draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-09.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-10.txt 
Network Working Group S. Weiler Network Working Group S. Weiler
Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc. Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc.
Updates: 4033, 4034, 4035, 5155 D. Blacka Updates: 4033, 4034, 4035, 5155 D. Blacka
(if approved) VeriSign, Inc. (if approved) VeriSign, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track September 5, 2009 Intended status: Standards Track March 8, 2010
Expires: March 9, 2010 Expires: September 9, 2010
Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-09 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-10
Abstract
This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the
DNSSECbis document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to
implementors as well as a repository of DNSSECbis errata.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 9, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Abstract include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the described in the BSD License.
DNSSECbis document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to
implementors as well as a repository of DNSSECbis errata.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Important Additions to DNSSSECbis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Important Additions to DNSSSECbis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. NSEC3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. NSEC3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. SHA-256 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. SHA-256 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Check for CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Check for CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 7 4.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 7
4.5. Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.5. Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.7. Setting the AD bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.8. Setting the CD bit on Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.9. Nested Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.9. Setting the CD bit on Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.10. Nested Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.10.1. Closest Encloser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.10.2. Accept Any Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.10.3. Preference Based on Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Errors in RFC 5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. Errors in RFC 5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction and Terminology 1. Introduction and Terminology
This document lists some additions, clarifications and corrections to This document lists some additions, clarifications and corrections to
the core DNSSECbis specification, as originally described in the core DNSSECbis specification, as originally described in
[RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035]. [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035], and later amended by [RFC5155].
(See section Section 2 for more recent additions to that core
document set.)
It is intended to serve as a resource for implementors and as a It is intended to serve as a resource for implementors and as a
repository of items that need to be addressed when advancing the repository of items that need to be addressed when advancing the
DNSSECbis documents from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard. DNSSECbis documents from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard.
1.1. Structure of this Document 1.1. Structure of this Document
The clarifications to DNSSECbis are sorted according to their The clarifications to DNSSECbis are sorted according to their
importance, starting with ones which could, if ignored, lead to importance, starting with ones which could, if ignored, lead to
security problems and progressing down to clarifications that are security problems and progressing down to clarifications that are
expected to have little operational impact. expected to have little operational impact.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Important Additions to DNSSSECbis 2. Important Additions to DNSSSECbis
This section updates the set of core DNSSEC protocol documents This section lists some documents that should be considered core
originally specified in Section 10 of [RFC4033]. DNSSEC protocol documents in addition to those originally specified
in Section 10 of [RFC4033].
2.1. NSEC3 Support 2.1. NSEC3 Support
[RFC5155] describes the use and behavior of the NSEC3 and NSEC3PARAM [RFC5155] describes the use and behavior of the NSEC3 and NSEC3PARAM
records for hashed denial of existence. Validator implementations records for hashed denial of existence. Validator implementations
are strongly encouraged to include support for NSEC3 because a number are strongly encouraged to include support for NSEC3 because a number
of highly visible zones are expected to use it. Validators that do of highly visible zones are expected to use it. Validators that do
not support validation of responses using NSEC3 will likely be not support validation of responses using NSEC3 will likely be
hampered in validating large portions of the DNS space. hampered in validating large portions of the DNS space.
[RFC5155] should be considered part of the DNS Security Document [RFC5155] should be considered part of the DNS Security Document
Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10. Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.
Note that the algorithm identifiers defined in RFC5155 (DSA-NSEC3-
SHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1) signal that a zone MAY be using NSEC3,
rather than NSEC. The zone MAY indeed be using either and validators
supporting these algorithms MUST support both NSEC3 and NSEC
responses.
2.2. SHA-256 Support 2.2. SHA-256 Support
[RFC4509] describes the use of SHA-256 as a digest algorithm for use [RFC4509] describes the use of SHA-256 as a digest algorithm in
with Delegation Signer (DS) RRs. [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256] Delegation Signer (DS) RRs. [RFC5702] describes the use of the
describes the use of the RSASHA256 algorithm for use in DNSKEY and RSASHA256 algorithm in DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs. Validator
RRSIG RRs. Validator implementations are strongly encouraged to implementations are strongly encouraged to include support for this
include support for this algorithm for DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG records. algorithm for DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG records.
Both [RFC4509] and [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256] should also be Both [RFC4509] and [RFC5702] should also be considered part of the
considered part of the DNS Security Document Family as described by DNS Security Document Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.
[RFC4033], Section 10.
3. Security Concerns 3. Security Concerns
This section provides clarifications that, if overlooked, could lead This section provides clarifications that, if overlooked, could lead
to security issues. to security issues.
3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs 3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs
[RFC4035] Section 5.4 under-specifies the algorithm for checking non- [RFC4035] Section 5.4 under-specifies the algorithm for checking non-
existence proofs. In particular, the algorithm as presented would existence proofs. In particular, the algorithm as presented would
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[RFC4034] Appendix B.1 incorrectly defines the Key Tag field [RFC4034] Appendix B.1 incorrectly defines the Key Tag field
calculation for algorithm 1. It correctly says that the Key Tag is calculation for algorithm 1. It correctly says that the Key Tag is
the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the
public key modulus. However, [RFC4034] then goes on to incorrectly public key modulus. However, [RFC4034] then goes on to incorrectly
say that this is 4th to last and 3rd to last octets of the public key say that this is 4th to last and 3rd to last octets of the public key
modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets. modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets.
4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies 4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies
[RFC4035] does not provide any instructions to servers as to how to As stated in [RFC3225], the DO bit of the query MUST be copied in the
set the DO bit. Some authoritative server implementations have response. At least one implementation has done something different,
chosen to copy the DO bit settings from the incoming query to the so it may be wise for resolvers to be liberal in what they accept.
outgoing response. Others have chosen to never set the DO bit in
responses. Either behavior is permitted. To be clear, in replies to
queries with the DO-bit set servers may or may not set the DO bit.
4.7. Setting the AD bit on Replies 4.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries
The use of the AD bit in the query was previously undefined. This
document defines it as a signal indicating that the requester
understands and is interested in the value of the AD bit in the
response. This allows a requestor to indicate that it understands
the AD bit without also requesting DNSSEC data via the DO bit.
4.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies
Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4035] describes under which conditions a Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4035] describes under which conditions a
validating resolver should set or clear the AD bit in a response. In validating resolver should set or clear the AD bit in a response. In
order to protect legacy stub resolvers and middleboxes, validating order to protect legacy stub resolvers and middleboxes, validating
resolvers SHOULD only set the AD bit when a response both meets the resolvers SHOULD only set the AD bit when a response both meets the
conditions listed in RFC 4035, section 3.2.3, and the request conditions listed in RFC 4035, section 3.2.3, and the request
contained either a set DO bit or a set AD bit. contained either a set DO bit or a set AD bit.
Note that the use of the AD bit in the query was previously 4.9. Setting the CD bit on Requests
undefined. This document defines it as a signal indicating that the
requester understands and is interested in the value of the AD bit in
the response. This allows a requestor to indicate that it
understands the AD bit without also requesting DNSSEC data via the DO
bit.
4.8. Setting the CD bit on Requests When processing a request with the CD bit set, a resolver SHOULD
attempt to return all responsive data, even data that has failed
DNSSEC validation. RFC4035 section 3.2.2 requires a resolver
processing a request with the CD bit set to set the CD bit on its
upstream queries.
When processing a request with the CD bit set, the resolver MUST set The guidance in RFC4035 is ambiguous about what to do when a cached
the CD bit on its upstream queries. response was obtained with the CD bit not set. In the typical case,
no new query is required, nor does the cache need to track the state
of the CD bit used to make a given query. The problem arises when
the cached response is a server failure (RCODE 2), which may indicate
that the requested data failed DNSSEC validation at an upstream
validating resolver. (RFC2308 permits caching of server failures for
up to five minutes.) In these cases, a new query with the CD bit set
is required.
4.9. Nested Trust Anchors For efficiency, a validator may wish to set the CD bit on all
upstream queries when it has a trust anchor at or above the QNAME
(and thus can reasonably expect to be able to validate the response).
4.10. Nested Trust Anchors
A DNSSEC validator may be configured such that, for a given response, A DNSSEC validator may be configured such that, for a given response,
more than one trust anchor could be used to validate the chain of more than one trust anchor could be used to validate the chain of
trust to the response zone. For example, imagine a validator trust to the response zone. For example, imagine a validator
configured with trust anchors for "example." and "zone.example." configured with trust anchors for "example." and "zone.example."
When the validator is asked to validate a response to When the validator is asked to validate a response to
"www.sub.zone.example.", either trust anchor could apply. "www.sub.zone.example.", either trust anchor could apply.
When presented with this situation, DNSSEC validators SHOULD try all When presented with this situation, DNSSEC validators have a choice
applicable trust anchors until one succeeds. of which trust anchor(s) to use. Which to use is a matter of
implementation choice. It is possible and perhaps advisable to
expose the choice of policy as a configuration option. The rest of
this section discusses some possible policies. As a default, we
suggest that validators implement the "Accept Any Success" policy
described below in Section 4.10.2 while exposing other policies as
configuration options.
There are some scenarios where different behaviors, such as choosing 4.10.1. Closest Encloser
the trust anchor closest to the QNAME of the response, may be
desired. A DNSSEC validator MAY enable such behaviors as One policy is to choose the trust anchor closest to the QNAME of the
configurable overrides. response. In our example, that would be the "zone.example." trust
anchor.
This policy has the advantage of allowing the operator to trivially
override a parent zone's trust anchor with one that the operator can
validate in a stronger way, perhaps because the resolver operator is
affiliated with the zone in question. This policy also minimizes the
number of public key operations needed, which may be of benefit in
resource-constrained environments.
This policy has the disadvantage of possibly giving the user some
unexpected and unnecessary validation failures when sub-zone trust
anchors are neglected. As a concrete example, consider a validator
that configured a trust anchor for "zone.example." in 2009 and one
for "example." in 2011. In 2012, "zone.example." rolls its KSK and
updates its DS records, but the validator operator doesn't update its
trust anchor. With the "closest encloser" policy, the validator gets
validation failures.
4.10.2. Accept Any Success
Another policy is to try all applicable trust anchors until one gives
a validation result of Secure, in which case the final validation
result is Secure. If and only if all applicable trust anchors give a
result of Insecure, the final validation result is Insecure. If one
or more trust anchors lead to a Bogus result and there is no Secure
result, then the final validation result is Bogus.
This has the advantage of causing the fewer validation failures,
which may deliver a better user experience. If one trust anchor is
out of date (as in our above example), the user may still be able to
get a Secure validation result (and see DNS responses).
This policy has the disadvantage of making the validator subject to
compromise of the weakest of these trust anchors while making its
relatively painless to keep old trust anchors configured in
perpetuity.
4.10.3. Preference Based on Source
When the trust anchors have come from different sources (e.g.
automated updates ([RFC5011]), one or more DLV registries
([RFC5074]), and manually configured), a validator may wish to choose
between them based on the perceived reliability of those sources.
The order of precedence might be exposed as a configuration option.
For example, a validator might choose to prefer trust anchors found
in a DLV registry over those manually configured on the theory that
the manually configured ones will not be as aggressively maintained.
Conversely, a validator might choose to prefer manually configured
trust anchors over those obtained from a DLV registry on the theory
that the manually configured ones have been more carefully
authenticated.
Or the validator might do something more complicated: prefer a sub-
set of manually configured trust anchors (based on a configuration
option), then trust anchors that have been updated using the RFC5011
mechanism, then trust anchors from one DLV registry, then trust
anchors from a different DLV registry, then the rest of the manually
configured trust anchors.
5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications 5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications
5.1. Finding Zone Cuts 5.1. Finding Zone Cuts
Appendix C.8 of [RFC4035] discusses sending DS queries to the servers Appendix C.8 of [RFC4035] discusses sending DS queries to the servers
for a parent zone. To do that, a resolver may first need to apply for a parent zone. To do that, a resolver may first need to apply
special rules to discover what those servers are. special rules to discover what those servers are.
As explained in Section 3.1.4.1 of [RFC4035], security-aware name As explained in Section 3.1.4.1 of [RFC4035], security-aware name
skipping to change at page 10, line 35 skipping to change at page 12, line 29
validation algorithm clarifications in Section 3 are critical for validation algorithm clarifications in Section 3 are critical for
preserving the security properties DNSSEC offers. Furthermore, preserving the security properties DNSSEC offers. Furthermore,
failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 4 failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 4
could limit the ability to later change or expand DNSSEC, including could limit the ability to later change or expand DNSSEC, including
adding new algorithms. adding new algorithms.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256]
Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC",
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-14 (work in progress),
June 2009.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
RFC 1034, STD 13, November 1987. STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3225] Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC",
RFC 3225, December 2001.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005. RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005. RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer [RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008. Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
October 2009.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC3755] Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation [RFC3755] Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
Signer (DS)", RFC 3755, May 2004. Signer (DS)", RFC 3755, May 2004.
[RFC4641] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices", [RFC4641] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",
RFC 4641, September 2006. RFC 4641, September 2006.
[RFC4955] Blacka, D., "DNS Security (DNSSEC) Experiments", RFC 4955, [RFC4955] Blacka, D., "DNS Security (DNSSEC) Experiments", RFC 4955,
July 2007. July 2007.
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", RFC 5011, September 2007.
[RFC5074] Weiler, S., "DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV)", RFC 5074,
November 2007.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like the thank Rob Austein for his previous work as The editors would like the thank Rob Austein for his previous work as
an editor of this document. an editor of this document.
The editors are extremely grateful to those who, in addition to The editors are extremely grateful to those who, in addition to
finding errors and omissions in the DNSSECbis document set, have finding errors and omissions in the DNSSECbis document set, have
provided text suitable for inclusion in this document. provided text suitable for inclusion in this document.
The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as
skipping to change at page 12, line 8 skipping to change at page 14, line 9
The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in
Section 4.5, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake Section 4.5, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake
contributed text for Section 4.5. contributed text for Section 4.5.
The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 3.1 was found by The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 3.1 was found by
Roy Badami. Roy Arends found the related problem with DNAME. Roy Badami. Roy Arends found the related problem with DNAME.
The errors in the [RFC4035] examples were found by Roy Arends, who The errors in the [RFC4035] examples were found by Roy Arends, who
also contributed text for Section 5.3 of this document. also contributed text for Section 5.3 of this document.
The editors would like to thank Ed Lewis, Danny Mayer, Olafur The editors would like to thank Alfred Hoenes, Ed Lewis, Danny Mayer,
Gudmundsson, Suzanne Woolf, and Scott Rose for their substantive Olafur Gudmundsson, Suzanne Woolf, and Scott Rose for their
comments on the text of this document. substantive comments on the text of this document.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Samuel Weiler Samuel Weiler
SPARTA, Inc. SPARTA, Inc.
7110 Samuel Morse Drive 7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046 Columbia, Maryland 21046
US US
Email: weiler@tislabs.com Email: weiler@tislabs.com
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