draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-01.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-02.txt 
D. Massey D. Massey
USC/ISI USC/ISI
S. Rose S. Rose
NIST NIST
Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record
draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-01.txt draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-02.txt
Status of this Document Status of this Document
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Distribution of this document all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Distribution of this document
is unlimited. Comments regarding this document should be sent to is unlimited. Comments regarding this document should be sent to
the author. the author.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
skipping to change at line 33 skipping to change at line 33
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract Abstract
This document limits the KEY resource record to only DNSSEC This document limits the Domain Name System KEY resource
keys. The original KEY resource record used sub-typing record to only keys used by the Domain Name System Security
to store both DNSSEC keys and arbitrary application keys. Extensions (DNSSEC). The original KEY resource record used
Storing both DNSSEC and application keys in one record was sub-typing to store both DNSSEC keys and arbitrary application
a mistake. This document removes application keys from keys. Storing both DNSSEC and application keys in one record
was a mistake. This document removes application keys from
the KEY record by redefining the Protocol Octet field in the KEY record by redefining the Protocol Octet field in
the KEY RDATA. As a result of removing application keys, the KEY Resource Record Data. As a result of removing application
all but one of the flags in the KEY record become unnecessary keys, all but one of the flags in the KEY record become
and are removed. Three existing application key sub-types unnecessary and are removed. Three existing application
are changed to historic, but the format of the KEY record key sub-types are changed to reserved, but the format of
is not changed. This document updates RFC 2535. the KEY record is not changed. This document updates RFC
2535.
1 Introduction 1 Introduction
This document limits the scope the KEY resource record. The KEY This document limits the scope the KEY resource record. The KEY
resource record was defined in [DNSSEC] and used resource record resource record was defined in [1] and used resource record sub-typing
sub-typing to hold arbitrary public keys such as Email, IPSEC, DNSSEC, to hold arbitrary public keys such as Email, IPSEC, DNSSEC, and TLS
and TLS keys. This document eliminates the existing Email, IPSEC, keys. This document eliminates the existing Email, IPSEC, and TLS
and TLS sub-types and prohibits the introduction of new sub-types. sub-types and prohibits the introduction of new sub-types. DNSSEC
DNSSEC will be the only allowable sub-type for the KEY record (hence will be the only allowable sub-type for the KEY record (hence sub-typing
sub-typing is essentially eliminated) and all but one of the KEY is essentially eliminated) and all but one of the KEY record flags
record flags are also eliminated. are also eliminated.
Section 2 presents the motivation for restricting the KEY record Section 2 presents the motivation for restricting the KEY record
and Section ?? defines the revised KEY record. Section 4 and 5 summarize and Section 3 defines the revised KEY record. Section 4 and 5 summarize
the changes from RFC 2535 and discuss backwards compatibility. It the changes from RFC 2535 and discuss backwards compatibility. It
is important to note that this document restricts the use of the is important to note that this document restricts the use of the
KEY record and simplifies the flabs, does not change DNSSEC keys. KEY record and simplifies the flags, but does not change the definition
or use of DNSSEC keys.
2 Motivation for Restricting the KEY Record 2 Motivation for Restricting the KEY Record
The KEY record RDATA [DNSSEC] consists of flags, a Protocol Octet, The KEY record RDATA [1] consists of Flags, a Protocol Octet, an
an Algorithm type, and a public key. The Protocol Octet identifies Algorithm type, and a Public Key. The Protocol Octet identifies
the KEY record sub-type. DNSSEC public keys are stored in the KEY the KEY record sub-type. DNSSEC public keys are stored in the KEY
using a Protocol Octet value of 3. Email, IPSEC, and TLS keys are record using a Protocol Octet value of 3. Email, IPSEC, and TLS
also stored in the KEY resource record and using Protocol Octet values keys were also stored in the KEY record and used Protocol Octet values
of 1,2, and 4 (respectively). Protocol Octet values 5-254 are available of 1,2, and 4 (respectively). Protocol Octet values 5-254 were available
for assignment by IANA and values have been requested (but not assigned) for assignment by IANA and values were requested (but not assigned)
for applications such as SSH. for applications such as SSH.
Any use of sub-typing has inherent limitations. A resolver can not Any use of sub-typing has inherent limitations. A resolver can not
specify the desired sub-type in a DNS query and most DNS operations specify the desired sub-type in a DNS query and most DNS operations
apply only to resource records sets. For a example, a resolver can apply only to resource records sets. For a example, a resolver can
not directly request KEY records with a particular sub-type. Instead, not directly request KEY records with a particular sub-type. Instead,
the resolver must request all KEY records associated with a DNS name the resolver has to request all KEY records associated with a DNS
and then search the set for the desired sub-type. DNSSEC signatures name and then search the set for the desired sub-type. DNSSEC signatures
also apply to the set of all KEY resource records associated with also apply to the set of all KEY resource records associated with
the DNS name, regardless of sub-type. the DNS name, regardless of sub-type.
In the case of the KEY record, the inherent sub-type limitations In the case of the KEY record, the inherent sub-type limitations
are exacerbated since the sub-type is used to distinguish between are exacerbated since the sub-type is used to distinguish between
DNSSEC keys and application keys. DNSSEC keys and application keys DNSSEC keys and application keys. DNSSEC keys and application keys
differ in virtually every respect and Section 2.1 discusses these differ in virtually every respect and Section 2.1 discusses these
differences in more detail. Combining these very different types differences in more detail. Combining these very different types
of keys into a single sub-typed resource record adds unnecessary of keys into a single sub-typed resource record adds unnecessary
complexity and increases the potential for implementation and deployment complexity and increases the potential for implementation and deployment
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This document addresses these issues by removing all application keys This document addresses these issues by removing all application keys
from the KEY resource record. Note that the scope of this document from the KEY resource record. Note that the scope of this document
is strictly limited to the KEY record and this document does not is strictly limited to the KEY record and this document does not
endorse or restrict the storage of application keys in other resource endorse or restrict the storage of application keys in other resource
records. records.
2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys 2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys
DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNSSEC protocol and are DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNSSEC protocol and are
used by both name servers and resolvers in order to perform DNS tasks. used by both name servers and resolvers in order to perform DNS tasks.
A DNS zone, used to sign and authenticate RR sets, is most common A DNS zone key, used to sign and authenticate RR sets, is the most
example of a DNSSEC key. SIG(0) and TKEY also use DNSSEC keys. common example of a DNSSEC key. SIG(0) [3] and TKEY [2] also use
DNSSEC keys.
Application keys such as Email keys, IPSEC keys, and TLS keys and Application keys such as Email keys, IPSEC keys, and TLS keys are
are simply another type data. These keys have no special meaning simply another type data. These keys have no special meaning to
to a name server or resolver. a name server or resolver.
o They serve different purposes. The following table summarizes some of the differences between DNSSEC
keys and Application keys:
o They are managed by different administrators. 1. They serve different purposes.
o They are authenticated according to different rules. 2. They are managed by different administrators.
o Nameservers use different rules when including them in responses. 3. They are authenticated according to different rules.
o Resolvers process them in different ways. 4. Nameservers use different rules when including them in responses.
o Faults/key compromises have different consequences. 5. Resolvers process them in different ways.
The purpose of a DNSSEC key is to sign resource records associated 6. Faults/key compromises have different consequences.
1. The purpose of a DNSSEC key is to sign resource records associated
with a DNS zone (or generate DNS transaction signatures in the case with a DNS zone (or generate DNS transaction signatures in the case
of SIG(0)/TKEY). But the purpose of an application key is specific of SIG(0)/TKEY). But the purpose of an application key is specific
to the application. Application keys, such as PGP/email, IPSEC, TLS, to the application. Application keys, such as PGP/email, IPSEC, TLS,
and SSH keys, are not a mandatory part of any zone and the purpose and SSH keys, are not a mandatory part of any zone and the purpose
and proper use of application keys is outside the scope of DNS. and proper use of application keys is outside the scope of DNS.
DNSSEC keys are managed by DNS administrators, but application keys 2. DNSSEC keys are managed by DNS administrators, but application
are managed by application administrators. The DNS zone administrator keys are managed by application administrators. The DNS zone administrator
determines the key lifetime, handles any suspected key compromises, determines the key lifetime, handles any suspected key compromises,
and manages any DNSSEC key changes. Likewise, the application administrator and manages any DNSSEC key changes. Likewise, the application administrator
is responsible for the same functions for the application keys related is responsible for the same functions for the application keys related
to the application. For example, a user typically manages her own to the application. For example, a user typically manages her own
PGP key and a server manages its own TLS key. Application key management PGP key and a server manages its own TLS key. Application key management
tasks are outside the scope of DNS administration. tasks are outside the scope of DNS administration.
DNSSEC zone keys are used to authenticate application keys, but application 3. DNSSEC zone keys are used to authenticate application keys, but
keys MUST NOT be used to authenticate DNS zone keys. A DNS zone application keys MUST NOT be used to authenticate DNS zone keys.
key is either configured as trusted key or authenticated by constructing A DNS zone key is either configured as trusted key or authenticated
a chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy. To participate in the chain by constructing a chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy. To participate
of trust, a DNS zone must exchange zone key information with its in the chain of trust, a DNS zone needs to exchange zone key information
parent zone [DNSSEC]. Application keys are not configured as trusted with its parent zone [1]. Application keys are not configured as
keys in the DNS and are never part of any DNS chain of trust. Application trusted keys in the DNS and are never part of any DNS chain of trust.
key data should not be exchanged with the parent zone. A resolver Application key data SHOULD not be exchanged with the parent zone.
considers an application key authenticated if it has a valid signature A resolver considers an application key authenticated if it has a
from the local DNS zone keys, but applications may impose additional valid signature from the local DNS zone keys, but applications could
requirements before the application key is accepted as authentic. impose additional requirements before the application key is accepted
as authentic.
It MAY be useful for nameservers to include DNS zone keys in the 4. It MAY be useful for nameservers to include DNS zone keys in
additional section of a response, but application keys are typically the additional section of a response, but application keys are typically
not useful unless they have been specifically requested. For example, not useful unless they have been specifically requested. For example,
it may be useful to include the isi.edu zone key along with a response it could be useful to include the isi.edu zone key along with a response
that contain the www.isi.edu A record and SIG record. A secure resolver that contain the www.isi.edu A record and SIG record. A secure resolver
will need the isi.edu zone key in order to check the SIG and authenticate will need the isi.edu zone key in order to check the SIG and authenticate
the www.isi.edu A record. It is typical not useful to include the the www.isi.edu A record. It is typical not useful to include the
IPSEC, email, and TLS keys along with the A record. Note that by IPSEC, email, and TLS keys along with the A record. Note that by
placing application keys in the KEY record, a resolver will need placing application keys in the KEY record, a resolver will need
the IPSEC, email, TLS, and other key associated with isi.edu if the the IPSEC, email, TLS, and other key associated with isi.edu if the
resolver intends to authenticate the isi.edu zone key (since signatures resolver intends to authenticate the isi.edu zone key (since signatures
only apply to the entire KEY set). only apply to the entire KEY set).
DNS zone keys require special handling by resolvers, but application 5. DNS zone keys require special handling by resolvers, but application
keys should be treated the same as any other type of DNS data. The keys are treated the same as any other type of DNS data. The DNSSEC
DNSSEC keys are of no value to end applications, unless the applications keys are of no value to end applications, unless the applications
plan to do their own DNS authentication. Secure resolvers MUST NOT plan to do their own DNS authentication. Secure resolvers MUST NOT
use application keys as part of the authentication process. Application use application keys as part of the authentication process. Application
keys have no unique value to resolvers and are only useful to the keys have no unique value to resolvers and are only useful to the
application requesting the key. Note that if sub-types are used application requesting the key. Note that if sub-types are used
to identify the application key, then either the interface to the to identify the application key, then either the interface to the
resolver must specify the sub-type or the application must be able resolver needs to specify the sub-type or the application needs to
to accept all KEY records and pick out the desired the sub-type. be able to accept all KEY records and pick out the desired the sub-type.
A fault or compromise of DNS zone key can lead to invalid or forged 6. A fault or compromise of a DNS zone key can lead to invalid
DNS data, but a fault or compromise of an application key should or forged DNS data, but a fault or compromise of an application key
have no impact on other DNS data. Incorrectly adding or changing SHOULD have no impact on other DNS data. Incorrectly adding or changing
a DNS zone key can invalidate all of the DNS data in zone and in a DNS zone key can invalidate all of the DNS data in zone and in
all of its subzones. By using a compromised key, an attacker can all of its subzones. By using a compromised key, an attacker can
forge data from the effected zone and any for any of its sub-zones. forge data from the effected zone and any for any of its sub-zones.
A fault or compromise of an application key has implications for A fault or compromise of an application key has implications for
that application, but it should not have an impact on the DNS. Note that application, but it SHOULD not have an impact on the DNS. Note
that application key faults and key compromises can have an impact that application key faults and key compromises can have an impact
on the entire DNS if the application key and DNS zone keys are both on the entire DNS if the application key and DNS zone keys are both
stored in the KEY record. stored in the KEY record.
In summary, DNSSEC keys and application keys differ in most every In summary, DNSSEC keys and application keys differ in most every
respect. DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNS infrastructure respect. DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNS infrastructure
and require special handling by DNS administrators and DNS resolvers. and require special handling by DNS administrators and DNS resolvers.
Application keys are simply another type of data and have no special Application keys are simply another type of data and have no special
meaning to DNS administrators or resolvers. These two different types meaning to DNS administrators or resolvers. These two different types
of data do not belong in the same resource record. of data do not belong in the same resource record.
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The KEY record uses type 25 and is used as resource record for storing The KEY record uses type 25 and is used as resource record for storing
DNSSEC keys. The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol DNSSEC keys. The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol
octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key itself. The octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key itself. The
format is as follows: format is as follows:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags | protocol | algorithm | | flags | protocol | algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | /
/ public key / / public key /
/ / / /
/ / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
In the flags field, all bits except bit 7 are reserved should be In the flags field, all bits except bit 7 are reserved and SHOULD
zero. If Bit 7 (Zone bit) is set to 1, then the KEY is a DNS Zone be zero. If Bit 7 (Zone bit) is set to 1, then the KEY is a DNS
key. If Bit 7 is set to 0, the KEY is not a zone key. SIG(0)/TKEY Zone key. If Bit 7 is set to 0, the KEY is not a zone key. SIG(0)/TKEY
are examples of DNSSEC keys that are not zone keys. are examples of DNSSEC keys that are not zone keys.
The protocol field must be set to 3. The protocol field MUST be set to 3.
The algorithm and public key fields are not changed. The algorithm and public key fields are not changed.
4 Changes from RFC 2535 KEY Record 4 Changes from RFC 2535 KEY Record
The KEY RDATA format is not changed. The KEY RDATA format is not changed.
All flags except for the zone key flag are eliminated: All flags except for the zone key flag are eliminated:
o The A/C bits (bits 0 and 1) are eliminated and must be 0. o The A/C bits (bits 0 and 1) are eliminated. They SHOULD be
set to 0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
o The extended flags bit (bit 3) is eliminated and must be 0. o The extended flags bit (bit 3) is eliminated. It SHOULD be
set to 0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
o The host/user bit (bit 6) is eliminated and must be 0. o The host/user bit (bit 6) is eliminated. It SHOULD be set to
0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
o The zone bit (bit 7) remains unchanged. o The zone bit (bit 7) remains unchanged.
o The signatory field (bits 12-15) are eliminated by [SDU] and o The signatory field (bits 12-15) are eliminated by [4]. They
must be 0. SHOULD be set to 0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the
receiver.
o Bits 2,4,5,8,9,10,11 remain unchanged. They are reserved and o Bits 2,4,5,8,9,10,11 remain unchanged. They are reserved, SHOULD
must be zero. be set to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Assignment of any future KEY record Flag values requires a standards
action.
All Protocol Octet values except DNSSEC (3) are eliminated: All Protocol Octet values except DNSSEC (3) are eliminated:
o Value 1 (Email) is renamed to reserved. o Value 1 (Email) is renamed to reserved.
o Value 2 (IPSEC) is renamed to reserved. o Value 2 (IPSEC) is renamed to reserved.
o Value 3 (DNSSEC) is unchanged. o Value 3 (DNSSEC) is unchanged.
o Value 4 (TLS) is renamed to reserved. o Value 4 (TLS) is renamed to reserved.
o Value 5-254 remains unchanged (reserved). o Value 5-254 remains unchanged (reserved).
o Value 255 (ANY) is renamed to reserved. o Value 255 (ANY) is renamed to reserved.
Name servers and resolvers SHOULD reject any KEY with a Protocol Name servers and resolvers SHOULD reject any KEY with a Protocol
other than 3. other than 3. Assignment of any future KEY record Protocol Octet
values requires a standards action.
The algorithm and public key fields are not changed. The algorithm and public key fields are not changed.
5 Backward Compatibility 5 Backward Compatibility
No backwards compatibility is provided for application keys. Any DNSSEC zone key records are not change and remain backwards compatible.
Email, IPSEC, or TLS keys are now deprecated and SHOULD be rejected
by name servers and resolvers. However, problems with applications
keys (such as keys at the apex and large RR sets) and have already
been identified some change in the definition and/or usage of the
KEY record would be required even if the approach described here
were not required.
DNSSEC zone KEY records are not change and remain backwards compatible.
A properly formatted RFC 2535 zone KEY would have all flag bits, A properly formatted RFC 2535 zone KEY would have all flag bits,
other than the Zone Bit (Bit 7), set to 0 and would have the Protocol other than the Zone Bit (Bit 7), set to 0 and would have the Protocol
Octet set to 3. This remains true under the restricted KEY. Octet set to 3. This remains true under the restricted KEY.
DNSSEC non-zone KEY records (SIG(0)/TKEY keys) are backwards compatible, DNSSEC non-zone key records (SIG(0)/TKEY keys) are backwards compatible,
but the distinction between host and user keys (flag bit 6) is lost. but the distinction between host and user keys (flag bit 6) is lost.
No backwards compatibility is provided for application keys. Any
Email, IPSEC, or TLS keys are now deprecated and SHOULD be rejected
by name servers and resolvers. Storing application keys in the KEY
record created problems such as keys at the apex and large RR sets
and some change in the definition and/or usage of the KEY record
would have been required even if the approach described here were
not adopted.
Overall, existing nameservers and resolvers will continue to correctly Overall, existing nameservers and resolvers will continue to correctly
process KEY records with a sub-type of DNSSEC keys. process KEY records with a sub-type of DNSSEC keys.
6 Storing Application Keys in the DNS 6 Storing Application Keys in the DNS
The scope of this document is strictly limited to the KEY record. The scope of this document is strictly limited to the KEY record.
This document prohibits storing application keys in the KEY record, This document prohibits storing application keys in the KEY record,
but it does not endorse or restrict the storing application keys but it does not endorse or restrict the storing application keys
in other record types. Other documents should describe how DNS handles in other record types. Other documents can describe how DNS handles
application keys. application keys.
7 IANA Consideration 7 IANA Consideration
KEY record Protocol Octet values 1,2,4, and 255 should be changed RFC 2535 created an IANA registry for DNS KEY Resource Record Protocol
to reserved. Octet values. Values to 1,2,3, 4, and 255 were assigned by RFC 2535
and values 5-254 were made available for assignment by IANA. This
document makes two sets of changes to this registry.
Assignment of any future KEY record Protocol Octet values requires First, this document re-assigns DNS KEY Resource Record Protocol Octet
a standards action. values 1, 2, 4, and 255 to ``reserved''. DNS Key Resource Record
Protocol Octet Value 3 remains unchanged as ``DNSSEC''.
Second, new values are no longer available for assignment by IANA
and this document closes the IANA registry for DNS KEY Resource Record
Protocol Octet Values. Assignment of any future KEY Resource Record
Protocol Octet values requires a standards action.
8 Security Consideration 8 Security Consideration
This document eliminates potential security problems that could arise This document eliminates potential security problems that could arise
due to the coupling of DNS zone keys and application keys. Prior due to the coupling of DNS zone keys and application keys. Prior
to the change described in the document, a correctly authenticated to the change described in this document, a correctly authenticated
KEY set could include both application keys and DNSSEC keys. If KEY set could include both application keys and DNSSEC keys. If
one of the application keys is compromised, it could be used as a one of the application keys is compromised, it could be used as a
false zone key to create phony DNS signatures (SIG records). Resolvers false zone key to create false DNS signatures (SIG records). Resolvers
that do not carefully check the KEY sub-type may believe these false that do not carefully check the KEY sub-type could believe these
signatures and incorrectly authenticate DNS data. With this change, false signatures and incorrectly authenticate DNS data. With this
application keys cannot appear in an authenticated KEY set and this change, application keys cannot appear in an authenticated KEY set
vulnerability is eliminated. and this vulnerability is eliminated.
The format and correct usage of DNSSEC keys is not changed by this The format and correct usage of DNSSEC keys is not changed by this
document and no new security considerations are introduced. document and no new security considerations are introduced.
9 Intellectual Property 9 Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain
to the implementation or use of the technology described in this to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might document or the extent to which any license under such rights might
skipping to change at line 334 skipping to change at line 359
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification
can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights
which may cover technology that may be required to practice this which may cover technology that may be required to practice this
standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director.
10 References 10 References (Normative)
[DNSSEC] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC [1] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 2535,
2535, March 1999. March 1999.
[SDU] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update", [2] Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)", RFC
2930, September 2000.
[3] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s)",
RFC 2931, September 2000.
[4] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update",
RFC 3007, November 2000. RFC 3007, November 2000.
11 Author Information 11 Author Information
Daniel Massey <masseyd@isi.edu> Daniel Massey <masseyd@isi.edu>
USC Information Sciences Institute USC Information Sciences Institute
3811 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 200 3811 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22203 Arlington, VA 22203
Scott Rose <scott.rose@nist.gov> Scott Rose <scott.rose@nist.gov>
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