draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-01.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-02.txt 
DNSEXT D. Blacka DNSEXT D. Blacka
Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc. Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc.
Expires: January 19, 2006 July 18, 2005 Expires: August 27, 2006 February 23, 2006
DNSSEC Experiments DNSSEC Experiments
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-01 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-02
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2006. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2006.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract Abstract
In the long history of the development of the DNS security extensions In the long history of the development of the DNS security extensions
[1] (DNSSEC), a number of alternate methodologies and modifications [1] (DNSSEC), a number of alternate methodologies and modifications
have been proposed and rejected for practical, rather than strictly have been proposed and rejected for practical, rather than strictly
technical, reasons. There is a desire to be able to experiment with technical, reasons. There is a desire to be able to experiment with
these alternate methods in the public DNS. This document describes a these alternate methods in the public DNS. This document describes a
methodology for deploying alternate, non-backwards-compatible, DNSSEC methodology for deploying alternate, non-backwards-compatible, DNSSEC
methodologies in an experimental fashion without disrupting the methodologies in an experimental fashion without disrupting the
deployment of standard DNSSEC. deployment of standard DNSSEC.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Defining an Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Defining an Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 14 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Definitions and Terminology 1. Definitions and Terminology
Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035 Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035
[4]) and the DNS security extensions ([1], [2], and [3]. [4]) and the DNS security extensions ([1], [2], and [3].
The key words "MUST, "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST, "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY, and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY, and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5].
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When discussing DNSSEC experiments, it is necessary to classify these When discussing DNSSEC experiments, it is necessary to classify these
experiments into two broad categories: experiments into two broad categories:
Backwards-Compatible: describes experimental changes that, while not Backwards-Compatible: describes experimental changes that, while not
strictly adhering to the DNSSEC standard, are nonetheless strictly adhering to the DNSSEC standard, are nonetheless
interoperable with clients and server that do implement the DNSSEC interoperable with clients and server that do implement the DNSSEC
standard. standard.
Non-Backwards-Compatible: describes experiments that would cause a Non-Backwards-Compatible: describes experiments that would cause a
standard DNSSEC-aware resolver to (incorrectly) determine that all standard DNSSEC-aware resolver to (incorrectly) determine that all
or part of a zone is bogus, or to otherwise not interoperable with or part of a zone is bogus, or to otherwise not interoperate with
standard DNSSEC clients and servers. standard DNSSEC clients and servers.
Not included in these terms are experiments with the core DNS Not included in these terms are experiments with the core DNS
protocol itself. protocol itself.
The methodology described in this document is not necessary for The methodology described in this document is not necessary for
backwards-compatible experiments, although it certainly could be used backwards-compatible experiments, although it certainly could be used
if desired. if desired.
Note that, in essence, this metholodolgy would also be used to Note that, in essence, this metholodology would also be used to
introduce a new DNSSEC algorithm, independently from any DNSSEC introduce a new DNSSEC algorithm, independently from any DNSSEC
experimental protocol change. experimental protocol change.
4. Method 4. Method
The core of the methodology is the use of strictly "unknown" The core of the methodology is the use of strictly "unknown"
algorithms to sign the experimental zone, and more importantly, algorithms to sign the experimental zone, and more importantly,
having only unknown algorithm DS records for the delegation to the having only unknown algorithm DS records for the delegation to the
zone at the parent. zone at the parent.
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for the existing, known algorithms. While, strictly speaking, it is for the existing, known algorithms. While, strictly speaking, it is
only necessary to create an alternate identifier for the mandatory only necessary to create an alternate identifier for the mandatory
algorithms, it is RECOMMENDED that all OPTIONAL defined algorithms be algorithms, it is RECOMMENDED that all OPTIONAL defined algorithms be
aliased as well. aliased as well.
It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a
particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then
the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for
experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is
chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are
defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and "5.dnssec- defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and
experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier will "5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier
suffice. will suffice.
Using this method, resolvers (or, more specificially, DNSSEC Using this method, resolvers (or, more specificially, DNSSEC
validators) essentially indicate their ability to understand the validators) essentially indicate their ability to understand the
DNSSEC experiment's semantics by understanding what the new algorithm DNSSEC experiment's semantics by understanding what the new algorithm
identifiers signify. identifiers signify.
This method creates two classes of DNSSEC-aware servers and This method creates two classes of DNSSEC-aware servers and
resolvers: servers and resolvers that are aware of the experiment resolvers: servers and resolvers that are aware of the experiment
(and thus recognize the experiments algorithm identifiers and (and thus recognize the experiments algorithm identifiers and
experimental semantics), and servers and resolvers that are unware of experimental semantics), and servers and resolvers that are unware of
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There are a number of considerations with using this methodology. There are a number of considerations with using this methodology.
1. Under some circumstances, it may be that the experiment will not 1. Under some circumstances, it may be that the experiment will not
be sufficiently masked by this technique and may cause resolution be sufficiently masked by this technique and may cause resolution
problem for resolvers not aware of the experiment. For instance, problem for resolvers not aware of the experiment. For instance,
the resolver may look at the not validatable response and the resolver may look at the not validatable response and
conclude that the response is bogus, either due to local policy conclude that the response is bogus, either due to local policy
or implementation details. This is not expected to be the common or implementation details. This is not expected to be the common
case, however. case, however.
2. In general, it will not be possible for DNSSEC-aware resolvers 2. It will not be possible for DNSSEC-aware resolvers not aware of
not aware of the experiment to build a chain of trust through an the experiment to build a chain of trust through an experimental
experimental zone. zone.
7. Transitions 7. Transitions
If an experiment is successful, there may be a desire to move the If an experiment is successful, there may be a desire to move the
experiment to a standards-track extension. One way to do so would be experiment to a standards-track extension. One way to do so would be
to move from private algorithm numbers to IANA allocated algorithm to move from private algorithm numbers to IANA allocated algorithm
numbers, with otherwise the same meaning. This would still leave a numbers, with otherwise the same meaning. This would still leave a
divide between resolvers that understood the extension versus divide between resolvers that understood the extension versus
resolvers that did not. It would, in essence, create an additional resolvers that did not. It would, in essence, create an additional
version of DNSSEC. version of DNSSEC.
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9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
IANA may need to allocate new DNSSEC algorithm numbers if that IANA may need to allocate new DNSSEC algorithm numbers if that
transition approach is taken, or the experiment decides to use transition approach is taken, or the experiment decides to use
allocated numbers to begin with. No IANA action is required to allocated numbers to begin with. No IANA action is required to
deploy an experiment using private algorithm identifiers. deploy an experiment using private algorithm identifiers.
10. References 10. References
10.1 Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[1] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [1] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005. March 2005.
[2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005. March 2005.
[3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005. RFC 4035, March 2005.
10.2 Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[4] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [4] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[6] Weiler, S., "Clarifications and Implementation Notes for [6] Austein, R. and S. Weiler, "Clarifications and Implementation
DNSSECbis", draft-weiler-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-00 (work in Notes for DNSSECbis", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-02
progress), March 2005. (work in progress), January 2006.
Author's Address Author's Address
David Blacka David Blacka
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
21355 Ridgetop Circle 21355 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166 Dulles, VA 20166
US US
Phone: +1 703 948 3200 Phone: +1 703 948 3200
Email: davidb@verisign.com Email: davidb@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com
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ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
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Acknowledgment Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society. Internet Society.
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