
the tag value, since that separates tag-specs. the tag value, since that separates tag-specs.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Although the "plain text" defined INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Although the "plain text" defined
below (as "tag-value") only includes 7-bit characters, an below (as "tag-value") only includes 7-bit characters, an
implementation that wished to anticipate future standards would be implementation that wished to anticipate future standards would be
advised not to preclude the use of UTF8-encoded text in tag=value advised not to preclude the use of UTF8-encoded text in tag=value
lists. lists.
Formally, the ABNF syntax rules are as follows: Formally, the ABNF syntax rules are as follows:
skipping to change at page 13, line 41 skipping to change at page 14, line 11
Tag=value pairs that represent the default value MAY be included to Tag=value pairs that represent the default value MAY be included to
aid legibility. aid legibility.
Unrecognized tags MUST be ignored. Unrecognized tags MUST be ignored.
Tags that have an empty value are not the same as omitted tags. An Tags that have an empty value are not the same as omitted tags. An
omitted tag is treated as having the default value; a tag with an omitted tag is treated as having the default value; a tag with an
empty value explicitly designates the empty string as the value. empty value explicitly designates the empty string as the value.
3.3. Signing and Verification Algorithms 4.3. Signing and Verification Algorithms
DKIM supports multiple digital signature algorithms. Two algorithms DKIM supports multiple digital signature algorithms. Two algorithms
are defined by this specification at this time: rsa-sha1 and rsa- are defined by this specification at this time: rsa-sha1 and rsa-
sha256. Signers MUST implement and SHOULD sign using rsa-sha256. sha256. Signers MUST implement and SHOULD sign using rsa-sha256.
Verifiers MUST implement rsa-sha256. Verifiers MUST implement rsa-sha256.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Although sha256 is strongly encouraged, some INFORMATIVE NOTE: Although rsa-sha256 is strongly encouraged, some
senders of low-security messages (such as routine newsletters) may senders of low-security messages (such as routine newsletters) may
prefer to use sha1 because of reduced CPU requirements to compute prefer to use rsa-sha1 because of reduced CPU requirements to
a sha1 hash. In general, sha256 should always be used whenever compute a SHA1 hash. MTAs with compliant verifierst that do not
possible. implement rsa-sha1 will treat such messages as unsigned. {DKIM 13}
In general, rsa-sha256 should always be used whenever possible.
3.3.1. The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm 4.3.1. The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm
The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described
in Section 3.7 below using SHA-1 [FIPS-180-2-2002] as the hash-alg. in Section 4.7 below using SHA-1 [FIPS-180-2-2002] as the hash-alg.
That hash is then signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm That hash is then signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm
(defined in PKCS#1 version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the (defined in PKCS#1 version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the
signer's private key. The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted signer's private key. The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted
into any form other than the native binary form before being signed. into any form other than the native binary form before being signed.
The signing algorithm SHOULD use a public exponent of 65537. The signing algorithm SHOULD use a public exponent of 65537.
3.3.2. The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm 4.3.2. The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm
The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described
in Section 3.7 below using SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2-2002] as the hash-alg. in Section 4.7 below using SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2-2002] as the hash-alg.
That hash is then signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm That hash is then signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm
(defined in PKCS#1 version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the (defined in PKCS#1 version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the
signer's private key. The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted signer's private key. The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted
into any form other than the native binary form before being signed. into any form other than the native binary form before being signed.
3.3.3. Key Sizes 4.3.3. Key Sizes
Selecting appropriate key sizes is a trade-off between cost, Selecting appropriate key sizes is a trade-off between cost,
performance, and risk. Since short RSA keys more easily succumb to performance, and risk. Since short RSA keys more easily succumb to
off-line attacks, signers MUST use RSA keys of at least 1024 bits for off-line attacks, signers MUST use RSA keys of at least 1024 bits for
long-lived keys. Verifiers MUST be able to validate signatures with long-lived keys. Verifiers MUST be able to validate signatures with
keys ranging from 512 bits to 2048 bits, and they MAY be able to keys ranging from 512 bits to 2048 bits, and they MAY be able to
validate signatures with larger keys. Verifier policies may use the validate signatures with larger keys. Verifier policies may use the
length of the signing key as one metric for determining whether a length of the signing key as one metric for determining whether a
signature is acceptable. signature is acceptable.
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o Larger keys impose higher CPU costs to verify and sign email o Larger keys impose higher CPU costs to verify and sign email
o Keys can be replaced on a regular basis, thus their lifetime can o Keys can be replaced on a regular basis, thus their lifetime can
be relatively short be relatively short
o The security goals of this specification are modest compared to o The security goals of this specification are modest compared to
typical goals of other systems that employ digital signatures typical goals of other systems that employ digital signatures
See [RFC3766] for further discussion on selecting key sizes. See [RFC3766] for further discussion on selecting key sizes.
3.3.4. Other Algorithms 4.3.4. Other Algorithms
Other algorithms MAY be defined in the future. Verifiers MUST ignore Other algorithms MAY be defined in the future. Verifiers MUST ignore
any signatures using algorithms that they do not implement. any signatures using algorithms that they do not implement.
3.4. Canonicalization 4.4. Canonicalization
Some mail systems modify email in transit, potentially invalidating a Some mail systems modify email in transit, potentially invalidating a
signature. For most signers, mild modification of email is signature. For most signers, mild modification of email is
immaterial to validation of the DKIM domain name's use. For such immaterial to validation of the DKIM domain name's use. For such
signers, a canonicalization algorithm that survives modest in-transit signers, a canonicalization algorithm that survives modest in-transit
modification is preferred. modification is preferred.
Other signers demand that any modification of the email, however Other signers demand that any modification of the email, however
minor, result in a signature verification failure. These signers minor, result in a signature verification failure. These signers
prefer a canonicalization algorithm that does not tolerate in-transit prefer a canonicalization algorithm that does not tolerate in-transit
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algorithms MAY be defined in the future; verifiers MUST ignore any algorithms MAY be defined in the future; verifiers MUST ignore any
signatures that use unrecognized canonicalization algorithms. signatures that use unrecognized canonicalization algorithms.
Canonicalization simply prepares the email for presentation to the Canonicalization simply prepares the email for presentation to the
signing or verification algorithm. It MUST NOT change the signing or verification algorithm. It MUST NOT change the
transmitted data in any way. Canonicalization of header fields and transmitted data in any way. Canonicalization of header fields and
body are described below. body are described below.
NOTE: This section assumes that the message is already in "network NOTE: This section assumes that the message is already in "network
normal" format (text is ASCII encoded, lines are separated with CRLF normal" format (text is ASCII encoded, lines are separated with CRLF
characters, etc.). See also Section 5.3 for information about characters, etc.). See also Section 6.3 for information about
normalizing the message. normalizing the message.
3.4.1. The "simple" Header Canonicalization Algorithm 4.4.1. The "simple" Header Canonicalization Algorithm
The "simple" header canonicalization algorithm does not change header The "simple" header canonicalization algorithm does not change header
fields in any way. Header fields MUST be presented to the signing or fields in any way. Header fields MUST be presented to the signing or
verification algorithm exactly as they are in the message being verification algorithm exactly as they are in the message being
signed or verified. In particular, header field names MUST NOT be signed or verified. In particular, header field names MUST NOT be
case folded and whitespace MUST NOT be changed. case folded and whitespace MUST NOT be changed.
3.4.2. The "relaxed" Header Canonicalization Algorithm 4.4.2. The "relaxed" Header Canonicalization Algorithm
The "relaxed" header canonicalization algorithm MUST apply the The "relaxed" header canonicalization algorithm MUST apply the
following steps in order: following steps in order:
o Convert all header field names (not the header field values) to o Convert all header field names (not the header field values) to
lowercase. For example, convert "SUBJect: AbC" to "subject: AbC". lowercase. For example, convert "SUBJect: AbC" to "subject: AbC".
o Unfold all header field continuation lines as described in o Unfold all header field continuation lines as described in
[RFC5322]; in particular, lines with terminators embedded in [RFC5322]; in particular, lines with terminators embedded in
continued header field values (that is, CRLF sequences followed by continued header field values (that is, CRLF sequences followed by
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character. WSP characters here include those before and after a character. WSP characters here include those before and after a
line folding boundary. line folding boundary.
o Delete all WSP characters at the end of each unfolded header field o Delete all WSP characters at the end of each unfolded header field
value. value.
o Delete any WSP characters remaining before and after the colon o Delete any WSP characters remaining before and after the colon
separating the header field name from the header field value. The separating the header field name from the header field value. The
colon separator MUST be retained. colon separator MUST be retained.
3.4.3. The "simple" Body Canonicalization Algorithm 4.4.3. The "simple" Body Canonicalization Algorithm
The "simple" body canonicalization algorithm ignores all empty lines The "simple" body canonicalization algorithm ignores all empty lines
at the end of the message body. An empty line is a line of zero at the end of the message body. An empty line is a line of zero
length after removal of the line terminator. If there is no body or length after removal of the line terminator. If there is no body or
no trailing CRLF on the message body, a CRLF is added. It makes no no trailing CRLF on the message body, a CRLF is added. It makes no
other changes to the message body. In more formal terms, the other changes to the message body. In more formal terms, the
"simple" body canonicalization algorithm converts "0*CRLF" at the end "simple" body canonicalization algorithm converts "0*CRLF" at the end
of the body to a single "CRLF". of the body to a single "CRLF".
Note that a completely empty or missing body is canonicalized as a Note that a completely empty or missing body is canonicalized as a
single "CRLF"; that is, the canonicalized length will be 2 octets. single "CRLF"; that is, the canonicalized length will be 2 octets.
The sha1 value (in base64) for an empty body (canonicalized to a The sha1 value (in base64) for an empty body (canonicalized to a
"CRLF") is: "CRLF") is:
uoq1oCgLlTqpdDX/iUbLy7J1Wic= uoq1oCgLlTqpdDX/iUbLy7J1Wic=
The sha256 value is: The sha256 value is:
frcCV1k9oG9oKj3dpUqdJg1PxRT2RSN/XKdLCPjaYaY= frcCV1k9oG9oKj3dpUqdJg1PxRT2RSN/XKdLCPjaYaY=
3.4.4. The "relaxed" Body Canonicalization Algorithm 4.4.4. The "relaxed" Body Canonicalization Algorithm
The "relaxed" body canonicalization algorithm MUST apply the The "relaxed" body canonicalization algorithm MUST apply the
following steps (a) and (b) in order: following steps (a) and (b) in order:
a. Reduce whitespace: a. Reduce whitespace:
* Ignore all whitespace at the end of lines. Implementations * Ignore all whitespace at the end of lines. Implementations
MUST NOT remove the CRLF at the end of the line. MUST NOT remove the CRLF at the end of the line.
* Reduce all sequences of WSP within a line to a single SP * Reduce all sequences of WSP within a line to a single SP
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line" is defined in Section 3.4.3. If the body is non-empty, but line" is defined in Section 3.4.3. If the body is non-empty, but
does not end with a CRLF, a CRLF is added. (For email, this is does not end with a CRLF, a CRLF is added. (For email, this is
only possible when using extensions to SMTP or non-SMTP transport only possible when using extensions to SMTP or non-SMTP transport
mechanisms.) mechanisms.)
The sha1 value (in base64) for an empty body (canonicalized to a null The sha1 value (in base64) for an empty body (canonicalized to a null
input) is: input) is:
2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk= 2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=
The sha256 value is: The sha256 value is:
47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU= 47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=
INFORMATIVE NOTE: It should be noted that the relaxed body INFORMATIVE NOTE: It should be noted that the relaxed body
canonicalization algorithm may enable certain types of extremely canonicalization algorithm may enable certain types of extremely
crude "ASCII Art" attacks where a message may be conveyed by crude "ASCII Art" attacks where a message may be conveyed by
adjusting the spacing between words. If this is a concern, the adjusting the spacing between words. If this is a concern, the
"simple" body canonicalization algorithm should be used instead. "simple" body canonicalization algorithm should be used instead.
3.4.5. Body Length Limits 4.4.5. Body Length Limits
A body length count MAY be specified to limit the signature A body length count MAY be specified to limit the signature
calculation to an initial prefix of the body text, measured in calculation to an initial prefix of the body text, measured in
octets. If the body length count is not specified, the entire octets. If the body length count is not specified, the entire
message body is signed. message body is signed.
INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: This capability is provided because it is INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: This capability is provided because it is
very common for mailing lists to add trailers to messages (e.g., very common for mailing lists to add trailers to messages (e.g.,
instructions how to get off the list). Until those messages are instructions how to get off the list). Until those messages are
also signed, the body length count is a useful tool for the also signed, the body length count is a useful tool for the
verifier since it may as a matter of policy accept messages having verifier since it may as a matter of policy accept messages having
valid signatures with extraneous data. valid signatures with extraneous data.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Using body length limits enables INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Using body length limits enables
an attack in which an attacker modifies a message to include an attack in which an attacker modifies a message to include
content that solely benefits the attacker. It is possible for the content that solely benefits the attacker. It is possible for the
appended content to completely replace the original content in the appended content to completely replace the original content in the
end recipient's eyes and to defeat duplicate message detection end recipient's eyes and to defeat duplicate message detection
algorithms. To avoid this attack, signers should be wary of using algorithms. To avoid this attack, signers should be wary of using
this tag, and verifiers might wish to ignore the tag or remove this tag, and verifiers might wish to ignore the tag, {DKIM 2}
text that appears after the specified content length, perhaps perhaps based on other criteria.
based on other criteria.
The body length count allows the signer of a message to permit data The body length count allows the signer of a message to permit data
to be appended to the end of the body of a signed message. The body to be appended to the end of the body of a signed message. The body
length count MUST be calculated following the canonicalization length count MUST be calculated following the canonicalization
algorithm; for example, any whitespace ignored by a canonicalization algorithm; for example, any whitespace ignored by a canonicalization
algorithm is not included as part of the body length count. Signers algorithm is not included as part of the body length count. Signers
of MIME messages that include a body length count SHOULD be sure that of MIME messages that include a body length count SHOULD be sure that
the length extends to the closing MIME boundary string. the length extends to the closing MIME boundary string.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: A signer wishing to ensure that INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: A signer wishing to ensure that
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only works for some MIME types, e.g., multipart/mixed but not only works for some MIME types, e.g., multipart/mixed but not
multipart/signed. multipart/signed.
A body length count of zero means that the body is completely A body length count of zero means that the body is completely
unsigned. unsigned.
Signers wishing to ensure that no modification of any sort can occur Signers wishing to ensure that no modification of any sort can occur
should specify the "simple" canonicalization algorithm for both should specify the "simple" canonicalization algorithm for both
header and body and omit the body length count. header and body and omit the body length count.
3.4.6. Canonicalization Examples (INFORMATIVE) 4.4.6. Canonicalization Examples (INFORMATIVE)
In the following examples, actual whitespace is used only for In the following examples, actual whitespace is used only for
clarity. The actual input and output text is designated using clarity. The actual input and output text is designated using
bracketed descriptors: "<SP>" for a space character, "<HTAB>" for a bracketed descriptors: "<SP>" for a space character, "<HTAB>" for a
tab character, and "<CRLF>" for a carriage-return/line-feed sequence. tab character, and "<CRLF>" for a carriage-return/line-feed sequence.
For example, "X <SP> Y" and "X<SP>Y" represent the same three For example, "X <SP> Y" and "X<SP>Y" represent the same three
characters. characters.
Example 1: A message reading: Example 1: A message reading:
A: <SP> X <CRLF> A: <SP> X <CRLF>
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Example 3: When processed using relaxed header canonicalization and Example 3: When processed using relaxed header canonicalization and
simple body canonicalization, the canonicalized version has a header simple body canonicalization, the canonicalized version has a header
of: of:
a:X <CRLF> a:X <CRLF>
b:Y <SP> Z <CRLF> b:Y <SP> Z <CRLF>
and a body reading: and a body reading:
<SP> C <SP><CRLF> <SP> C <SP><CRLF>
D <SP><HTAB><SP> E <CRLF> D <SP><HTAB><SP> E <CRLF>
3.5. The DKIM-Signature Header Field 4.5. The DKIM-Signature Header Field
The signature of the email is stored in the DKIM-Signature header The signature of the email is stored in the DKIM-Signature header
field. This header field contains all of the signature and key- field. This header field contains all of the signature and key-
fetching data. The DKIM-Signature value is a tag-list as described fetching data. The DKIM-Signature value is a tag-list as described
in Section 3.2. in Section 4.2.
The DKIM-Signature header field SHOULD be treated as though it were a The DKIM-Signature header field SHOULD be treated as though it were a
trace header field as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC5322], and hence trace header field as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC5322], and hence
SHOULD NOT be reordered and SHOULD be prepended to the message. SHOULD NOT be reordered and SHOULD be prepended to the message.
The DKIM-Signature header field being created or verified is always The DKIM-Signature header field being created or verified is always
included in the signature calculation, after the rest of the header included in the signature calculation, after the rest of the header
fields being signed; however, when calculating or verifying the fields being signed; however, when calculating or verifying the
signature, the value of the "b=" tag (signature value) of that DKIM- signature, the value of the "b=" tag (signature value) of that DKIM-
Signature header field MUST be treated as though it were an empty Signature header field MUST be treated as though it were an empty
string. Unknown tags in the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be string. Unknown tags in the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be
included in the signature calculation but MUST be otherwise ignored included in the signature calculation but MUST be otherwise ignored
by verifiers. Other DKIM-Signature header fields that are included by verifiers. Other DKIM-Signature header fields that are included
in the signature should be treated as normal header fields; in in the signature should be treated as normal header fields; in
particular, the "b=" tag is not treated specially. particular, the "b=" tag is not treated specially.
The encodings for each field type are listed below. Tags described The encodings for each field type are listed below. Tags described
as qp-section are encoded as described in Section 6.7 of MIME Part as qp-section are encoded as described in Section 6.7 of MIME Part
One [RFC2045], with the additional conversion of semicolon characters One [RFC2045], with the additional conversion of semicolon characters
to "=3B"; intuitively, this is one line of quoted-printable encoded to "=3B"; intuitively, this is one line of quoted-printable encoded
text. The dkim-quoted-printable syntax is defined in Section 2.11. text. The dkim-quoted-printable syntax is defined in Section 3.11.
Tags on the DKIM-Signature header field along with their type and Tags on the DKIM-Signature header field along with their type and
requirement status are shown below. Unrecognized tags MUST be requirement status are shown below. Unrecognized tags MUST be
ignored. ignored.
v= Version (MUST be included). This tag defines the version of this v= Version (MUST be included). This tag defines the version of this
specification that applies to the signature record. It MUST have specification that applies to the signature record. It MUST have
the value "1". Note that verifiers must do a string comparison on the value "1". Note that verifiers must do a string comparison on
this value; for example, "1" is not the same as "1.0". this value; for example, "1" is not the same as "1.0".
skipping to change at page 21, line 20 skipping to change at page 21, line 31
sig-a-tag-h = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-sig-a-tag-h sig-a-tag-h = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-sig-a-tag-h
x-sig-a-tag-k = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT) x-sig-a-tag-k = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT)
; for later extension ; for later extension
x-sig-a-tag-h = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT) x-sig-a-tag-h = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT)
; for later extension ; for later extension
b= The signature data (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored in b= The signature data (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored in
this value and MUST be ignored when reassembling the original this value and MUST be ignored when reassembling the original
signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert
FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length
limits. See Signer Actions (Section 5) for how the signature is limits. See Signer Actions (Section 6) for how the signature is
computed. computed.
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-b-tag = %x62 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-b-tag-data sig-b-tag = %x62 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-b-tag-data
sig-b-tag-data = base64string sig-b-tag-data = base64string
bh= The hash of the canonicalized body part of the message as bh= The hash of the canonicalized body part of the message as
limited by the "l=" tag (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored limited by the "l=" tag (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored
in this value and MUST be ignored when reassembling the original in this value and MUST be ignored when reassembling the original
signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert
FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length
limits. See Section 3.7 for how the body hash is computed. limits. See Section 4.7 for how the body hash is computed.
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-bh-tag = %x62 %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-bh-tag-data sig-bh-tag = %x62 %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-bh-tag-data
sig-bh-tag-data = base64string sig-bh-tag-data = base64string
c= Message canonicalization (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is c= Message canonicalization (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is
"simple/simple"). This tag informs the verifier of the type of "simple/simple"). This tag informs the verifier of the type of
canonicalization used to prepare the message for signing. It canonicalization used to prepare the message for signing. It
consists of two names separated by a "slash" (%d47) character, consists of two names separated by a "slash" (%d47) character,
corresponding to the header and body canonicalization algorithms corresponding to the header and body canonicalization algorithms
respectively. These algorithms are described in Section 3.4. If respectively. These algorithms are described in Section 4.4. If
only one algorithm is named, that algorithm is used for the header only one algorithm is named, that algorithm is used for the header
and "simple" is used for the body. For example, "c=relaxed" is and "simple" is used for the body. For example, "c=relaxed" is
treated the same as "c=relaxed/simple". treated the same as "c=relaxed/simple".
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-c-tag = %x63 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-c-tag-alg sig-c-tag = %x63 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-c-tag-alg
["/" sig-c-tag-alg] ["/" sig-c-tag-alg]
sig-c-tag-alg = "simple" / "relaxed" / x-sig-c-tag-alg sig-c-tag-alg = "simple" / "relaxed" / x-sig-c-tag-alg
x-sig-c-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for later extension x-sig-c-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for later extension
skipping to change at page 22, line 26 skipping to change at page 23, line 6
into the mail stream (plain-text; REQUIRED). Hence, the SDID into the mail stream (plain-text; REQUIRED). Hence, the SDID
value is used to form the query for the public key. The SDID MUST value is used to form the query for the public key. The SDID MUST
correspond to a valid DNS name under which the DKIM key record is correspond to a valid DNS name under which the DKIM key record is
published. The conventions and semantics used by a signer to published. The conventions and semantics used by a signer to
create and use a specific SDID are outside the scope of the DKIM create and use a specific SDID are outside the scope of the DKIM
Signing specification, as is any use of those conventions and Signing specification, as is any use of those conventions and
semantics. When presented with a signature that does not meet semantics. When presented with a signature that does not meet
these requirements, verifiers MUST consider the signature invalid. these requirements, verifiers MUST consider the signature invalid.
Internationalized domain names MUST be encoded as described in Internationalized domain names MUST be encoded as described in
[RFC3490]. Section 2.3 of [RFC5890] to "A-Labels". {DKIM 4}.
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-d-tag = %x64 [FWS] "=" [FWS] domain-name sig-d-tag = %x64 [FWS] "=" [FWS] domain-name
domain-name = sub-domain 1*("." sub-domain) domain-name = sub-domain 1*("." sub-domain)
; from RFC 5321 Domain, but excluding address-literal ; from RFC5321 Domain, excluding address-literal
h= Signed header fields (plain-text, but see description; REQUIRED). h= Signed header fields (plain-text, but see description; REQUIRED).
A colon-separated list of header field names that identify the A colon-separated list of header field names that identify the
header fields presented to the signing algorithm. The field MUST header fields presented to the signing algorithm. The field MUST
contain the complete list of header fields in the order presented contain the complete list of header fields in the order presented
to the signing algorithm. The field MAY contain names of header to the signing algorithm. The field MAY contain names of header
fields that do not exist when signed; nonexistent header fields do fields that do not exist when signed; nonexistent header fields do
not contribute to the signature computation (that is, they are not contribute to the signature computation (that is, they are
treated as the null input, including the header field name, the treated as the null input, including the header field name, the
separating colon, the header field value, and any CRLF separating colon, the header field value, and any CRLF
terminator). The field MUST NOT include the DKIM-Signature header terminator). The field MUST NOT include the DKIM-Signature header
field that is being created or verified, but may include others. field that is being created or verified, but may include others.
Folding whitespace (FWS) MAY be included on either side of the Folding whitespace (FWS) MAY be included on either side of the
colon separator. Header field names MUST be compared against colon separator. Header field names MUST be compared against
actual header field names in a case-insensitive manner. This list actual header field names in a case-insensitive manner. This list
MUST NOT be empty. See Section 5.4 for a discussion of choosing MUST NOT be empty. See Section 6.4 for a discussion of choosing
header fields to sign. header fields to sign.
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] hdr-name sig-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] hdr-name
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] hdr-name ) 0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] hdr-name )
INFORMATIVE EXPLANATION: By "signing" header fields that do not INFORMATIVE EXPLANATION: By "signing" header fields that do not
actually exist, a signer can prevent insertion of those header actually exist, a signer can prevent insertion of those header
fields before verification. However, since a signer cannot fields before verification. However, since a signer cannot
possibly know what header fields might be created in the possibly know what header fields might be created in the
skipping to change at page 23, line 37 skipping to change at page 24, line 19
i= The Agent or User Identifier (AUID) on behalf of which the SDID is i= The Agent or User Identifier (AUID) on behalf of which the SDID is
taking responsibility (dkim-quoted-printable; OPTIONAL, default is taking responsibility (dkim-quoted-printable; OPTIONAL, default is
an empty Local-part followed by an "@" followed by the domain from an empty Local-part followed by an "@" followed by the domain from
the "d=" tag). the "d=" tag).
The syntax is a standard email address where the Local-part MAY be The syntax is a standard email address where the Local-part MAY be
omitted. The domain part of the address MUST be the same as, or a omitted. The domain part of the address MUST be the same as, or a
subdomain of, the value of the "d=" tag. subdomain of, the value of the "d=" tag.
Internationalized domain names MUST be converted using the steps Internationalized domain names MUST be converted as described in
listed in Section 4 of [RFC3490] using the "ToASCII" function. Section 2.3 of [RFC5890] to "A-Labels" {DKIM 4}.
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-i-tag = %x69 [FWS] "=" [FWS] [ Local-part ] sig-i-tag = %x69 [FWS] "=" [FWS] [ Local-part ]
"@" domain-name "@" domain-name
The AUID is specified as having the same syntax as an email The AUID is specified as having the same syntax as an email
address, but is not required to have the same semantics. Notably, address, but is not required to have the same semantics. Notably,
the domain name is not required to be registered in the DNS -- so the domain name is not required to be registered in the DNS -- so
it might not resolve in a query -- and the Local-part MAY be drawn it might not resolve in a query -- and the Local-part MAY be drawn
skipping to change at page 25, line 17 skipping to change at page 25, line 43
allow display of fraudulent content without appropriate warning allow display of fraudulent content without appropriate warning
to end users. The "l=" tag is intended for increasing to end users. The "l=" tag is intended for increasing
signature robustness when sending to mailing lists that both signature robustness when sending to mailing lists that both
modify their content and do not sign their messages. However, modify their content and do not sign their messages. However,
using the "l=" tag enables attacks in which an intermediary using the "l=" tag enables attacks in which an intermediary
with malicious intent modifies a message to include content with malicious intent modifies a message to include content
that solely benefits the attacker. It is possible for the that solely benefits the attacker. It is possible for the
appended content to completely replace the original content in appended content to completely replace the original content in
the end recipient's eyes and to defeat duplicate message the end recipient's eyes and to defeat duplicate message
detection algorithms. Examples are described in Security detection algorithms. Examples are described in Security
Considerations Section 8. To avoid this attack, signers should Considerations Section 9. To avoid this attack, signers should
be extremely wary of using this tag, and verifiers might wish be extremely wary of using this tag, and verifiers might wish
to ignore the tag or remove text that appears after the to ignore the tag. {DKIM 2}
specified content length.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The value of the "l=" tag is constrained to INFORMATIVE NOTE: The value of the "l=" tag is constrained to
76 decimal digits. This constraint is not intended to predict 76 decimal digits. This constraint is not intended to predict
the size of future messages or to require implementations to the size of future messages or to require implementations to
use an integer representation large enough to represent the use an integer representation large enough to represent the
maximum possible value, but is intended to remind the maximum possible value, but is intended to remind the
implementer to check the length of this and all other tags implementer to check the length of this and all other tags
during verification and to test for integer overflow when during verification and to test for integer overflow when
decoding the value. Implementers may need to limit the actual decoding the value. Implementers may need to limit the actual
value expressed to a value smaller than 10^76, e.g., to allow a value expressed to a value smaller than 10^76, e.g., to allow a
message to fit within the available storage space. message to fit within the available storage space.
skipping to change at page 28, line 10 skipping to change at page 28, line 38
header field value. After encoding, FWS MAY be added at arbitrary header field value. After encoding, FWS MAY be added at arbitrary
locations in order to avoid excessively long lines; such locations in order to avoid excessively long lines; such
whitespace is NOT part of the value of the header field, and MUST whitespace is NOT part of the value of the header field, and MUST
be removed before decoding. be removed before decoding.
The header fields referenced by the "h=" tag refer to the fields The header fields referenced by the "h=" tag refer to the fields
in the [RFC5322] header of the message, not to any copied fields in the [RFC5322] header of the message, not to any copied fields
in the "z=" tag. Copied header field values are for diagnostic in the "z=" tag. Copied header field values are for diagnostic
use. use.
Header fields with characters requiring conversion (perhaps from
legacy MTAs that are not [RFC5322] compliant) SHOULD be converted
as described in MIME Part Three [RFC2047].
ABNF: ABNF:
sig-z-tag = %x7A [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-z-tag-copy sig-z-tag = %x7A [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-z-tag-copy
*( "|" [FWS] sig-z-tag-copy ) *( "|" [FWS] sig-z-tag-copy )
sig-z-tag-copy = hdr-name [FWS] ":" qp-hdr-value sig-z-tag-copy = hdr-name [FWS] ":" qp-hdr-value
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE of a signature header field spread across INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE of a signature header field spread across
multiple continuation lines: multiple continuation lines:
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane; DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane;
c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=@eng.example.net; c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=@eng.example.net;
t=1117574938; x=1118006938; t=1117574938; x=1118006938;
h=from:to:subject:date; h=from:to:subject:date;
z=From:foo@eng.example.net|To:joe@example.com| z=From:foo@eng.example.net|To:joe@example.com|
Subject:demo=20run|Date:July=205,=202005=203:44:08=20PM=20-0700; Subject:demo=20run|Date:July=205,=202005=203:44:08=20PM=20-0700;
bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=; bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=;
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR
skipping to change at page 28, line 30 skipping to change at page 29, line 15
multiple continuation lines: multiple continuation lines:
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane; DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane;
c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=@eng.example.net; c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=@eng.example.net;
t=1117574938; x=1118006938; t=1117574938; x=1118006938;
h=from:to:subject:date; h=from:to:subject:date;
z=From:foo@eng.example.net|To:joe@example.com| z=From:foo@eng.example.net|To:joe@example.com|
Subject:demo=20run|Date:July=205,=202005=203:44:08=20PM=20-0700; Subject:demo=20run|Date:July=205,=202005=203:44:08=20PM=20-0700;
bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=; bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=;
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR
3.6. Key Management and Representation 4.6. Key Management and Representation
Signature applications require some level of assurance that the Signature applications require some level of assurance that the
verification public key is associated with the claimed signer. Many verification public key is associated with the claimed signer. Many
applications achieve this by using public key certificates issued by applications achieve this by using public key certificates issued by
a trusted third party. However, DKIM can achieve a sufficient level a trusted third party. However, DKIM can achieve a sufficient level
of security, with significantly enhanced scalability, by simply of security, with significantly enhanced scalability, by simply
having the verifier query the purported signer's DNS entry (or some having the verifier query the purported signer's DNS entry (or some
security-equivalent) in order to retrieve the public key. security-equivalent) in order to retrieve the public key.
DKIM keys can potentially be stored in multiple types of key servers DKIM keys can potentially be stored in multiple types of key servers
skipping to change at page 29, line 4 skipping to change at page 29, line 32
having the verifier query the purported signer's DNS entry (or some having the verifier query the purported signer's DNS entry (or some
security-equivalent) in order to retrieve the public key. security-equivalent) in order to retrieve the public key.
DKIM keys can potentially be stored in multiple types of key servers DKIM keys can potentially be stored in multiple types of key servers
and in multiple formats. The storage and format of keys are and in multiple formats. The storage and format of keys are
irrelevant to the remainder of the DKIM algorithm. irrelevant to the remainder of the DKIM algorithm.
Parameters to the key lookup algorithm are the type of the lookup Parameters to the key lookup algorithm are the type of the lookup
(the "q=" tag), the domain of the signer (the "d=" tag of the DKIM- (the "q=" tag), the domain of the signer (the "d=" tag of the DKIM-
Signature header field), and the selector (the "s=" tag). Signature header field), and the selector (the "s=" tag).
public_key = dkim_find_key(q_val, d_val, s_val) public_key = dkim_find_key(q_val, d_val, s_val)
This document defines a single binding, using DNS TXT records to This document defines a single binding, using DNS TXT records to
distribute the keys. Other bindings may be defined in the future. distribute the keys. Other bindings may be defined in the future.
3.6.1. Textual Representation 4.6.1. Textual Representation
It is expected that many key servers will choose to present the keys It is expected that many key servers will choose to present the keys
in an otherwise unstructured text format (for example, an XML form in an otherwise unstructured text format (for example, an XML form
would not be considered to be unstructured text for this purpose). would not be considered to be unstructured text for this purpose).
The following definition MUST be used for any DKIM key represented in The following definition MUST be used for any DKIM key represented in
an otherwise unstructured textual form. an otherwise unstructured textual form.
The overall syntax is a tag-list as described in Section 3.2. The The overall syntax is a tag-list as described in Section 4.2. The
current valid tags are described below. Other tags MAY be present current valid tags are described below. Other tags MAY be present
and MUST be ignored by any implementation that does not understand and MUST be ignored by any implementation that does not understand
them. them.
v= Version of the DKIM key record (plain-text; RECOMMENDED, default v= Version of the DKIM key record (plain-text; RECOMMENDED, default
is "DKIM1"). If specified, this tag MUST be set to "DKIM1" is "DKIM1"). If specified, this tag MUST be set to "DKIM1"
(without the quotes). This tag MUST be the first tag in the (without the quotes). This tag MUST be the first tag in the
record. Records beginning with a "v=" tag with any other value record. Records beginning with a "v=" tag with any other value
MUST be discarded. Note that verifiers must do a string MUST be discarded. Note that verifiers must do a string
comparison on this value; for example, "DKIM1" is not the same as comparison on this value; for example, "DKIM1" is not the same as
"DKIM1.0". "DKIM1.0".
ABNF: ABNF:
key-v-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] %x44 %x4B %x49 %x4D %x31 key-v-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] %x44 %x4B %x49 %x4D %x31
h= Acceptable hash algorithms (plain-text; OPTIONAL, defaults to h= Acceptable hash algorithms (plain-text; OPTIONAL, defaults to
allowing all algorithms). A colon-separated list of hash allowing all algorithms). A colon-separated list of hash
algorithms that might be used. Unrecognized algorithms MUST be algorithms that might be used. Unrecognized algorithms MUST be
ignored. Refer to Section 3.3 for a discussion of the hash ignored. Refer to Section 4.3 for a discussion of the hash
algorithms implemented by Signers and Verifiers. . The set of algorithms implemented by Signers and Verifiers. The set of
algorithms listed in this tag in each record is an operational algorithms listed in this tag in each record is an operational
choice made by the Signer. choice made by the Signer.
ABNF: ABNF:
key-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg key-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg ) 0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg )
key-h-tag-alg = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-key-h-tag-alg key-h-tag-alg = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-key-h-tag-alg
x-key-h-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for future extension x-key-h-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
k= Key type (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "rsa"). Signers and k= Key type (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "rsa"). Signers and
verifiers MUST support the "rsa" key type. The "rsa" key type verifiers MUST support the "rsa" key type. The "rsa" key type
indicates that an ASN.1 DER-encoded [ITU-X660-1997] RSAPublicKey indicates that an ASN.1 DER-encoded [ITU-X660-1997] RSAPublicKey
[RFC3447] (see Sections Section 3.1 and A.1.1) is being used in [RFC3447] (see Sections Section 4.1 and A.1.1) is being used in
the "p=" tag. (Note: the "p=" tag further encodes the value using the "p=" tag. (Note: the "p=" tag further encodes the value using
the base64 algorithm.) Unrecognized key types MUST be ignored. the base64 algorithm.) Unrecognized key types MUST be ignored.
ABNF: ABNF:
key-k-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-k-tag-type key-k-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-k-tag-type
key-k-tag-type = "rsa" / x-key-k-tag-type key-k-tag-type = "rsa" / x-key-k-tag-type
x-key-k-tag-type = hyphenated-word ; for future extension x-key-k-tag-type = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
n= Notes that might be of interest to a human (qp-section; OPTIONAL, n= Notes that might be of interest to a human (qp-section; OPTIONAL,
default is empty). No interpretation is made by any program. default is empty). No interpretation is made by any program.
This tag should be used sparingly in any key server mechanism that This tag should be used sparingly in any key server mechanism that
has space limitations (notably DNS). This is intended for use by has space limitations (notably DNS). This is intended for use by
administrators, not end users. administrators, not end users.
ABNF: ABNF:
key-n-tag = %x6e [FWS] "=" [FWS] qp-section key-n-tag = %x6e [FWS] "=" [FWS] qp-section
p= Public-key data (base64; REQUIRED). An empty value means that p= Public-key data (base64; REQUIRED). An empty value means that
skipping to change at page 32, line 11 skipping to change at page 33, line 4
same domain value on the right-hand side of the "@" in the "i=" same domain value on the right-hand side of the "@" in the "i="
tag and the value of the "d=" tag. That is, the "i=" domain MUST tag and the value of the "d=" tag. That is, the "i=" domain MUST
NOT be a subdomain of "d=". Use of this flag is RECOMMENDED NOT be a subdomain of "d=". Use of this flag is RECOMMENDED
unless subdomaining is required. unless subdomaining is required.
ABNF: ABNF:
key-t-tag = %x74 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag key-t-tag = %x74 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag ) 0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag )
key-t-tag-flag = "y" / "s" / x-key-t-tag-flag key-t-tag-flag = "y" / "s" / x-key-t-tag-flag
x-key-t-tag-flag = hyphenated-word ; for future extension x-key-t-tag-flag = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
Unrecognized flags MUST be ignored. Unrecognized flags MUST be ignored.
3.6.2. DNS Binding 4.6.2. DNS Binding
A binding using DNS TXT records as a key service is hereby defined. A binding using DNS TXT records as a key service is hereby defined.
All implementations MUST support this binding. All implementations MUST support this binding.
3.6.2.1. Namespace 4.6.2.1. Namespace
All DKIM keys are stored in a subdomain named "_domainkey". Given a All DKIM keys are stored in a subdomain named "_domainkey". Given a
DKIM-Signature field with a "d=" tag of "example.com" and an "s=" tag DKIM-Signature field with a "d=" tag of "example.com" and an "s=" tag
of "foo.bar", the DNS query will be for of "foo.bar", the DNS query will be for
"foo.bar._domainkey.example.com". "foo.bar._domainkey.example.com".
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONAL NOTE: Wildcard DNS records (e.g., 4.6.2.2. Resource Record Types for Key Storage
*.bar._domainkey.example.com) do not make sense in this context
and should not be used. Note also that wildcards within domains
(e.g., s._domainkey.*.example.com) are not supported by the DNS.
3.6.2.2. Resource Record Types for Key Storage
The DNS Resource Record type used is specified by an option to the The DNS Resource Record type used is specified by an option to the
query-type ("q=") tag. The only option defined in this base query-type ("q=") tag. The only option defined in this base
specification is "txt", indicating the use of a TXT Resource Record specification is "txt", indicating the use of a TXT Resource Record
(RR). A later extension of this standard may define another RR type. (RR). A later extension of this standard may define another RR type.
Strings in a TXT RR MUST be concatenated together before use with no Strings in a TXT RR MUST be concatenated together before use with no
intervening whitespace. TXT RRs MUST be unique for a particular intervening whitespace. TXT RRs MUST be unique for a particular
selector name; that is, if there are multiple records in an RRset, selector name; that is, if there are multiple records in an RRset,
the results are undefined. the results are undefined.
TXT RRs are encoded as described in Section 3.6.1 TXT RRs are encoded as described in Section 4.6.1
3.7. Computing the Message Hashes 4.7. Computing the Message Hashes
Both signing and verifying message signatures start with a step of Both signing and verifying message signatures start with a step of
computing two cryptographic hashes over the message. Signers will computing two cryptographic hashes over the message. Signers will
choose the parameters of the signature as described in Signer Actions choose the parameters of the signature as described in Signer Actions
Section 5; verifiers will use the parameters specified in the DKIM- Section 6; verifiers will use the parameters specified in the DKIM-
Signature header field being verified. In the following discussion, Signature header field being verified. In the following discussion,
the names of the tags in the DKIM-Signature header field that either the names of the tags in the DKIM-Signature header field that either
exists (when verifying) or will be created (when signing) are used. exists (when verifying) or will be created (when signing) are used.
Note that canonicalization (Section 3.4) is only used to prepare the Note that canonicalization (Section 4.4) is only used to prepare the
email for signing or verifying; it does not affect the transmitted email for signing or verifying; it does not affect the transmitted
email in any way. email in any way.
The signer/verifier MUST compute two hashes, one over the body of the The signer/verifier MUST compute two hashes, one over the body of the
message and one over the selected header fields of the message. message and one over the selected header fields of the message.
Signers MUST compute them in the order shown. Verifiers MAY compute Signers MUST compute them in the order shown. Verifiers MAY compute
them in any order convenient to the verifier, provided that the them in any order convenient to the verifier, provided that the
result is semantically identical to the semantics that would be the result is semantically identical to the semantics that would be the
case had they been computed in this order. case had they been computed in this order.
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All tags and their values in the DKIM-Signature header field are All tags and their values in the DKIM-Signature header field are
included in the cryptographic hash with the sole exception of the included in the cryptographic hash with the sole exception of the
value portion of the "b=" (signature) tag, which MUST be treated as value portion of the "b=" (signature) tag, which MUST be treated as
the null string. All tags MUST be included even if they might not be the null string. All tags MUST be included even if they might not be
understood by the verifier. The header field MUST be presented to understood by the verifier. The header field MUST be presented to
the hash algorithm after the body of the message rather than with the the hash algorithm after the body of the message rather than with the
rest of the header fields and MUST be canonicalized as specified in rest of the header fields and MUST be canonicalized as specified in
the "c=" (canonicalization) tag. The DKIM-Signature header field the "c=" (canonicalization) tag. The DKIM-Signature header field
MUST NOT be included in its own h= tag, although other DKIM-Signature MUST NOT be included in its own h= tag, although other DKIM-Signature
header fields MAY be signed (see Section 4). header fields MAY be signed (see Section 5).
When calculating the hash on messages that will be transmitted using When calculating the hash on messages that will be transmitted using
base64 or quoted-printable encoding, signers MUST compute the hash base64 or quoted-printable encoding, signers MUST compute the hash
after the encoding. Likewise, the verifier MUST incorporate the after the encoding. Likewise, the verifier MUST incorporate the
values into the hash before decoding the base64 or quoted-printable values into the hash before decoding the base64 or quoted-printable
text. However, the hash MUST be computed before transport level text. However, the hash MUST be computed before transport level
encodings such as SMTP "dot-stuffing" (the modification of lines encodings such as SMTP "dot-stuffing" (the modification of lines
beginning with a "." to avoid confusion with the SMTP end-of-message beginning with a "." to avoid confusion with the SMTP end-of-message
marker, as specified in [RFC5321]). marker, as specified in [RFC5321]).
With the exception of the canonicalization procedure described in With the exception of the canonicalization procedure described in
Section 3.4, the DKIM signing process treats the body of messages as Section 4.4, the DKIM signing process treats the body of messages as
simply a string of octets. DKIM messages MAY be either in plain-text simply a string of octets. DKIM messages MAY be either in plain-text
or in MIME format; no special treatment is afforded to MIME content. or in MIME format; no special treatment is afforded to MIME content.
Message attachments in MIME format MUST be included in the content Message attachments in MIME format MUST be included in the content
that is signed. that is signed.
More formally, pseudo-code for the signature algorithm is: More formally, pseudo-code for the signature algorithm is:
body-hash = hash-alg (canon-body, l-param) body-hash = hash-alg (canon-body, l-param)
data-hash = hash-alg (h-headers, D-SIG, content-hash) data-hash = hash-alg (h-headers, D-SIG, content-hash)
signature = sig-alg (d-domain, selector, data-hash) signature = sig-alg (d-domain, selector, data-hash)
where: where:
body-hash: is the output from hashing the body, using hash-alg. body-hash: is the output from hashing the body, using hash-alg.
hash-alg: is the hashing algorithm specified in the "a" hash-alg: is the hashing algorithm specified in the "a"
parameter. parameter.
canon-body: is a canonicalized representation of the body, canon-body: is a canonicalized representation of the body,
produced by using the body algorithm specified in the "c" produced by using the body algorithm specified in the "c"
parameter, as defined in Section 3.4 and excluding the parameter, as defined in Section 4.4 and excluding the
DKIM-Signature field. DKIM-Signature field.
l-param: is the length-of-body value of the "l" parameter. l-param: is the length-of-body value of the "l" parameter.
data-hash: is the output from using the hash-alg algorithm, to data-hash: is the output from using the hash-alg algorithm, to
hash the header including the DKIM-Signature header, and the hash the header including the DKIM-Signature header, and the
body hash. body hash.
h-headers: is the list of headers to be signed, as specified in h-headers: is the list of headers to be signed, as specified in
the "h" parameter. the "h" parameter.
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d-domain: is the domain name specified in the "d" parameter. d-domain: is the domain name specified in the "d" parameter.
selector: is the selector value specified in the "s" parameter. selector: is the selector value specified in the "s" parameter.
NOTE: Many digital signature APIs provide both hashing and NOTE: Many digital signature APIs provide both hashing and
application of the RSA private key using a single "sign()" application of the RSA private key using a single "sign()"
primitive. When using such an API, the last two steps in the primitive. When using such an API, the last two steps in the
algorithm would probably be combined into a single call that would algorithm would probably be combined into a single call that would
perform both the "a-hash-alg" and the "sig-alg". perform both the "a-hash-alg" and the "sig-alg".
3.8. Input Requirements 4.8. Input Requirements
DKIM's design is predicated on valid input. Therefore, signers and DKIM's design is predicated on valid input. Therefore, signers and
verifiers SHOULD take reasonable steps to ensure that the messages verifiers SHOULD take reasonable steps to ensure that the messages
they are processing are valid according to [RFC5322], [RFC2045], and they are processing are valid according to [RFC5322], [RFC2045], and
any other relevant message format standards. See Section 8.15 for any other relevant message format standards. See Section 9.15 for
additional discussion and references. additional discussion and references.
3.9. Signing by Parent Domains 4.9. Signing by Parent Domains
In some circumstances, it is desirable for a domain to apply a In some circumstances, it is desirable for a domain to apply a
signature on behalf of any of its subdomains without the need to signature on behalf of any of its subdomains without the need to
maintain separate selectors (key records) in each subdomain. By maintain separate selectors (key records) in each subdomain. By
default, private keys corresponding to key records can be used to default, private keys corresponding to key records can be used to
sign messages for any subdomain of the domain in which they reside; sign messages for any subdomain of the domain in which they reside;
for example, a key record for the domain example.com can be used to for example, a key record for the domain example.com can be used to
verify messages where the AUID ("i=" tag of the signature) is verify messages where the AUID ("i=" tag of the signature) is
sub.example.com, or even sub1.sub2.example.com. In order to limit sub.example.com, or even sub1.sub2.example.com. In order to limit
the capability of such keys when this is not intended, the "s" flag the capability of such keys when this is not intended, the "s" flag
MAY be set in the "t=" tag of the key record, to constrain the MAY be set in the "t=" tag of the key record, to constrain the
validity of the domain of the AUID. If the referenced key record validity of the domain of the AUID. If the referenced key record
contains the "s" flag as part of the "t=" tag, the domain of the AUID contains the "s" flag as part of the "t=" tag, the domain of the AUID
("i=" flag) MUST be the same as that of the SDID (d=) domain. If ("i=" flag) MUST be the same as that of the SDID (d=) domain. If
this flag is absent, the domain of the AUID MUST be the same as, or a this flag is absent, the domain of the AUID MUST be the same as, or a
subdomain of, the SDID. subdomain of, the SDID.
3.10. Relationship between SDID and AUID 4.10. Relationship between SDID and AUID
DKIM's primary task is to communicate from the Signer to a recipient- DKIM's primary task is to communicate from the Signer to a recipient-
side Identity Assessor a single Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) that side Identity Assessor a single Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) that
refers to a responsible identity. DKIM MAY optionally provide a refers to a responsible identity. DKIM MAY optionally provide a
single responsible Agent or User Identifier (AUID). single responsible Agent or User Identifier (AUID).
Hence, DKIM's mandatory output to a receive-side Identity Assessor is Hence, DKIM's mandatory output to a receive-side Identity Assessor is
a single domain name. Within the scope of its use as DKIM output, a single domain name. Within the scope of its use as DKIM output,
the name has only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner- the name has only basic domain name semantics; any possible owner-
specific semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. That is, within specific semantics are outside the scope of DKIM. That is, within
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is a broad and complex topic and trust mechanisms are subject to is a broad and complex topic and trust mechanisms are subject to
highly creative attacks. The real-world efficacy of any but the highly creative attacks. The real-world efficacy of any but the
most basic bindings between the SDID or AUID and other identities most basic bindings between the SDID or AUID and other identities
is not well established, nor is its vulnerability to subversion by is not well established, nor is its vulnerability to subversion by
an attacker. Hence, reliance on the use of such bindings should an attacker. Hence, reliance on the use of such bindings should
be strictly limited. In particular, it is not at all clear to be strictly limited. In particular, it is not at all clear to
what extent a typical end-user recipient can rely on any what extent a typical end-user recipient can rely on any
assurances that might be made by successful use of the SDID or assurances that might be made by successful use of the SDID or
AUID. AUID.
4. Semantics of Multiple Signatures 5. Semantics of Multiple Signatures
4.1. Example Scenarios
5.1. Example Scenarios
There are many reasons why a message might have multiple signatures. There are many reasons why a message might have multiple signatures.
For example, a given signer might sign multiple times, perhaps with For example, a given signer might sign multiple times, perhaps with
different hashing or signing algorithms during a transition phase. different hashing or signing algorithms during a transition phase.
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: Suppose SHA-256 is in the future found to be INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: Suppose SHA-256 is in the future found to be
insufficiently strong, and DKIM usage transitions to SHA-1024. A insufficiently strong, and DKIM usage transitions to SHA-1024. A
signer might immediately sign using the newer algorithm, but signer might immediately sign using the newer algorithm, but
continue to sign using the older algorithm for interoperability continue to sign using the older algorithm for interoperability
with verifiers that had not yet upgraded. The signer would do with verifiers that had not yet upgraded. The signer would do
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services, such as those commonly associated with academic alumni services, such as those commonly associated with academic alumni
sites. sites.
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: A recipient might have an address at INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: A recipient might have an address at
members.example.org, a site that has anti-abuse protection that is members.example.org, a site that has anti-abuse protection that is
somewhat less effective than the recipient would prefer. Such a somewhat less effective than the recipient would prefer. Such a
recipient might have specific authors whose messages would be recipient might have specific authors whose messages would be
trusted absolutely, but messages from unknown authors that had trusted absolutely, but messages from unknown authors that had
passed the forwarder's scrutiny would have only medium trust. passed the forwarder's scrutiny would have only medium trust.
4.2. Interpretation 5.2. Interpretation
A signer that is adding a signature to a message merely creates a new A signer that is adding a signature to a message merely creates a new
DKIM-Signature header, using the usual semantics of the h= option. A DKIM-Signature header, using the usual semantics of the h= option. A
signer MAY sign previously existing DKIM-Signature header fields signer MAY sign previously existing DKIM-Signature header fields
using the method described in Section 5.4 to sign trace header using the method described in Section 6.4 to sign trace header
fields. fields.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Signers should be cognizant that signing DKIM- INFORMATIVE NOTE: Signers should be cognizant that signing DKIM-
Signature header fields may result in signature failures with Signature header fields may result in signature failures with
intermediaries that do not recognize that DKIM-Signature header intermediaries that do not recognize that DKIM-Signature header
fields are trace header fields and unwittingly reorder them, thus fields are trace header fields and unwittingly reorder them, thus
breaking such signatures. For this reason, signing existing DKIM- breaking such signatures. For this reason, signing existing DKIM-
Signature header fields is unadvised, albeit legal. Signature header fields is unadvised, albeit legal.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: If a header field with multiple instances is INFORMATIVE NOTE: If a header field with multiple instances is
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messages they are signing, even if they know that the signatures messages they are signing, even if they know that the signatures
cannot be verified. cannot be verified.
When evaluating a message with multiple signatures, a verifier SHOULD When evaluating a message with multiple signatures, a verifier SHOULD
evaluate signatures independently and on their own merits. For evaluate signatures independently and on their own merits. For
example, a verifier that by policy chooses not to accept signatures example, a verifier that by policy chooses not to accept signatures
with deprecated cryptographic algorithms would consider such with deprecated cryptographic algorithms would consider such
signatures invalid. Verifiers MAY process signatures in any order of signatures invalid. Verifiers MAY process signatures in any order of
their choice; for example, some verifiers might choose to process their choice; for example, some verifiers might choose to process
signatures corresponding to the From field in the message header signatures corresponding to the From field in the message header
before other signatures. See Section 6.1 for more information about before other signatures. See Section 7.1 for more information about
signature choices. signature choices.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Verifier attempts to correlate INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Verifier attempts to correlate
valid signatures with invalid signatures in an attempt to guess valid signatures with invalid signatures in an attempt to guess
why a signature failed are ill-advised. In particular, there is why a signature failed are ill-advised. In particular, there is
no general way that a verifier can determine that an invalid no general way that a verifier can determine that an invalid
signature was ever valid. signature was ever valid.
Verifiers SHOULD ignore failed signatures as though they were not Verifiers SHOULD ignore failed signatures as though they were not
present in the message. Verifiers SHOULD continue to check present in the message. Verifiers SHOULD continue to check
signatures until a signature successfully verifies to the signatures until a signature successfully verifies to the
satisfaction of the verifier. To limit potential denial-of-service satisfaction of the verifier. To limit potential denial-of-service
attacks, verifiers MAY limit the total number of signatures they will attacks, verifiers MAY limit the total number of signatures they will
attempt to verify. attempt to verify.
5. Signer Actions 6. Signer Actions
The following steps are performed in order by signers. The following steps are performed in order by signers.
5.1. Determine Whether the Email Should Be Signed and by Whom 6.1. Determine Whether the Email Should Be Signed and by Whom
A signer can obviously only sign email for domains for which it has a A signer can obviously only sign email for domains for which it has a
private key and the necessary knowledge of the corresponding public private key and the necessary knowledge of the corresponding public
key and selector information. However, there are a number of other key and selector information. However, there are a number of other
reasons beyond the lack of a private key why a signer could choose reasons beyond the lack of a private key why a signer could choose
not to sign an email. not to sign an email.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Signing modules may be incorporated into any INFORMATIVE NOTE: Signing modules may be incorporated into any
portion of the mail system as deemed appropriate, including an portion of the mail system as deemed appropriate, including an
MUA, a SUBMISSION server, or an MTA. Wherever implemented, MUA, a SUBMISSION server, or an MTA. Wherever implemented,
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authenticated and authorized. authenticated and authorized.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER ADVICE: SUBMISSION servers should not sign INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER ADVICE: SUBMISSION servers should not sign
Received header fields if the outgoing gateway MTA obfuscates Received header fields if the outgoing gateway MTA obfuscates
Received header fields, for example, to hide the details of Received header fields, for example, to hide the details of
internal topology. internal topology.
If an email cannot be signed for some reason, it is a local policy If an email cannot be signed for some reason, it is a local policy
decision as to what to do with that email. decision as to what to do with that email.
5.2. Select a Private Key and Corresponding Selector Information 6.2. Select a Private Key and Corresponding Selector Information
This specification does not define the basis by which a signer should This specification does not define the basis by which a signer should
choose which private key and selector information to use. Currently, choose which private key and selector information to use. Currently,
all selectors are equal as far as this specification is concerned, so all selectors are equal as far as this specification is concerned, so
the decision should largely be a matter of administrative the decision should largely be a matter of administrative
convenience. Distribution and management of private keys is also convenience. Distribution and management of private keys is also
outside the scope of this document. outside the scope of this document.
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS ADVICE: A signer should not sign with a INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS ADVICE: A signer should not sign with a
private key when the selector containing the corresponding public private key when the selector containing the corresponding public
key is expected to be revoked or removed before the verifier has key is expected to be revoked or removed before the verifier has
an opportunity to validate the signature. The signer should an opportunity to validate the signature. The signer should
anticipate that verifiers may choose to defer validation, perhaps anticipate that verifiers may choose to defer validation, perhaps
until the message is actually read by the final recipient. In until the message is actually read by the final recipient. In
particular, when rotating to a new key pair, signing should particular, when rotating to a new key pair, signing should
immediately commence with the new private key and the old public immediately commence with the new private key and the old public
key should be retained for a reasonable validation interval before key should be retained for a reasonable validation interval before
being removed from the key server. being removed from the key server.
5.3. Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions 6.3. Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions
Some messages, particularly those using 8-bit characters, are subject Some messages, particularly those using 8-bit characters, are subject
to modification during transit, notably conversion to 7-bit form. to modification during transit, notably conversion to 7-bit form.
Such conversions will break DKIM signatures. In order to minimize Such conversions will break DKIM signatures. In order to minimize
the chances of such breakage, signers SHOULD convert the message to a the chances of such breakage, signers SHOULD convert the message to a
suitable MIME content transfer encoding such as quoted-printable or suitable MIME content transfer encoding such as quoted-printable or
base64 as described in [RFC2045] before signing. Such conversion is base64 as described in [RFC2045] before signing. Such conversion is
outside the scope of DKIM; the actual message SHOULD be converted to outside the scope of DKIM; the actual message SHOULD be converted to
7-bit MIME by an MUA or MSA prior to presentation to the DKIM 7-bit MIME by an MUA or MSA prior to presentation to the DKIM
algorithm. algorithm.
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bare CR or LF characters (used by some systems as a local line bare CR or LF characters (used by some systems as a local line
separator convention) MUST be converted to the SMTP-standard CRLF separator convention) MUST be converted to the SMTP-standard CRLF
sequence before the message is signed. Any conversion of this sort sequence before the message is signed. Any conversion of this sort
SHOULD be applied to the message actually sent to the recipient(s), SHOULD be applied to the message actually sent to the recipient(s),
not just to the version presented to the signing algorithm. not just to the version presented to the signing algorithm.
More generally, the signer MUST sign the message as it is expected to More generally, the signer MUST sign the message as it is expected to
be received by the verifier rather than in some local or internal be received by the verifier rather than in some local or internal
form. form.
5.4. Determine the Header Fields to Sign 6.4. Determine the Header Fields to Sign
The From header field MUST be signed (that is, included in the "h=" The From header field MUST be signed (that is, included in the "h="
tag of the resulting DKIM-Signature header field). Signers SHOULD tag of the resulting DKIM-Signature header field). Signers SHOULD
NOT sign an existing header field likely to be legitimately modified NOT sign an existing header field likely to be legitimately modified
or removed in transit. In particular, [RFC5321] explicitly permits or removed in transit. In particular, [RFC5321] explicitly permits
modification or removal of the Return-Path header field in transit. modification or removal of the Return-Path header field in transit.
Signers MAY include any other header fields present at the time of Signers MAY include any other header fields present at the time of
signing at the discretion of the signer. signing at the discretion of the signer.
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS NOTE: The choice of which header fields to INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS NOTE: The choice of which header fields to
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instances by intermediate MTAs will cause DKIM signatures to be instances by intermediate MTAs will cause DKIM signatures to be
broken; such anti-social behavior should be avoided. broken; such anti-social behavior should be avoided.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER'S NOTE: Although not required by this INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER'S NOTE: Although not required by this
specification, all end-user visible header fields should be signed specification, all end-user visible header fields should be signed
to avoid possible "indirect spamming". For example, if the to avoid possible "indirect spamming". For example, if the
Subject header field is not signed, a spammer can resend a Subject header field is not signed, a spammer can resend a
previously signed mail, replacing the legitimate subject with a previously signed mail, replacing the legitimate subject with a
one-line spam. one-line spam.
5.5. Recommended Signature Content 6.5. Recommended Signature Content
In order to maximize compatibility with a variety of verifiers, it is In order to maximize compatibility with a variety of verifiers, it is
recommended that signers follow the practices outlined in this recommended that signers follow the practices outlined in this
section when signing a message. However, these are generic section when signing a message. However, these are generic
recommendations applying to the general case; specific senders may recommendations applying to the general case; specific senders may
wish to modify these guidelines as required by their unique wish to modify these guidelines as required by their unique
situations. Verifiers MUST be capable of verifying signatures even situations. Verifiers MUST be capable of verifying signatures even
if one or more of the recommended header fields is not signed (with if one or more of the recommended header fields is not signed (with
the exception of From, which must always be signed) or if one or more the exception of From, which must always be signed) or if one or more
of the dis-recommended header fields is signed. Note that verifiers of the dis-recommended header fields is signed. Note that verifiers
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Signers SHOULD NOT use "l=" unless they intend to accommodate Signers SHOULD NOT use "l=" unless they intend to accommodate
intermediate mail processors that append text to a message. For intermediate mail processors that append text to a message. For
example, many mailing list processors append "unsubscribe" example, many mailing list processors append "unsubscribe"
information to message bodies. If signers use "l=", they SHOULD information to message bodies. If signers use "l=", they SHOULD
include the entire message body existing at the time of signing in include the entire message body existing at the time of signing in
computing the count. In particular, signers SHOULD NOT specify a computing the count. In particular, signers SHOULD NOT specify a
body length of 0 since this may be interpreted as a meaningless body length of 0 since this may be interpreted as a meaningless
signature by some verifiers. signature by some verifiers.
5.6. Compute the Message Hash and Signature 6.6. Compute the Message Hash and Signature
The signer MUST compute the message hash as described in Section 3.7 The signer MUST compute the message hash as described in Section 4.7
and then sign it using the selected public-key algorithm. This will and then sign it using the selected public-key algorithm. This will
result in a DKIM-Signature header field that will include the body result in a DKIM-Signature header field that will include the body
hash and a signature of the header hash, where that header includes hash and a signature of the header hash, where that header includes
the DKIM-Signature header field itself. the DKIM-Signature header field itself.
Entities such as mailing list managers that implement DKIM and that Entities such as mailing list managers that implement DKIM and that
modify the message or a header field (for example, inserting modify the message or a header field (for example, inserting
unsubscribe information) before retransmitting the message SHOULD unsubscribe information) before retransmitting the message SHOULD
check any existing signature on input and MUST make such check any existing signature on input and MUST make such
modifications before re-signing the message. modifications before re-signing the message.
The signer MAY elect to limit the number of bytes of the body that The signer MAY elect to limit the number of bytes of the body that
will be included in the hash and hence signed. The length actually will be included in the hash and hence signed. The length actually
hashed should be inserted in the "l=" tag of the DKIM-Signature hashed should be inserted in the "l=" tag of the DKIM-Signature
header field. header field.
5.7. Insert the DKIM-Signature Header Field 6.7. Insert the DKIM-Signature Header Field
Finally, the signer MUST insert the DKIM-Signature header field Finally, the signer MUST insert the DKIM-Signature header field
created in the previous step prior to transmitting the email. The created in the previous step prior to transmitting the email. The
DKIM-Signature header field MUST be the same as used to compute the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be the same as used to compute the
hash as described above, except that the value of the "b=" tag MUST hash as described above, except that the value of the "b=" tag MUST
be the appropriately signed hash computed in the previous step, be the appropriately signed hash computed in the previous step,
signed using the algorithm specified in the "a=" tag of the DKIM- signed using the algorithm specified in the "a=" tag of the DKIM-
Signature header field and using the private key corresponding to the Signature header field and using the private key corresponding to the
selector given in the "s=" tag of the DKIM-Signature header field, as selector given in the "s=" tag of the DKIM-Signature header field, as
chosen above in Section 5.2 chosen above in Section 6.2
The DKIM-Signature header field MUST be inserted before any other The DKIM-Signature header field MUST be inserted before any other
DKIM-Signature fields in the header block. DKIM-Signature fields in the header block.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: The easiest way to achieve this INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: The easiest way to achieve this
is to insert the DKIM-Signature header field at the beginning of is to insert the DKIM-Signature header field at the beginning of
the header block. In particular, it may be placed before any the header block. In particular, it may be placed before any
existing Received header fields. This is consistent with treating existing Received header fields. This is consistent with treating
DKIM-Signature as a trace header field. DKIM-Signature as a trace header field.
6. Verifier Actions 7. Verifier Actions
Since a signer MAY remove or revoke a public key at any time, it is Since a signer MAY remove or revoke a public key at any time, it is
recommended that verification occur in a timely manner. In many recommended that verification occur in a timely manner. In many
configurations, the most timely place is during acceptance by the configurations, the most timely place is during acceptance by the
border MTA or shortly thereafter. In particular, deferring border MTA or shortly thereafter. In particular, deferring
verification until the message is accessed by the end user is verification until the message is accessed by the end user is
discouraged. discouraged.
A border or intermediate MTA MAY verify the message signature(s). An A border or intermediate MTA MAY verify the message signature(s). An
MTA who has performed verification MAY communicate the result of that MTA who has performed verification MAY communicate the result of that
skipping to change at page 46, line 10 skipping to change at page 46, line 38
A verifying MTA MAY implement a policy with respect to unverifiable A verifying MTA MAY implement a policy with respect to unverifiable
mail, regardless of whether or not it applies the verification header mail, regardless of whether or not it applies the verification header
field to signed messages. field to signed messages.
Verifiers MUST produce a result that is semantically equivalent to Verifiers MUST produce a result that is semantically equivalent to
applying the following steps in the order listed. In practice, applying the following steps in the order listed. In practice,
several of these steps can be performed in parallel in order to several of these steps can be performed in parallel in order to
improve performance. improve performance.
6.1. Extract Signatures from the Message 7.1. Extract Signatures from the Message
The order in which verifiers try DKIM-Signature header fields is not The order in which verifiers try DKIM-Signature header fields is not
defined; verifiers MAY try signatures in any order they like. For defined; verifiers MAY try signatures in any order they like. For
example, one implementation might try the signatures in textual example, one implementation might try the signatures in textual
order, whereas another might try signatures by identities that match order, whereas another might try signatures by identities that match
the contents of the From header field before trying other signatures. the contents of the From header field before trying other signatures.
Verifiers MUST NOT attribute ultimate meaning to the order of Verifiers MUST NOT attribute ultimate meaning to the order of
multiple DKIM-Signature header fields. In particular, there is multiple DKIM-Signature header fields. In particular, there is
reason to believe that some relays will reorder the header fields in reason to believe that some relays will reorder the header fields in
potentially arbitrary ways. potentially arbitrary ways.
skipping to change at page 47, line 34 skipping to change at page 48, line 15
the original submitter signature in place even though the exploder the original submitter signature in place even though the exploder
knows that it is modifying the message in some way that will break knows that it is modifying the message in some way that will break
that signature, and the exploder inserts its own signature. In that signature, and the exploder inserts its own signature. In
this case, the message should succeed even in the presence of the this case, the message should succeed even in the presence of the
known-broken signature. known-broken signature.
For each signature to be validated, the following steps should be For each signature to be validated, the following steps should be
performed in such a manner as to produce a result that is performed in such a manner as to produce a result that is
semantically equivalent to performing them in the indicated order. semantically equivalent to performing them in the indicated order.
6.1.1. Validate the Signature Header Field 7.1.1. Validate the Signature Header Field
Implementers MUST meticulously validate the format and values in the Implementers MUST meticulously validate the format and values in the
DKIM-Signature header field; any inconsistency or unexpected values DKIM-Signature header field; any inconsistency or unexpected values
MUST cause the header field to be completely ignored and the verifier MUST cause the header field to be completely ignored and the verifier
to return PERMFAIL (signature syntax error). Being "liberal in what to return PERMFAIL (signature syntax error). Being "liberal in what
you accept" is definitely a bad strategy in this security context. you accept" is definitely a bad strategy in this security context.
Note however that this does not include the existence of unknown tags Note however that this does not include the existence of unknown tags
in a DKIM-Signature header field, which are explicitly permitted. in a DKIM-Signature header field, which are explicitly permitted.
Verifiers MUST ignore DKIM-Signature header fields with a "v=" tag Verifiers MUST ignore DKIM-Signature header fields with a "v=" tag
that is inconsistent with this specification and return PERMFAIL that is inconsistent with this specification and return PERMFAIL
(incompatible version). (incompatible version).
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: An implementation may, of course, INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: An implementation may, of course,
choose to also verify signatures generated by older versions of choose to also verify signatures generated by older versions of
this specification. this specification.
If any tag listed as "required" in Section 3.5 is omitted from the If any tag listed as "required" in Section 4.5 is omitted from the
DKIM-Signature header field, the verifier MUST ignore the DKIM- DKIM-Signature header field, the verifier MUST ignore the DKIM-
Signature header field and return PERMFAIL (signature missing Signature header field and return PERMFAIL (signature missing
required tag). required tag).
INFORMATIONAL NOTE: The tags listed as required in Section 3.5 are INFORMATIONAL NOTE: The tags listed as required in Section 4.5 are
"v=", "a=", "b=", "bh=", "d=", "h=", and "s=". Should there be a "v=", "a=", "b=", "bh=", "d=", "h=", and "s=". Should there be a
conflict between this note and Section 3.5, Section 3.5 is conflict between this note and Section 4.5, Section 4.5 is
normative. normative.
If the DKIM-Signature header field does not contain the "i=" tag, the If the DKIM-Signature header field does not contain the "i=" tag, the
verifier MUST behave as though the value of that tag were "@d", where verifier MUST behave as though the value of that tag were "@d", where
"d" is the value from the "d=" tag. "d" is the value from the "d=" tag.
Verifiers MUST confirm that the domain specified in the "d=" tag is Verifiers MUST confirm that the domain specified in the "d=" tag is
the same as or a parent domain of the domain part of the "i=" tag. the same as or a parent domain of the domain part of the "i=" tag.
If not, the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be ignored and the If not, the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be ignored and the
verifier should return PERMFAIL (domain mismatch). verifier should return PERMFAIL (domain mismatch).
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"com" and "co.uk" may be ignored. The list of unacceptable domains "com" and "co.uk" may be ignored. The list of unacceptable domains
SHOULD be configurable. SHOULD be configurable.
Verifiers MAY ignore the DKIM-Signature header field and return Verifiers MAY ignore the DKIM-Signature header field and return
PERMFAIL (unacceptable signature header) for any other reason, for PERMFAIL (unacceptable signature header) for any other reason, for
example, if the signature does not sign header fields that the example, if the signature does not sign header fields that the
verifier views to be essential. As a case in point, if MIME header verifier views to be essential. As a case in point, if MIME header
fields are not signed, certain attacks may be possible that the fields are not signed, certain attacks may be possible that the
verifier would prefer to avoid. verifier would prefer to avoid.
6.1.2. Get the Public Key 7.1.2. Get the Public Key
The public key for a signature is needed to complete the verification The public key for a signature is needed to complete the verification
process. The process of retrieving the public key depends on the process. The process of retrieving the public key depends on the
query type as defined by the "q=" tag in the DKIM-Signature header query type as defined by the "q=" tag in the DKIM-Signature header
field. Obviously, a public key need only be retrieved if the process field. Obviously, a public key need only be retrieved if the process
of extracting the signature information is completely successful. of extracting the signature information is completely successful.
Details of key management and representation are described in Details of key management and representation are described in
Section 3.6. The verifier MUST validate the key record and MUST Section 4.6. The verifier MUST validate the key record and MUST
ignore any public key records that are malformed. ignore any public key records that are malformed.
NOTE: The use of a wildcard TXT record that covers a queried DKIM NOTE: The use of a wildcard TXT record that covers a queried DKIM
domain name will produce a response to a DKIM query that is domain name will produce a response to a DKIM query that is
unlikely to be valid DKIM key record. This problem is not unlikely to be valid DKIM key record. This problem is not
specific to DKIM and applies to many other types of queries. specific to DKIM and applies to many other types of queries.
Client software that processes DNS responses needs to take this Client software that processes DNS responses needs to take this
problem into account. problem into account.
When validating a message, a verifier MUST perform the following When validating a message, a verifier MUST perform the following
steps in a manner that is semantically the same as performing them in steps in a manner that is semantically the same as performing them in
the order indicated -- in some cases the implementation may the order indicated -- in some cases the implementation may
parallelize or reorder these steps, as long as the semantics remain parallelize or reorder these steps, as long as the semantics remain
unchanged: unchanged:
1. Retrieve the public key as described in Section 3.6 using the 1. Retrieve the public key as described in Section 4.6 using the
algorithm in the "q=" tag, the domain from the "d=" tag, and the algorithm in the "q=" tag, the domain from the "d=" tag, and the
selector from the "s=" tag. selector from the "s=" tag.
2. If the query for the public key fails to respond, the verifier 2. If the query for the public key fails to respond, the verifier
MAY defer acceptance of this email and return TEMPFAIL (key MAY defer acceptance of this email and return TEMPFAIL (key
unavailable). If verification is occurring during the incoming unavailable). If verification is occurring during the incoming
SMTP session, this MAY be achieved with a 451/4.7.5 SMTP reply SMTP session, this MAY be achieved with a 451/4.7.5 SMTP reply
code. Alternatively, the verifier MAY store the message in the code. Alternatively, the verifier MAY store the message in the
local queue for later trial or ignore the signature. Note that local queue for later trial or ignore the signature. Note that
storing a message in the local queue is subject to denial-of- storing a message in the local queue is subject to denial-of-
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been revoked and the verifier MUST treat this as a failed been revoked and the verifier MUST treat this as a failed
signature check and return PERMFAIL (key revoked). There is no signature check and return PERMFAIL (key revoked). There is no
defined semantic difference between a key that has been revoked defined semantic difference between a key that has been revoked
and a key record that has been removed. and a key record that has been removed.
8. If the public key data is not suitable for use with the algorithm 8. If the public key data is not suitable for use with the algorithm
and key types defined by the "a=" and "k=" tags in the DKIM- and key types defined by the "a=" and "k=" tags in the DKIM-
Signature header field, the verifier MUST immediately return Signature header field, the verifier MUST immediately return
PERMFAIL (inappropriate key algorithm). PERMFAIL (inappropriate key algorithm).
6.1.3. Compute the Verification 7.1.3. Compute the Verification
Given a signer and a public key, verifying a signature consists of Given a signer and a public key, verifying a signature consists of
actions semantically equivalent to the following steps. actions semantically equivalent to the following steps.
1. Based on the algorithm defined in the "c=" tag, the body length 1. Based on the algorithm defined in the "c=" tag, the body length
specified in the "l=" tag, and the header field names in the "h=" specified in the "l=" tag, and the header field names in the "h="
tag, prepare a canonicalized version of the message as is tag, prepare a canonicalized version of the message as is
described in Section 3.7 (note that this version does not described in Section 4.7 (note that this version does not
actually need to be instantiated). When matching header field actually need to be instantiated). When matching header field
names in the "h=" tag against the actual message header field, names in the "h=" tag against the actual message header field,
comparisons MUST be case-insensitive. comparisons MUST be case-insensitive.
2. Based on the algorithm indicated in the "a=" tag, compute the 2. Based on the algorithm indicated in the "a=" tag, compute the
message hashes from the canonical copy as described in message hashes from the canonical copy as described in
Section 3.7. Section 4.7.
3. Verify that the hash of the canonicalized message body computed 3. Verify that the hash of the canonicalized message body computed
in the previous step matches the hash value conveyed in the "bh=" in the previous step matches the hash value conveyed in the "bh="
tag. If the hash does not match, the verifier SHOULD ignore the tag. If the hash does not match, the verifier SHOULD ignore the
signature and return PERMFAIL (body hash did not verify). signature and return PERMFAIL (body hash did not verify).
4. Using the signature conveyed in the "b=" tag, verify the 4. Using the signature conveyed in the "b=" tag, verify the
signature against the header hash using the mechanism appropriate signature against the header hash using the mechanism appropriate
for the public key algorithm described in the "a=" tag. If the for the public key algorithm described in the "a=" tag. If the
signature does not validate, the verifier SHOULD ignore the signature does not validate, the verifier SHOULD ignore the
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calculated. Implementations may also verify the signature on the calculated. Implementations may also verify the signature on the
message header before validating that the message hash listed in message header before validating that the message hash listed in
the "bh=" tag in the DKIM-Signature header field matches that of the "bh=" tag in the DKIM-Signature header field matches that of
the actual message body; however, if the body hash does not match, the actual message body; however, if the body hash does not match,
the entire signature must be considered to have failed. the entire signature must be considered to have failed.
A body length specified in the "l=" tag of the signature limits the A body length specified in the "l=" tag of the signature limits the
number of bytes of the body passed to the verification algorithm. number of bytes of the body passed to the verification algorithm.
All data beyond that limit is not validated by DKIM. Hence, All data beyond that limit is not validated by DKIM. Hence,
verifiers might treat a message that contains bytes beyond the verifiers might treat a message that contains bytes beyond the
indicated body length with suspicion, such as by truncating the indicated body length with suspicion, such as by declaring the
message at the indicated body length, declaring the signature invalid signature invalid (e.g., by returning PERMFAIL (unsigned content)),
(e.g., by returning PERMFAIL (unsigned content)), or conveying the or conveying the partial verification to the policy module. {DKIM 2}
partial verification to the policy module.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Verifiers that truncate the body
at the indicated body length might pass on a malformed MIME
message if the signer used the "N-4" trick (omitting the final
"--CRLF") described in the informative note in Section 3.4.5.
Such verifiers may wish to check for this case and include a
trailing "--CRLF" to avoid breaking the MIME structure. A simple
way to achieve this might be to append "--CRLF" to any "multipart"
message with a body length; if the MIME structure is already
correctly formed, this will appear in the postlude and will not be
displayed to the end user.
6.2. Communicate Verification Results 7.2. Communicate Verification Results
Verifiers wishing to communicate the results of verification to other Verifiers wishing to communicate the results of verification to other
parts of the mail system may do so in whatever manner they see fit. parts of the mail system may do so in whatever manner they see fit.
For example, implementations might choose to add an email header For example, implementations might choose to add an email header
field to the message before passing it on. Any such header field field to the message before passing it on. Any such header field
SHOULD be inserted before any existing DKIM-Signature or preexisting SHOULD be inserted before any existing DKIM-Signature or preexisting
authentication status header fields in the header field block. The authentication status header fields in the header field block. The
Authentication-Results: header field ([RFC5451]) MAY be used for this Authentication-Results: header field ([RFC5451]) MAY be used for this
purpose. purpose.
INFORMATIVE ADVICE to MUA filter writers: Patterns intended to INFORMATIVE ADVICE to MUA filter writers: Patterns intended to
search for results header fields to visibly mark authenticated search for results header fields to visibly mark authenticated
mail for end users should verify that such header field was added mail for end users should verify that such header field was added
by the appropriate verifying domain and that the verified identity by the appropriate verifying domain and that the verified identity
matches the author identity that will be displayed by the MUA. In matches the author identity that will be displayed by the MUA. In
particular, MUA filters should not be influenced by bogus results particular, MUA filters should not be influenced by bogus results
header fields added by attackers. To circumvent this attack, header fields added by attackers. To circumvent this attack,
verifiers may wish to delete existing results header fields after verifiers may wish to delete existing results header fields after
verification and before adding a new header field. verification and before adding a new header field.
6.3. Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy 7.3. Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy
It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe what actions It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe what actions
an Identity Assessor can make, but mail carrying a validated SDID an Identity Assessor can make, but mail carrying a validated SDID
presents an opportunity to an Identity Assessor that unauthenticated presents an opportunity to an Identity Assessor that unauthenticated
email does not. Specifically, an authenticated email creates a email does not. Specifically, an authenticated email creates a
predictable identifier by which other decisions can reliably be predictable identifier by which other decisions can reliably be
managed, such as trust and reputation. Conversely, unauthenticated managed, such as trust and reputation. Conversely, unauthenticated
email lacks a reliable identifier that can be used to assign trust email lacks a reliable identifier that can be used to assign trust
and reputation. It is reasonable to treat unauthenticated email as and reputation. It is reasonable to treat unauthenticated email as
lacking any trust and having no positive reputation. lacking any trust and having no positive reputation.
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SMTP reply code. In particular, cryptographic signature verification SMTP reply code. In particular, cryptographic signature verification
failures MUST NOT return 4xx SMTP replies. failures MUST NOT return 4xx SMTP replies.
Once the signature has been verified, that information MUST be Once the signature has been verified, that information MUST be
conveyed to the Identity Assessor (such as an explicit allow/ conveyed to the Identity Assessor (such as an explicit allow/
whitelist and reputation system) and/or to the end user. If the SDID whitelist and reputation system) and/or to the end user. If the SDID
is not the same as the address in the From: header field, the mail is not the same as the address in the From: header field, the mail
system SHOULD take pains to ensure that the actual SDID is clear to system SHOULD take pains to ensure that the actual SDID is clear to
the reader. the reader.
The verifier MAY treat unsigned header fields with extreme
skepticism, including marking them as untrusted or even deleting them
before display to the end user.
While the symptoms of a failed verification are obvious -- the While the symptoms of a failed verification are obvious -- the
signature doesn't verify -- establishing the exact cause can be more signature doesn't verify -- establishing the exact cause can be more
difficult. If a selector cannot be found, is that because the difficult. If a selector cannot be found, is that because the
selector has been removed, or was the value changed somehow in selector has been removed, or was the value changed somehow in
transit? If the signature line is missing, is that because it was transit? If the signature line is missing, is that because it was
never there, or was it removed by an overzealous filter? For never there, or was it removed by an overzealous filter? For
diagnostic purposes, the exact reason why the verification fails diagnostic purposes, the exact reason why the verification fails
SHOULD be made available to the policy module and possibly recorded SHOULD be made available to the policy module and possibly recorded
in the system logs. If the email cannot be verified, then it SHOULD in the system logs. If the email cannot be verified, then it SHOULD
be rendered the same as all unverified email regardless of whether or be treated {DKIM 2} the same as all unverified email regardless of
not it looks like it was signed. whether or not it looks like it was signed.
7. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
DKIM has registered namespaces with IANA. In all cases, new values DKIM has registered namespaces with IANA. In all cases, new values
are assigned only for values that have been documented in a published are assigned only for values that have been documented in a published
RFC that has IETF Consensus [RFC5226]. RFC that has IETF Consensus [RFC5226].
This memo updates these registries as described below. Of note is This memo updates these registries as described below. Of note is
the addition of a new "status" column. All registrations into these the addition of a new "status" column. All registrations into these
namespaces MUST include the name being registered, the document in namespaces MUST include the name being registered, the document in
which it was registered or updated, and an indication of its current which it was registered or updated, and an indication of its current
status which MUST be one of "active" (in current use) or "historic" status which MUST be one of "active" (in current use) or "historic"
(no longer in current use). (no longer in current use).
7.1. DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications 8.1. DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications
A DKIM-Signature provides for a list of tag specifications. IANA has A DKIM-Signature provides for a list of tag specifications. IANA has
established the DKIM-Signature Tag Specification Registry for tag established the DKIM-Signature Tag Specification Registry for tag
specifications that can be used in DKIM-Signature fields. specifications that can be used in DKIM-Signature fields.
The updated entries in the registry comprise: The updated entries in the registry comprise:
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
skipping to change at page 54, line 26 skipping to change at page 54, line 26
| l | (this document) | active | | l | (this document) | active |
| q | (this document) | active | | q | (this document) | active |
| s | (this document) | active | | s | (this document) | active |
| t | (this document) | active | | t | (this document) | active |
| x | (this document) | active | | x | (this document) | active |
| z | (this document) | active | | z | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
Table 1: DKIM-Signature Tag Specification Registry Updated Values Table 1: DKIM-Signature Tag Specification Registry Updated Values
7.2. DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry 8.2. DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry
The "q=" tag-spec (specified in Section 3.5) provides for a list of The "q=" tag-spec (specified in Section 4.5) provides for a list of
query methods. query methods.
IANA has established the DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry for IANA has established the DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry for
mechanisms that can be used to retrieve the key that will permit mechanisms that can be used to retrieve the key that will permit
validation processing of a message signed using DKIM. validation processing of a message signed using DKIM.
The updated entry in the registry comprises: The updated entry in the registry comprises:
+------+--------+-----------------+--------+ +------+--------+-----------------+--------+
| TYPE | OPTION | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | OPTION | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+------+--------+-----------------+--------+ +------+--------+-----------------+--------+
| dns | txt | (this document) | active | | dns | txt | (this document) | active |
+------+--------+-----------------+--------+ +------+--------+-----------------+--------+
DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry Updated Values DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry Updated Values
7.3. DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry 8.3. DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry
The "c=" tag-spec (specified in Section 3.5) provides for a specifier The "c=" tag-spec (specified in Section 4.5) provides for a specifier
for canonicalization algorithms for the header and body of the for canonicalization algorithms for the header and body of the
message. message.
IANA has established the DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Algorithm IANA has established the DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Algorithm
Registry for algorithms for converting a message into a canonical Registry for algorithms for converting a message into a canonical
form before signing or verifying using DKIM. form before signing or verifying using DKIM.
The updated entries in the header registry comprise: The updated entries in the header registry comprise:
+---------+-----------------+--------+ +---------+-----------------+--------+
skipping to change at page 55, line 30 skipping to change at page 55, line 30
+---------+-----------------+--------+ +---------+-----------------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+---------+-----------------+--------+ +---------+-----------------+--------+
| simple | (this document) | active | | simple | (this document) | active |
| relaxed | (this document) | active | | relaxed | (this document) | active |
+---------+-----------------+--------+ +---------+-----------------+--------+
DKIM-Signature Body Canonicalization Algorithm Registry DKIM-Signature Body Canonicalization Algorithm Registry
Updated Values Updated Values
7.4. _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications 8.4. _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications
A _domainkey DNS TXT record provides for a list of tag A _domainkey DNS TXT record provides for a list of tag
specifications. IANA has established the DKIM _domainkey DNS TXT Tag specifications. IANA has established the DKIM _domainkey DNS TXT Tag
Specification Registry for tag specifications that can be used in DNS Specification Registry for tag specifications that can be used in DNS
TXT Records. TXT Records.
The updated entries in the registry comprise: The updated entries in the registry comprise:
+------+-----------------+----------+ +------+-----------------+----------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
skipping to change at page 56, line 8 skipping to change at page 56, line 8
| k | (this document) | active | | k | (this document) | active |
| n | (this document) | active | | n | (this document) | active |
| p | (this document) | active | | p | (this document) | active |
| s | (this document) | active | | s | (this document) | active |
| t | (this document) | active | | t | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+----------+ +------+-----------------+----------+
DKIM _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specification Registry DKIM _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specification Registry
Updated Values Updated Values
7.5. DKIM Key Type Registry 8.5. DKIM Key Type Registry
The "k=" <key-k-tag> (specified in Section 3.6.1) and the "a=" <sig- The "k=" <key-k-tag> (specified in Section 4.6.1) and the "a=" <sig-
a-tag-k> (specified in Section 3.5) tags provide for a list of a-tag-k> (specified in Section 4.5) tags provide for a list of
mechanisms that can be used to decode a DKIM signature. mechanisms that can be used to decode a DKIM signature.
IANA has established the DKIM Key Type Registry for such mechanisms. IANA has established the DKIM Key Type Registry for such mechanisms.
The updated entry in the registry comprises: The updated entry in the registry comprises:
+------+-----------+--------+ +------+-----------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+------+-----------+--------+ +------+-----------+--------+
| rsa | [RFC3447] | active | | rsa | [RFC3447] | active |
+------+-----------+--------+ +------+-----------+--------+
DKIM Key Type Updated Values DKIM Key Type Updated Values
7.6. DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry 8.6. DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry
The "h=" <key-h-tag> (specified in Section 3.6.1) and the "a=" <sig- The "h=" <key-h-tag> (specified in Section 4.6.1) and the "a=" <sig-
a-tag-h> (specified in Section 3.5) tags provide for a list of a-tag-h> (specified in Section 4.5) tags provide for a list of
mechanisms that can be used to produce a digest of message data. mechanisms that can be used to produce a digest of message data.
IANA has established the DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry for such IANA has established the DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry for such
mechanisms. mechanisms.
The updated entries in the registry comprise: The updated entries in the registry comprise:
+--------+-------------------+--------+ +--------+-------------------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+--------+-------------------+--------+ +--------+-------------------+--------+
| sha1 | [FIPS-180-2-2002] | active | | sha1 | [FIPS-180-2-2002] | active |
| sha256 | [FIPS-180-2-2002] | active | | sha256 | [FIPS-180-2-2002] | active |
+--------+-------------------+--------+ +--------+-------------------+--------+
DKIM Hash Algorithms Updated Values DKIM Hash Algorithms Updated Values
7.7. DKIM Service Types Registry 8.7. DKIM Service Types Registry
The "s=" <key-s-tag> tag (specified in Section 3.6.1) provides for a The "s=" <key-s-tag> tag (specified in Section 4.6.1) provides for a
list of service types to which this selector may apply. list of service types to which this selector may apply.
IANA has established the DKIM Service Types Registry for service IANA has established the DKIM Service Types Registry for service
types. types.
The updated entries in the registry comprise: The updated entries in the registry comprise:
+-------+-----------------+--------+ +-------+-----------------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+-------+-----------------+--------+ +-------+-----------------+--------+
| email | (this document) | active | | email | (this document) | active |
| * | (this document) | active | | * | (this document) | active |
+-------+-----------------+--------+ +-------+-----------------+--------+
DKIM Service Types Registry Updated Values DKIM Service Types Registry Updated Values
7.8. DKIM Selector Flags Registry 8.8. DKIM Selector Flags Registry
The "t=" <key-t-tag> tag (specified in Section 3.6.1) provides for a The "t=" <key-t-tag> tag (specified in Section 4.6.1) provides for a
list of flags to modify interpretation of the selector. list of flags to modify interpretation of the selector.
IANA has established the DKIM Selector Flags Registry for additional IANA has established the DKIM Selector Flags Registry for additional
flags. flags.
The updated entries in the registry comprise: The updated entries in the registry comprise:
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS | | TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
| y | (this document) | active | | y | (this document) | active |
| s | (this document) | active | | s | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+--------+ +------+-----------------+--------+
DKIM Selector Flags Registry Updated Values DKIM Selector Flags Registry Updated Values
7.9. DKIM-Signature Header Field 8.9. DKIM-Signature Header Field
IANA has added DKIM-Signature to the "Permanent Message Header IANA has added DKIM-Signature to the "Permanent Message Header
Fields" registry (see [RFC3864]) for the "mail" protocol, using this Fields" registry (see [RFC3864]) for the "mail" protocol, using this
document as the reference. document as the reference.
8. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
It has been observed that any mechanism that is introduced that It has been observed that any mechanism that is introduced that
attempts to stem the flow of spam is subject to intensive attack. attempts to stem the flow of spam is subject to intensive attack.
DKIM needs to be carefully scrutinized to identify potential attack DKIM needs to be carefully scrutinized to identify potential attack
vectors and the vulnerability to each. See also [RFC4686]. vectors and the vulnerability to each. See also [RFC4686].
8.1. Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag) 9.1. Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag)
Body length limits (in the form of the "l=" tag) are subject to Body length limits (in the form of the "l=" tag) are subject to
several potential attacks. several potential attacks.
8.1.1. Addition of New MIME Parts to Multipart/* 9.1.1. Addition of New MIME Parts to Multipart/*
If the body length limit does not cover a closing MIME multipart If the body length limit does not cover a closing MIME multipart
section (including the trailing "--CRLF" portion), then it is section (including the trailing "--CRLF" portion), then it is
possible for an attacker to intercept a properly signed multipart possible for an attacker to intercept a properly signed multipart
message and add a new body part. Depending on the details of the message and add a new body part. Depending on the details of the
MIME type and the implementation of the verifying MTA and the MIME type and the implementation of the verifying MTA and the
receiving MUA, this could allow an attacker to change the information receiving MUA, this could allow an attacker to change the information
displayed to an end user from an apparently trusted source. displayed to an end user from an apparently trusted source.
For example, if attackers can append information to a "text/html" For example, if attackers can append information to a "text/html"
body part, they may be able to exploit a bug in some MUAs that body part, they may be able to exploit a bug in some MUAs that
continue to read after a "</html>" marker, and thus display HTML text continue to read after a "</html>" marker, and thus display HTML text
on top of already displayed text. If a message has a "multipart/ on top of already displayed text. If a message has a "multipart/
alternative" body part, they might be able to add a new body part alternative" body part, they might be able to add a new body part
that is preferred by the displaying MUA. that is preferred by the displaying MUA.
8.1.2. Addition of new HTML content to existing content 9.1.2. Addition of new HTML content to existing content
Several receiving MUA implementations do not cease display after a Several receiving MUA implementations do not cease display after a
""</html>"" tag. In particular, this allows attacks involving ""</html>"" tag. In particular, this allows attacks involving
overlaying images on top of existing text. overlaying images on top of existing text.
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: Appending the following text to an existing, INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: Appending the following text to an existing,
properly closed message will in many MUAs result in inappropriate properly closed message will in many MUAs result in inappropriate
data being rendered on top of existing, correct data: data being rendered on top of existing, correct data:
<div style="position: relative; bottom: 350px; z-index: 2;"> <div style="position:relative; bottom:350px; z-index:2;">
<img src="http://www.ietf.org/images/ietflogo2e.gif" width=578 height=370> </div> <img src="http://www.ietf.org/images/ietflogo2e.gif"
width=578 height=370> </div>
8.2. Misappropriated Private Key 9.2. Misappropriated Private Key
If the private key for a user is resident on their computer and is If the private key for a user is resident on their computer and is
not protected by an appropriately secure mechanism, it is possible not protected by an appropriately secure mechanism, it is possible
for malware to send mail as that user and any other user sharing the for malware to send mail as that user and any other user sharing the
same private key. The malware would not, however, be able to same private key. The malware would not, however, be able to
generate signed spoofs of other signers' addresses, which would aid generate signed spoofs of other signers' addresses, which would aid
in identification of the infected user and would limit the in identification of the infected user and would limit the
possibilities for certain types of attacks involving socially possibilities for certain types of attacks involving socially
engineered messages. This threat applies mainly to MUA-based engineered messages. This threat applies mainly to MUA-based
implementations; protection of private keys on servers can be easily implementations; protection of private keys on servers can be easily
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A somewhat more effective countermeasure is to send messages through A somewhat more effective countermeasure is to send messages through
an outgoing MTA that can authenticate the submitter using existing an outgoing MTA that can authenticate the submitter using existing
techniques (e.g., SMTP Authentication), possibly validate the message techniques (e.g., SMTP Authentication), possibly validate the message
itself (e.g., verify that the header is legitimate and that the itself (e.g., verify that the header is legitimate and that the
content passes a spam content check), and sign the message using a content passes a spam content check), and sign the message using a
key appropriate for the submitter address. Such an MTA can also key appropriate for the submitter address. Such an MTA can also
apply controls on the volume of outgoing mail each user is permitted apply controls on the volume of outgoing mail each user is permitted
to originate in order to further limit the ability of malware to to originate in order to further limit the ability of malware to
generate bulk email. generate bulk email.
8.3. Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks 9.3. Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks
Since the key servers are distributed (potentially separate for each Since the key servers are distributed (potentially separate for each
domain), the number of servers that would need to be attacked to domain), the number of servers that would need to be attacked to
defeat this mechanism on an Internet-wide basis is very large. defeat this mechanism on an Internet-wide basis is very large.
Nevertheless, key servers for individual domains could be attacked, Nevertheless, key servers for individual domains could be attacked,
impeding the verification of messages from that domain. This is not impeding the verification of messages from that domain. This is not
significantly different from the ability of an attacker to deny significantly different from the ability of an attacker to deny
service to the mail exchangers for a given domain, although it service to the mail exchangers for a given domain, although it
affects outgoing, not incoming, mail. affects outgoing, not incoming, mail.
A variation on this attack is that if a very large amount of mail A variation on this attack is that if a very large amount of mail
were to be sent using spoofed addresses from a given domain, the key were to be sent using spoofed addresses from a given domain, the key
servers for that domain could be overwhelmed with requests. However, servers for that domain could be overwhelmed with requests. However,
given the low overhead of verification compared with handling of the given the low overhead of verification compared with handling of the
email message itself, such an attack would be difficult to mount. email message itself, such an attack would be difficult to mount.
8.4. Attacks Against the DNS 9.4. Attacks Against the DNS
Since the DNS is a required binding for key services, specific Since the DNS is a required binding for key services, specific
attacks against the DNS must be considered. attacks against the DNS must be considered.
While the DNS is currently insecure [RFC3833], these security While the DNS is currently insecure [RFC3833], these security
problems are the motivation behind DNS Security (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], problems are the motivation behind DNS Security (DNSSEC) [RFC4033],
and all users of the DNS will reap the benefit of that work. and all users of the DNS will reap the benefit of that work.
DKIM is only intended as a "sufficient" method of proving DKIM is only intended as a "sufficient" method of proving
authenticity. It is not intended to provide strong cryptographic authenticity. It is not intended to provide strong cryptographic
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A specific DNS security issue that should be considered by DKIM A specific DNS security issue that should be considered by DKIM
verifiers is the name chaining attack described in Section 2.3 of verifiers is the name chaining attack described in Section 2.3 of
[RFC3833]. A DKIM verifier, while verifying a DKIM-Signature header [RFC3833]. A DKIM verifier, while verifying a DKIM-Signature header
field, could be prompted to retrieve a key record of an attacker's field, could be prompted to retrieve a key record of an attacker's
choosing. This threat can be minimized by ensuring that name choosing. This threat can be minimized by ensuring that name
servers, including recursive name servers, used by the verifier servers, including recursive name servers, used by the verifier
enforce strict checking of "glue" and other additional information in enforce strict checking of "glue" and other additional information in
DNS responses and are therefore not vulnerable to this attack. DNS responses and are therefore not vulnerable to this attack.
8.5. Replay Attacks 9.5. Replay Attacks
In this attack, a spammer sends a message to be spammed to an In this attack, a spammer sends a message to be spammed to an
accomplice, which results in the message being signed by the accomplice, which results in the message being signed by the
originating MTA. The accomplice resends the message, including the originating MTA. The accomplice resends the message, including the
original signature, to a large number of recipients, possibly by original signature, to a large number of recipients, possibly by
sending the message to many compromised machines that act as MTAs. sending the message to many compromised machines that act as MTAs.
The messages, not having been modified by the accomplice, have valid The messages, not having been modified by the accomplice, have valid
signatures. signatures.
Partial solutions to this problem involve the use of reputation Partial solutions to this problem involve the use of reputation
skipping to change at page 61, line 5 skipping to change at page 61, line 5
spam. This requires a real-time detection mechanism in order to spam. This requires a real-time detection mechanism in order to
react quickly enough. However, such measures might be prone to react quickly enough. However, such measures might be prone to
abuse, if for example an attacker resent a large number of messages abuse, if for example an attacker resent a large number of messages
received from a victim in order to make them appear to be a spammer. received from a victim in order to make them appear to be a spammer.
Large verifiers might be able to detect unusually large volumes of Large verifiers might be able to detect unusually large volumes of
mails with the same signature in a short time period. Smaller mails with the same signature in a short time period. Smaller
verifiers can get substantially the same volume of information via verifiers can get substantially the same volume of information via
existing collaborative systems. existing collaborative systems.
8.6. Limits on Revoking Keys 9.6. Limits on Revoking Keys
When a large domain detects undesirable behavior on the part of one When a large domain detects undesirable behavior on the part of one
of its users, it might wish to revoke the key used to sign that of its users, it might wish to revoke the key used to sign that
user's messages in order to disavow responsibility for messages that user's messages in order to disavow responsibility for messages that
have not yet been verified or that are the subject of a replay have not yet been verified or that are the subject of a replay
attack. However, the ability of the domain to do so can be limited attack. However, the ability of the domain to do so can be limited
if the same key, for scalability reasons, is used to sign messages if the same key, for scalability reasons, is used to sign messages
for many other users. Mechanisms for explicitly revoking keys on a for many other users. Mechanisms for explicitly revoking keys on a
per-address basis have been proposed but require further study as to per-address basis have been proposed but require further study as to
their utility and the DNS load they represent. their utility and the DNS load they represent.
8.7. Intentionally Malformed Key Records 9.7. Intentionally Malformed Key Records
It is possible for an attacker to publish key records in DNS that are It is possible for an attacker to publish key records in DNS that are
intentionally malformed, with the intent of causing a denial-of- intentionally malformed, with the intent of causing a denial-of-
service attack on a non-robust verifier implementation. The attacker service attack on a non-robust verifier implementation. The attacker
could then cause a verifier to read the malformed key record by could then cause a verifier to read the malformed key record by
sending a message to one of its users referencing the malformed sending a message to one of its users referencing the malformed
record in a (not necessarily valid) signature. Verifiers MUST record in a (not necessarily valid) signature. Verifiers MUST
thoroughly verify all key records retrieved from the DNS and be thoroughly verify all key records retrieved from the DNS and be
robust against intentionally as well as unintentionally malformed key robust against intentionally as well as unintentionally malformed key
records. records.
8.8. Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature Header Fields 9.8. Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature Header Fields
Verifiers MUST be prepared to receive messages with malformed DKIM- Verifiers MUST be prepared to receive messages with malformed DKIM-
Signature header fields, and thoroughly verify the header field Signature header fields, and thoroughly verify the header field
before depending on any of its contents. before depending on any of its contents.
8.9. Information Leakage 9.9. Information Leakage
An attacker could determine when a particular signature was verified An attacker could determine when a particular signature was verified
by using a per-message selector and then monitoring their DNS traffic by using a per-message selector and then monitoring their DNS traffic
for the key lookup. This would act as the equivalent of a "web bug" for the key lookup. This would act as the equivalent of a "web bug"
for verification time rather than when the message was read. for verification time rather than when the message was read.
8.10. Remote Timing Attacks 9.10. Remote Timing Attacks
In some cases it may be possible to extract private keys using a In some cases it may be possible to extract private keys using a
remote timing attack [BONEH03]. Implementations should consider remote timing attack [BONEH03]. Implementations should consider
obfuscating the timing to prevent such attacks. obfuscating the timing to prevent such attacks.
8.11. Reordered Header Fields 9.11. Reordered Header Fields
Existing standards allow intermediate MTAs to reorder header fields. Existing standards allow intermediate MTAs to reorder header fields.
If a signer signs two or more header fields of the same name, this If a signer signs two or more header fields of the same name, this
can cause spurious verification errors on otherwise legitimate can cause spurious verification errors on otherwise legitimate
messages. In particular, signers that sign any existing DKIM- messages. In particular, signers that sign any existing DKIM-
Signature fields run the risk of having messages incorrectly fail to Signature fields run the risk of having messages incorrectly fail to
verify. verify.
8.12. RSA Attacks 9.12. RSA Attacks
An attacker could create a large RSA signing key with a small An attacker could create a large RSA signing key with a small
exponent, thus requiring that the verification key have a large exponent, thus requiring that the verification key have a large
exponent. This will force verifiers to use considerable computing exponent. This will force verifiers to use considerable computing
resources to verify the signature. Verifiers might avoid this attack resources to verify the signature. Verifiers might avoid this attack
by refusing to verify signatures that reference selectors with public by refusing to verify signatures that reference selectors with public
keys having unreasonable exponents. keys having unreasonable exponents.
In general, an attacker might try to overwhelm a verifier by flooding In general, an attacker might try to overwhelm a verifier by flooding
it with messages requiring verification. This is similar to other it with messages requiring verification. This is similar to other
MTA denial-of-service attacks and should be dealt with in a similar MTA denial-of-service attacks and should be dealt with in a similar
fashion. fashion.
8.13. Inappropriate Signing by Parent Domains 9.13. Inappropriate Signing by Parent Domains
The trust relationship described in Section 3.9 could conceivably be The trust relationship described in Section 4.9 could conceivably be
used by a parent domain to sign messages with identities in a used by a parent domain to sign messages with identities in a
subdomain not administratively related to the parent. For example, subdomain not administratively related to the parent. For example,
the ".com" registry could create messages with signatures using an the ".com" registry could create messages with signatures using an
"i=" value in the example.com domain. There is no general solution "i=" value in the example.com domain. There is no general solution
to this problem, since the administrative cut could occur anywhere in to this problem, since the administrative cut could occur anywhere in
the domain name. For example, in the domain "example.podunk.ca.us" the domain name. For example, in the domain "example.podunk.ca.us"
there are three administrative cuts (podunk.ca.us, ca.us, and us), there are three administrative cuts (podunk.ca.us, ca.us, and us),
any of which could create messages with an identity in the full any of which could create messages with an identity in the full
domain. domain.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: This is considered an acceptable risk for the INFORMATIVE NOTE: This is considered an acceptable risk for the
same reason that it is acceptable for domain delegation. For same reason that it is acceptable for domain delegation. For
example, in the example above any of the domains could potentially example, in the example above any of the domains could potentially
simply delegate "example.podunk.ca.us" to a server of their choice simply delegate "example.podunk.ca.us" to a server of their choice
and completely replace all DNS-served information. Note that a and completely replace all DNS-served information. Note that a
verifier MAY ignore signatures that come from an unlikely domain verifier MAY ignore signatures that come from an unlikely domain
such as ".com", as discussed in Section 6.1.1. such as ".com", as discussed in Section 7.1.1.
8.14. Attacks Involving Addition of Header Fields 9.14. Attacks Involving Addition of Header Fields
Many email implementations do not enforce [RFC5322] with strictness. Many email implementations do not enforce [RFC5322] with strictness.
As discussed in Section 5.3 DKIM processing is predicated on a valid As discussed in Section 6.3 DKIM processing is predicated on a valid
mail message as its input. However, DKIM implementers should be mail message as its input. However, DKIM implementers should be
aware of the potential effect of having loose enforcement by email aware of the potential effect of having loose enforcement by email
components interacting with DKIM modules. components interacting with DKIM modules.
For example, a message with multiple From: header fields violates For example, a message with multiple From: header fields violates
Section 3.6 of [RFC5322]. With the intent of providing a better user Section 3.6 of [RFC5322]. With the intent of providing a better user
experience, many agents tolerate these violations and deliver the experience, many agents tolerate these violations and deliver the
message anyway. An MUA then might elect to render to the user the message anyway. An MUA then might elect to render to the user the
value of the last, or "top", From: field. This may also be done value of the last, or "top", From: field. This may also be done
simply out of the expectation that there is only one, where a "find simply out of the expectation that there is only one, where a "find
skipping to change at page 63, line 34 skipping to change at page 63, line 34
canonicalized for input to the hash function, the extra field canonicalized for input to the hash function, the extra field
references will prevent instances of the cited fields from being references will prevent instances of the cited fields from being
added after signing, as doing so would render the signature invalid. added after signing, as doing so would render the signature invalid.
The From: field is used above to illustrate this issue, but it is The From: field is used above to illustrate this issue, but it is
only one of several fields that Section 3.6 of [RFC5322] constrains only one of several fields that Section 3.6 of [RFC5322] constrains
in this way. In reality any agent that forgives malformations, or is in this way. In reality any agent that forgives malformations, or is
careless about identifying which parts of a message were careless about identifying which parts of a message were
authenticated, is open to exploitation. authenticated, is open to exploitation.
8.15. Malformed Inputs 9.15. Malformed Inputs
DKIM allows additional header fields to be added to a signed message DKIM allows additional header fields to be added to a signed message
without breaking the signature. This tolerance can be abused, for without breaking the signature. This tolerance can be abused, for
example in a replay attack. The attack is accomplished by creating example in a replay attack. The attack is accomplished by creating
additional instances of header fields to an already signed message, additional instances of header fields to an already signed message,
without breaking the signature. These then might be displayed to the without breaking the signature. These then might be displayed to the
end user or are used as filtering input. Salient fields could end user or are used as filtering input. Salient fields could
include From: and Subject:, include From: and Subject:,
The resulting message violates section 3.6 of [RFC5322]. The way The resulting message violates section 3.6 of [RFC5322]. The way
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receiver filtering of invalid messages can ensure that adding receiver filtering of invalid messages can ensure that adding
additional header fields will break the DKIM signature by including additional header fields will break the DKIM signature by including
two copies of the header fields about which they are concerned in the two copies of the header fields about which they are concerned in the
signature (e.g. "h= ... from:from:to:to:subject:subject ..."). See signature (e.g. "h= ... from:from:to:to:subject:subject ..."). See
Sections 3.5 and 5.4 for further discussion of this mechanism. Sections 3.5 and 5.4 for further discussion of this mechanism.
Specific validity rules for all known header fields can be gleaned Specific validity rules for all known header fields can be gleaned
from the IANA "Permanent Header Field Registry" and the reference from the IANA "Permanent Header Field Registry" and the reference
documents it identifies. documents it identifies.
9. References 10. References
9.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[FIPS-180-2-2002] [FIPS-180-2-2002]
U.S. Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS U.S. Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS
PUB 180-2, August 2002. PUB 180-2, August 2002.
[ITU-X660-1997] [ITU-X660-1997]
"Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", 1997. (DER)", 1997.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES",
RFC 1034, November 1987. RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996. Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[RFC2047] Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
Part Three: Message Header Extensions for Non-ASCII Text",
RFC 2047, November 1996.
[RFC2049] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2049] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Five: Conformance Criteria and Extensions (MIME) Part Five: Conformance Criteria and
Examples", RFC 2049, November 1996. Examples", RFC 2049, November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, January 2008. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008. October 2008.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, [RFC5322] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008. October 2008.
[RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598, [RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009. July 2009.
9.2. Informative References [RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalizing Domain Names in
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, August 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[BONEH03] "Remote Timing Attacks are Practical", Proceedings 12th [BONEH03] "Remote Timing Attacks are Practical", Proceedings 12th
USENIX Security Symposium, 2003. USENIX Security Symposium, 2003.
[RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed, [RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,
"Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and "Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, October 1995. Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, October 1995.
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For [RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
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