draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-04.txt 
DNS Extensions working group J. Jansen DNS Extensions working group J. Jansen
Internet-Draft NLnet Labs Internet-Draft NLnet Labs
Expires: August 19, 2008 February 16, 2008 Intended status: Standards Track April 11, 2008
Expires: October 13, 2008
Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
for DNSSEC for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-04
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512
DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035). Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).
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2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Support for SHA-1 and SHA-2 signatures . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Support for NSEC3 denial of existence . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource 7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource
Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [1], RFC 4034 [2], and RFC 4035 [3] integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [1], RFC 4034 [2], and RFC 4035 [3]
describe these DNS Security Extensions, called DNSSEC. describe these DNS Security Extensions, called DNSSEC.
RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records, RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This
document extends that list with the algorithms RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/ document extends that list with the algorithms RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/
SHA-512, and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce SHA-512, and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms. RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
Familiarity with DNSSEC, RSA [7] and the SHA-2 [5] family of Familiarity with DNSSEC, RSA [8] and the SHA-2 [5] family of
algorithms is assumed in this document. algorithms is assumed in this document.
To refer to both SHA-256 and SHA-512, this document will use the name To refer to both SHA-256 and SHA-512, this document will use the name
SHA-2. This is done to improve readability. When a part of text is SHA-2. This is done to improve readability. When a part of text is
specific for either SHA-256 or SHA-512, their specific names are specific for either SHA-256 or SHA-512, their specific names are
used. The same goes for RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, which will be used. The same goes for RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, which will be
grouped using the name RSA/SHA-2. grouped using the name RSA/SHA-2.
2. DNSKEY Resource Records 2. DNSKEY Resource Records
The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [2] and RFC 3110 The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [2] and RFC 3110
[6]. [6].
2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records 2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records
RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-256 are stored in DNSKEY RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-256 are stored in DNSKEY
resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA1}. resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA1}.
For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-256 will be
{TBA2}.
The key size for RSA/SHA-256 keys MUST NOT be less than 512 bits, and The key size for RSA/SHA-256 keys MUST NOT be less than 512 bits, and
MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits. MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits.
2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records
RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-512 are stored in DNSKEY RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-512 are stored in DNSKEY
resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA3}. resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA2}.
For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-512 will be
{TBA4}.
The key size for RSA/SHA-512 keys MUST NOT be less than 1024 bits, The key size for RSA/SHA-512 keys MUST NOT be less than 1024 bits,
and MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits. and MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits.
3. RRSIG Resource Records 3. RRSIG Resource Records
The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follow the RSASSA- The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follow the RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, and is calculated as follows. The PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, and is calculated as follows. The
values for the RDATA fields that precede the signature data are values for the RDATA fields that precede the signature data are
specified in RFC 4034 [2]. specified in RFC 4034 [2].
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the resource record set that is signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [2]. the resource record set that is signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [2].
The "prefix" is intended to make the use of standard cryptographic The "prefix" is intended to make the use of standard cryptographic
libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly from the libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly from the
specification of EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2 specification of EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2
[4]. The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified below. [4]. The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified below.
3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records
RSA/SHA-256 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource RSA/SHA-256 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource
records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA1} for use with NSEC, or records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA1}.
{TBA2} for use with NSEC3.
The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix as The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix as
specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]: specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]:
hex 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 hex 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20
3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records 3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records
RSA/SHA-512 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource RSA/SHA-512 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource
records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA3} for use with NSEC, or records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA2}.
{TBA4} for use with NSEC3.
The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix as The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix as
specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]: specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]:
hex 30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40 hex 30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40
4. Deployment Considerations 4. Deployment Considerations
4.1. Key Sizes 4.1. Key Sizes
Apart from prohibiting RSA/SHA-512 signatures smaller than 1024 Apart from prohibiting RSA/SHA-512 signatures smaller than 1024
bytes, this document will not specify what size of keys to use. That bytes, this document will not specify what size of keys to use. That
is more an operational issue and depends largely on the environment is an operational issue and depends largely on the environment and
and intended use. Some good starting points might be DNSSEC intended use. Some good starting points for more information might
Operational Practises [9], section 3.5, and NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 be DNSSEC Operational Practises [10], section 3.5, and NIST SP 800-57
[10] and Part 3 [11]. Part 1 [11] and Part 3 [12].
4.2. Signature Sizes 4.2. Signature Sizes
In this family of signing algorithms, the size of signatures is In this family of signing algorithms, the size of signatures is
related to the size of the key, and not the hashing algorithm used in related to the size of the key, and not the hashing algorithm used in
the signing process. Therefore, RRSIG resource records produced with the signing process. Therefore, RRSIG resource records produced with
RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512 shall have the same size as those produced RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512 shall have the same size as those produced
with RSA/SHA1, if the keys have the same length. with RSA/SHA1, if the keys have the same length.
5. Implementation Considerations 5. Implementation Considerations
5.1. Support for SHA-1 and SHA-2 signatures
DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG resource DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG resource
records with the RSA/SHA-2 algorithms. records with the RSA/SHA-2 algorithms.
If both RSA/SHA-2 and RSA/SHA-1 RRSIG resource records are available If both RSA/SHA-2 and RSA/SHA-1 RRSIG resource records are available
for a certain RRset, with a secure path to their keys, the validator for a certain RRset, with a secure path to their keys, the validator
SHOULD ignore the SHA-1 signature. If the RSA/SHA-2 signature does SHOULD ignore the SHA-1 signature. If the RSA/SHA-2 signature does
not verify the data, and the RSA/SHA-1 signature does, the validator not verify the data, and the RSA/SHA-1 signature does, the validator
SHOULD mark the data with the security status from the RSA/SHA-2 SHOULD mark the data with the security status from the RSA/SHA-2
signature. signature.
5.2. Support for NSEC3 denial of existence
Implementations that have support for RSA/SHA-2 MUST also have
support for NSEC3 denial of existence, as specified in RFC 5155 [7].
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
IANA has not yet assigned an algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256 and IANA has not yet assigned an algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256 and
RSA/SHA-512. RSA/SHA-512.
The algorithm list from RFC 4034 Appendix A.1 [2] is extended with The algorithm list from RFC 4034 Appendix A.1 [2] is extended with
the following entries: the following entries:
Zone Zone
Value Algorithm [Mnemonic] Signing References Status Value Algorithm [Mnemonic] Signing References Status
----- ----------- ----------- ------- ----------- -------- ----- ----------- ----------- ------- ----------- --------
{TBA1} RSA/SHA-256 RSASHA256 y {this memo} OPTIONAL {TBA1} RSA/SHA-256 RSASHA256 y {this memo} OPTIONAL
{TBA2} RSA/SHA-256-NSEC3 RSASHA256NSEC3 y {this memo} OPTIONAL {TBA2} RSA/SHA-512 RSASHA512 y {this memo} OPTIONAL
{TBA3} RSA/SHA-512 RSASHA512 y {this memo} OPTIONAL
{TBA4} RSA/SHA-512-NSEC3 RSASHA512NSEC3 y {this memo} OPTIONAL
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource Records 7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource Records
Users of DNSSEC are encouraged to deploy SHA-2 as soon as software Users of DNSSEC are encouraged to deploy SHA-2 as soon as software
implementations allow for it. SHA-2 is widely believed to be more implementations allow for it. SHA-2 is widely believed to be more
resilient to attack than SHA-1, and confidence in SHA-1's strength is resilient to attack than SHA-1, and confidence in SHA-1's strength is
being eroded by recently-announced attacks. Regardless of whether or being eroded by recently-announced attacks. Regardless of whether or
not the attacks on SHA-1 will affect DNSSEC, it is believed (at the not the attacks on SHA-1 will affect DNSSEC, it is believed (at the
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DNSKEY RRset at the zone apex (see [3] Section 2.2), a malicious DNSKEY RRset at the zone apex (see [3] Section 2.2), a malicious
party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the validator party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the validator
to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone. to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone.
Together with the implementation considerations from Section 5 of Together with the implementation considerations from Section 5 of
this document, this provides resilience against algorithm downgrade this document, this provides resilience against algorithm downgrade
attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2. attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [2]. Also, we try to This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [2]. Also, we try to
follow the documents RFC 3110 [6] and RFC 4509 [8] for consistency. follow the documents RFC 3110 [6] and RFC 4509 [9] for consistency.
The authors of and contributors to these documents are gratefully The authors of and contributors to these documents are gratefully
acknowledged for their hard work. acknowledged for their hard work.
The following people provided additional feedback and text: Jaap The following people provided additional feedback and text: Jaap
Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Rob Austein, Miek Gieben, Alfred Hoenes, Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Rob Austein, Miek Gieben, Alfred Hoenes,
Michael St. Johns, Scott Rose and Wouter Wijngaards. Michael St. Johns, Scott Rose and Wouter Wijngaards.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
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[4] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards [4] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1",
RFC 3447, February 2003. RFC 3447, February 2003.
[5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash [5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002. Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002.
[6] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name [6] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[7] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence",
RFC 5155, March 2008.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[7] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols, [8] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols,
algorithms, and source code in C", Wiley and Sons , ISBN 0-471- algorithms, and source code in C", Wiley and Sons , ISBN 0-471-
11709-9, 1996. 11709-9, 1996.
[8] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) [9] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS)
Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
[9] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices", [10] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",
RFC 4641, September 2006. RFC 4641, September 2006.
[10] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid, [11] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
"Recommendations for Key Management Part 1: General", NIST "Recommendations for Key Management Part 1: General", NIST
SP 800-57 Part 1, March 2007. SP 800-57 Part 1, March 2007.
[11] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Jones, A., Polk, W., Smid, [12] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Jones, A., Polk, W., Smid,
M., and S. Rose, "Recommendations for Key Management Part 3: M., and S. Rose, "Recommendations for Key Management Part 3:
Application-Specific Key Guidance", NIST SP 800-57 Part 3, Application-Specific Key Guidance", NIST SP 800-57 Part 3,
March 2007. March 2007.
Author's Address Author's Address
Jelte Jansen Jelte Jansen
NLnet Labs NLnet Labs
Kruislaan 419 Kruislaan 419
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