DNS Extensions Working Group                                     S. Rose
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Updates: 2536, 2539, 3110, 4034, 4398,                    April 19,                     June 12, 2012
5155, 5702, 5933 (if approved)
Intended status: BCP
Expires: October 21, December 14, 2012

    Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY Algorithm
                         Implementation Status
              draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-imp-status-02
              draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-imp-status-03

Abstract

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) requires the use of
   cryptographic algorithm suites for generating digital signatures over
   DNS data.  There is currently an IANA registry for these algorithms
   that is incomplete in that it lacks the recommended implementation status of each algorithm.
   This document provides an applicability statement on algorithm
   implementation status for DNSSEC component software.  This document
   lists each algorithm's status based on the current reference.  In the
   case that an algorithm is specified without an implementation status,
   this document assigns one.  This document updates RFCs 2536, 2539,
   3110, 4034, 4398, 5155, 5702, and 5933.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, December 14, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   2.  The DNS Security Algorithm Implementation Status Lists  . . . . 3
     2.1.  Algorithm Implementation Status Assignement Rationale . . . 3
     2.2.  DNSSEC Implementation Status Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     2.3.  Specifying New Algorithms and Updating Status of
           Existing Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC4509], [RFC5155], and [RFC5702] uses
   digital signatures over DNS data to provide source authentication and
   integrity protection.  DNSSEC uses an IANA registry to list codes for
   digital signature algorithms (consisting of a cryptographic algorithm
   and one-way hash function).

   The original list of algorithm status is found in [RFC4034].  Other
   DNSSEC RFC's have added new algorithms or changed the status of
   algorithms in the registry.  However, implementers must read through
   all the documents in order to discover which algorithms are
   considered wise to implement, which are not, and which algorithms may
   become widely used in the future.  This document includes the current
   implementation status for certain algorithms.

   This implementation status indication is only to be considered for
   implementation, not deployment or operations.  Operators are free to
   deploy any digital signature algorithm available in implementations
   or algorithms chosen by local security policies.  This status is to
   measure compliance to this document only.

   This document updates the following: [RFC2536], [RFC2539], [RFC3110],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4398], [RFC5155], [RFC5702], and [RFC5933].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  The DNS Security Algorithm Implementation Status Lists

2.1.  Algorithm Implementation Status Assignement Rationale

   The status of RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 is set to RECOMMENDED TO IMPLEMENT
   as major many deployments (such as the root zone) use NSEC3 [ROOTDPS]. NSEC3.  The status of RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 RSA/
   SHA-512 are also set to RECOMMENDED TO IMPLEMENT as it major deployments
   (such as the root zone) use these algorithms [ROOTDPS].  It is
   believed that these RSA/SHA-256 or RSA/SHA-512 algorithms will replace
   older algorithms (e.g.  RSA/SHA-1) that have a perceived weakness or
   these recommended algorithms are seen in major deployments.

   Likewise, ECDSA with the two identified curves (ECDSAP256SHA256 and
   ECDSAP384SHA384) are algorithms that may see widespread use due to
   the precieved similar level of security offered with smaller key size
   compared to the key sizes of algorithms such as RSA.

   All other algorithms used in DNSSEC specified without an
   implementation status are currently set to OPTIONAL.

2.2.  DNSSEC Implementation Status Table

   The DNSSEC algorithm implementation status table is listed below.
   Only the algorithms already specified for use with DNSSEC (at the
   time of writing) are listed.

    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+
    |    MUST    |  MUST NOT  |    RECOMMENDED    |      OPTIONAL     |
    |  IMPLEMENT | IMPLEMENT  |   TO IMPLEMENT    |                   |
    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+
    |            |            |                   |                   |
    |   RSASHA1  |   RSAMD5   |   RSASHA256       |   DSASHA1         |
    |            |            |   RSASHA1-NSEC3   |   DH              |
    |            |            |    -SHA1          |   DSA-NSEC3-SHA1  |
    |            |            |   RSASHA512       |   GOST-ECC        |
    |            |            |   ECDSAP256SHA256 |                   |
    |            |            |   ECDSAP384SHA384 |                   |
    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+

   This table does not list the Reserved values in the IANA registry
   table or the values for INDIRECT (252), PRIVATE (253) and PRIVATEOID
   (254).  These values may relate to more than one algorithm and are
   therefore up to the implementer's discretion.  Their implementation
   (or lack thereof) therefore cannot be included when judging
   compliance to this document.

2.3.  Specifying New Algorithms and Updating Status of Existing Entries

   [RFC6014] establishes a parallel procedure for adding a registry
   entry for a new algorithm other than a standards track document.
   Algorithms entered into the registry using that procedure are to be
   considered OPTIONAL for implementation purposes.  Specifications that
   follow this path do not need to obsolete or update this document.

   Adding a newly specified algorithm to the registry with an
   implementation status other than OPTIONAL SHALL entail making this
   document obsolete and replacing the table in Section 2.2 (with the
   new algorithm entry).  Altering the status value of any existing
   algorithm in the registry SHALL entail making this document obsolete
   and replacing the table in Section 2.2 above.

   This document cannot be updated, only made obsolete and replaced by a
   successor document.

3.  IANA Considerations

   This document lists the implementation status of cryptographic
   algorithms used with DNSSEC.  These algorithms are maintained in an
   IANA registry. registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers.
   There are no changes to the registry in this document.  However this
   document asks to be listed as a reference for the entire registry.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document lists, and in some cases assigns, the implementation
   status of cryptographic algorithms used with DNSSEC.  It is not meant
   to be a discussion on algorithm superiority.  No new security
   considerations are raised in this document.

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2536]  Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
              (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.

   [RFC2539]  Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
              Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.

   [RFC3110]  Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
              Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4398]  Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
              System (DNS)", RFC 4398, March 2006.

   [RFC4509]  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

   [RFC5702]  Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
              and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
              October 2009.

   [RFC5933]  Dolmatov, V., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of GOST
              Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
              for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, July 2010.

   [RFC6014]  Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier
              Allocation for DNSSEC", RFC 6014, November 2010.

5.2.  Informative References

   [ROOTDPS]  Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter,
              "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK
              Operator", DNS ROOTDPS, May 2010, <http://
              www.root-dnssec.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/
              icann-dps-00.txt>.

Author's Address

   Scott Rose
   NIST
   100 Bureau Dr.
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   USA

   Phone: +1-301-975-8439
   EMail: scottr.nist@gmail.com