draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-04.txt   rfc4955.txt 
DNSEXT D. Blacka Network Working Group D. Blacka
Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc. Request for Comments: 4955 VeriSign, Inc.
Intended status: Best Current March 20, 2007
Practice
Expires: September 21, 2007
DNSSEC Experiments
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-04
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a methodology for deploying alternate, non- This document describes a methodology for deploying alternate, non-
backwards-compatible, DNSSEC methodologies in an experimental fashion backwards-compatible, DNS Security (DNSSEC) methodologies in an
without disrupting the deployment of standard DNSSEC. experimental fashion without disrupting the deployment of standard
DNSSEC.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Defining an Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Defining an Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Use in Non-Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Use in Non-Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Definitions and Terminology
Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035
[5]) and the DNS security extensions (RFC 4033 [2], RFC 4034 [3], and
RFC 4035 [4]) is assumed.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
2. Overview 1. Overview
Historically, experimentation with DNSSEC alternatives has been a Historically, experimentation with DNSSEC alternatives has been a
problematic endeavor. There has typically been a desire to both problematic endeavor. There has typically been a desire to both
introduce non-backwards-compatible changes to DNSSEC and to try these introduce non-backwards-compatible changes to DNSSEC and to try these
changes on real zones in the public DNS. This creates a problem when changes on real zones in the public DNS. This creates a problem when
the change to DNSSEC would make all or part of the zone using those the change to DNSSEC would make all or part of the zone using those
changes appear bogus (bad) or otherwise broken to existing security- changes appear bogus (bad) or otherwise broken to existing security-
aware resolvers. aware resolvers.
This document describes a standard methodology for setting up DNSSEC This document describes a standard methodology for setting up DNSSEC
experiments. This methodology addresses the issue of co-existence experiments. This methodology addresses the issue of coexistence
with standard DNSSEC and DNS by using unknown algorithm identifiers with standard DNSSEC and DNS by using unknown algorithm identifiers
to hide the experimental DNSSEC protocol modifications from standard to hide the experimental DNSSEC protocol modifications from standard
security-aware resolvers. security-aware resolvers.
2. Definitions and Terminology
Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035
[5]) and the DNS security extensions (RFC 4033 [2], RFC 4034 [3], and
RFC 4035 [4]) is assumed.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
3. Experiments 3. Experiments
When discussing DNSSEC experiments, it is necessary to classify these When discussing DNSSEC experiments, it is necessary to classify these
experiments into two broad categories: experiments into two broad categories:
Backwards-Compatible: describes experimental changes that, while not Backwards-Compatible: describes experimental changes that, while not
strictly adhering to the DNSSEC standard, are nonetheless strictly adhering to the DNSSEC standard, are nonetheless
interoperable with clients and servers that do implement the interoperable with clients and servers that do implement the
DNSSEC standard. DNSSEC standard.
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of trust to a child zone, then it can only do one of two things: of trust to a child zone, then it can only do one of two things:
treat responses from the zone as insecure (the recommended behavior), treat responses from the zone as insecure (the recommended behavior),
or treat the responses as bogus. If the validator chooses the or treat the responses as bogus. If the validator chooses the
latter, this will both violate the expectation of the zone owner and latter, this will both violate the expectation of the zone owner and
defeat the purpose of the above rule. However, with local policy, it defeat the purpose of the above rule. However, with local policy, it
is within the right of a validator to refuse to trust certain zones is within the right of a validator to refuse to trust certain zones
based on any criteria, including the use of unknown signing based on any criteria, including the use of unknown signing
algorithms. algorithms.
Because we are talking about experiments, it is RECOMMENDED that Because we are talking about experiments, it is RECOMMENDED that
private algorithm numbers be used (see RFC 4034 [3], appendix A.1.1. private algorithm numbers be used (see RFC 4034 [3], Appendix A.1.1.
Note that secure handling of private algorithms requires special Note that secure handling of private algorithms requires special
handing by the validator logic. See draft-ietf-dnssec-bis-updates handing by the validator logic. See "Clarifications and
[6] for further details.) Normally, instead of actually inventing Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis" [6] for further details.)
new signing algorithms, the recommended path is to create alternate Normally, instead of actually inventing new signing algorithms, the
algorithm identifiers that are aliases for the existing, known recommended path is to create alternate algorithm identifiers that
algorithms. While, strictly speaking, it is only necessary to create are aliases for the existing, known algorithms. While, strictly
an alternate identifier for the mandatory algorithms, it is suggested speaking, it is only necessary to create an alternate identifier for
that all optional defined algorithms be aliased as well. the mandatory algorithms, it is suggested that all optional defined
algorithms be aliased as well.
It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a
particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then
the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for
experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is
chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are
defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and
"5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier "5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier
will suffice. will suffice.
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of the experiment. of the experiment.
This method also precludes any zone from being both in an experiment This method also precludes any zone from being both in an experiment
and in a classic DNSSEC island of security. That is, a zone is and in a classic DNSSEC island of security. That is, a zone is
either in an experiment and only possible to validate experimentally, either in an experiment and only possible to validate experimentally,
or it is not. or it is not.
5. Defining an Experiment 5. Defining an Experiment
The DNSSEC experiment MUST define the particular set of (previously The DNSSEC experiment MUST define the particular set of (previously
unknown) algorithm identifiers that identify the experiment, and unknown) algorithm identifiers that identify the experiment and
define what each unknown algorithm identifier means. Typically, define what each unknown algorithm identifier means. Typically,
unless the experiment is actually experimenting with a new DNSSEC unless the experiment is actually experimenting with a new DNSSEC
algorithm, this will be a mapping of private algorithm identifiers to algorithm, this will be a mapping of private algorithm identifiers to
existing, known algorithms. existing, known algorithms.
Normally the experiment will choose a DNS name as the algorithm Normally the experiment will choose a DNS name as the algorithm
identifier base. This DNS name SHOULD be under the control of the identifier base. This DNS name SHOULD be under the control of the
authors of the experiment. Then the experiment will define a mapping authors of the experiment. Then the experiment will define a mapping
between known mandatory and optional algorithms into this private between known mandatory and optional algorithms into this private
algorithm identifier space. Alternately, the experiment MAY use the algorithm identifier space. Alternately, the experiment MAY use the
OID private algorithm space instead (using algorithm number 254), or Object Identifier (OID) private algorithm space instead (using
MAY choose non-private algorithm numbers, although this would require algorithm number 254), or MAY choose non-private algorithm numbers,
an IANA allocation. although this would require an IANA allocation.
For example, an experiment might specify in its description the DNS For example, an experiment might specify in its description the DNS
name "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" as the base name, and declare name "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" as the base name, and declare
that "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is an alias of DNSSEC that "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is an alias of DNSSEC
algorithm 3 (DSA), and that "5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is an algorithm 3 (DSA), and that "5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is an
alias of DNSSEC algorithm 5 (RSASHA1). alias of DNSSEC algorithm 5 (RSASHA1).
Resolvers MUST only recognize the experiment's semantics when present Resolvers MUST only recognize the experiment's semantics when present
in a zone signed by one or more of these algorithm identifiers. This in a zone signed by one or more of these algorithm identifiers. This
is necessary to isolate the semantics of one experiment from any is necessary to isolate the semantics of one experiment from any
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8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Zones using this methodology will be considered insecure by all Zones using this methodology will be considered insecure by all
resolvers except those aware of the experiment. It is not generally resolvers except those aware of the experiment. It is not generally
possible to create a secure delegation from an experimental zone that possible to create a secure delegation from an experimental zone that
will be followed by resolvers unaware of the experiment. will be followed by resolvers unaware of the experiment.
Implementers should take into account any security issues that may Implementers should take into account any security issues that may
result from environments being configured to trust both experimental result from environments being configured to trust both experimental
and non-experimental zones. If the experimental zone is more and non-experimental zones. If the experimental zone is more
vulnerable to attacks, it could, for example, be used promote trust vulnerable to attacks, it could, for example, be used to promote
in zones not part of the experiment, possibly under the control of an trust in zones not part of the experiment, possibly under the control
attacker. of an attacker.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References 9. References
10.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005. March 2005.
[3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005. March 2005.
[4] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, [4] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005. RFC 4035, March 2005.
10.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[5] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [5] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[6] Austein, R. and S. Weiler, "Clarifications and Implementation [6] Weiler, S. and R. Austein, "Clarifications and Implementation
Notes for DNSSECbis", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-02 Notes for DNSSECbis", Work in Progress, March 2007.
(work in progress), January 2006.
Author's Address Author's Address
David Blacka David Blacka
VeriSign, Inc. VeriSign, Inc.
21355 Ridgetop Circle 21355 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166 Dulles, VA 20166
US US
Phone: +1 703 948 3200 Phone: +1 703 948 3200
Email: davidb@verisign.com EMail: davidb@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
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such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Internet Society.
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