draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-05.txt		draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06.txt
	DNS Extensions Working Group S. Crocker		DNS Extensions Working Group S. Crocker
	Internet-Draft Shinkuro Inc.		Internet-Draft Shinkuro Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Rose		Intended status: Standards Track S. Rose
	Expires: September 27, 2012 NIST		Expires: November 2, 2012 NIST
	March 26, 2012		May 1, 2012
	Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC		Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
	draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-05		draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin		The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
	authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital		authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
	signatures. These digital signatures can be generated using		signatures. These digital signatures can be generated using
	different algorithms. This draft sets out to specify a way for		different algorithms. This draft sets out to specify a way for
	validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which		validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
	cryptographic algorithms and hash algorithms they support.		cryptographic algorithms and hash algorithms they support.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 42		skipping to change at page 1, line 42
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2012.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2012.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 22		skipping to change at page 2, line 22
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash		2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash
	Understood (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS . . 3		Understood (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS . . 3
	3. Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2. Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1.1. Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.3. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1.2. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4. Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2. Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4. Intermediate System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Intermediate System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. Traffic Analysis Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. Traffic Analysis Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	skipping to change at page 3, line 14		skipping to change at page 3, line 14
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and		The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
	[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and		[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
	integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. Each		integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. Each
	digital signature RR (RRSIG) contains an algorithm code number.		digital signature RR (RRSIG) contains an algorithm code number.
	These algorithm codes tells validators which cryptographic algorithm		These algorithm codes tells validators which cryptographic algorithm
	was used to generate the digital signature.		was used to generate the digital signature.
	Likewise, Delegated Signer (DS) RR's and NSEC3 RR's use a hashed		Likewise, Delegation Signer (DS) RR's and NSEC3 RR's use a hashed
	value as part of their RDATA and like digital signature algorithms,		value as part of their RDATA and, like digital signature algorithms,
	these hash algorithms have code numbers. All three algorithm codes		these hash algorithms have code numbers. All three algorithm codes
	(RRSIG/DNSKEY, DS and NSEC3) are maintained in unique IANA		(RRSIG/DNSKEY, DS and NSEC3) are maintained in unique IANA
	registries.		registries.
	This draft sets out to specify a way for validating end-system		This draft sets out to specify a way for validating end-system
	resolvers to tell a server which cryptographic and/or hash algorithms		resolvers to tell a server in a DNS query which digital signature
	they support in a DNS query. This is done using the EDNS attribute		and/or hash algorithms they support. This is done using the new EDNS
	values in the OPT meta-RR [RFC2671].		options specified below in Section 2 for use in the OPT meta-RR
			[I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0].
	These proposed EDNS options serve to measure the acceptance and use		These proposed EDNS options serve to measure the acceptance and use
	of new digital signing algorithms. These signaling options can be		of new digital signing algorithms. These signaling options can be
	used by zone administrators as a gauge to measure the successful		used by zone administrators as a gauge to measure the successful
	deployment of code that implements a newly deployed digital signature		deployment of code that implements a newly deployed digital signature
	and hash algorithm, DS hash and NSEC3 hash algorithm used with		algorithm, DS hash and NSEC3 hash algorithm used with DNSSEC. A zone
	DNSSEC. A zone administrator may be able to determine when to stop		administrator may be able to determine when to stop signing with a
	signing with the old algorithm(s) when the server sees that a		superseded algorithm when the server sees that a significant number
	significant number of its clients signal that they are able to accept		of its clients signal that they are able to accept the new algorithm.
	the new algorithm. Note that this survey may be conducted over the		Note that this survey may be conducted over the period of years
	period of years before a tipping point is seen.		before a tipping point is seen.
	This draft does not seek to introduce another process for including		This draft does not seek to introduce another process for including
	new algorithms for use with DNSSEC. It also does not address the		new algorithms for use with DNSSEC. It also does not address the
	question of which algorithms are to be included in any official list		question of which algorithms are to be included in any official list
	of mandatory or recommended cryptographic algorithms for use with		of mandatory or recommended cryptographic algorithms for use with
	DNSSEC. Rather, this document specifies a means by which a client		DNSSEC. Rather, this document specifies a means by which a client
	query can signal a set of algorithms and hashes it implements.		query can signal a set of algorithms and hashes it implements.
	2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash Understood		2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash Understood
	(DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS		(DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS
	The ENDS0 specification outlined in [RFC2671] defines a way to		The ENDS0 specification outlined in
	include new options using a standardized mechanism. These options		[I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0] defines a way to include new
	are contained in the RDATA of the OPT meta-RR. This document defines		options using a standardized mechanism. These options are contained
	three new EDNS0 options for a client to signal which digital		in the RDATA of the OPT meta-RR. This document defines three new
	signature and/or hash algorithms the client supports. These options		EDNS options for a client to signal which digital signature and/or
	can be used independly of each other and MAY appear in any order in		hash algorithms the client supports. These options can be used
	the OPT RR.		independently of each other and MAY appear in any order in the OPT
			RR.
	The figure below shows how each option is defined in the RDATA of the		The figure below shows how each option is defined in the RDATA of the
	OPT RR specified in [RFC2671]:		OPT RR specified in [I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0]:
	0 8 16		0 8 16
	+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+		+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
	| OPTION-CODE (TBD) |		| OPTION-CODE (TBD) |
	+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+		+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
	| LIST-LENGTH |		| LIST-LENGTH |
	+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+		+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
	| ALG-CODE | ... \		| ALG-CODE | ... \
	+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+		+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
	skipping to change at page 4, line 29		skipping to change at page 4, line 31
	o DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU) option for DNSSEC digital		o DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU) option for DNSSEC digital
	signing algorithms. Its value is fixed at TBD1.		signing algorithms. Its value is fixed at TBD1.
	o DS Hash Understood (DHU) option for DS RR hash algorithms. Its		o DS Hash Understood (DHU) option for DS RR hash algorithms. Its
	value is fixed at TBD2.		value is fixed at TBD2.
	o NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) option for NSEC3 hash algorithms. Its		o NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) option for NSEC3 hash algorithms. Its
	value is fixed at TBD3.		value is fixed at TBD3.
	LIST-LENGTH is the length of the list of digital signature or hash		LIST-LENGTH is the length of the list of digital signature or hash
	algorithms in octets. Since each algorithm and hash codes are 1		algorithm codes in octets. Each algorithm code occupies a single
	octet long so this value is the number of octets.		octet.
	ALG-CODE is the list of assigned values of DNSSEC zone signing		ALG-CODE is the list of assigned values of DNSSEC zone signing
	algorithms, DS hash algorithms, or NSEC3 hash algorithms (depending		algorithms, DS hash algorithms, or NSEC3 hash algorithms (depending
	on the OPTION-CODE in use) that the client indicates as understood.		on the OPTION-CODE in use) that the client declares to be supported.
	The values SHOULD be in descending order of preference, with the most		The values SHOULD be in descending order of preference, with the most
	preferred algorithm first. For example, if a validating client		preferred algorithm first. For example, if a validating client
	signals the DAU option and RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256 and prefers the		signals the DAU option and RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256 and prefers the
	latter, the values of ALG-CODE would be: 8 (RSA/SHA-256), 5 (RSA/		latter, the values of ALG-CODE would be: 8 (RSA/SHA-256), 5 (RSA/
	SHA-1).		SHA-1).
	If all three options are included in the OPT RR, there is a potential		If all three options are included in the OPT RR, there is a potential
	for the OPT RR to take up considerable size in the DNS message.		for the OPT RR to take up considerable size in the DNS message.
	However, in practical terms including all three options are likely to		However, in practical terms, including all three options is likely to
	take up 16-24 octets (average of 6-10 digital signature algorithms,		take up 22-34 octets (average of 6-10 digital signature algorithms,
	3-5 DS hash algorithms and 1-5 NSEC3 hash algorithms) including the		3-5 DS hash algorithms and 1-5 NSEC3 hash algorithms) including the
	EDNS option codes and option lengths in a reasonable potential future		EDNS option codes and option lengths in a reasonable potential future
	example.		example.
	3. Client Considerations		3. Client Considerations
	A validating end-system resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option,		A validating end-system resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option,
	or combination thereof in the OPT meta-RR when sending a query. The		or combination thereof in the OPT meta-RR when sending a query. The
	validating end-system resolver sets the value(s) in the order of		validating end-system resolver sets the value(s) in the order of
	preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s) first as described		preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s) first as described
	in section 2. The end-system resolver SHOULD also set the DNSSEC-OK		in section 2. The end-system resolver SHOULD also set the DNSSEC-OK
	bit [RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in the		bit [RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in the
	response.		response.
	Note that the PRIVATEDNS (253) and/or the PRIVATEOID (254) digital		Note that the PRIVATEDNS (253) and/or the PRIVATEOID (254) digital
	signature codes for cover a potentially wide range of algorithms and		signature codes both cover a potentially wide range of algorithms and
	are likely not useful to a server. There is no compelling reason for		are likely not useful to a server. There is no compelling reason for
	a client to include these codes in its list of the DAU. Likewise,		a client to include these codes in its list of the DAU. Likewise,
	clients MUST NOT include RESERVED codes in any of the options.		clients MUST NOT include RESERVED codes in any of the options.
	3.1. Stub Resolvers		3.1. Stub Resolvers
	Typically, stub resolvers rely on an upstream recursive server (or		Typically, stub resolvers rely on an upstream recursive server (or
	cache) to provide a response. So optimal setting of the DAU, DSU and		cache) to provide a response. So optimal setting of the DAU, DSU and
	N3U options depends on whether the stub resolver performs its own		N3U options depends on whether the stub resolver elects to perform
	DNSSEC validation or doesn't perform its own validation.		its own validation.
	3.2. Validating Stub Resolvers		3.1.1. Validating Stub Resolvers
	A validating stub resolver already (usually) sets the DO bit		A validating stub resolver already (usually) sets the DO bit
	[RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive additional DNSSEC RRs		[RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive additional DNSSEC RRs
	(i.e. RRSIG RR's) in the response. Such validating resolvers SHOULD		(i.e. RRSIG RR's) in the response. Such validating resolvers SHOULD
	include the DAU, DHU and/or the N3U option(s) in the OPT RR when		include the DAU, DHU and/or the N3U option(s) in the OPT RR when
	sending a query. This way thee validating stub resolver indicates		sending a query. This way the validating stub resolver indicates
	which cryptographic algorithm(s) it supports by setting the values(s)		which cryptographic algorithm(s) it supports by setting the values in
	in the order of preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s)		the order of preference, with the most preferred algorithm first as
	first as described in Section 2.		described in Section 2.
	3.3. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers		3.1.2. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers
	The DAU, DHU and N3U EDNS options are NOT RECOMMENDED for non-		The DAU, DHU and N3U EDNS options are NOT RECOMMENDED for non-
	validating stub resolvers.		validating stub resolvers.
	3.4. Recursive Resolvers		3.2. Recursive Resolvers
	3.4.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers		3.2.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers
	A validating recursive resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U		A validating recursive resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U
	option(s) when performing recursion based on the DO and CD flags in		option(s) when performing recursion based on the DO and CD flags in
	the client request [RFC4035]. If the client of the recursive		the client request [RFC4035]. If the client of the recursive
	resolver did not include the DO bit in the query the recursive		resolver did not include the DO bit in the query the recursive
	resolver SHOULD include the option(s) according to its own local		resolver SHOULD include the option(s) according to its own local
	policy.		policy.
	If the client did include the DO and CD bits, but did not include the		If the client did include the DO and CD bits, but did not include the
	DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s) in the query, the validating recursive		DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s) in the query, the validating recursive
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	If the client did set the DO bit and the option(s) in the query, the		If the client did set the DO bit and the option(s) in the query, the
	validating recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on		validating recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on
	the setting of the CD bit. If the CD bit is set, the validating		the setting of the CD bit. If the CD bit is set, the validating
	recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on the client		recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on the client
	query or a superset of the client option(s) list and the validator's		query or a superset of the client option(s) list and the validator's
	own list (if different). If the CD bit is not set, the validating		own list (if different). If the CD bit is not set, the validating
	recursive resolver MAY copy the client option(s) or substitute its		recursive resolver MAY copy the client option(s) or substitute its
	own option list.		own option list.
	3.4.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers		3.2.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers
	Recursive resolvers that do not do validation SHOULD copy the DAU,		Recursive resolvers that do not do validation SHOULD copy the DAU,
	DHU and/or N3U option(s) seen in received queries as they represent		DHU and/or N3U option(s) seen in received queries as they represent
	the wishes of the validating downstream resolver that issued the		the wishes of the validating downstream resolver that issued the
	original query.		original query.
	4. Intermediate System Considerations		4. Intermediate System Considerations
	Intermediate proxies [RFC5625] that understand DNS SHOULD behave like		Intermediate proxies [RFC5625] that understand DNS SHOULD behave like
	a comparable recursive resolver when dealing with the DAU, DHU and		a comparable recursive resolver when dealing with the DAU, DHU and
	N3U options.		N3U options.
	5. Server Considerations		5. Server Considerations
	When an authoritative server sees the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s)		When an authoritative server sees the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s)
	in the OPT meta-RR in a request the normal algorithm for servicing		in the OPT meta-RR in a request the normal algorithm for servicing
	requests is followed. The options does not trigger any special		requests is followed. The options MUST NOT trigger any special
	processing on the server side.		processing (e.g. RRSIG filtering in responses) on the server side.
	If the options are present but the DNSSEC-OK (OK) bit is not set, the		If the options are present but the DNSSEC-OK (OK) bit is not set, the
	server does not do any DNSSEC processing, including any recording of		server does not do any DNSSEC processing, including any recording of
	the option(s).		the option(s).
	6. Traffic Analysis Considerations		6. Traffic Analysis Considerations
	Zone administrators that are planning or are in the process of a		Zone administrators that are planning or are in the process of a
	cryptographic algorithm rollover operation should monitor DNS query		cryptographic algorithm rollover operation should monitor DNS query
	traffic and record the number of queries, the presense of the OPT RR		traffic and record the number of queries, the presense of the OPT RR
	in queries and the values of the DAU/DHU/N3U option(s) (if present).		in queries and the values of the DAU/DHU/N3U option(s) (if present).
	This monitoring can be used to measure the deployment of client code		This monitoring can be used to measure the deployment of client code
	that implements (and signals) certain algorithms. The Exactly how to		that implements (and signals) specific algorithms. Description of
	capture DNS traffic and measure new algorithm adoption is beyond the		the techniques used to capture DNS traffic and measure new algorithm
	scope of this document.		adoption is beyond the scope of this document.
	Zone administrators that need to comply with changes to their		Zone administrators that need to comply with changes to their
	organization's security policy (with regards to cryptographic		organization's security policy (with regards to cryptographic
	algorithm use) can use this data to set milestone dates for		algorithm use) can use this data to set milestone dates for
	performing an algorithm rollover. For example, zone administrators		performing an algorithm rollover. For example, zone administrators
	can use the data to determine when older algorithms can be phased out		can use the data to determine when older algorithms can be phased out
	without disrupting a significant number of clients. In order to keep		without disrupting a significant number of clients. In order to keep
	this disruption to a minimum, zone administrators should wait to		this disruption to a minimum, zone administrators should wait to
	complete an algorithm rollover until a large majority of clients		complete an algorithm rollover until a large majority of clients
	signal that they understand the new algorithm. This may be in the		signal that they recognize the new algorithm. This may be in the
	order of years rather than months. Note that clients that do not		order of years rather than months.
	implement these options are likely to be older implementations which
	would also not implement any newly deployed algorithm.		Note that clients that do not implement these options are likely to
			be older implementations which would also not implement any newly
			deployed algorithm.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	The algorithm codes used to identify DNSSEC algorithms, DS RR hash		The algorithm codes used to identify DNSSEC algorithms, DS RR hash
	algorithms and NSEC3 hash algorithms have already been established by		algorithms and NSEC3 hash algorithms have already been established by
	IANA. This document does not seek to alter that registry in any way.		IANA. This document does not seek to alter that registry in any way.
	This draft seeks to update the "DNS EDNS0 Options" registry by adding		This draft seeks to update the "DNS EDNS Options" registry by adding
	the DAU, DHU and N3U options and referencing this document. The code		the DAU, DHU and N3U options and referencing this document. The code
	for these options are TBD1, TBD2 and TBD3 respectively.		for these options are TBD1, TBD2 and TBD3 respectively.
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	This document specifies a way for a client to signal its		This document specifies a way for a client to signal its
	cryptographic and hash algorithm knowledge to a cache or server. It		cryptographic and hash algorithm knowledge to a cache or server. It
	is not meant to be a discussion on algorithm superiority. The		is not meant to be a discussion on algorithm superiority. The
	signals are optional codes contained in the OPT meta-RR used with		signals are optional codes contained in the OPT meta-RR used with
	EDNS0. The goal of these options are to signal new algorithm uptake		EDNS. The goal of these options are to signal new algorithm uptake
	in client code to allow zone administrators to know when it is		in client code to allow zone administrators to know when it is
	possible to complete an algorithm rollover in a DNSSEC signed zone.		possible to complete an algorithm rollover in a DNSSEC signed zone.
	9. Normative References		9. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P.
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for
			DNS (EDNS0)", draft-ietf-dnsext-
	[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",		rfc2671bis-edns0-08 (work in
	RFC 2671, August 1999.		progress), February 2012.
	[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use
	Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",		in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
	RFC 4033, March 2005.		Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			March 1997.
	[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
			M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS
			Security Introduction and
			Requirements", RFC 4033,
			March 2005.
	Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",		[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
	RFC 4034, March 2005.		M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
			"Resource Records for the DNS
			Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
			March 2005.
	[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
	Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security		M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
	Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.		"Protocol Modifications for the
			DNS Security Extensions",
			RFC 4035, March 2005.
	[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines",		[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy
	BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009.		Implementation Guidelines",
			BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Steve Crocker		Steve Crocker
	Shinkuro Inc.		Shinkuro Inc.
	5110 Edgemoor Lane		5110 Edgemoor Lane
	Bethesda, MD 20814		Bethesda, MD 20814
	USA		USA
	EMail: steve@shinkuro.com		EMail: steve@shinkuro.com
End of changes. 31 change blocks.
	72 lines changed or deleted		87 lines changed or added
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