draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-05.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt 
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Expires: February 2005 August 2004 Expires: June 2005 December 2004
Elliptic Curve KEYs in the DNS Elliptic Curve KEYs in the DNS
-------- ----- ---- -- --- --- -------- ----- ---- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-05.txt> <draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt>
Richard C. Schroeppel Richard C. Schroeppel
Donald Eastlake 3rd Donald Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
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material or to cite them other than a "work in progress." material or to cite them other than a "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Abstract Abstract
The standard method for storing elliptic curve cryptographic keys in The standard method for storing elliptic curve cryptographic keys and
the Domain Name System is specified. signatures in the Domain Name System is specified.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Acknowledgement Acknowledgement
The assistance of Hilarie K. Orman in the production of this document The assistance of Hilarie K. Orman in the production of this document
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Abstract...................................................1 Abstract...................................................1
Copyright Notice...........................................1 Copyright Notice...........................................1
Acknowledgement............................................2 Acknowledgement............................................2
Table of Contents..........................................2 Table of Contents..........................................2
1. Introduction............................................3 1. Introduction............................................3
2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records.................3 2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records.................3
3. The Elliptic Curve Equation.............................9 3. The Elliptic Curve Equation.............................9
4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y?..........................10 4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y?..........................10
5. Performance Considerations.............................11 5. Elliptic Curve SIG Resource Records....................11
6. Security Considerations................................11 6. Performance Considerations.............................13
7. IANA Considerations....................................11 7. Security Considerations................................13
Copyright and Disclaimer..................................12 8. IANA Considerations....................................13
Copyright and Disclaimer..................................14
Informational References..................................13 Informational References..................................15
Normative Refrences.......................................13 Normative Refrences.......................................15
Authors Addresses.........................................14 Author's Addresses........................................16
Expiration and File Name..................................14 Expiration and File Name..................................16
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
other information. The DNS has been extended to include digital other information. The DNS has been extended to include digital
signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC intro, signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC intro,
protocol, records]. protocol, records].
This document describes how to store elliptic curve cryptographic This document describes how to store elliptic curve cryptographic
(ECC) keys in the DNS so they can be used for a variety of security (ECC) keys and signatures in the DNS so they can be used for a
purposes. A DNS elliptic curve SIG resource record is not defined. variety of security purposes. Familiarity with ECC cryptography is
Familiarity with ECC cryptography is assumed [Menezes]. assumed [Menezes].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records 2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records
Elliptic curve public keys are stored in the DNS within the RDATA Elliptic curve public keys are stored in the DNS within the RDATA
portions of key RRs with the structure shown below [RFC records]. portions of key RRs, such as RRKEY and KEY [RFC records] RRs, with
the structure shown below.
The period of key validity may not be in the RR with the key but
could be indicated by RR(s) with signatures that authenticates the
RR(s) containing the key.
The research world continues to work on the issue of which is the The research world continues to work on the issue of which is the
best elliptic curve system, which finite field to use, and how to best elliptic curve system, which finite field to use, and how to
best represent elements in the field. So, representations are best represent elements in the field. So, representations are
defined for every type of finite field, and every type of elliptic defined for every type of finite field, and every type of elliptic
curve. The reader should be aware that there is a unique finite curve. The reader should be aware that there is a unique finite
field with a particular number of elements, but many possible field with a particular number of elements, but many possible
representations of that field and its elements. If two different representations of that field and its elements. If two different
representations of a field are given, they are interconvertible with representations of a field are given, they are interconvertible with
a tedious but practical precomputation, followed by a fast a tedious but practical precomputation, followed by a fast
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When FMT=2, the field polynomial is specified implicitly. No other When FMT=2, the field polynomial is specified implicitly. No other
parameters are required to define the field; the next parameters parameters are required to define the field; the next parameters
present will be the LQ,Q pair. The implicit field poynomial is the present will be the LQ,Q pair. The implicit field poynomial is the
lexicographically smallest irreducible (mod P) polynomial of the lexicographically smallest irreducible (mod P) polynomial of the
correct degree. The ordering of polynomials is by highest-degree correct degree. The ordering of polynomials is by highest-degree
coefficients first -- the leading coefficient 1 is most important, coefficients first -- the leading coefficient 1 is most important,
and the constant term is least important. Coefficients are ordered and the constant term is least important. Coefficients are ordered
by sign-magnitude: 0 < 1 < -1 < 2 < -2 < ... The first polynomial of by sign-magnitude: 0 < 1 < -1 < 2 < -2 < ... The first polynomial of
degree D is X^D (which is not irreducible). The next is X^D+1, which degree D is X^D (which is not irreducible). The next is X^D+1, which
is sometimes irreducible, followed by X^D-1, which isnt. Assuming is sometimes irreducible, followed by X^D-1, which isn't. Assuming
odd P, this series continues to X^D - (P-1)/2, and then goes to X^D + odd P, this series continues to X^D - (P-1)/2, and then goes to X^D +
X, X^D + X + 1, X^D + X - 1, etc. X, X^D + X + 1, X^D + X - 1, etc.
When FMT=3, the field polynomial is a binomial, X^DEG + K. P must be When FMT=3, the field polynomial is a binomial, X^DEG + K. P must be
odd. The polynomial is determined by the degree and the low order odd. The polynomial is determined by the degree and the low order
term K. Of all the field parameters, only the LK,K parameters are term K. Of all the field parameters, only the LK,K parameters are
present. The high-order bit of the LK octet stores on optional sign present. The high-order bit of the LK octet stores on optional sign
for K; if the sign bit is present, the field polynomial is X^DEG - K. for K; if the sign bit is present, the field polynomial is X^DEG - K.
When FMT=4, the field polynomial is a trinomial, X^DEG + H*X^DEGH + When FMT=4, the field polynomial is a trinomial, X^DEG + H*X^DEGH +
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P). When P=2 or 3, the flag B selects an alternate curve P). When P=2 or 3, the flag B selects an alternate curve
equation. equation.
LC,C is the third parameter of the elliptic curve equation, LC,C is the third parameter of the elliptic curve equation,
present only when P=2 (indicated by flag M=0) and flag B=1. present only when P=2 (indicated by flag M=0) and flag B=1.
LG,G defines a point on the curve, of order Q. The W-coordinate LG,G defines a point on the curve, of order Q. The W-coordinate
of the curve point is given explicitly; the Z-coordinate is of the curve point is given explicitly; the Z-coordinate is
implicit. implicit.
LY,Y is the users public signing key, another curve point of LY,Y is the user's public signing key, another curve point of
order Q. The W-coordinate is given explicitly; the Z- order Q. The W-coordinate is given explicitly; the Z-
coordinate is implicit. The LY,Y parameter pair is always coordinate is implicit. The LY,Y parameter pair is always
present. present.
3. The Elliptic Curve Equation 3. The Elliptic Curve Equation
(The coordinates of an elliptic curve point are named W,Z instead of (The coordinates of an elliptic curve point are named W,Z instead of
the more usual X,Y to avoid confusion with the Y parameter of the the more usual X,Y to avoid confusion with the Y parameter of the
signing key.) signing key.)
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A*W^2 + B. Z,W,A,B are all elements of the field GF[2^N]. The A A*W^2 + B. Z,W,A,B are all elements of the field GF[2^N]. The A
parameter can often be 0 or 1, or be chosen as a single-1-bit value. parameter can often be 0 or 1, or be chosen as a single-1-bit value.
The flag B is used to select an alternate curve equation, Z^2 + C*Z = The flag B is used to select an alternate curve equation, Z^2 + C*Z =
W^3 + A*W + B. This is the only time that the C parameter is used. W^3 + A*W + B. This is the only time that the C parameter is used.
4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y? 4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y?
The number of points on the curve is the number of solutions to the The number of points on the curve is the number of solutions to the
curve equation, + 1 (for the "point at infinity"). The prime Q must curve equation, + 1 (for the "point at infinity"). The prime Q must
divide the number of points. Usually the curve is chosen first, then divide the number of points. Usually the curve is chosen first, then
the number of points is determined with Schoofs algorithm. This the number of points is determined with Schoof's algorithm. This
number is factored, and if it has a large prime divisor, that number number is factored, and if it has a large prime divisor, that number
is taken as Q. is taken as Q.
G must be a point of order Q on the curve, satisfying the equation G must be a point of order Q on the curve, satisfying the equation
Q * G = the point at infinity (on the elliptic curve) Q * G = the point at infinity (on the elliptic curve)
G may be chosen by selecting a random [RFC 1750] curve point, and G may be chosen by selecting a random [RFC 1750] curve point, and
multiplying it by (number-of-points-on-curve/Q). G must not itself multiplying it by (number-of-points-on-curve/Q). G must not itself
be the "point at infinity"; in this astronomically unlikely event, a be the "point at infinity"; in this astronomically unlikely event, a
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In the (mod P) case, the two possible Z values sum to P. The smaller In the (mod P) case, the two possible Z values sum to P. The smaller
value is less than P/2; it is used in subsequent calculations. In value is less than P/2; it is used in subsequent calculations. In
GF[P^D] fields, the highest-degree non-zero coefficient of the field GF[P^D] fields, the highest-degree non-zero coefficient of the field
element Z is used; it is chosen to be less than P/2. element Z is used; it is chosen to be less than P/2.
In the GF[2^N] case, the two possible Z values xor to W (or to the In the GF[2^N] case, the two possible Z values xor to W (or to the
parameter C with the alternate curve equation). The numerically parameter C with the alternate curve equation). The numerically
smaller Z value (the one which does not contain the highest-order 1 smaller Z value (the one which does not contain the highest-order 1
bit of W (or C)) is used in subsequent calculations. bit of W (or C)) is used in subsequent calculations.
Y is specified by giving the W-coordinate of the users public Y is specified by giving the W-coordinate of the user's public
signature key. The Z-coordinate value is determined from the curve signature key. The Z-coordinate value is determined from the curve
equation. As with G, there are two possible Z values; the same rule equation. As with G, there are two possible Z values; the same rule
is followed for choosing which Z to use. is followed for choosing which Z to use.
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
During the key generation process, a random [RFC 1750] number X must During the key generation process, a random [RFC 1750] number X must
be generated such that 1 <= X <= Q-1. X is the private key and is be generated such that 1 <= X <= Q-1. X is the private key and is
used in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed used in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed
as as
Y = X * G (as points on the elliptic curve) Y = X * G (as points on the elliptic curve)
If the Z-coordinate of the computed point Y is wrong (i.e., Z > P/2 If the Z-coordinate of the computed point Y is wrong (i.e., Z > P/2
in the (mod P) case, or the high-order non-zero coefficient of Z > in the (mod P) case, or the high-order non-zero coefficient of Z >
P/2 in the GF[P^D] case, or Z sharing a high bit with W(C) in the P/2 in the GF[P^D] case, or Z sharing a high bit with W(C) in the
GF[2^N] case), then X must be replaced with Q-X. This will GF[2^N] case), then X must be replaced with Q-X. This will
correspond to the correct Z-coordinate. correspond to the correct Z-coordinate.
5. Performance Considerations 5. Elliptic Curve SIG Resource Records
Elliptic curve signatures use smaller moduli or field sizes than RSA The signature portion of an RR RDATA area when using the EC
and DSA. Creation of a curve is slow, but not done very often. Key algorithm, for example in the RRSIG and SIG [RFC records] RRs is
generation is faster than RSA or DSA. shown below.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R, (length determined from LQ) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| S, (length determined from LQ) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R and S are integers (mod Q). Their length is specified by the LQ
field of the corresponding KEY RR and can also be calculated from the
SIG RR's RDLENGTH. They are right justified, high-order-octet first.
The same conditional formula for calculating the length from LQ is
used as for all the other length fields above.
The data signed is determined as specified in [RFC 2535]. Then the
following steps are taken where Q, P, G, and Y are as specified in
the public key [Schneier]:
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Generate random [RFC 1750] K such that 0 < K < Q. (Never sign two
different messages with the same K. K should be chosen from a
very large space: If an opponent learns a K value for a single
signature, the user's signing key is compromised, and a forger
can sign arbitrary messages. There is no harm in signing the
same message multiple times with the same key or different
keys.)
R = (the W-coordinate of ( K*G on the elliptic curve )) interpreted
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
as an integer, and reduced (mod Q). (R must not be 0. In
this astronomically unlikely event, generate a new random K
and recalculate R.)
S = ( K^(-1) * (hash + X*R) ) mod Q.
S must not be 0. In this astronomically unlikely event, generate a
new random K and recalculate R and S.
If S > Q/2, set S = Q - S.
The pair (R,S) is the signature.
Another party verifies the signature as follows:
Check that 0 < R < Q and 0 < S < Q/2. If not, it can not be a
valid EC sigature.
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Sinv = S^(-1) mod Q.
U1 = (hash * Sinv) mod Q.
U2 = (R * Sinv) mod Q.
(U1 * G + U2 * Y) is computed on the elliptic curve.
V = (the W-coordinate of this point) interpreted as an integer
and reduced (mod Q).
The signature is valid if V = R.
The reason for requiring S < Q/2 is that, otherwise, both (R,S) and
(R,Q-S) would be valid signatures for the same data. Note that a
signature that is valid for hash(data) is also valid for
hash(data)+Q or hash(data)-Q, if these happen to fall in the range
[0,2^160-1]. It's believed to be computationally infeasible to
find data that hashes to an assigned value, so this is only a
cosmetic blemish. The blemish can be eliminated by using Q >
2^160, at the cost of having slightly longer signatures, 42 octets
instead of 40.
We must specify how a field-element E ("the W-coordinate") is to be
interpreted as an integer. The field-element E is regarded as a
radix-P integer, with the digits being the coefficients in the
polynomial basis representation of E. The digits are in the ragne
[0,P-1]. In the two most common cases, this reduces to "the
obvious thing". In the (mod P) case, E is simply a residue mod P,
and is taken as an integer in the range [0,P-1]. In the GF[2^D]
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
case, E is in the D-bit polynomial basis representation, and is
simply taken as an integer in the range [0,(2^D)-1]. For other
fields GF[P^D], it's necessary to do some radix conversion
arithmetic.
6. Performance Considerations
Elliptic curve signatures use smaller moduli or field sizes than
RSA and DSA. Creation of a curve is slow, but not done very often.
Key generation is faster than RSA or DSA.
DNS implementations have been optimized for small transfers, DNS implementations have been optimized for small transfers,
typically less than 512 octets including DNS overhead. Larger typically less than 512 octets including DNS overhead. Larger
transfers will perform correctly and and extensions have been transfers will perform correctly and and extensions have been
standardized to make larger transfers more efficient [RFC 2671]. standardized to make larger transfers more efficient [RFC 2671].
However, it is still advisable at this time to make reasonable However, it is still advisable at this time to make reasonable
efforts to minimize the size of RR sets stored within the DNS efforts to minimize the size of RR sets stored within the DNS
consistent with adequate security. consistent with adequate security.
6. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
Keys retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they Keys retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they
have been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently have been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently
verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure
obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies
acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms, acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms,
evaluating the necessary strength of the key is essential and evaluating the necessary strength of the key is essential and
dependent on local policy. dependent on local policy.
Some specific key generation considerations are given in the body of Some specific key generation considerations are given in the body
this document. of this document.
7. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
The key and signature data structures defined herein correspond to
the value 4 in the Algorithm number field of the IANA registry
Assignment of meaning to the remaining ECC data flag bits or to Assignment of meaning to the remaining ECC data flag bits or to
values of ECC fields outside the ranges for which meaning in defined values of ECC fields outside the ranges for which meaning in
defined in this document requires an IETF consensus as defined in
[RFC 2434].
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
in this document requires an IETF consensus as defined in [RFC 2434].
Copyright and Disclaimer Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2004. This document is subject to Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2004. This document is subject
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and except to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Informational References Informational References
[RFC 1034] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and [RFC 1034] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", 11/01/1987. facilities", 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1035] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - implementation and [RFC 1035] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - implementation and
specification", 11/01/1987. specification", 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1750] - D. Eastlake, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness [RFC 1750] - D. Eastlake, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", 12/29/1994. Recommendations for Security", 12/29/1994.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R. [RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in progress, Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt. progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security [RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt. work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[RFC 2671] - P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", August [RFC 2671] - P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
1999. August 1999.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, [Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons
[Menezes] - Alfred Menezes, "Elliptic Curve Public Key [Menezes] - Alfred Menezes, "Elliptic Curve Public Key
Cryptosystems", 1993 Kluwer. Cryptosystems", 1993 Kluwer.
[Silverman] - Joseph Silverman, "The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves", [Silverman] - Joseph Silverman, "The Arithmetic of Elliptic
1986, Springer Graduate Texts in mathematics #106. Curves", 1986, Springer Graduate Texts in mathematics #106.
Normative Refrences Normative Refrences
[RFC 2119] - S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC 2119] - S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997. Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC 2434] - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC 2434] - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", October 1998. IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", October 1998.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", [RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt. progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Authors Addresses Author's Addresses
Rich Schroeppel Rich Schroeppel
500 S. Maple Drive 500 S. Maple Drive
Woodland Hills, UT 84653 USA Woodland Hills, UT 84653 USA
Telephone: 1-801-423-7998(h) Telephone: +1-505-844-9079(w)
1-505-844-9079(w) +1-801-423-7998(h)
Email: rschroe@sandia.gov Email: rschroe@sandia.gov
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories Motorola Laboratories
155 Beaver Street 155 Beaver Street
Milford, MA 01757 USA Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1 508-634-2066 (h) Telephone: +1 508-786-7554 (w)
+1 508-786-7554 (w) +1 508-634-2066 (h)
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in February 2004. This draft expires in June 2004.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-05.txt. Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt.
 End of changes. 

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