draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-05.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06.txt 
DNS Extensions Working Group S. Crocker DNS Extensions Working Group S. Crocker
Internet-Draft Shinkuro Inc. Internet-Draft Shinkuro Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track S. Rose Intended status: Standards Track S. Rose
Expires: September 27, 2012 NIST Expires: November 2, 2012 NIST
March 26, 2012 May 1, 2012
Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-05 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06
Abstract Abstract
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
signatures. These digital signatures can be generated using signatures. These digital signatures can be generated using
different algorithms. This draft sets out to specify a way for different algorithms. This draft sets out to specify a way for
validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
cryptographic algorithms and hash algorithms they support. cryptographic algorithms and hash algorithms they support.
skipping to change at page 1, line 42 skipping to change at page 1, line 42
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 22 skipping to change at page 2, line 22
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash 2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash
Understood (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS . . 3 Understood (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS . . 3
3. Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Intermediate System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Intermediate System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Traffic Analysis Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Traffic Analysis Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
skipping to change at page 3, line 14 skipping to change at page 3, line 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and [RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. Each integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. Each
digital signature RR (RRSIG) contains an algorithm code number. digital signature RR (RRSIG) contains an algorithm code number.
These algorithm codes tells validators which cryptographic algorithm These algorithm codes tells validators which cryptographic algorithm
was used to generate the digital signature. was used to generate the digital signature.
Likewise, Delegated Signer (DS) RR's and NSEC3 RR's use a hashed Likewise, Delegation Signer (DS) RR's and NSEC3 RR's use a hashed
value as part of their RDATA and like digital signature algorithms, value as part of their RDATA and, like digital signature algorithms,
these hash algorithms have code numbers. All three algorithm codes these hash algorithms have code numbers. All three algorithm codes
(RRSIG/DNSKEY, DS and NSEC3) are maintained in unique IANA (RRSIG/DNSKEY, DS and NSEC3) are maintained in unique IANA
registries. registries.
This draft sets out to specify a way for validating end-system This draft sets out to specify a way for validating end-system
resolvers to tell a server which cryptographic and/or hash algorithms resolvers to tell a server in a DNS query which digital signature
they support in a DNS query. This is done using the EDNS attribute and/or hash algorithms they support. This is done using the new EDNS
values in the OPT meta-RR [RFC2671]. options specified below in Section 2 for use in the OPT meta-RR
[I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0].
These proposed EDNS options serve to measure the acceptance and use These proposed EDNS options serve to measure the acceptance and use
of new digital signing algorithms. These signaling options can be of new digital signing algorithms. These signaling options can be
used by zone administrators as a gauge to measure the successful used by zone administrators as a gauge to measure the successful
deployment of code that implements a newly deployed digital signature deployment of code that implements a newly deployed digital signature
and hash algorithm, DS hash and NSEC3 hash algorithm used with algorithm, DS hash and NSEC3 hash algorithm used with DNSSEC. A zone
DNSSEC. A zone administrator may be able to determine when to stop administrator may be able to determine when to stop signing with a
signing with the old algorithm(s) when the server sees that a superseded algorithm when the server sees that a significant number
significant number of its clients signal that they are able to accept of its clients signal that they are able to accept the new algorithm.
the new algorithm. Note that this survey may be conducted over the Note that this survey may be conducted over the period of years
period of years before a tipping point is seen. before a tipping point is seen.
This draft does not seek to introduce another process for including This draft does not seek to introduce another process for including
new algorithms for use with DNSSEC. It also does not address the new algorithms for use with DNSSEC. It also does not address the
question of which algorithms are to be included in any official list question of which algorithms are to be included in any official list
of mandatory or recommended cryptographic algorithms for use with of mandatory or recommended cryptographic algorithms for use with
DNSSEC. Rather, this document specifies a means by which a client DNSSEC. Rather, this document specifies a means by which a client
query can signal a set of algorithms and hashes it implements. query can signal a set of algorithms and hashes it implements.
2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash Understood 2. Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash Understood
(DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS
The ENDS0 specification outlined in [RFC2671] defines a way to The ENDS0 specification outlined in
include new options using a standardized mechanism. These options [I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0] defines a way to include new
are contained in the RDATA of the OPT meta-RR. This document defines options using a standardized mechanism. These options are contained
three new EDNS0 options for a client to signal which digital in the RDATA of the OPT meta-RR. This document defines three new
signature and/or hash algorithms the client supports. These options EDNS options for a client to signal which digital signature and/or
can be used independly of each other and MAY appear in any order in hash algorithms the client supports. These options can be used
the OPT RR. independently of each other and MAY appear in any order in the OPT
RR.
The figure below shows how each option is defined in the RDATA of the The figure below shows how each option is defined in the RDATA of the
OPT RR specified in [RFC2671]: OPT RR specified in [I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0]:
0 8 16 0 8 16
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| OPTION-CODE (TBD) | | OPTION-CODE (TBD) |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| LIST-LENGTH | | LIST-LENGTH |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| ALG-CODE | ... \ | ALG-CODE | ... \
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
skipping to change at page 4, line 29 skipping to change at page 4, line 31
o DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU) option for DNSSEC digital o DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU) option for DNSSEC digital
signing algorithms. Its value is fixed at TBD1. signing algorithms. Its value is fixed at TBD1.
o DS Hash Understood (DHU) option for DS RR hash algorithms. Its o DS Hash Understood (DHU) option for DS RR hash algorithms. Its
value is fixed at TBD2. value is fixed at TBD2.
o NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) option for NSEC3 hash algorithms. Its o NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) option for NSEC3 hash algorithms. Its
value is fixed at TBD3. value is fixed at TBD3.
LIST-LENGTH is the length of the list of digital signature or hash LIST-LENGTH is the length of the list of digital signature or hash
algorithms in octets. Since each algorithm and hash codes are 1 algorithm codes in octets. Each algorithm code occupies a single
octet long so this value is the number of octets. octet.
ALG-CODE is the list of assigned values of DNSSEC zone signing ALG-CODE is the list of assigned values of DNSSEC zone signing
algorithms, DS hash algorithms, or NSEC3 hash algorithms (depending algorithms, DS hash algorithms, or NSEC3 hash algorithms (depending
on the OPTION-CODE in use) that the client indicates as understood. on the OPTION-CODE in use) that the client declares to be supported.
The values SHOULD be in descending order of preference, with the most The values SHOULD be in descending order of preference, with the most
preferred algorithm first. For example, if a validating client preferred algorithm first. For example, if a validating client
signals the DAU option and RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256 and prefers the signals the DAU option and RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256 and prefers the
latter, the values of ALG-CODE would be: 8 (RSA/SHA-256), 5 (RSA/ latter, the values of ALG-CODE would be: 8 (RSA/SHA-256), 5 (RSA/
SHA-1). SHA-1).
If all three options are included in the OPT RR, there is a potential If all three options are included in the OPT RR, there is a potential
for the OPT RR to take up considerable size in the DNS message. for the OPT RR to take up considerable size in the DNS message.
However, in practical terms including all three options are likely to However, in practical terms, including all three options is likely to
take up 16-24 octets (average of 6-10 digital signature algorithms, take up 22-34 octets (average of 6-10 digital signature algorithms,
3-5 DS hash algorithms and 1-5 NSEC3 hash algorithms) including the 3-5 DS hash algorithms and 1-5 NSEC3 hash algorithms) including the
EDNS option codes and option lengths in a reasonable potential future EDNS option codes and option lengths in a reasonable potential future
example. example.
3. Client Considerations 3. Client Considerations
A validating end-system resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option, A validating end-system resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option,
or combination thereof in the OPT meta-RR when sending a query. The or combination thereof in the OPT meta-RR when sending a query. The
validating end-system resolver sets the value(s) in the order of validating end-system resolver sets the value(s) in the order of
preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s) first as described preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s) first as described
in section 2. The end-system resolver SHOULD also set the DNSSEC-OK in section 2. The end-system resolver SHOULD also set the DNSSEC-OK
bit [RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in the bit [RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in the
response. response.
Note that the PRIVATEDNS (253) and/or the PRIVATEOID (254) digital Note that the PRIVATEDNS (253) and/or the PRIVATEOID (254) digital
signature codes for cover a potentially wide range of algorithms and signature codes both cover a potentially wide range of algorithms and
are likely not useful to a server. There is no compelling reason for are likely not useful to a server. There is no compelling reason for
a client to include these codes in its list of the DAU. Likewise, a client to include these codes in its list of the DAU. Likewise,
clients MUST NOT include RESERVED codes in any of the options. clients MUST NOT include RESERVED codes in any of the options.
3.1. Stub Resolvers 3.1. Stub Resolvers
Typically, stub resolvers rely on an upstream recursive server (or Typically, stub resolvers rely on an upstream recursive server (or
cache) to provide a response. So optimal setting of the DAU, DSU and cache) to provide a response. So optimal setting of the DAU, DSU and
N3U options depends on whether the stub resolver performs its own N3U options depends on whether the stub resolver elects to perform
DNSSEC validation or doesn't perform its own validation. its own validation.
3.2. Validating Stub Resolvers 3.1.1. Validating Stub Resolvers
A validating stub resolver already (usually) sets the DO bit A validating stub resolver already (usually) sets the DO bit
[RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive additional DNSSEC RRs [RFC4035] to indicate that it wishes to receive additional DNSSEC RRs
(i.e. RRSIG RR's) in the response. Such validating resolvers SHOULD (i.e. RRSIG RR's) in the response. Such validating resolvers SHOULD
include the DAU, DHU and/or the N3U option(s) in the OPT RR when include the DAU, DHU and/or the N3U option(s) in the OPT RR when
sending a query. This way thee validating stub resolver indicates sending a query. This way the validating stub resolver indicates
which cryptographic algorithm(s) it supports by setting the values(s) which cryptographic algorithm(s) it supports by setting the values in
in the order of preference, with the most preferred algorithm(s) the order of preference, with the most preferred algorithm first as
first as described in Section 2. described in Section 2.
3.3. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers 3.1.2. Non-Validating Stub Resolvers
The DAU, DHU and N3U EDNS options are NOT RECOMMENDED for non- The DAU, DHU and N3U EDNS options are NOT RECOMMENDED for non-
validating stub resolvers. validating stub resolvers.
3.4. Recursive Resolvers 3.2. Recursive Resolvers
3.4.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers 3.2.1. Validating Recursive Resolvers
A validating recursive resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U A validating recursive resolver sets the DAU, DHU and/or N3U
option(s) when performing recursion based on the DO and CD flags in option(s) when performing recursion based on the DO and CD flags in
the client request [RFC4035]. If the client of the recursive the client request [RFC4035]. If the client of the recursive
resolver did not include the DO bit in the query the recursive resolver did not include the DO bit in the query the recursive
resolver SHOULD include the option(s) according to its own local resolver SHOULD include the option(s) according to its own local
policy. policy.
If the client did include the DO and CD bits, but did not include the If the client did include the DO and CD bits, but did not include the
DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s) in the query, the validating recursive DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s) in the query, the validating recursive
skipping to change at page 6, line 19 skipping to change at page 6, line 19
If the client did set the DO bit and the option(s) in the query, the If the client did set the DO bit and the option(s) in the query, the
validating recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on validating recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on
the setting of the CD bit. If the CD bit is set, the validating the setting of the CD bit. If the CD bit is set, the validating
recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on the client recursive resolver SHOULD include the option(s) based on the client
query or a superset of the client option(s) list and the validator's query or a superset of the client option(s) list and the validator's
own list (if different). If the CD bit is not set, the validating own list (if different). If the CD bit is not set, the validating
recursive resolver MAY copy the client option(s) or substitute its recursive resolver MAY copy the client option(s) or substitute its
own option list. own option list.
3.4.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers 3.2.2. Non-validating Recursive Resolvers
Recursive resolvers that do not do validation SHOULD copy the DAU, Recursive resolvers that do not do validation SHOULD copy the DAU,
DHU and/or N3U option(s) seen in received queries as they represent DHU and/or N3U option(s) seen in received queries as they represent
the wishes of the validating downstream resolver that issued the the wishes of the validating downstream resolver that issued the
original query. original query.
4. Intermediate System Considerations 4. Intermediate System Considerations
Intermediate proxies [RFC5625] that understand DNS SHOULD behave like Intermediate proxies [RFC5625] that understand DNS SHOULD behave like
a comparable recursive resolver when dealing with the DAU, DHU and a comparable recursive resolver when dealing with the DAU, DHU and
N3U options. N3U options.
5. Server Considerations 5. Server Considerations
When an authoritative server sees the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s) When an authoritative server sees the DAU, DHU and/or N3U option(s)
in the OPT meta-RR in a request the normal algorithm for servicing in the OPT meta-RR in a request the normal algorithm for servicing
requests is followed. The options does not trigger any special requests is followed. The options MUST NOT trigger any special
processing on the server side. processing (e.g. RRSIG filtering in responses) on the server side.
If the options are present but the DNSSEC-OK (OK) bit is not set, the If the options are present but the DNSSEC-OK (OK) bit is not set, the
server does not do any DNSSEC processing, including any recording of server does not do any DNSSEC processing, including any recording of
the option(s). the option(s).
6. Traffic Analysis Considerations 6. Traffic Analysis Considerations
Zone administrators that are planning or are in the process of a Zone administrators that are planning or are in the process of a
cryptographic algorithm rollover operation should monitor DNS query cryptographic algorithm rollover operation should monitor DNS query
traffic and record the number of queries, the presense of the OPT RR traffic and record the number of queries, the presense of the OPT RR
in queries and the values of the DAU/DHU/N3U option(s) (if present). in queries and the values of the DAU/DHU/N3U option(s) (if present).
This monitoring can be used to measure the deployment of client code This monitoring can be used to measure the deployment of client code
that implements (and signals) certain algorithms. The Exactly how to that implements (and signals) specific algorithms. Description of
capture DNS traffic and measure new algorithm adoption is beyond the the techniques used to capture DNS traffic and measure new algorithm
scope of this document. adoption is beyond the scope of this document.
Zone administrators that need to comply with changes to their Zone administrators that need to comply with changes to their
organization's security policy (with regards to cryptographic organization's security policy (with regards to cryptographic
algorithm use) can use this data to set milestone dates for algorithm use) can use this data to set milestone dates for
performing an algorithm rollover. For example, zone administrators performing an algorithm rollover. For example, zone administrators
can use the data to determine when older algorithms can be phased out can use the data to determine when older algorithms can be phased out
without disrupting a significant number of clients. In order to keep without disrupting a significant number of clients. In order to keep
this disruption to a minimum, zone administrators should wait to this disruption to a minimum, zone administrators should wait to
complete an algorithm rollover until a large majority of clients complete an algorithm rollover until a large majority of clients
signal that they understand the new algorithm. This may be in the signal that they recognize the new algorithm. This may be in the
order of years rather than months. Note that clients that do not order of years rather than months.
implement these options are likely to be older implementations which
would also not implement any newly deployed algorithm. Note that clients that do not implement these options are likely to
be older implementations which would also not implement any newly
deployed algorithm.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
The algorithm codes used to identify DNSSEC algorithms, DS RR hash The algorithm codes used to identify DNSSEC algorithms, DS RR hash
algorithms and NSEC3 hash algorithms have already been established by algorithms and NSEC3 hash algorithms have already been established by
IANA. This document does not seek to alter that registry in any way. IANA. This document does not seek to alter that registry in any way.
This draft seeks to update the "DNS EDNS0 Options" registry by adding This draft seeks to update the "DNS EDNS Options" registry by adding
the DAU, DHU and N3U options and referencing this document. The code the DAU, DHU and N3U options and referencing this document. The code
for these options are TBD1, TBD2 and TBD3 respectively. for these options are TBD1, TBD2 and TBD3 respectively.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document specifies a way for a client to signal its This document specifies a way for a client to signal its
cryptographic and hash algorithm knowledge to a cache or server. It cryptographic and hash algorithm knowledge to a cache or server. It
is not meant to be a discussion on algorithm superiority. The is not meant to be a discussion on algorithm superiority. The
signals are optional codes contained in the OPT meta-RR used with signals are optional codes contained in the OPT meta-RR used with
EDNS0. The goal of these options are to signal new algorithm uptake EDNS. The goal of these options are to signal new algorithm uptake
in client code to allow zone administrators to know when it is in client code to allow zone administrators to know when it is
possible to complete an algorithm rollover in a DNSSEC signed zone. possible to complete an algorithm rollover in a DNSSEC signed zone.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [I-D.ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P.
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for
DNS (EDNS0)", draft-ietf-dnsext-
[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", rfc2671bis-edns0-08 (work in
RFC 2671, August 1999. progress), February 2012.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
RFC 4033, March 2005. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS
Security Introduction and
Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
RFC 4034, March 2005. M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Resource Records for the DNS
Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson,
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. "Protocol Modifications for the
DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines", [RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy
BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009. Implementation Guidelines",
BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Steve Crocker Steve Crocker
Shinkuro Inc. Shinkuro Inc.
5110 Edgemoor Lane 5110 Edgemoor Lane
Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814
USA USA
EMail: steve@shinkuro.com EMail: steve@shinkuro.com
 End of changes. 31 change blocks. 
72 lines changed or deleted 87 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/