draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-01.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-02.txt 
Network Working Group S. Weiler Network Working Group S. Weiler
Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc
Updates: 4034, 4035 (if approved) May 23, 2005 Updates: 4034, 4035 (if approved) R. Austein
Expires: November 24, 2005 Expires: July 15, 2006 ISC
January 11, 2006
Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-01 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-02
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2005. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2006.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract Abstract
This document is a collection of minor technical clarifications to This document is a collection of minor technical clarifications to
the DNSSECbis document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to the DNSSECbis document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to
implementors as well as an interim repository of possible DNSSECbis implementors as well as an interim repository of possible DNSSECbis
errata. errata.
Proposed additions in future versions Proposed additions in future versions
An index sorted by the section of DNSSECbis being clarified. An index sorted by the section of DNSSECbis being clarified.
A list of proposed protocol changes being made in other documents, A list of proposed protocol changes being made in other documents,
such as NSEC3 and Epsilon. This document would not make those such as [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-online-signing] and [I-D.ietf-dnsext-
changes, merely provide an index into the documents that are making nsec3]. This document would not make those changes, merely provide
changes. an index into the documents that are making changes.
Changes between -01 and -02
Added Section 4.4.
Changes between -00 and -01 Changes between -00 and -01
Document significantly restructured. Document significantly restructured.
Added section on QTYPE=ANY. Added Section 2.3.
Changes between personal submission and first WG draft Changes between personal submission and first WG draft
Added Section 2.1 based on namedroppers discussions from March 9-10, Added Section 2.1 based on namedroppers discussions from March 9-10,
2005. 2005.
Added Section 3.4, Section 3.3, Section 4.3, and Section 2.2. Added Section 3.4, Section 3.3, Section 4.3, and Section 2.2.
Added the DNSSECbis RFC numbers. Added the DNSSECbis RFC numbers.
Figured out the confusion in Section 4.1. Figured out the confusion in Section 4.1.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Significant Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Significant Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Empty Non-Terminal Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Empty Non-Terminal Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 6 3.3. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 6
3.4 Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3 Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 11 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction and Terminology 1. Introduction and Terminology
This document lists some minor clarifications and corrections to This document lists some minor clarifications and corrections to
DNSSECbis, as described in [1], [2], and [3]. DNSSECbis, as described in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035].
It is intended to serve as a resource for implementors and as a It is intended to serve as a resource for implementors and as a
repository of items that need to be addressed when advancing the repository of items that need to be addressed when advancing the
DNSSECbis documents from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard. DNSSECbis documents from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard.
In this version (-01 of the WG document), feedback is particularly In this version (-01 of the WG document), feedback is particularly
solicited on the structure of the document and whether the text in solicited on the structure of the document and whether the text in
the recently added sections is correct and sufficient. the recently added sections is correct and sufficient.
Proposed substantive additions to this document should be sent to the Proposed substantive additions to this document should be sent to the
namedroppers mailing list as well as to the editor of this document. namedroppers mailing list as well as to the editors of this document.
The editor would greatly prefer text suitable for direct inclusion in The editors would greatly prefer contributions of text suitable for
this document. direct inclusion in this document.
1.1 Structure of this Document 1.1. Structure of this Document
The clarifications to DNSSECbis are sorted according to the editor's The clarifications to DNSSECbis are sorted according to the editors'
impression of their importance, starting with ones which could, if impression of their importance, starting with ones which could, if
ignored, lead to security and stability problems and progressing down ignored, lead to security and stability problems and progressing down
to clarifications that are likely to have little operational impact. to clarifications that are likely to have little operational impact.
Mere typos and awkward phrasings are not addressed unless they could Mere typos and awkward phrasings are not addressed unless they could
lead to misinterpretation of the DNSSECbis documents. lead to misinterpretation of the DNSSECbis documents.
1.2 Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Significant Concerns 2. Significant Concerns
This section provides clarifications that, if overlooked, could lead This section provides clarifications that, if overlooked, could lead
to security issues or major interoperability problems. to security issues or major interoperability problems.
2.1 Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs 2.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs
RFC4035 Section 5.4 slightly underspecifies the algorithm for [RFC4035] Section 5.4 slightly underspecifies the algorithm for
checking non-existence proofs. In particular, the algorithm there checking non-existence proofs. In particular, the algorithm there
might incorrectly allow the NSEC from the parent side of a zone cut might incorrectly allow the NSEC from the parent side of a zone cut
to prove the non-existence of either other RRs at that name in the to prove the non-existence of either other RRs at that name in the
child zone or other names in the child zone. It might also allow a child zone or other names in the child zone. It might also allow a
NSEC at the same name as a DNAME to prove the non-existence of names NSEC at the same name as a DNAME to prove the non-existence of names
beneath that DNAME. beneath that DNAME.
A parent-side delegation NSEC (one with the NS bit set, but no SOA A parent-side delegation NSEC (one with the NS bit set, but no SOA
bit set, and with a singer field that's shorter than the owner name) bit set, and with a singer field that's shorter than the owner name)
must not be used to assume non-existence of any RRs below that zone must not be used to assume non-existence of any RRs below that zone
cut (both RRs at that ownername and at ownernames with more leading cut (both RRs at that ownername and at ownernames with more leading
labels, no matter their content). Similarly, an NSEC with the DNAME labels, no matter their content). Similarly, an NSEC with the DNAME
bit set must not be used to assume the non-existence of any bit set must not be used to assume the non-existence of any
descendant of that NSEC's owner name. descendant of that NSEC's owner name.
2.2 Empty Non-Terminal Proofs 2.2. Empty Non-Terminal Proofs
To be written, based on Roy Arends' May 11th message to namedroppers. To be written, based on Roy Arends' May 11th message to namedroppers.
2.3 Validating Responses to an ANY Query The editors are trying to figure out whether what's really required
here is a discussion of the relationship between DNS RCODEs and
DNSSECbis.
RFC4035 does not address now to validate responses when QTYPE=*. As 2.3. Validating Responses to an ANY Query
described in Section 6.2.2 of RFC1034, a proper response to QTYPE=*
may include a subset of the RRsets at a given name -- it is not [RFC4035] does not address how to validate responses when QTYPE=*.
necessary to include all RRsets at the QNAME in the response. As described in Section 6.2.2 of [RFC1034], a proper response to
QTYPE=* may include a subset of the RRsets at a given name -- it is
not necessary to include all RRsets at the QNAME in the response.
When validating a response to QTYPE=*, validate all received RRsets When validating a response to QTYPE=*, validate all received RRsets
that match QNAME and QCLASS. If any of those RRsets fail validation, that match QNAME and QCLASS. If any of those RRsets fail validation,
treat the answer as Bogus. If there are no RRsets matching QNAME and treat the answer as Bogus. If there are no RRsets matching QNAME and
QCLASS, validate that fact using the rules in RFC4035 Section 5.4 (as QCLASS, validate that fact using the rules in [RFC4035] Section 5.4
clarified in this document). To be clear, a validator must not (as clarified in this document). To be clear, a validator must not
insist on receiving all records at the QNAME in response to QTYPE=*. insist on receiving all records at the QNAME in response to QTYPE=*.
3. Interoperability Concerns 3. Interoperability Concerns
3.1 Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms 3.1. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms
Section 5.2 of RFC4035 includes rules for how to handle delegations Section 5.2 of [RFC4035] includes rules for how to handle delegations
to zones that are signed with entirely unsupported algorithms, as to zones that are signed with entirely unsupported algorithms, as
indicated by the algorithms shown in those zone's DS RRsets. It does indicated by the algorithms shown in those zone's DS RRsets. It does
not explicitly address how to handle DS records that use unsupported not explicitly address how to handle DS records that use unsupported
message digest algorithms. In brief, DS records using unknown or message digest algorithms. In brief, DS records using unknown or
unsupported message digest algorithms MUST be treated the same way as unsupported message digest algorithms MUST be treated the same way as
DS records referring to DNSKEY RRs of unknown or unsupported DS records referring to DNSKEY RRs of unknown or unsupported
algorithms. algorithms.
The existing text says: The existing text says:
If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed in
in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The
resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as
described above. described above.
To paraphrase the above, when determining the security status of a To paraphrase the above, when determining the security status of a
zone, a validator discards (for this purpose only) any DS records zone, a validator discards (for this purpose only) any DS records
listing unknown or unsupported algorithms. If none are left, the listing unknown or unsupported algorithms. If none are left, the
zone is treated as if it were unsigned. zone is treated as if it were unsigned.
Modified to consider DS message digest algorithms, a validator also Modified to consider DS message digest algorithms, a validator also
discards any DS records using unknown or unsupported message digest discards any DS records using unknown or unsupported message digest
algorithms. algorithms.
3.2 Private Algorithms 3.2. Private Algorithms
As discussed above, section 5.2 of RFC4035 requires that validators As discussed above, section 5.2 of [RFC4035] requires that validators
make decisions about the security status of zones based on the public make decisions about the security status of zones based on the public
key algorithms shown in the DS records for those zones. In the case key algorithms shown in the DS records for those zones. In the case
of private algorithms, as described in RFC4034 Appendix A.1.1, the of private algorithms, as described in [RFC4034] Appendix A.1.1, the
eight-bit algorithm field in the DS RR is not conclusive about what eight-bit algorithm field in the DS RR is not conclusive about what
algorithm(s) is actually in use. algorithm(s) is actually in use.
If no private algorithms appear in the DS set or if any supported If no private algorithms appear in the DS set or if any supported
algorithm appears in the DS set, no special processing will be algorithm appears in the DS set, no special processing will be
needed. In the remaining cases, the security status of the zone needed. In the remaining cases, the security status of the zone
depends on whether or not the resolver supports any of the private depends on whether or not the resolver supports any of the private
algorithms in use (provided that these DS records use supported hash algorithms in use (provided that these DS records use supported hash
functions, as discussed in Section 3.1). In these cases, the functions, as discussed in Section 3.1). In these cases, the
resolver MUST retrieve the corresponding DNSKEY for each private resolver MUST retrieve the corresponding DNSKEY for each private
algorithm DS record and examine the public key field to determine the algorithm DS record and examine the public key field to determine the
algorithm in use. The security-aware resolver MUST ensure that the algorithm in use. The security-aware resolver MUST ensure that the
hash of the DNSKEY RR's owner name and RDATA matches the digest in hash of the DNSKEY RR's owner name and RDATA matches the digest in
the DS RR. If they do not match, and no other DS establishes that the DS RR. If they do not match, and no other DS establishes that
the zone is secure, the referral should be considered BAD data, as the zone is secure, the referral should be considered BAD data, as
discussed in RFC4035. discussed in [RFC4035].
This clarification facilitates the broader use of private algorithms, This clarification facilitates the broader use of private algorithms,
as suggested by [5]. as suggested by [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments].
3.3 Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs 3.3. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs
When multiple RRSIGs cover a given RRset, RFC4035 Section 5.3.3 When multiple RRSIGs cover a given RRset, [RFC4035] Section 5.3.3
suggests that "the local resolver security policy determines whether suggests that "the local resolver security policy determines whether
the resolver also has to test these RRSIG RRs and how to resolve the resolver also has to test these RRSIG RRs and how to resolve
conflicts if these RRSIG RRs lead to differing results." In most conflicts if these RRSIG RRs lead to differing results." In most
cases, a resolver would be well advised to accept any valid RRSIG as cases, a resolver would be well advised to accept any valid RRSIG as
sufficient. If the first RRSIG tested fails validation, a resolver sufficient. If the first RRSIG tested fails validation, a resolver
would be well advised to try others, giving a successful validation would be well advised to try others, giving a successful validation
result if any can be validated and giving a failure only if all result if any can be validated and giving a failure only if all
RRSIGs fail validation. RRSIGs fail validation.
If a resolver adopts a more restrictive policy, there's a danger that If a resolver adopts a more restrictive policy, there's a danger that
properly-signed data might unnecessarily fail validation, perhaps properly-signed data might unnecessarily fail validation, perhaps
because of cache timing issues. Furthermore, certain zone management because of cache timing issues. Furthermore, certain zone management
techniques, like the Double Signature Zone-signing Key Rollover techniques, like the Double Signature Zone-signing Key Rollover
method described in section 4.2.1.2 of [6] might not work reliably. method described in section 4.2.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-dnssec-
operational-practices] might not work reliably.
3.4 Key Tag Calculation 3.4. Key Tag Calculation
RFC4034 Appendix B.1 incorrectly defines the Key Tag field [RFC4034] Appendix B.1 incorrectly defines the Key Tag field
calculation for algorithm 1. It correctly says that the Key Tag is calculation for algorithm 1. It correctly says that the Key Tag is
the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the
public key modulus. However, RFC4034 then goes on to incorrectly say public key modulus. However, [RFC4034] then goes on to incorrectly
that this is 4th to last and 3rd to last octets of the public key say that this is 4th to last and 3rd to last octets of the public key
modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets. modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets.
4. Minor Corrections and Clarifications 4. Minor Corrections and Clarifications
4.1 Finding Zone Cuts 4.1. Finding Zone Cuts
Appendix C.8 of RFC4035 discusses sending DS queries to the servers Appendix C.8 of [RFC4035] discusses sending DS queries to the servers
for a parent zone. To do that, a resolver may first need to apply for a parent zone. To do that, a resolver may first need to apply
special rules to discover what those servers are. special rules to discover what those servers are.
As explained in Section 3.1.4.1 of RFC4035, security-aware name As explained in Section 3.1.4.1 of [RFC4035], security-aware name
servers need to apply special processing rules to handle the DS RR, servers need to apply special processing rules to handle the DS RR,
and in some situations the resolver may also need to apply special and in some situations the resolver may also need to apply special
rules to locate the name servers for the parent zone if the resolver rules to locate the name servers for the parent zone if the resolver
does not already have the parent's NS RRset. Section 4.2 of RFC4035 does not already have the parent's NS RRset. Section 4.2 of
specifies a mechanism for doing that. [RFC4035] specifies a mechanism for doing that.
4.2 Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage 4.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage
Questions of the form "can I use a different DNSKEY for signing the Questions of the form "can I use a different DNSKEY for signing the
X" have occasionally arisen. X" have occasionally arisen.
The short answer is "yes, absolutely". You can even use a different The short answer is "yes, absolutely". You can even use a different
DNSKEY for each RRset in a zone, subject only to practical limits on DNSKEY for each RRset in a zone, subject only to practical limits on
the size of the DNSKEY RRset. However, be aware that there is no way the size of the DNSKEY RRset. However, be aware that there is no way
to tell resolvers what a particularly DNSKEY is supposed to be used to tell resolvers what a particularly DNSKEY is supposed to be used
for -- any DNSKEY in the zone's signed DNSKEY RRset may be used to for -- any DNSKEY in the zone's signed DNSKEY RRset may be used to
authenticate any RRset in the zone. For example, if a weaker or less authenticate any RRset in the zone. For example, if a weaker or less
trusted DNSKEY is being used to authenticate NSEC RRsets or all trusted DNSKEY is being used to authenticate NSEC RRsets or all
dynamically updated records, that same DNSKEY can also be used to dynamically updated records, that same DNSKEY can also be used to
sign any other RRsets from the zone. sign any other RRsets from the zone.
Furthermore, note that the SEP bit setting has no effect on how a Furthermore, note that the SEP bit setting has no effect on how a
DNSKEY may be used -- the validation process is specifically DNSKEY may be used -- the validation process is specifically
prohibited from using that bit by RFC4034 section 2.1.2. It possible prohibited from using that bit by [RFC4034] section 2.1.2. It
to use a DNSKEY without the SEP bit set as the sole secure entry possible to use a DNSKEY without the SEP bit set as the sole secure
point to the zone, yet use a DNSKEY with the SEP bit set to sign all entry point to the zone, yet use a DNSKEY with the SEP bit set to
RRsets in the zone (other than the DNSKEY RRset). It's also possible sign all RRsets in the zone (other than the DNSKEY RRset). It's also
to use a single DNSKEY, with or without the SEP bit set, to sign the possible to use a single DNSKEY, with or without the SEP bit set, to
entire zone, including the DNSKEY RRset itself. sign the entire zone, including the DNSKEY RRset itself.
4.3 Errors in Examples 4.3. Errors in Examples
The text in RFC4035 Section C.1 refers to the examples in B.1 as The text in [RFC4035] Section C.1 refers to the examples in B.1 as
"x.w.example.com" while B.1 uses "x.w.example". This is painfully "x.w.example.com" while B.1 uses "x.w.example". This is painfully
obvious in the second paragraph where it states that the RRSIG labels obvious in the second paragraph where it states that the RRSIG labels
field value of 3 indicates that the answer was not the result of field value of 3 indicates that the answer was not the result of
wildcard expansion. This is true for "x.w.example" but not for wildcard expansion. This is true for "x.w.example" but not for
"x.w.example.com", which of course has a label count of 4 "x.w.example.com", which of course has a label count of 4
(antithetically, a label count of 3 would imply the answer was the (antithetically, a label count of 3 would imply the answer was the
result of a wildcard expansion). result of a wildcard expansion).
The first paragraph of RFC4035 Section C.6 also has a minor error: The first paragraph of [RFC4035] Section C.6 also has a minor error:
the reference to "a.z.w.w.example" should instead be "a.z.w.example", the reference to "a.z.w.w.example" should instead be "a.z.w.example",
as in the previous line. as in the previous line.
4.4. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List
[RFC4034] Section 6.2 item 3 has a list of resource record types for
which DNS names in the RDATA are downcased for purposes of DNSSEC
canonical form (for both ordering and signing). That list contains
HINFO twice. The implementor is encouraged to exercise good
discretion and professional judgement when deciding whether to
downcase such DNS names once or twice.
Further, it is worth noting that the list of RR types in [RFC3597]
has the same bug and, as could be expected, doesn't include RRSIG or
NSEC.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document specifies no IANA Actions. This document specifies no IANA Actions.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document does not make fundamental changes to the DNSSEC This document does not make fundamental changes to the DNSSEC
protocol, as it was generally understood when DNSSECbis was protocol, as it was generally understood when DNSSECbis was
published. It does, however, address some ambiguities and omissions published. It does, however, address some ambiguities and omissions
in those documents that, if not recognized and addressed in in those documents that, if not recognized and addressed in
implementations, could lead to security failures. In particular, the implementations, could lead to security failures. In particular, the
validation algorithm clarifications in Section 2 are critical for validation algorithm clarifications in Section 2 are critical for
preserving the security properties DNSSEC offers. Furthermore, preserving the security properties DNSSEC offers. Furthermore,
failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 3 failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 3
could limit the ability to later change or expand DNSSEC, including could limit the ability to later change or expand DNSSEC, including
by adding new algorithms. by adding new algorithms.
7. References 7. References
7.1 Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[1] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, RFC 1034, STD 13, November 1987.
March 2005.
[2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
March 2005.
[3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4035, March 2005. RFC 4033, March 2005.
[4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
7.2 Informative References [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[5] Blacka, D., "DNSSEC Experiments", 7.2. Informative References
draft-blacka-dnssec-experiments-00 (work in progress),
December 2004.
[6] Gieben, R. and O. Kolkman, "DNSSEC Operational Practices", [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments]
draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-operational-practices-04 (work in Blacka, D., "DNSSEC Experiments",
progress), May 2005. draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-01 (work in
progress), July 2005.
Author's Address [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-online-signing]
Weiler, S. and J. Ihren, "Minimally Covering NSEC Records
and DNSSEC On-line Signing",
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-online-signing-01 (work in
progress), January 2006.
Samuel Weiler [I-D.ietf-dnsext-nsec3]
SPARTA, Inc Laurie, B., "DNSSEC Hash Authenticated Denial of
7075 Samuel Morse Drive Existence", draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-03 (work in progress),
Columbia, Maryland 21046 October 2005.
US
Email: weiler@tislabs.com [I-D.ietf-dnsop-dnssec-operational-practices]
Gieben, R. and O. Kolkman, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",
draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-operational-practices-06 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[RFC3597] Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
(RR) Types", RFC 3597, September 2003.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editor is extremely grateful to those who, in addition to finding The editors are extremely grateful to those who, in addition to
errors and omissions in the DNSSECbis document set, have provided finding errors and omissions in the DNSSECbis document set, have
text suitable for inclusion in this document. provided text suitable for inclusion in this document.
The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as
described in Section 3.2, and the lack of specificity in handling ANY described in Section 3.2, and the lack of specificity in handling ANY
queries, as described in Section 2.3, were discovered by David queries, as described in Section 2.3, were discovered by David
Blacka. Blacka.
The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in
Section 3.4, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake Section 3.4, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake
contributed text for Section 3.4. contributed text for Section 3.4.
The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 2.1 was found by The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 2.1 was found by
Roy Badami. Roy Arends found the related problem with DNAME. Roy Badami. Roy Arends found the related problem with DNAME.
The errors in the RFC4035 examples were found by Roy Arends, who also The errors in the [RFC4035] examples were found by Roy Arends, who
contributed text for Section 4.3 of this document. also contributed text for Section 4.3 of this document.
The editor would like to thank Olafur Gudmundsson and Scott Rose for The editors would like to thank Danny Mayer, Olafur Gudmundsson, and
their substantive comments on the text of this document. Scott Rose for their substantive comments on the text of this
document.
Authors' Addresses
Samuel Weiler
SPARTA, Inc
7075 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046
US
Email: weiler@tislabs.com
Rob Austein
ISC
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA
Email: sra@isc.org
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