DNS Extensions working group J. Jansen Internet-Draft NLnet Labs Expires:
July 5, 2006 January 2006June 13, 2008 December 11, 2007 Use of RSA/SHA-256SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records infor DNSSEC draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-01draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-02 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2006.June 13, 2008. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).IETF Trust (2007). Abstract This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC4033, RFC4034, and RFC4035). Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records . . . 3. . . . . . . . . 4 4. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. 5 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. 5 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.1. 5 6.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-256SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG resource records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2. 5 6.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. 6 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.16 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.26 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. . 7 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 7. . 8 1. Introduction The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed database for Internet Addressing. The DNS has been extended to use digital signatures andcryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the integrity of its data. RFC4033 , RFC4034 , and RFC4035  describe these DNS Security Extensions.Extensions, called DNSSEC. RFC4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records, and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This document extends that list with the algorithm RSA/SHA-256,RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, and specifies how to store RSA/SHA-256DNSKEY data and how to produce RSA/SHA-256RRSIG resource records.records with these hash algorithms. Familiarity with theDNSSEC, RSA  and SHA-256the SHA-2  family of algorithms is assumed in this document. To refer to both SHA-256 and SHA-512, this document will use the name SHA-2. This is done to improve readability. When a part of text is specific for either SHA-256 or SHA-512, their specific names are used. The same goes for RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, which will be grouped using the name RSA/SHA-2. 2. DNSKEY Resource Records The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC4034  and RFC3110 . 2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-256 are stored in DNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number [TBA]. The format ofFor use with NSEC3, the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC4034  and RFC3110 . 3.algorithm number of RSA/SHA-256 RRSIGwill be [TBA]. 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records RSA/SHA-256 signaturesRSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-512 are stored in the DNS using RRSIGDNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number [TBA]. For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-512 will be [TBA]. 3. RRSIG Resource Records The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR is calculated as follows. The values for the fields that precede the signature data are specified in RFC4034 . hash = SHA-256(data)SHA-XXX(data) Where XXX is either 256 or 512, depending on the algorithm used. signature = ( 00 | 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash ) ** e (mod n) Where SHA-256SHA-XXX is the message digest algorithm as specified in FIPS 180 , | is concatenation, 00, 01, FF and 00 are fixed octets of corresponding hexadecimal value, "e" is the private exponent of the signing RSA key, and "n" is the public modulus of the signing key. The FF octet MUST be repeated the maximum number of times so that the total length of the signature equals the length of the modulus of the signer's public key ("n"). "data" is the data of the resource record set that is signed, as specified in RFC4034 . The prefix isshould make the ASN.1 BER SHA-256use of standard cryptographic libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly from PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2 . The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified below. 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records RSA/SHA-256 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource records (RRs) with algorithm number [TBA]. The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix as specified in PKCS 2.1 : hex 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 This3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records RSA/SHA-512 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource records (RRs) with algorithm number [TBA]. The prefix should makeis the use of standard cryptographic libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly fromASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix as specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2 .2.1 : hex 30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40 4. Implementation Considerations DNSSEC aware implementations MUSTSHOULD be able to support RRSIG resource records with the RSA/SHA-256 algorithm.RSA/SHA-2 algorithms. If both RSA/SHA-256RSA/SHA-2 and RSA/SHA-1 RRSIG resource records are available for a certain rrset, with a secure path to their keys, the validator SHOULD ignore the SHA-1 signature. If the RSA/SHA-256RSA/SHA-2 signature does not verify the data, and the RSA/SHA-1 signature does, the validator SHOULD mark the data with the security status from the RSA/ SHA-256RSA/SHA-2 signature. 5. IANA Considerations IANA has not yet assigned an algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256.RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512. The algorithm list from RFC4034 Appendix A.1  is extended with the following entry:entries: Zone Value Algorithm [Mnemonic] Signing References Status ----- ----------- ----------- --------------- ---------- --------- [tba]-------- [TBA] RSA/SHA-256 [RSASHA256] y [TBA] MANDATORYOPTIONAL [TBA] RSA/SHA-256-NSEC3 [RSASHA256NSEC3] y [TBA] OPTIONAL [TBA] RSA/SHA-512 [RSASHA512] y [TBA] OPTIONAL [TBA] RSA/SHA-512-NSEC3 [RSASHA512NSEC3] y [TBA] OPTIONAL 6. Security Considerations 6.16.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-256SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG resource records Users of DNSSEC are encouraged to deploy SHA-256SHA-2 as soon as software implementations allow for it. SHA-256SHA-2 is widely believed to be more resilient to attack than SHA-1, and confidence in SHA-1's strength is being eroded by recently-announced attacks. Regardless of whether or not the attacks on SHA-1 will affect DNSSEC, it is believed (at the time of this writing) that SHA-256SHA-2 is the better choice for use in DSDNSSEC records. SHA-256SHA-2 is considered sufficiently strong for the immediate future, but predictions about future development in cryptography and cryptanalysis are beyond the scope of this document. 6.26.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks Since each RRset MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRset at the zone apex (see  Section 2.2), a malicious party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA256RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the validator to use the RSA/SHA1RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone. Together with the implementation considerations from Section 4 of this document, this provides resilience against algorithm downgrade attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA256.RSA/SHA-2. 7. Acknowledgments This document is a minor extension to RFC4034 . Also, we try to follow the documents RFC3110  and draft-ietf-dnsext-ds-sha256.txtRFC4509  for consistency. The authors of and contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work. The following people provided additional feedback and text: Jaap Akkerhuis, Rob Austein, Miek GiebenGieben, Scott Rose and Wouter Wijngaards. 8. References 8.18.1. Normative References  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, March 2005.  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, March 2005.  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002.  Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. 8.28.2. Informative References  Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols, algorithms, and source code in C", Wiley and Sons , ISBN 0-471- 11709-9, 1996.  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", Work in Progress FebRFC 4509, May 2006. Author's Address Jelte Jansen NLnet Labs Kruislaan 419 Amsterdam 1098VA NL Email: jelte@NLnetLabs.nl URI: http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intellectual Property StatementThe IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at email@example.com. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currentlyprovided by the Internet Society.IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA).